What next? The Growing Imbalance between Parliament and the Executive: End of Session Report 2021–22 Contents

Part 1: Key themes and concerns during session 2021–22

Restricting parliamentary scrutiny

7.During the pandemic, pre-emptive and immediate action was often necessary to deal with developments at speed. It was, therefore, understandable that emergency legislative procedures had to be used. However, as the need to take emergency action receded, we continued to see legislative practices that, in our view, restricted the ability of Parliament to scrutinise secondary legislation effectively. These included:

Instruments being brought into effect immediately or almost immediately without due cause

8.A significant proportion of pandemic-related instruments continued to be brought into immediate effect during session 2021–22 even though most pandemic restrictions had been lifted. Of 86 instruments with “coronavirus” in their title:

9.Convention requires departments to allow at least 21 days between a negative instrument being laid before Parliament and its coming into force. The purpose of this “21-day rule” is not only to allow time for parliamentary scrutiny before an instrument comes into effect but also to enable operational staff and the public to react to and prepare for changes in the law.5 The 21-day rule should be set aside only for compelling reasons.6 However, in this session, several instruments were brought into effect immediately without a satisfactory explanation of why this was necessary.

10.In March 2022, for example, we held an oral evidence session with Baroness Stedman-Scott, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), about a set of regulations which reduced the period during which claimants were permitted to limit their job search to the same occupation and level of remuneration as their previous role.7 The regulations, the Universal Credit and Jobseekers’ Allowance (Work Search and Work Availability Requirements–limitations) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/108), were laid on 7 February 2022 and came into force the next day. The Minister was unable to explain what adverse effect would have occurred if the regulations had been brought into effect in accordance with the 21-day rule. We concluded that the claimed “urgency” was self-imposed and that there had been no compelling reason for curtailing parliamentary scrutiny.

11.We also criticised the Ministry of Justice for laying a set of regulations, the Coronavirus Act 2020 (Delay in Expiry: Inquests, Courts and Tribunals, and Statutory Sick Pay) (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/362), on 23 March 2022 and bringing them into force the next day which extended by six months certain temporary provisions in the Coronavirus Act 2020. It was not clear to us why the regulations were brought into force overnight when the date on which the Coronavirus Act 2020 would expire had been known well in advance.8

12.Bringing legislation into effect with such urgency should only happen in circumstances where it is justified on the ground of an emergency—such as the prevention of the spread of infection or imposing sanctions. Reasons of political expediency or to remedy poor planning are not good enough. We therefore expect that, now that the pandemic restrictions have been lifted, departments will only breach the 21-day rule in the most exceptional of circumstances and, on each occasion, will offer a clear explanation of, and justification for, their action.

Making permanent certain changes, without adequate explanation, which were introduced on a temporary basis under the pretext of an emergency

13.While measures taken in response to the pandemic may well have been justifiable in the short-term and on the ground of an emergency, we expressed criticism when certain temporary measures were subsequently made permanent simply by further order. Our concern was that this would allow significant changes to the law to be made without the robust parliamentary scrutiny afforded by primary legislation. Sometimes these changes sought to make newly-realised benefits permanent: the draft Competition Appeal Tribunal (Recording and Broadcasting) Order 2022, for example, made permanent the disapplication of statutory prohibitions on recording and broadcasting court proceedings, after the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) had found that the temporary disapplication had proved effective during the pandemic, particularly for the management of large hearings, and had attracted large numbers of observers for some cases.9 Similarly, the MoJ laid the Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/ 295) to make permanent temporary provisions which had allowed civil wedding and civil partnership ceremonies to take place outdoors during the pandemic, in response to popular support for outdoor ceremonies.10

14.In other cases, however, we raised concerns about such an approach. For example, the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development etc.) (England) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2021 (SI 2021/1464)11 made permanent several time-limited permitted development rights that had been introduced to support cafes, pubs and other businesses during the pandemic. We considered that this meant that local residents who may have concerns about a development, such as a marquee providing additional space in a pub garden, would no longer be able to raise their concerns through the local planning process. We took the view that permanent and potentially impactful changes were being made to local planning law under the pretext of the pandemic under circumstances which could hardly have been anticipated when the original primary planning legislation was passed. This is an ongoing concern which we first raised in session 2019–21.12

15.We regret that once again the Government used secondary legislation to make permanent certain changes under the pretext of the emergency of the pandemic. Where such changes have a potentially significant impact on businesses or members of the general public, it would be more appropriate to achieve permanency by way of primary legislation, thereby providing the opportunity for robust parliamentary scrutiny.

Failing to take into account concerns raised by the House

16.The draft Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) (Amendment) (No. 5) Regulations 2021 (“the No. 5 Regulations”) removed the obligation for car and van drivers towing a trailer to take an additional test. They replaced an earlier set of regulations (“the No. 2 Regulations”) which had to be re-laid due to a procedural error. In our report on the No. 5 Regulations,13 we expressed disappointment that the safety concerns about a potential increase in towing accidents which we had raised in our report on the No. 2 Regulations and which the House had followed up in debate,14 were not addressed in the Explanatory Memorandum (EM) accompanying the No. 5 Regulations. We wrote to the Minister, Baroness Vere of Norbiton, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department for Transport (DfT), to ask about the reason for this omission. The Minister’s response neither reduced our concerns about these safety issues nor reassured us that the Department had understood the critical importance of evidence-based policy or the respect that should be accorded to Parliament. (We later held an oral evidence session with the Minister (see paragraph 28 below)). The Minister wrote to us again in April 2022 to inform is that an IA had been published for these Regulations, nearly four months after they had taken effect.15

17.When preparing an EM, departments should ensure that, where appropriate, it includes an explanation of how concerns that may have been previously raised in Parliament about a policy have been addressed or taken into account.

Failure to send instruments to the SLSC for scrutiny

18.On several occasions in this session, departments failed to send instruments to the Committee for scrutiny. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), for example, twice failed to send us Codes of Practice on data sharing. Although not statutory instruments, they were instruments subject to a form of negative procedure, and therefore within our remit. This was a significant oversight.

19.Similarly, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) failed to send to us a Private Parking Code of Practice in February 2022, and DfT only realised in April 2022, more than a year later, that it had failed to lay an instrument before Parliament which had come into force in February 2021.16

20.We have reminded departments that our remit includes all instruments subject to a parliamentary procedure, not just statutory instruments. We expect departmental Senior Responsible Owners of secondary legislation to ensure that we receive all instruments subject to parliamentary procedure.

Legislative backlog at the Department for Transport

21.A continuing issue that has been a feature of session 2021–22 has been the legislative backlog at DfT. During the session, we drew attention to delays, sometimes of decades, in implementing a backlog of international maritime legislation which DfT had instead been addressing through guidance and Marine Shipping Notices rather than legislation. When we also came across an air safety measure which addressed the recommendations of the Air Accident Investigation Board’s investigation into the Vauxhall helicopter crash17 some seven years after the event, we asked the Minister, Robert Courts MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Aviation, Maritime, Security and Civil Contingencies, to give oral evidence in October 2021. We welcomed the candid admission of the Minister that DfT, particularly in the maritime sector, had got it wrong, in some cases failing to transpose international legislation more than 20 years old. Following a full audit of outstanding legislation, there is now a clear plan for remedying the deficiencies by 2023.18 Mr Courts recently wrote to the Committee to confirm that by April 2022, DfT had implemented six of the 29 delayed instruments and several more were at the point of laying. We welcome DfT’s actions to rectify the situation. We invite the Government to tell us whether other departments have similar backlogs.

Loss of parliamentary oversight

22.During session 2021–22, we raised concerns about a loss of parliamentary oversight in the case of the draft Organics (Equivalence and Control Bodies Listing) (Amendment) Regulations 2021. These regulations replaced a legislative mechanism, which required a statutory instrument to update lists of recognised third countries and bodies, with an administrative mechanism, which allows the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) to update the lists without any parliamentary oversight.19 Defra argued that changes to these lists were “uncontroversial administrative changes” which did not require significant parliamentary scrutiny. We took the view, however, that amendment by statutory instrument was an appropriate and frequently used vehicle for minor changes, such as updates to lists of recognised countries or bodies, and that parliamentary scrutiny of such changes was desirable. We also disagreed with Defra’s view that the Secretary of State’s general accountability to Parliament and the publication of any changes to the lists were a suitable replacement for direct parliamentary scrutiny.

23.In contrast, we found that the replacement of a legislative process with an administrative one to be more appropriate in the case of the draft Import of Animals and Animal Products and Approved Countries (Amendment) Regulations 202220 which empowered the Government to change certain conditions for the import of animals and animal products from non-EU countries without parliamentary oversight. The new administrative process will be similar to that applied by the European Commission and also mirrors the process that already exists in Great Britain for imports from the EU.

24.Departments should consider very carefully whether to propose replacing legislative processes with administrative ones. Parliament may well wish to have oversight of changes even though they may be thought by departments to be minor or technical.

Failing to provide information on impact

25.In this session, a number of significant instruments were laid which were not only without an Impact Assessment (IA) but where it was evident that the policy had been formulated without adequate analysis of the potential impact. In July 2021, for example, we took evidence from the Rt Hon. Nadhim Zahawi MP, then Minister for COVID Vaccine Deployment at the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), on the draft Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (Coronavirus) Regulations 2021, which made it mandatory for anyone working in a care home to be fully vaccinated against coronavirus.21 Submissions we received from care providers made it clear that there was deep concern in the sector about the potential side effects of the regulations on staffing. Without an IA, we were unclear about the justification for some of the policy choices underlying the Regulations, including the basis on which DHSC had struck a balance between public health benefits, other care issues, the wider costs to society and the impact on the rights of individuals. The final version of the IA was not published until November 2021.

26.We were particularly disappointed that, a few months later, when DHSC extended the requirement for mandatory COVID-19 vaccination to anyone working in the NHS who would have direct contact with a service user, the legislation once again lacked an IA22 (albeit, on this occasion, we were aware that an IA had been submitted for independent validation to the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC)). The RPC rated several sections of the IA as unfit for purpose, including the section dealing with wider consequences. We also found the EM to be inadequate because, although it repeatedly asserted that there was a strong case for making vaccination mandatory, DHSC had failed to provide an evidence-based argument and any coherent statement to explain and justify its intended policy.

27.A proper IA follows a standardised methodology and is externally validated by the RPC so that the accuracy and comprehensiveness is assured. In relation to vaccinations for care home staff, DHSC did provide—but only the day before the instrument was debated in the House of Lords—an Impact Statement, a document of the Department’s own devising, with some rudimentary information. Also, in November 2021, in relation to vaccinations for all NHS staff, the Secretary of State, the Rt Hon. Sajid Javid MP, offered, in the absence of an IA, to give oral evidence to the Committee on DHSC’s approach, which we did not take up. In our view, clear and comprehensive explanatory material including accurate information on the costs and benefits of the change, should be laid at the same time as the instrument, so that it is available to all interested parties both inside and outside Parliament.

28.In January 2022, we took evidence from Baroness Vere of Norbiton and questioned her about the lack of an IA for the No. 5 Regulations (see paragraph 16 above) concerning the removal of the obligation for car and van drivers towing a trailer to take an additional test.23 We had been told, when the No. 2 Regulations were laid, that the risk assessment on the safety of the change would be included in an IA. Ten weeks after the evidence session and six months after the No. 2 Regulations were laid, Baroness Vere wrote to the Committee to apologise that the IA had still not been published. We finally received a letter from the Minister in April 2022 informing us that the IA had now been published, nearly four months after the Regulations had taken effect.24

29.We also criticised DLUHC for failing to complete an IA for the draft Private Parking Code of Practice25 by the time the draft Code was laid, and similarly expressed concerns that Defra had not laid an IA for the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (Variation of Schedule 9) (England) (No. 2) Order 2021 (SI 2021/548),26 because at that time the RPC had not yet validated the IA. We took the view that this was an internal planning matter for the Department and not an acceptable excuse for failing to present all the necessary documentation to Parliament in time for it to inform the scrutiny process.

30.In contrast, although prior to validation by the RPC, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) published a well-developed draft IA alongside regulations which imposed sanctions on Russian financial instruments from 1 March 2022. Although this was emergency legislation which was brought into immediate effect, the draft IA provided helpful information to Parliament about the limited impact of the sanctions on UK businesses.27

31.We reiterated our expectations regarding IAs in our report Government by Diktat—namely, where a formal IA is required, it should be laid at the same time as the instrument—in part to demonstrate that the policy was evidence-based; and where the impact of the legislation is likely to fall below the £5 million threshold or only affect the public sector (and so does not require an IA), some basic information about the financial impact and other consequences should be included in the EM.

32.The need for this was illustrated by our report on the Education (Student Loans) (Repayment) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/301) which maintained current repayment thresholds for student loans.28 While the Department for Education said that this would result in savings of £3.7 billion for the Government, it failed to explain that these savings would be funded by increased payments of up to £9.45 per month or £113.40 per year for up to one million borrowers of student loans.

33.We are concerned that a failure to provide IAs when they were required was a frequent occurrence and affected several departments during the session: each instance undermined the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the legislation effectively and also had the potential to cast doubt over the robustness of the policy development process. We call on the Government to ensure that the timely production of IAs is made a priority and part of the oversight exercised by departmental Senior Responsible Owners and Lead Ministers for secondary legislation.

34.Given the importance of meaningful impact information for parliamentary scrutiny, we are taking evidence on the availability and quality of impact information.29 We are particularly interested in how this may be affected by policy decisions following the Government’s review of the Better Regulation Framework.30 We will report our findings and conclusions in the forthcoming session.

Inadequate consultation

35.Meaningful consultation is a key element of transparent and effective policy design. While we commend that for certain pandemic-related regulations departments sought the views of at least a sample of affected groups despite curtailed deadlines,31 at times departments were less compliant with the spirit of the consultation principles.32

36.We saw legislation being taken forward where local consultation had been carried out, but it was unclear whether the feedback received was then used to inform the final policy decision. For example, we noted that while DLUHC said that unitarisation should always be “locally led” and “command a good deal of local support”, the EM to the regulations introducing unitarisation in Cumbria, the draft Cumbria (Structural Changes) Order 2022, however, made it clear that the only proposal to have received support from a majority of local respondents during consultation was not implemented. DLUHC explained that more than one proposal for unitarisation had enjoyed a degree of local support and that there were a number of criteria that had to be met. We were not clear, however, on what basis the chosen option for unitarisation was permitted to go ahead when the feedback received suggested that the chosen option did not enjoy widespread support from local residents.33 Concerns about the consultation and geographic choice were highlighted in the debate in the House of Lords about the regulations.34

37.Departments need to ensure that the EM accompanying an instrument sets out clearly how feedback received during consultation has been taken into account and, in particular, how possible objections or concerns have been addressed.

Poor quality explanation

38.We continued to see examples of poorly drafted EMs throughout the session. We drew ten SIs to the attention of the House on the ground that the explanatory material laid in support provided insufficient information to gain a clear understanding about the instruments’ policy objective and intended implementation. We also asked for a number of EMs to be revised to include additional information for the benefit of all readers.

39.In two of our reports, we complained that information about relevant court cases had not been included in the EM. For example, the SI allowing the continued use of Napier Barracks in Kent for asylum applicants,35 neglected to mention that a recent High Court judgement against the Home Office had found that the standards and operational systems at Napier Barracks had been unlawful. Similarly, our report on the SI regulating the release of gamebirds into protected areas36 commented that, while the EM had referred to judicial review proceedings, it had not provided any detail of how the instrument addressed the issues raised.

40.Where secondary legislation is intended to address issues arising from a court judgment, this should be explained in the EM.

41.During session 2021–22, we also criticised a number of EMs for requiring the reader to refer to other documents to understand the policy change and its implications. For example, to gain an understanding of the issues involved in the mandatory vaccination of NHS staff,37 we had to consult a range of other documents, including an Impact Statement, the Government’s consultation document and their response, the Equality Impact Assessment and several guidance documents. Similarly, we found that, while the EM accompanying the Building Regulations etc. (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2021 (SI 2021/1391)38 set out briefly how the instrument fitted into the staged improvement of building standards and provided links to further material, it assumed an extensive understanding of the policy area, requiring us to obtain substantial additional information from DLUHC to understand the changes.

42.We also asked for the EMs of several instruments to be replaced because they did not provide sufficient information for those less familiar with the policy area to understand the changes being made. For example, we asked for the EMs to two sets of regulations on fisheries, the Sea Fisheries (Amendment etc.) Regulations 2021 (SI 2021/698) and the Sea Fisheries (Amendment etc.) (No. 2) Regulations 2021(SI 2021/1429), to be replaced,39 because Defra had failed to explain the technical terms used or to provide sufficient context in the EMs. Similarly, we asked BEIS to revise the EM to the draft Contracts for Difference (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2022. We found that the EM used technical jargon and failed to explain some of the key concepts or technologies underpinning the instrument, so that it was difficult to understand for a lay reader what the proposed changes would mean in practice.40

43.An EM should set out the case for an instrument’s underlying policy and describe its intended effect in a way that can be understood by a lay reader. It should provide Parliament, those affected by changes in the law and the wider public with a clear and accessible, stand-alone, comprehensive explanation, and it should not be necessary for the reader to conduct extensive research or consult a range of other documents in order to achieve an understanding of what an instrument does. This is particularly important where a policy area is complex and technical.

The availability and appropriate use of guidance

44.In our Government by Diktat report, we highlighted the issue about the blurring between guidance and legislation, and how the guidance or legislation would be enforced. Session 2021–22 provided several examples where we raised concerns about guidance. In our report on the draft Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2022, which removed a regulatory burden for research and development trials involving certain genetically modified plants,41 we noted that the guidance, which is intended to clarify what type of plants will qualify for the lighter regulatory approach, had not yet been published. We found Defra at fault because numerous concerns had been raised during consultation about the lack of clarity.

45.We similarly noted that the draft Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (Coronavirus) Regulations 2021, which made it mandatory for anyone working in a care home to be fully vaccinated against coronavirus,42 lacked key definitions. They were not set out in the instrument or even outlined in the EM. In oral evidence to the Committee, the Minister, the Rt Hon. Mr Zahawi MP. told that us that this information would be set out in forthcoming operational guidance. We concluded, however, that this information was crucial to the understanding of how the policy underlying the regulations would work, and that, without it, effective parliamentary scrutiny was impossible.

46.Our report on an order relating to the release of gamebirds, the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (Variation of Schedule 9) (England) (No. 2) Order 2021 (SI 2021/548), highlighted an apparent inconsistency between the provisions in the SI which made it an offence to allow certain gamebirds to escape into protected areas in England, and the statutory guidance which stated that any activity “must not encourage the released birds to inhabit or occupy” an adjacent protected area.43 We concluded that the statutory guidance appeared to offer a more realistic approach to the challenges of trying to prevent the movement of gamebirds in the wild, but that the mismatch and lack of clarity could create problems for both the enforcement authorities and those releasing the gamebirds.

47.Where guidance is important to understanding how an instrument will operate in practice, it should be published when the instrument is laid before Parliament. And it should, of course, align fully with the legislation it supports. Key definitions or criteria that will be used in making decisions on how the legislation will operate in practice should be in the legislation itself. These matters are fundamental to effective parliamentary scrutiny, and we expect, therefore, that departmental Senior Responsible Owners will take responsibility for ensuring they are dealt with appropriately.

4 Made affirmatives are SIs that are made into law (signed by the minister) before Parliament has considered them, but that cannot remain law unless they are approved by Parliament within a certain time period (usually 28 or 40 sitting days). Made affirmatives are typically used when the Government require an urgent change to the law.

5 According to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (JSCI), the 21-day rule “is designed to protect those affected by changes in the law made by subordinate legislation from being subject to the effect of the changes before they have had a reasonable opportunity to understand the effects and what they must do to satisfy any requirements”. See JCSI, Transparency and Accountability in Subordinate Legislation, para 2.18 (First Report, Session 2017–19, HC Paper 1158, HL Paper 151).

6 Ibid. See para 2.20, where the JCSI sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples which would not generally be regarded as justification for breach of the 21-day rule.

7 SLSC, 33rd Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 176).

8 SLSC, 36th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 193).

9 SLSC, 25th Report (Session 2019–21, HL Paper 137).

10 SLSC, 35th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 187).

11 SLSC, 26th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 146).

12 See, for example; SLSC, 52nd Report (Session 2019–21, HL 268) and SLSC, 25th Report (Session 2019–21, HL Paper 123).

13 SLSC, 23rd Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 123).

14 HL Debs, 9 November 2021, cols 484-496 [Lords Chamber Grand Committee].

15 SLSC, 37th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 197).

16 High Speed Rail (West Midlands – Crewe) (Qualifying Authorities) Regulations 2021 (SI 2021/151). See SLSC, 37th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 197).

17 Air Navigation (Amendment) Order 2021 (SI 2021/879). See: SLSC, 12th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 63).

18 SLSC, 17th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 88).

19 SLSC, 11th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 52).

20 SLSC, 37th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 197).

24 SLSC, 37th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 197).

25 SLSC, 32nd Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 171).

26 SLSC, 2nd Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 7).

27 Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/194). See SLSC, 31st Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 165).

28 SLSC, 36th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 193).

29 See Corrected oral evidence: Quality of impact assessments, 5 April 2022 and 22 March 2022.

30 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Reforming the framework for better regulation’: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reforming-the-framework-for-better-regulation [accessed 26 April 2022].

31 See, for example, the draft Airports Slot Allocation (Alleviation of Usage Requirements) (No. 2) Regulations 2021, the Private Storage Aid for Pigmeat (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/21) and the Protection of Animals at the Time of Killing (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/33).

32 These principles include that consultations are only part of a process of engagement and should last for a proportionate amount of time; be targeted; take account of the groups being consulted; and facilitate scrutiny. See: Cabinet Office, ‘Consultation principles: guidance’: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consultation-principles-guidance[accessed 27 April 2022].

33 SLSC, 9th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 156).

34 HL Deb, 9 March 2022, cols 497GC-513GC (Lord Chamber).

35 Town and Country Planning (Napier Barracks) Special Development Order 2021 (SI 2021/962). See: SLSC, 13th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 70).

36 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (Variation of Schedule 9, Part 1) (England) Order 2021 (SI 2021/236). See: SLSC, 2nd Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 7).

38 SLSC, 26th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 146).

39 SLSC, Sixth Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 28), and 25th Report (Session 2019–21, HL Paper 137).

40 SLSC, 37th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 197).

41 SLSC, 29th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 156).

42 Draft Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (Coronavirus) Regulations 2021. See SLSC, 8th Report (Session 2019–21, HL Paper 40) and SLSC, 10th Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 50).

43 SLSC, 2nd Report (Session 2021–22, HL Paper 7).

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