Summary of conclusions and recommendations
Defining a science and technology strategy
1.We welcome the indication that the Government is thinking more strategically about UK science and technology and recognises that the UK cannot be “world-beating” at everything. But the ambition to become a science and technology superpower by 2030 risks not being realised, as there are few details about how this will be defined or delivered. (Paragraph 17)
2.The priority areas of science and technology that the Government has outlined are very broad and it is unclear whether these areas will be narrowed down. A strategy needs specific, measurable outcomes and a delivery plan. (Paragraph 18)
3.The Government should set out specifically what it wants to achieve in each of the broad areas of science and technology that it has identified. There should be a clear implementation plan including measurable targets and key outcomes in priority areas, and an explanation of how they will be delivered. (Paragraph 18)
4.We welcome the Office for Science and Technology Strategy’s commitment to establish and to publish metrics, by the end of 2022, to define the “science and tech superpower” ambition. This is necessary if “science and tech superpower” is to become more than slogan. (Paragraph 20)
5.The Government should update Parliament on its progress on developing metrics by the end of 2022. Once metrics are available, an independent body should be empowered to monitor progress towards the Government’s science and technology targets and to report annually to Parliament and government. (Paragraph 20)
6.The proliferation of disparate strategies is confusing and it raises concerns about a lack of coherence and delivery. (Paragraph 23)
7.In defining an overarching implementation plan, the Government should consolidate existing sector-specific strategies that are working well and monitor progress against them to ensure that they provide a clear and consistent message. (Paragraph 23)
8.Research and development is a long-term endeavour. It has been undermined by frequent policy changes especially when strategies that are supposed to be long-term are abandoned after a few years. (Paragraph 27)
9.The Government should make every effort to establish science and technology policy for the long term, building on existing policies and with clear, cross-party support. (Paragraph 27)
10.The own–collaborate–access framework is a useful starting point for approaching international science and technology policy. But it is insufficiently understood and poorly applied. It is not clear whether decisions have been taken on how the framework will apply to specific technologies. (Paragraph 34)
11.The Government must clarify the own–collaborate–access framework by publishing the areas of technology where it will be applied, and by explaining how it intends to balance owning, collaborating or accessing in these areas. (Paragraph 34)
12.The Government’s inconsistent approach to international scientific collaboration has severely undermined the aspiration to be a “science and tech superpower.” The UK’s reputation and scientific capability have been damaged by the cuts to Official Development Assistance and the ongoing lack of association with Horizon Europe. The UK must be seen as a reliable partner, and the Government must recognise that it cannot reproduce the benefits of international collaborations domestically. (Paragraph 42)
13.A cross-Government science strategy must recognise the importance of international collaborations and steps must be taken to rebuild the UK’s reputation as a partner. (Paragraph 42)
14.We are concerned that the National Science and Technology Council has met only three times in the first year since it was established in July 2021. (Paragraph 47)
15.The National Science and Technology Council should meet regularly and frequently. Given the importance of science and technology to the UK, ten to twelve times per year seems more appropriate than three or four. (Paragraph 47)
16.We are also surprised that no substantive documents have been produced by the Office for Science and Technology Strategy. (Paragraph 48)
17.The Office for Science and Technology Strategy should publish the outcomes of the Council’s decisions, and its substantive plans for the specific areas of cross-government working that it has identified. It is critical that this strategy is communicated widely. (Paragraph 48)
18.The right people and the right science and technology skills will be crucial to becoming a “science and tech superpower.” (Paragraph 50)
19.The Office for Science and Technology Strategy should include “people and skills” as a core strand in its work to coordinate a science and technology strategy across Government. (Paragraph 50)
20.Given the centrality of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Department for Education to science and technology, there is a compelling case that they should be present at every meeting of the National Science and Technology Council. (Paragraph 51)
21.The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Department for Education should have representatives as full members of the National Science and Technology Council. (Paragraph 51)
22.We welcome the establishment of a cabinet level committee for discussing and directing matters of science and technology in the form of the National Science and Technology Council and its supporting body the Office for Science and Technology Strategy. But, a year after their establishment, the remits of these bodies remain unclear. We do not know how they will interact with existing bodies, such as UK Research and Innovation. Without clarification we cannot be confident that they will add any value to an already complex landscape. (Paragraph 57)
23.We urge the Government to clarify the remits of the National Science and Technology Council and the Office for Science and Technology Strategy. It should set out how they interact with existing Government bodies, especially UK Research and Innovation. These organisations should simplify and organise the science and technology landscape, not complicate it further. (Paragraph 57)
24.There need to be clear lines of accountability for policies that cut across departments. It should be clear which individual is accountable. (Paragraph 58)
25.The National Science and Technology Council and Office for Science and Technology Strategy must identify the areas of cross-departmental work they will coordinate. They should identify individuals to be accountable for specific elements of the strategy, and ensure they have appropriate levers to do so. (Paragraph 58)
26.We are concerned that the position of Minister for Science, Research, and Innovation was vacant at the time of writing. (Paragraph 59)
27.Accountability for the delivery of the Government’s overall science and technology strategy should sit with the minister responsible for science and technology, which should be a cabinet-level position. (Paragraph 59)
28.UK Research and Innovation is expected to deliver on a range of Government priorities as well as its core function of funding excellent research. It has to respond to priorities from multiple bodies, including the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, its research councils, and now potentially the National Science and Technology Council and Office for Science and Technology Strategy. (Paragraph 67)
29.The role and accountabilities of UK Research and Innovation and its board, particularly as they apply to wider Government policies, must be clarified. It is critical that the organisation is sufficiently and flexibly resourced, and well-connected across government. It should not lose focus on funding blue-skies research. (Paragraph 67)
30.UK Research and Innovation is affected by numerous reviews despite only being established in 2018. It is not realistic to expect it to function as well as it could in such a context. (Paragraph 68)
31.Once the reviews are finished, UK Research and Innovation should be allowed to operate in a more certain policy environment. (Paragraph 68)
32.We welcome the increase in research and development funding for Government departments. But we are concerned that this could result in duplication of work being done by UK Research and Innovation. Some departments have published areas of research interest, but some have not, and many have not updated them for some time. (Paragraph 74)
33.Departments should co-ordinate with UK Research and Innovation on research activities to address their areas of research interest, and on managing grants, to avoid duplication. Departmental areas of research interest should be updated annually and specific research questions identified. (Paragraph 74)
34.The Chief Scientific Adviser network is effective and well-coordinated. It presents an important opportunity to align scientific objectives across Government and to support the role of the National Science and Technology Council. (Paragraph 80)
35.The Government science capability review recommendations on Chief Scientific Advisers should be implemented. Every department should have an independent, external expert as Chief Scientific Adviser, and departments should be able to hire additional science advisers if expertise is required on a topic. Part of the role of a Chief Scientific Adviser should be in approving departmental research and development spending. (Paragraph 80)
36.The civil service needs more science capability, not just in specialist roles and not only by direct employment. It needs effective processes for drawing on outside expertise. The Government acknowledges the need for more scientists in the civil service and the ambition that we heard from Sir Patrick Vallance to approach 50 per cent of science and engineering graduates for recruitment to the civil service generalist fast stream is welcome. This target needs regular monitoring and reporting. (Paragraph 85)
37.The Office for Science and Technology Strategy should monitor progress towards the target to increase the number of science and engineering graduates on the fast stream. The Government should record the number of scientists and engineers in departments and their specialisms. (Paragraph 86)
The 2.4% target
38.We welcome the substantial planned uplift in Government spending on research and development towards the 2.4% of GDP target. It has the potential to be transformational for UK science and technology, even though it would still leave the UK behind other OECD countries. But increasing research intensity to such an extent is highly ambitious and previous attempts have failed. It will not be achievable with business as usual policies. (Paragraph 94)
39.We are concerned that the economic context may threaten the Government’s commitment to research and development. (Paragraph 95)
40.A boom-and-bust cycle in research and development funding must be avoided. The Government should go beyond an abstract percentage of GDP target and explain what benefits it wants to achieve with the additional funding. (Paragraph 95)
41.The Government wants to become a “regulatory superpower”. Regulations can make countries more attractive to investors, but companies operating in international markets are concerned about regulatory divergence. (Paragraph 107)
42.The Government should work with industry and the research base to identify the areas, such as artificial intelligence, in which the UK can take a global lead in regulation. (Paragraph 107)
43.Deregulation for its own sake will not automatically spur innovation, and regulations can incentivise innovators by providing a clear direction of travel. It is not at all clear what role the Government envisages for regulatory reform in a science and technology strategy. (Paragraph 108)
44.Sector-based taskforces should be established, providing a single point of contact with industry, to identify opportunities for regulatory reform, explaining how they will encourage innovation. (Paragraph 108)
45.The Government wants to use public procurement to encourage the development and deployment of new technologies, but has not identified the technologies that will be supported. Value for money rules governing expenditure of public money are vital, but they do not always work for investments in developing companies and technologies: risk is inherent in the process and benefits may accrue only in the long-term. (Paragraph 116)
46.The role that public procurement will play in a science and technology strategy needs to be clarified. The Government should set out which technologies, or areas of technology, it will support through public procurement. A proportion of public procurement spending should be set aside to support defined areas of technological priority, with the value for money rules being interpreted appropriately. The flexible interpretation of value for money rules should apply to future funding decisions, not just the initial procurement decision. (Paragraph 116)
47.The Government has identified risk aversion as a cultural factor that limits investment in research and development in the UK. This may be true, but we have not heard any concrete proposals on how to change it. (Paragraph 117)
48.The Government must explain how it will address any cultural risk aversion in the UK. It needs to set out its own approach to risk when it comes to public money. It should adopt a portfolio approach to risky investments, supported by appropriate expert input, and it must acknowledge that some failed ventures are an inevitable part of the process. (Paragraph 117)
49.The Government has identified potential levers to increase research and development spending, such as tax credits, reforming pension fund rules and public procurement. But many of these areas for reform are perennial suggestions and we heard concerningly few specifics about why this attempt will be different. (Paragraph 118)
50.The Government should work with stakeholders to identify how tax credits, pension fund rules and public procurement will need to change, how these changes would support innovation and how this would lead to different outcomes from past attempts to stimulate business research and development investment. These changes must be communicated clearly to potential investors. (Paragraph 118)
51.Reforms to tax credits, intellectual property regulations and public procurement could be driven by government taskforces in each area, providing a single point of feedback for stakeholders to propose reforms. These should be headed by individuals given accountability for the delivery of each element of reform across government. (Paragraph 119)
52.To increase private sector research and development spending towards the 2.4% target, a step change in the level of engagement with industry is needed. Industry witnesses welcomed the idea of a strategic approach to science and technology, but were often unclear about the Government’s plans and policies. (Paragraph 124)
53.The Office for Science and Technology must engage intensively with industry to define and implement a science and technology strategy in order to meet the 2.4% of GDP target. (Paragraph 124)
54.Outside the life sciences sector, the UK has a limited manufacturing base. A successful science and technology strategy will need to recognise the existing structure of the UK economy and have a plan to grow the UK’s manufacturing base, if that is the intention. (Paragraph 128)
55.The Government should explain what role the services sector will play in increased research and development spending and outline how the 2.4% target fits with the structure of the UK’s economy. (Paragraph 128)
56.The UK supports many start-ups, but companies often leave when they reach a certain size because of the capital or expertise available in countries like the United States. This is a long-standing problem which has proved difficult to address. It is welcome that the Government has identified mechanisms to increase scale-up funding, but specific policy changes in these areas have not been set out. (Paragraph 135)
57.The Government must develop clear incentives to encourage late-stage investors and support companies to scale-up. The recommendations of the Life Sciences Scale-up Taskforce should be published. The Government should explore mechanisms to recoup investments from companies that have received public money if they move abroad. (Paragraph 135)
58.The Government discusses using public funding in a number of ways: to support companies in their early stages; to de-risk investments for the private sector; to provide later-stage capital for a smaller number of focus areas; and to encourage scale-up of industries in the UK. It is not clear how the Government sees its role as a technology investor. (Paragraph 142)
59.The Government should explain what it wants public innovation investment to achieve, which technologies and sectors it wants to support, and which mechanisms it will use to provide funding in each case. (Paragraph 142)