Summary
This inquiry set out to examine the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the unprecedented international response that it prompted, for UK-EU relations. We aimed to look beyond immediate crisis management to the longer-term impact of these developments.
We focused on four core themes: cooperation on sanctions; the UK-EU defence relationship; reconstruction of Ukraine; and long-term implications for the UK-EU foreign and security relationship.
In general terms, we welcome and commend the responses to Russia’s aggression by the Government, the EU, and its Member States. Our policy recommendations are designed to strengthen these responses and make them more effective.
Cooperation on sanctions
The evidence we received showed that arrangements for cooperation between the UK, the EU and other allies on imposition and implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been broadly effective. The coordination between the UK and the EU, much of it within the framework of the G7, should be considered as a model for pragmatic cooperation that could be replicated in other areas of the UK-EU relationships.
Overall, the UK’s post-Brexit independent sanctions regime appears to have stood up well in the face of its first major test. Without the need for unanimity, it has enabled the UK to be nimbler and swifter in imposing sanctions.
The UK, the EU and the US have so far been broadly in alignment on the sanctions that they have introduced. We heard that some of the minor differences that have emerged can be justified. Nevertheless, we received persuasive evidence that sanctions are more effective when imposed and enforced by as broad a coalition of countries as possible. Divergence between sanctions regimes results in gaps and loopholes, weakening their effectiveness; it should be as limited as possible.
We are concerned at the growing evidence that Russia has been able to circumvent sanctions, including through third states and uninsured shadow tanker fleets. This is an issue where decisive action by the UK and its allies is needed.
Sanctioned Russian assets should be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The Government should also work closely with its international partners and allies, including the EU, to explore options to make this happen. The Foreign Secretary suggested to us that a legal route exists to achieve this. We await details of the action the Government is taking to find such a route.
We find it incomprehensible that the promise made by sanctioned Russian businessman Roman Abramovich to use the proceeds from the sale of Chelsea FC to support Ukraine remains unfulfilled, and that the assets remain frozen. This impasse reflects badly on both Mr Abramovich and the Government, which ought to have pushed for a more binding commitment. The funds should be released as soon as possible and should be spent in territories controlled by the Ukrainian Government.
The defence relationship
We welcome the leading role of the United Kingdom as the second largest supplier of military support for Ukraine, amounting to £7.1 billion overall at the time of writing, and the encouragement that the Government has provided to other European countries to provide support.
We are, however, concerned about challenges to sustaining the current levels of support in the medium and longer term. The Government should continue to work with European partners and allies in providing military aid to Ukraine for as long as it takes to reverse Russian aggression. Close UK-EU cooperation to ensure a continued supply of sufficient military support for Ukraine would be of particular importance in the case of a policy change by a future US administration.
The EU has re-evaluated its defence policy and approach to resilience over the past two years. While it is too early to properly assess many of its new initiatives, and some initial outcomes are currently limited, the EU is now in the process of developing its defence industrial ecosystem. We believe that the UK should seek to engage with this ecosystem where this is in the UK’s interests, while also continuing to collaborate with individual EU Member States on bilateral and minilateral projects.
It is a matter of regret that the current rules for third-country participation in European Defence Fund projects act as a barrier to UK involvement, given that the strategic interests of the UK and EU are closely aligned. Protectionism is not the way to build an efficient defence industry.
Any UK-EU cooperation on defence must be complementary with NATO’s objectives. NATO remains the leading organisation for defending Europe and setting standards to enable military interoperability between European allies.
Reconstruction of Ukraine
The reconstruction of Ukraine will be a colossal undertaking, regardless of the outcome of the conflict. It cannot wait until the war has finished. Much of Ukraine is in urgent need of international support and rebuilding.
It is imperative that governments and international organisations, including the UK and the EU, cooperate closely throughout the reconstruction process to prevent duplication and ensure that all international partners are working on the basis of a coherent programme that best meets Ukraine’s needs. We welcome the UK’s close involvement up to this point, including hosting the successful Ukraine Recovery Conference in London in June 2023. We also welcome the establishment of the Multi-Donor Cooperation Platform for Ukraine and urge the Government to remain closely involved in its work over the coming years.
The UK has a strong reputation in Ukraine, with expertise in several sectors essential to reconstruction, such as private sector investment and the insurance industry. The Government should take full advantage of this and play a leading part, working closely with the EU, its Member States, and other partners.
Reconstruction is expected to be linked closely to Ukraine’s candidacy for EU membership. The drive to meet the criteria for EU membership is likely to serve as a lever for reforms to Ukraine’s economy and public institutions. The Government should work closely with the EU to ensure that assistance provided to Kyiv serves the shared objective of bringing Ukraine into Western institutions.
The Government is well placed to take a prominent role, working with the EU and other international partners, in supporting Ukraine’s efforts to tackle corruption and strengthen its public institutions. This will be vital to creating an environment where public and private sector donors have the confidence to invest in Ukraine.
Long-term implications for the UK-EU foreign policy and security relationship
In the context of the immediate threat to its security posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has demonstrated an ability to perform a more “geopolitical” role. Given the EU’s size and its geographical proximity to the UK, any change in the EU’s approach to foreign and security policy will be bound to have implications for UK national security. However, it remains to be seen whether developments over the past two years represent a durable change in the EU’s approach. The EU has not achieved such a clear and united response to the recent crises in the Middle East, reflecting greater divisions between Member States.
Any future reduction in US support for Ukraine and for wider European security would be a challenge to the whole continent. The UK, the EU and its Member States should ensure that they are prepared for a scenario in which they may need to take on a greater share of the burden, despite all the difficulties.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new context for the UK-EU engagement on foreign and security policy that was absent when the Trade and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated. While we acknowledge that the ad hoc arrangements for cooperation with the EU on Ukraine have worked effectively, we believe that there would be considerable value in complementing these with more regular arrangements for forward-looking cooperation between the UK and the EU in relation to longer-term challenges such as policy towards China. We therefore reiterate our previous recommendation that the Government should approach the EU with a view to establishing more regular, forward-looking formats for cooperation on major foreign policy and security issues.