Permanent secretaries: their appointment and removal Contents

Chapter 3: Departures

94.This inquiry was prompted by a series of high-profile permanent secretary departures, often characterised as “sackings” or “dismissals”. As the inquiry progressed we came to appreciate the range of circumstances under which an individual might leave a post, where it was not always straightforward to describe the situation as a “dismissal”. This chapter considers the circumstances under which permanent secretaries depart their posts, reserving the term “dismissal” for those in which an individual is removed from post having been subject to disciplinary action. This would usually occur only following misconduct or incompetence.

95.“Departure” covers a range of scenarios in which a senior civil servant vacates their post, not necessarily following formal disciplinary action. This could occur because a permanent secretary’s five-year fixed tenure comes to an end, as a result of an actual or perceived inability on the part of the secretary of state or Prime Minister to work effectively with an individual,146 or, it has been suggested, on political or ideological grounds.

96.Simon Case told us that permanent secretaries were appointed as members of the senior civil service of their department but were ultimately employed by the Crown. In cases of departure, individuals could rely on their employment rights and on appointment received an employment contract setting out principal terms and conditions, including the particulars required by the Employment Rights Act 1996. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister has authority to appoint or dismiss civil servants through section 3 of CRAG.147

97.Other than the Prime Minister, ministers do not have the authority to dismiss civil servants, including permanent secretaries.148 The Civil Service Commission does not have a role in departures. Its statutory role is “in relation to selections for appointments to the civil service”149 and the Commission’s Recruitment Principles are silent on departure.150 However, similar bodies in Australia and New Zealand, albeit in different political and organisational contexts, do have a role in departures.151 We examined the reasons for departures of senior civil servants and whether there was scope for greater regularisation of the process.

Dismissal on performance or misconduct grounds

98.Baroness Prashar and Lord Macpherson considered it essential that due process was followed for dismissals on performance or misconduct grounds.152 Baroness Prashar said steps had to be taken in any good organisation—including performance management, appraisals and warnings—before dismissal could take place. She thought the Government should be no different, particularly as irregular dismissals could give rise to questions about civil service impartiality.153

99.Simon Case assured us that formal processes were in place for matters of performance, misconduct and discipline.154 The Cabinet Office explained the process of performance and misconduct management for permanent secretaries:

“Secretaries of state are consulted about the performance of their permanent secretaries at regular points: formal performance appraisal processes and tenure renewal negotiations. They may also raise any performance concerns directly with the Cabinet Secretary at any point … feedback on permanent secretaries’ delivery of ministerial priorities and departmental leadership is reviewed at regular delivery stocktake discussions, which are chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and attended by the organisation’s lead non-Executive Director (NED). The outputs from these discussions inform the performance appraisal process.”155

100.If issues of permanent secretary underperformance or misconduct arise, concerns—including any concerns the secretary of state has—can be raised through regular “stocktake” discussions with the individual’s line manager.156 The Cabinet Office stated: “permanent secretaries are subject to the same HR policies and processes to which other employees are subject”. However, the permanent secretary’s role as head of the organisation meant “(reasonable) amendments to the departmental processes may need to be made in order to achieve a swift resolution—particularly where ministers have concerns and it is necessary to re-establish the important relationship of trust and confidence between them.”157 This sentiment was somewhat echoed by Lord Sedwill, who said it was right that if someone was “not up to the job” they were removed from post.158

101.Some witnesses supported the Civil Service Commission providing a “guardianship” role over the dismissal process, particularly in increasing transparency.159 Alex Thomas thought this could include becoming involved in the performance management of permanent secretaries, but was opposed to making it “impossible or too hard” to remove a permanent secretary who was not performing.160

102.In the rare circumstances in which a permanent secretary must be dismissed on performance or misconduct grounds this should be treated wholly as a human resources matter, following due process. We welcome the current process of performance and misconduct management for permanent secretaries as outlined by the Cabinet Office.

103.There is scope for the Civil Service Commission to play a role in the dismissal of senior civil servants on performance or conduct grounds, by ensuring due process is followed.

Departures on other grounds

Fixed five-year tenure

104.Fixed five-year tenure was introduced for standard permanent secretary contracts in 2014. The tenure applies to the role rather than the individual—in the words of the Cabinet Office: “an individual’s contractual rights and underlying permanent employment status are unaffected by their tenure period in a particular role at this level.”161 While there is no automatic presumption in favour of renewal, renewals may be granted at the discretion of the Prime Minister where a permanent secretary’s performance is strong.162

105.Lord Sedwill explained the process as follows: as the five-year point approached the Head of the Civil Service would talk to the permanent secretary during their annual appraisal to ascertain whether they intended to apply for an extension. The Head of the Civil Service would then consult the secretary of state and the Prime Minister before making any formal recommendation.163 The Cabinet Office explained that, if an appointment was not renewed, the permanent secretary was expected to depart their post when the tenure period ended.164 If an appropriate alternative post could not be identified compensation might be offered.165

106.Lord Sedwill viewed the five-year tenure as a means of preventing “too much churn short of the five-year point”, while also providing an important opportunity to assess the value of a permanent secretary’s continuation in post beyond five years.166 Lord Maude saw the benefit in having the option not to reappoint a permanent secretary after five years, which did not exist prior to the introduction of five-year tenure.167 While Baroness Prashar did not disagree with this point of view, she cautioned that the five-year tenure system—which often coincided with elections—could be misused to “bring politicisation through the back door”.168

107.The risks involved in senior civil servant terms coinciding with political cycles was raised in a report by the Irish Government in June 2023:

“International research suggests that the use of limited term appointments for senior level Public Service appointments is relatively common across OECD countries. These countries use limited-term appointments for such senior positions in order to promote a focus on performance, avoid complacency, generate renewal at the top level and ensure opportunities for talent to progress. Most OECD countries have term limits for Senior Civil Service positions which do not correspond with political cycles, which ensures stability of leadership and can also act to protect independence of the civil service.”169

108.We considered whether the introduction of the five-year tenure had affected the manner and timing of permanent secretary departures. The Institute for Government provided figures on the average tenure of permanent secretaries since 2010:

Table 1: Figures on the average tenure of permanent secretaries since 2010

Period

Average tenure

2010–13

3 years, 9.5 months

2014–present

3 years, 10.5 months

2010–18

4 years

2019–2023

3.5 years

Source: Written evidence from Alex Thomas, Programme Director, Institute for Government (SCS0005)

109.Simon Case provided a slightly different set of figures:

Table 2: Average years in role for permanent secretaries since June 2019

Data point

All permanent secretaries

Heads of Department only

Years in current role (avg.)

Years as a permanent secretary (avg.)

Number of permanent secretaries

Years in current role (avg.)

Years as a permanent secretary (avg.)

Number

June 2019

6.8

8.0

40

6.7

8.5

21

June 2020

5.3

6.3

40

5.6

7.0

18

June 2021

4.0

4.8

43

4.3

5.6

18

June 2022

3.4

4.1

47

3.6

4.9

19

June 2023

2.4

3.2

45

2.7

4.2

19

Average

4.4

5.3

43

4.6

6.0

19

Source: Letter from Simon Case, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, to Baroness Drake, Chair of the Constitution Committee, following up on the Committee evidence session with the Paymaster General and Cabinet Secretary on 18 July 2023 (30 August 2023), Annex B, para 7b: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41154/documents/202176/default/

110.The two sets of figures use different methodologies, one measuring completed tenure and the other recording time in post at a particular time. There appears to be insufficient evidence of a significant long-term reduction in tenure. Nonetheless, Alex Thomas described a “notable dip” between 2019 and 2023, largely coinciding with the Boris Johnson premiership and the first five-year tenures starting to conclude.170 We have previously noted that 12 individuals of permanent secretary rank departed the civil service in 2020, significantly above the average number.171 The figures from Simon Case also show a reduction in time in post between 2019 and 2023, possibly reflecting the events of 2020.

111.There is insufficient evidence that fixed five-year tenure has had any general impact on churn at permanent secretary level, notwithstanding the notable dip between 2019 and 2023. Nonetheless, it serves as a valuable check on a permanent secretary’s continuation in post, allowing the Head of the Civil Service, the secretary of state and the Prime Minister to consider various factors before deciding whether renewal is appropriate.

112.We acknowledge the risk that where the completion of a permanent secretary’s five-year tenure coincides with a change of Government, it could be used as an opportunity to appoint a permanent secretary more politically aligned to the incoming Government. However, there is insufficient evidence to suggest this has happened to date.

Poor relationship between a permanent secretary and secretary of state

113.The importance of a positive working relationship between a secretary of state and a permanent secretary was captured in written evidence by the Cabinet Office:

“The permanent secretary is the head of their organisation and an important part of their role is to secure the absolute confidence of their Secretary of State. The success of that relationship is critical to their effectiveness in the role.”172

114.An irrecoverable relationship breakdown was described by Rt Hon Jeremy Quin MP, Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet Office, as “very rare” and Lord Maude said it “should not be frequent”.173 During an event at the Institute for Government former Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service Lord O’Donnell recalled ministers telling him they could not work with a particular official, sometimes very shortly after taking office, which he considered “ridiculous”. But if the relationship continued to be difficult, he accepted that sometimes personalities did not work well together and would seek to find a solution. He thought that, ultimately, if the Prime Minister lost confidence in a permanent secretary they would need to be moved, but it was better to avoid reaching that point.174

115.There was a clear sense among witnesses that in these circumstances the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service175 should have “sufficient personal authority and gravitas to be able to interrogate reasons for [removal]” and to advise against it where he or she considers it unwise.176 Simon Case told us he would expect to be “intimately involved” in managing a poor relationship between a permanent secretary and a secretary of state and he would expect this to “play out over weeks, if not months.”177 He said:

“When there are issues around performance, you would expect to be consulted early to try to help bring the parties back together, to identify the particular issues, and to put together improvement plans, whether formally or informally, to try to make that work. If, in the end, you cannot make the relationship work to both parties’ satisfaction, you begin the discussion about either redeployment or what we call voluntary exit, which is a conversation that I would be involved with, as would the Prime Minister.”178

116.This was in line with evidence from Lord Maude, who thought a period of reflection should take place to discover whether there is any possibility of resolving the situation.179

117.However, given the importance of this relationship, and its inevitable impact on a permanent secretary’s overall performance, witnesses were clear that secretaries of state and permanent secretaries with incompatible working relationships should not be forced to continue to work together.180 In such circumstances the Prime Minister, as Minister for the Civil Service, could remove the permanent secretary from post.181

118.Witnesses agreed that in such circumstances there was a limit to what the Cabinet Secretary could do to resist the decision.182 Simon Case said that where a “mutually agreed breakdown in relationships” occurred, there was a need to act quickly and no process should “get in the way of doing what all parties think is the sensible and right thing to do.” However, he thought that ensuring a “proper process” was followed, albeit at times rapidly, would help maintain the integrity and impartiality of the civil service.183

119.Baroness Prashar said that, if the removal of a permanent secretary became unavoidable, it should be done with “courtesy, compassion and understanding”.184 Many witnesses thought every effort should be made to identify another suitable job in the civil service for the official.185 Though, Alex Thomas suggested that in recent times it was more difficult for permanent secretaries to find another post to which to transfer if they had lost the confidence of the secretary of state.186 Lord Sedwill thought a transfer at permanent secretary level would be challenging, given that there were a limited number of equivalent roles.187 In the correct circumstances, retirement could be offered instead.188 This would allow the individual to “depart with dignity” and pursue other career opportunities.189

120.We considered whether, and to what extent, further processes should be put in place to regularise the departure of permanent secretaries when their relationship with the secretary of state was not viable. Simon Case said there was an argument that the civil service should not be managing this alone for fear of “marking [its] own homework”. He thought “it would benefit everybody to have absolute transparency around … departure” and saw a potential role for the Civil Service Commission given its existing role in protecting and preserving the impartiality of the civil service and the notion of appointment “on merit”.190 He noted, however, that there was “a limit on what you can put into the public domain” about individual departures.191

121.Lord Sedwill was not convinced it would be possible to introduce “structured due process” where a secretary of state or Prime Minister felt unable to work with a particular permanent secretary. He thought prohibiting the departure of a permanent secretary until a particular procedure had been followed would result in permanent secretaries who were “completely disempowered and unable to fulfil their duties.”192

122.We recognise that for a permanent secretary fostering a positive relationship with the secretary of state is, in itself, a matter of performance. The Recruitment Principles require panels to assess a candidate’s ability to work with the minister as part of the permanent secretary appointment process and it is rare that a breakdown in relationship occurs. However, forming a positive relationship is a two-way process. Incoming ministers must allow permanent secretaries time to establish a productive relationship before seeking their removal. It is vital that ministers prize expertise and good advice over pre-conceived notions about their ability to work with a particular permanent secretary. Removal on the grounds of a poor working relationship must not become cover for arbitrary removal of permanent secretaries on political or ideological grounds.

123.The Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service has a vital role in ensuring that individuals are not removed from their posts by a Prime Minister without due process. If the working relationship between a secretary of state and a permanent secretary is irrecoverable the Head of the Civil Service must be given the opportunity to manage the individual’s transfer to another role or, where appropriate, their retirement. There is a case for formalising the departure process in situations where there is no issue of performance or misconduct (see paragraph 131).

Political or ideological grounds

124.It has been widely speculated that recent senior civil servant departures may have taken place on political or ideological grounds:

125.The critical point about both Sir Tom Scholar and Sir Stephen Lovegrove’s departures was the short time frame in which the decisions were made, which would not have allowed for any meaningful process to be followed. Lord Sedwill emphasised that these individuals would not have had the opportunity “to demonstrate to the new administration that they would serve them with the same loyalty and capability they had served previous administrations.”200 Lord Macpherson thought a “pre-emptive” move of this nature might be justified if there had been serious underperformance in a department but in the circumstances it appeared to be based on the perceived views of the individuals in question.201

126.That due process was not followed gave rise to questions about impartiality and may, in Lord Sedwill’s view, have been a “deliberate signal to Whitehall that political alignment with the new Government’s views was the key criterion and that capability, loyalty and performance were not.”202 This was concerning, not least because perception of a civil servant’s views could be incorrect.203 Baroness Prashar was concerned Tom Scholar’s removal sent a message to ministers that it was within ministerial power to dismiss permanent secretaries, and that this could become a trend.204

127.Simon Case noted widespread feeling that Tom Scholar’s removal was “an unusual and potentially unwise act”.205 Alex Thomas thought there was an argument that the existing system for the departure of senior civil servants had “failed the stress test” when it came to these individuals. He thought there should be a “higher bar” for removing permanent secretaries: the Government should “justify much more rigorously and, over a reasonable but not indefinite period of time” why the permanent secretary should be removed.206

128.Simon Case acknowledged that permanent secretaries looked to the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service to protect them from removal on political or ideological grounds. He considered this part of his role. He cautioned, however, that there was a limit to what he could do publicly given the private nature of civil servant advice to ministers.207

129.Baroness Stuart was hesitant to involve the Civil Service Commission in dismissal or departures, which she thought risked straying into human resources functions.208 However, while noting Baroness Stuart’s reservations, Simon Case thought there was scope for the Commission to play a greater role in protecting civil servants from politically or ideologically motivated dismissals. He noted that formal processes existed for performance management and discipline issues but not for the sort of departure caused, for example, by a breakdown of relationship between a permanent secretary and a minister. While acknowledging that it was sometimes necessary, for instance where there had been a machinery of government change, to move quickly, and that “in politics there are questions about personal fit” he thought it “advisable to make sure that those are dealt with in an open, transparent and proper way”. Such a process would need to be fair to the individual while protecting their rights and should capture “what the evidence is for a breakdown in relationship”.209 Mr Case thought information about such departures could be shared, privately as necessary, with a scrutiny body such as the Civil Service Commission.210

130.While removal of senior civil servants on political or ideological grounds may be rare, we are concerned that recent examples may be an indication that there are insufficient safeguards around the departure of senior civil servants.

131.Formal departure processes should be set out in writing, requiring ministers and the Prime Minister to explain to the Civil Service Commission—in private if necessary—their decision to remove and replace a senior civil servant . A written record of the decision and the reasons for it should be kept. These processes should be sufficiently flexible to allow a minister to replace at short notice a senior civil servant with whom a working relationship has broken down. However, it is desirable that senior civil servants are given sufficient opportunity to build a positive working relationship with the minister and demonstrate that they can deliver the Government’s priorities. Under no circumstances should civil servants be dismissed on purely political or ideological grounds.


146 Q 50 (Dr Conor Casey) and Q 87 (Lord Sedwill)

147 Q 130 (Simon Case), Letter from Simon Case, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, to Baroness Drake, Chair of the Constitution Committee, following up on the Committee evidence session with the Paymaster General and Cabinet Secretary on 18 July 2023 (30 August 2023): https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41154/documents/202176/default/

148 QQ 66 and 75 (Baroness Prashar). Ministers are able to contribute to the performance management of those who work directly with them and wield informal influence over the composition of their teams. See, for instance, Constitution Committee, The accountability of civil servants (6th Report, Session 2012–13, HL Paper 61), paras 36–39.

149 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, section 2 (3)

150 Civil Service Commission, Recruitment Principles and written evidence from Cabinet Office (SCS0003), para 2

151 The Australian Prime Minister may recommend in writing that the Governor-General terminates the appointment of a department secretary but before doing so must have received a report about the proposed termination from the Public Service Commissioner. Public Service Act 1999 (Australia), section 59(1) and (2). In New Zealand, the Public Service Commission may investigate the chief executive if a minister or the Prime Minister believes there is a problem with their performance or conduct, and remove them from office for just cause or excuse with the agreement of the Governor-General in Council. Public Service Act 2020 (New Zealand), Schedule 7, section 8(1).

152 Q 75 (Baroness Prashar, Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court)

153 Q 75 (Baroness Prashar)

154 Q 127 (Simon Case)

155 Written evidence from the Cabinet Office (SCS0003), para 10

156 Ibid., para 16

157 Ibid., para 15

158 Q 66 (Lord Sedwill)

159 Q 6 (Alex Thomas) and Q 95 (Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston)

160 Q 6 (Alex Thomas)

161 Written evidence from Cabinet Office (SCS0003), para 13

162 Ibid., para 13 and Q 87 (Lord Sedwill)

163 Q 87 (Lord Sedwill) and written evidence from Cabinet Office (SCS0003), para 10

164 Written evidence from Cabinet Office (SCS0003), paras 13–14

165 Ibid., para 14. The Cabinet Office said compensation should be “in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Service Compensation Scheme and as set out in their contract of employment”.

166 Q 87 (Lord Sedwill)

167 Q 115 (Lord Maude of Horsham)

168 Q 87 (Baroness Prashar)

169 Government of Ireland’s Department of Public Expenditure, NDP Delivery and Reform, Review of Senior Public Service Recruitment and Pay Determination Processes (27 June 2023), p 71: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/ddd08-review-of-senior-public-service-recruitment-and-pay-determination-processes/ [accessed 29 August 2023]

170 Written evidence from Alex Thomas, Programme Director, Institute for Government (SCS0005)

171 The average number of departures per year for 2019–2022 was 7, slightly above the 2013–2022 average of 5.7.

172 Written evidence from the Cabinet Office (SCS0003), para 11

173 Q 115 (Lord Maude of Horsham), Q 127 (Jeremy Quin MP)

174 Institute for Government, ‘Has civil service impartiality had its day?’ (23 May 2023): https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/event/civil-service-impartiality [accessed 31 July 2023]

175 The role of Cabinet Secretary is combined with the role of Head of the Civil Service and has been since 2014 (the two roles were also combined prior to 2012). As Head of the Civil Service, the office holder manages senior civil servants, including by setting objectives, delivering feedback, and rewarding good performance. Institute for Government, ‘Cabinet secretary’ (26 June 2020): https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/cabinet-secretary. [accessed 29 August 2023]

176 Q 66 (Baroness Prashar), QQ 67, 69 (Lord Sedwill) and Q 121 (Lord Maude of Horsham)

177 QQ 129 and 130 (Simon Case)

178 Q 129 (Simon Case)

179 Q 121 (Lord Maude of Horsham)

180 Q 75 (Lord Sedwill) and Q 120 (Lord Maude of Horsham)

181 Q 131 (Simon Case)

182 Q 4 (Alex Thomas), Q 67 (Lord Sedwill), QQ 129 and 130 (Simon Case)

183 Q 131 (Simon Case)

184 Q 66 (Baroness Prashar)

185 QQ 69 and 87 (Lord Sedwill), QQ 42 and 53 (Dr Conor Casey), QQ 115, 120 and 121 (Lord Maude of Horsham) and Q 57 (Yuan Yi Zhu)

186 Q 3 (Alex Thomas)

187 Q 75 (Lord Sedwill)

188 Q 87 (Lord Sedwill)

189 Q 50 (Dr Conor Casey, Yuan Yi Zhu) and 75 (Lord Sedwill)

190 QQ 129 and 130 (Simon Case)

191 QQ 127 and 129 (Simon Case)

192 QQ 69 and 75 (Lord Sedwill)

193 Q 24 (Prof Dennis Grube)

194 BBC News, ‘Sir Mark Sedwill: UK’s top civil servant steps down’ (28 June 2020): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53210773 [accessed 29 August 2023]

195 Q 66 (Lord Sedwill)

196 Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, and Elizabeth Truss MP, ‘Sir Tim Barrow appointed as National Security Adviser’ (7 September 2022): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sir-tim-barrow-appointed-as-national-security-adviser [accessed 29 August 2023]

197 Q 3 (Jill Rutter), Q 22 (Prof Dennis Grube) and Q 66 (Baroness Prashar and Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court)

198 Q 66 (Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court)

199 Q 129 (Simon Case)

200 Q 67 (Lord Sedwill)

201 Q 68 (Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court)

202 67 (Lord Sedwill) and Q 66 (Baroness Prashar)

203 Q 71 (Lord Sedwill)

204 Q 66 (Baroness Prashar)

205 Q 129 (Simon Case)

206 Q 9 (Alex Thomas)

207 Q 132 (Simon Case)

208 Q 101 (Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston)

209 Q 127 (Simon Case)

210 Q 129 (Simon Case)




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