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The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU relationship Contents

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The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU relationship

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.On 24 February 2022, Russia started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The UK, the EU, individual EU Member States and other partners immediately condemned the invasion and have since been providing large amounts of military and economic support to Ukraine.

2.The UK has played a key role in the West’s response to the invasion, including a commitment of £7.1 billion of military assistance to Ukraine to date.1

3.The crisis, despite delays to agreement on some initiatives due to the need to reach consensus among Member States, has prompted an unprecedented response from the EU. It has introduced new mechanisms (such as common ammunition procurements through the Regulation establishing the Act in Support of Ammunition Production)2 and creatively developed existing mechanisms (for example, providing lethal support to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility).3

4.Russia’s actions have prompted a re-evaluation of various aspects of foreign, security and defence policy in both the UK and the EU. The UK published a revised security strategy in March 2023.4 Meanwhile, the EU has developed a vision for a more “geopolitical EU”, set out in the EU Strategic Compass published in March 2022.5 The Russian invasion of Ukraine also prompted notable policy shifts in individual Member States—for instance, Germany committed to a substantial increase in defence spending and Denmark ended its longstanding opt-out from EU defence and security initiatives.

5.These developments have changed the whole context of UK-EU relations in this field compared to when the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was agreed in 2020. The TCA contains no provisions for UK-EU cooperation on external affairs, with the UK Government having decided not to pursue a legally-binding “security partnership” along the lines of those envisaged in the UK-EU Political Declaration of 2019.

6.The invasion has led to much closer cooperation between the UK and the EU on foreign and security policy. EU leaders, in alignment with the UK, US and Canada, have consistently demanded immediate Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, and have cooperated on far-reaching sanctions against the Russian state and individuals close to the regime, as well as on military, political, financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine.

7.Since 23 February 2022, the EU, in cooperation with international partners including the UK, has introduced extensive individual and economic sanctions against Russia and Russian individuals, including President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and members of the Russian State Duma and National Security Council.6 In March 2022 the sanctions regime was extended to Belarus, as a consequence of the decision of the regime in Minsk to allow Russian forces to use its territory to attack Ukraine from the north.

8.Our report, The future UK-EU relationship, published in April 2023, included recommendations about UK-EU foreign and security policy cooperation.7 This report builds on those recommendations, with a specific focus on the longer-term implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU relations.

Our inquiry

9.We aimed to look beyond immediate crisis management towards the handling of longer-term issues, focusing on the following four themes:

(1)Cooperation on sanctions

(2)The UK-EU defence relationship

(3)Reconstruction of Ukraine

(4)Long-term implications for the UK-EU foreign and security relationship.

10.These do not comprise an exhaustive list of areas in which Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had implications for the UK-EU relationship. We acknowledge that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also had important consequences for other areas of UK-EU relations, notably cooperation on energy security, which is an area we addressed in our report published in April 2023.

11.The evidence that we collected demonstrated that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided a context for more pragmatic and practical cooperation between the UK and the EU, prompting them to put aside disagreements to address a common threat.

12.We issued our call for evidence on 26 July 2023 (see Appendix 3). The deadline for written submissions was 10 November 2023. 22 responses were received.

13.We took oral evidence between September and December 2023, hearing from 22 witnesses. These included practitioners, experts and stakeholders. On 12 December 2023 we heard from the Minister for Europe, Leo Docherty MP. We are grateful to all of our witnesses, who are listed in Appendix 2.

14.On 14 December 2023 we took evidence from the Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton.8 This session covered a wide range of issues relating to the UK-EU relationship, including those addressed by this inquiry. We refer to his evidence in this report where it is relevant.

This report

15.The remainder of this report is divided into four chapters, focusing in turn on each of the four themes identified above.

16.In general terms we welcome and commend the responses to Russia’s aggression by the Government and by the EU and its Member States. Insofar as our report includes recommendations for policy, these are designed to strengthen these responses and make them more effective.

17.We make this report for debate.

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