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The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU relationship Contents

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Chapter 5: Long-term implications for the UK-EU foreign policy and security relationship

249.Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a profound shock to the European foreign policy and security landscape, upending many of the assumptions held by policymakers over previous decades.

250.In the period since the outbreak of the conflict the UK, the EU and many EU Member States individually have re-evaluated their foreign policy priorities and approaches to resilience. There is every reason to believe that these developments will have far-reaching long-term implications for European security and for relations between the UK and the EU, extending beyond issues directly related to the ongoing conflict.

251.In 2024 there will be an election to the European Parliament, a new European Commission will be appointed, a General Election is expected in the UK and a presidential election will take place in the United States of America. These all have the potential to lead to further changes in how the EU and UK conduct their respective foreign policies. The conflict and instability in the Middle East since the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 may also have implications for the UK-EU foreign policy and security relationship.

A more “geopolitical” EU?

252.Less than a month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted a new security strategy, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (see Box 8).348 This referred to a “tectonic shift in European history” and asserted that the EU “needs to take a more active stance to protect its citizens, defend its interests, protect its values, and work with partners to provide security for a safer and more just world”. In the foreword, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, wrote that the EU must “ensure that we turn the EU’s geopolitical awakening into a more permanent strategic posture”.

Box 8: The EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence

Published in March 2022, building on the earlier Global Strategy, the Strategic Compass sets out the EU’s vision to “make Europe a security provider”. It is described as a “Member States-owned document now adopted by the Council” and it is stated in the foreword that by adopting it Member States “commit to implementing it”. The document asserts that the EU needs “to take a more active stance to protect its citizens, defend its interests, protect its values, and work with partners to provide security for a safer and more just world”. It calls for the EU and EU Member States to “invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor”. It also identifies a need for “more rapidity, robustness and flexibility in decision-making” and a move towards a “common strategic culture”, aiming to increase the EU’s credibility as a strategic actor. Specific proposals include the development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity; enhanced cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and strengthening cyber resilience; and a substantial increase in defence expenditure. The Strategic Compass additionally calls for “further ambitious and concrete steps” to strengthen cooperation with NATO and pledges that security and defence issues will be included “more systematically” in political dialogues with third country partners. It states that the EU “remain[s] open to a broad and ambitious security and defence engagement with the United Kingdom”.

Source: European Union, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (March 2022): https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf [accessed 23 January 2024]

253.Notable policy shifts have also taken place in several Member States. There have been substantial rises in defence budgets, including in Germany. As part of the major changes in German national security policy announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in March 2023, in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the German Government published its first ever National Security Strategy in June 2023 and has committed to meet the NATO target to spend 2% of GDP on defence.349 Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership following the outbreak of the conflict. Finland formally joined in April 2023 although Sweden’s application is still awaiting ratification by all NATO members.350 Meanwhile, Denmark ended its longstanding opt-out from EU defence and security initiatives following a referendum held in June 2022.

254.In March 2023 the UK Government published an updated foreign policy and security strategy, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world.351 This document updated the 2021 Integrated Review and in particular gave greater prominence to European security, describing the Euro-Atlantic region as a “core priority”.

255.Several of our witnesses considered that the shift in the EU’s approach to foreign policy was substantial. Nathalie Loiseau MEP referred to a “cultural revolution” evident in many aspects of the EU’s response, including the provision of military support to Ukraine on a scale that was “not possible to imagine before”.352 Sir Julian King, formerly European Commissioner for the Security Union, similarly identified a “sea change in how the EU collectively works on both security and defence”.353 He noted that some of this pre-dates the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that it is also motivated by “other geopolitical drivers, in particular tensions with and concerns about China”. Another former European Commissioner, Baroness Ashton, also considered that the EU had been “moving towards a bigger geopolitical role for much longer than the Ukraine crisis” but said that the conflict had “undoubtedly accelerated that”.354

256.The EU Ambassador to the UK told us that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had “pushed forward the development that began way back in the early 2000s when we started to create a security and defence policy in which it was understood that, if we wanted to be effective in addressing security challenges, we had to have an holistic approach”.355 He said that the conflict in Ukraine had “further strengthened our conviction that we must pursue this”.

257.Looking beyond Ukraine, we heard that there had been a wider shift in the EU towards what one expert termed “economic statecraft” to protect against external shocks, involving the use of a combination of trade and foreign policy mechanisms, which had previously been more separate spheres within the EU.356 We were told that a “decade of crises” had encouraged greater “experimentation in new forms of decision-making and policy development”. Isabella Antinozzi (RUSI) characterised these shifts as a “securitisation” of EU policy, extending to areas such as energy, economic security and supply chain resilience.357 According to the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, the result is that the UK has been left with a “more strategic, coordinated and active foreign policy and security actor on its doorstep”.358

258.However, some of the evidence that we received challenged the notion that there had been a substantial shift in EU policy. In the assessment of the Henry Jackson Society there is a “dissonance between the EU’s aspirations to be a geopolitical actor and its capacity”.359 On its analysis the EU “lacks a joint strategic assessment of threats” and has displayed an “inability to pool resources which has undermined its ability to procure weapons to advance its security”. It therefore concluded that the EU “does not seem ready to adopt a more assertive foreign policy”. In a similar vein, James Rogers (Council on Geostrategy) told us that there were “still some outstanding differences between some of the key member states about how to deal with both Ukraine and particularly Russia”.360 He argued that the EU was “still stuck, in many respects, in the world of the 1990s, not the world of the mid-2020s” and that addressing this would “require a significant shift in strategic culture over the coming years”.

259.Witnesses expressed mixed views as to the durability of any shift in the EU’s approach to foreign and security policy, and its applicability to other crises beyond Ukraine. Professor Anand Menon of UK in a Changing Europe considered that the EU had “performed well” in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine but that this was a “very easy case for the EU to have acted on”, given western unity and that it involved “direct and deliberate aggression on the border, essentially, of some member states”.361 A similar argument was advanced by Dr Luigi Scazzieri (Centre for European Reform), who noted that the EU’s unity on Ukraine had not been replicated in its response to the crisis in Israel/Gaza.362 Dr Stefan Meister (German Council on Foreign Relations) suggested that in relation to other conflicts in post-Soviet eastern Europe, for instance Nagorno-Karabakh, he did “not see a very geopolitical EU”.363 Other witnesses, for instance Baroness Ashton, Sir Julian King and Professor Alexander Mattelaer (Brussels School of Governance), expressed greater confidence that what they saw as the EU’s trajectory towards becoming a more geopolitical actor would continue beyond the current conflict.364 The EU Ambassador to the UK told us that “overall, we have been expressing common positions” in response to other crises, including that in Israel/Gaza.365

260.During the period that our inquiry was taking place there were some signs of emerging strains within the EU over aspects of its response to the conflict in Ukraine. Hungary has increasingly sought to obstruct additional EU financial support to Ukraine, including using its veto to prevent agreement at the European Council meeting in December 2023.366 Meanwhile, Slovakia withdrew its military support for Ukraine following the formation of a new government in October 2023.

261.Some of those that we heard from suggested that the long-term strategic challenges faced by the UK and the EU are broadly similar. For example, Ms Loiseau highlighted common interests in strengthening the European pillar of NATO, developing a maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific and addressing the causes of irregular migration to Europe.367 Meanwhile, Agathe Demarais (European Council on Foreign Relations) noted that both the UK and the EU believe that “managing China’s rise will be the greatest diplomatic, military and economic challenge” in the longer-term, but share “less hawkish” stances than the United States of America.368

262.In its written submission the FCDO stated that the Government “recognise[s] and support[s] the EU’s approach to tackling broader geopolitical challenges”.369 It added that “on China, we agree on the need to protect national security, align our approach with partners, and engage with China directly”. The Government is “supportive of a geopolitically active EU, as a close and likeminded partner and ally in an increasingly contested and volatile international space”.

263.In response to the immediate threat to its security posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made a concerted effort to take on a more “geopolitical” role, as envisaged in the Strategic Compass published in 2022.

264.It remains to be seen whether these developments represent a durable change in the EU’s geopolitical role. For example, the EU has not achieved a clear and united response to the conflict in Israel, Gaza and the wider Middle East, reflecting greater divisions between EU Member States than was the case in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

265.Given the EU’s size and its geographical proximity to the UK, any change in the EU’s approach to foreign and security policy will be bound to have implications for UK national security. The Government should therefore continue to monitor closely the evolution of the EU’s external policies when considering British foreign and security policy.

266.The respective approaches of the UK and EU to long-term strategic challenges such as relations with China and developing the European pillar of NATO are broadly similar. We consider that there would be considerable mutual benefits to enhancing cooperation between the UK and EU on such issues.

European strategic autonomy

267.The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a renewed debate within the EU about its ability to act autonomously, often referred to as “strategic autonomy”.

268.We heard that “strategic autonomy” had not been precisely defined by the EU.370 As Baroness Ashton told us, “depending on which room you are in and with which people, it means different things”.371 She suggested that a debate “about how Europe is meant to operate as an entity in itself, in terms of its capacity to resolve issues that directly affect itself, how far it is beholden to external forces—the United States, for example—and how far it is able to determine a policy and strategy of its own” had been going on for a long time. This became especially prominent during the US presidency of Donald Trump from 2017–21, during which the priorities of the EU and US appeared increasingly to diverge.

269.Ms Loiseau saw strategic autonomy as being about “working with your allies every time you can—that is a very strong statement; every time you can, you should work with your allies—while working and acting autonomously every time you have to”.372 She stressed that there may be circumstances where the EU has to act autonomously because its “priorities and concerns are not shared by allies”.

270.Mr Bond and Dr Scazzieri told us that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had served to “pause the more controversial elements” of the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda, while at the same time leading to a “doubling down on less controversial areas”.373 This was attributed to the international response to the conflict having demonstrated that NATO remains the cornerstone of European security, and that non-EU NATO allies such as the US and UK have an essential role.374 We heard that Member States in central and eastern Europe have particular concerns about the notion of European strategic autonomy in relation to defence and security.375 Radosław Sikorski, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland who returned to this post in December 2023, emphasised that “in this Ukrainian emergency, the United States has rallied round, has come through and has protected us from an aggressive Russia”.376 He said that the alliance with the United States is “not something that central and eastern Europe would ever give up”.

271.Some witnesses expressed concern that any future reduction in US support would leave Europe more exposed. For example, Mr Sikorski told us that if “Joe Biden was not in the White House and the United States was engaged somewhere else, Ukraine might not have been as supported as it has been”.377 He saw this as an “argument for being better prepared in case we are not so lucky in future”. The Henry Jackson Society noted that the US’s “long-term strategic interests lie in the Indo-Pacific”, not in Europe.378 Professor Menon identified a scenario where, in the event of a change in the US presidency, Europeans might “have to look to themselves a lot more and work together a lot more closely”.379 Professor Mattelaer suggested to us that it would be “wise for European states to think of contingency plans to help to address such a prospect”.380 However, Dr Scazzieri feared that at present this possibility was “almost too difficult for many decision-makers to face”.381

272.Several expert witnesses indicated that within the EU the emphasis of the strategic autonomy agenda had increasingly shifted away from the military dimension towards economic autonomy.382 Ms Dennison highlighted the EU’s economic security strategy, published in spring 2023, which conveyed “a sense that, as Europeans, we also have to recognise that we operate in this world too, so we need a more sophisticated understanding, which will never be autarky in an economic sense but is the ability to manage our relationships in a more sophisticated way in that environment”.383 She considered “strategic interdependence” to be more accurate terminology than “strategic autonomy”. Professor Szyszczak (University of Sussex) indicated that this agenda now extended to “almost all policy areas”.384 The Spanish presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2023 promoted what it termed “open strategic autonomy”.385 This places an emphasis on cooperation between the EU and allies and is focused primarily on economic challenges. In Professor Menon’s assessment, strategic autonomy has become a “very inward, slightly mercantilist construct aimed at prioritising European industries over all others”.386

273.Dr Benjamin Martill (University of Edinburgh) stressed that in discussions of strategic autonomy it is often European rather than EU autonomy that is the “aim of the game”.387 He saw this as especially true in the defence field, where autonomy in various areas is dependent on “co-optation of non-EU members like the UK, Norway and Turkey into any such designs”. Researchers from the Centre for Britain and Europe at the University of Surrey similarly noted that “the term European not EU strategic autonomy is usually used” and that, in this context, the “UK’s capabilities are of critical importance”.388 These authors added that on its own the EU currently “falls far short of being strategically autonomous”.

274.Sir Julian King told us that what he characterised an as EU agenda to “reinforce its self-sufficiency and reduce dependencies” posed “issues for all countries outside the EU in how they engage with the EU on those issues, including the UK”.389 Ms Loiseau felt that it was primarily for the UK Government to determine how far it wished to engage with this agenda. She told us that “either we speak in theory about European strategic autonomy including the UK or we speak in practice where the UK is interested”.390

275.The FCDO indicated that the Government is “supportive of the EU’s approach to secure Europe’s interests, weaken dependencies and de-risk relationships”.391 However, in the area of defence it “continue[s] to encourage the EU to ensure this is done in coordination with NATO and is open to all European nations”.

276.The EU’s strategic autonomy agenda is focused increasingly on economic security and resilience since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Government should monitor developments in EU policy in these areas closely and consider what contribution the UK might be able to make to strengthening the resilience of Europe as a whole.

277.Any future reduction in US support for Ukraine, and for wider European security, has the potential to leave Europe badly exposed. The EU, EU Member States and other European partners, including the UK, should ensure that they are prepared for a scenario in which they may need to take on a greater share of the burden, despite all the difficulties.

EU enlargement

278.Enlargement has gained renewed prominence on the EU political agenda since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Candidate status was granted to Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022. The European Council subsequently agreed to open membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and to grant candidate status to Georgia, in December 2023.392 These developments have also given fresh impetus to the enlargement process in the Western Balkans.

279.Witnesses emphasised that the conflict in Ukraine had led to a change in the views of several key Member States on enlargement.393 We heard that there had been a particularly marked shift in the position of France which had “traditionally been very enlargement-sceptic” but had “changed its tune” from around May 2022 onwards.394

280.Susi Dennison of the European Council on Foreign Relations noted that the “next wave of enlargement is being talked about and understood at an EU level as being a geopolitical enlargement, something that is being done on a clear interest basis by the EU”.395 As Baroness Ashton explained, Ukraine’s potential accession to the EU is seen as “not only about the safety and security of Ukraine but about the nature and character of Europe itself”.396 Ms Loiseau argued that it was to the EU’s “benefit that we get bigger in a world where isolationism is dangerous”.397 Meanwhile, Mr Sikorski suggested that Ukrainian membership would “rebalance Europe”, providing it with “two lungs in power relationships and in the weight of populations”.398

281.As was discussed in Chapter 4, there is overwhelming support for EU membership in Ukraine. Orysia Lutsevych of the Chatham House Ukraine Forum described the European Commission’s recommendation that accession negotiations be opened as an “important moment to celebrate”.399 She added that “Ukraine will be fully anchored, and its destiny is clear: it belongs in the European family of nations”. Natalie Jaresko, a former Finance Minister of Ukraine, similarly saw this as “extraordinarily good news”.400

282.Several witnesses anticipated that the enlargement process would in practice be a long one. Dr Meister suggested that Ukraine’s accession “will not be a high-speed integration and the benefits will not be coming so soon”.401 Dr Kostovicova and Dr Cooper (LSE) explained that “Ukraine’s geographical size combined with the complexity of its internal economic development” would present “tremendous challenges for integration into the European single market”.402 On this theme, Sir Julian King highlighted “quite big practical hurdles” to Ukraine’s accession, for example around agriculture, heavy industry, old nuclear plants and free movement of people.403 Nevertheless, he noted that there had been similar issues associated with the enlargement of the mid-2000s but that these had been overcome because there was “great political commitment” to making enlargement work. He felt that similar conditions had emerged following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

283.Some witnesses were sceptical that Ukraine would join the EU in the foreseeable future. Mr Rogers stressed the need to be “realistic”, saying that the “war must be won before Ukraine can join the EU, and even then there may be some outstanding territorial issues that would need to be overcome, which I think would prevent it becoming an EU country”.404 He noted that accession would require unanimous agreement among Member States and that “domestic politics” may prevent this. Professor Menon similarly told us that he was “quite sceptical about the prospects of enlargement anytime soon”, suggesting that there was a “paradox” that “the war will be behind us by definition when there is a serious debate about Ukrainian accession, and at that point political priorities will shift”.405

284.We heard that there were likely to be tensions between the EU objectives of enlargement to the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and also to the Western Balkans. Andrew Duff, a former MEP, predicted that the EU was unlikely to fast-track Ukraine’s membership as any perception that it was getting special treatment would be received negatively by Western Balkans candidate countries.406 A similar point was made by Dr Kostovicova and Dr Cooper, who noted that Ukraine and Moldova’s “accelerated EU accession” had been greeted with a degree of “resentment” in the Western Balkans, which had experienced “two decades of being in the EU’s waiting room”.407 Baroness Ashton stressed that, in “thinking about a regional architecture for Europe”, the EU should not forget about Moldova and Georgia.408 The EU Ambassador to the UK agreed that it would be “important for those dealing with the issue to ensure that it is not just about Ukraine but all candidates”.409

285.Some of our witnesses raised the possibility of a phased integration process. Mr Bond and Dr Scazzieri envisaged that candidate countries may initially participate in some Council formats without full voting rights.410 Dr Meister also anticipated that in the short-term there would not be “full-scale integration” of Ukraine into the EU, but that there “may be partial integration of Ukraine in some sectors”.411 According to Georgina Wright (Institut Montaigne), “discussions of either a multi-speed Europe or different forms of membership” have been taking place within the EU.412

286.The focus on enlargement has additionally prompted a debate within the EU about other institutional reforms, for instance to decision-making processes and to the EU budget. Dr Meister told us that the “EU itself will change, and the question will be how and when”.413 Mr Sikorski emphasised that an EU of potentially 35 Member States would “pose issues for constitutional order”.414 He gave the example of sanctions and asked whether the EU “wanted to be hostages of one country blocking”. He also raised the issue of allocation of structural funds, noting that the fact that Ukraine is large and relatively poor would mean that some European regions that currently receive funds would no longer be eligible for these without reform. Ms Loiseau, meanwhile, referred to “ideas floated in the air of changing the way in which decisions are taken” but indicated that there were differences of view within the EU on this.415 The EU Ambassador to the UK referred to proposals to move towards qualified majority voting in external affairs, but said that debates about reform would be “complex”.416 Mr Bond and Dr Scazzieri considered that institutional reform was not a “given”, since some Member States oppose any shift away from unanimous decision-making.417

287.Professor Menon emphasised to us that, as a non-member of the EU, the UK’s ability to directly influence the enlargement process would be “very limited”.418 Other witnesses suggested that the UK may still be able to offer some support to candidate countries. For example, Baroness Ashton indicated that UK ambassadors remain involved in “a lot of positive work going on to support the countries of the Western Balkans in their aspiration to be in the EU”.419 She identified “opportunities to try to support the future of the European Union for countries where we can see the absolute positive reasons for them to be part of it”. Ms Loiseau also referred to UK-EU cooperation in relation to the Western Balkans, arguing that the UK and the EU “need to join our efforts to stabilise those countries and lead them towards a European path”.420

288.Some witnesses considered that potential institutional reforms within the EU could have implications for relations with the UK. Ms Wright suggested that it would be “very difficult for the UK Government to participate in those discussions because it chose to leave”, but argued that it should be “thinking quite seriously about how the EU is evolving and what opportunities this could provide for the UK as well”.421 Mr Bond and Dr Scazzieri highlighted the possibility that a phased process of integration for accession states “could leave the EU more open to including the UK as a non-voting participant, for example in some meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council”.422 The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change similarly noted that enlargement may “open up new opportunities for the UK to develop and deepen ties with the Union”.423 It recommended that the UK should “stay alive to these unfolding processes with the EU and the possibilities they may provide”.

289.Ukraine’s EU accession process could potentially have implications for the UK’s own relations with both Ukraine and the EU in the medium-to-longer term, as Ukraine seeks to integrate into the internal market. Were Ukraine ultimately to join the EU, its relations with the UK would then be governed by the TCA. The Minister for Europe told us that the Government is “alive to that prospect”.424 Mr Henricson-Bell added that there is “thinking ongoing” about this but said that the Government considers it important to not “lose sight of the immediate term, which is helping Ukraine to win this war”.425

290.As noted in Chapter 4, the Foreign Secretary told us that the Government strongly supports “Ukraine wanting to anchor itself in the Euro-Atlantic alliance”.426 The Minister for Europe similarly indicated that if, “through its own sovereign choice”, Ukraine were to embark on a journey towards EU membership that would allow it to be “prosperous, sovereign, liberated and a strong ally of the UK”, that would be “clearly a good thing”.427

291.The UK is no longer a member of the EU and will have no direct influence on the next round of EU enlargement. But the EU’s overall objective in pursuing enlargement (greater stability and security in Europe) is clearly in the UK’s national interest as well. There is therefore a strong case for using the UK’s experience and expertise in reform and capacity building to support candidate countries during the enlargement process. In Ukraine, that would fit naturally with the UK’s contribution to reconstruction and tackling corruption.

292.Potential enlargement has prompted a renewed debate about institutional reform within the EU. Should such reform happen, it could present both opportunities and risks for UK-EU cooperation. The Government should monitor any developments closely and report to Parliament on their implications for UK-EU relations.

The future UK-EU foreign policy and security relationship

293.In our report published in April 2023, The future UK-EU relationship, we concluded that there would be “considerable mutual benefit” to ad hoc engagement between the UK and the EU on foreign, defence and security policy being “complemented by some structured arrangements for ongoing interaction and cooperation, for example in response to new and emerging threats”.428 We therefore recommended that the UK should “approach the EU without further delay with the aim of establishing appropriate structured cooperation arrangements, as foreseen in the UK-EU Political Declaration of October 2019”.429

294.We were disappointed at the Government’s limited engagement with this recommendation in its response to the report. In a letter to the Committee in August 2023 the then Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon James Cleverly MP, said that “both sides are focused on making sure our cooperation delivers, rather than on institutional changes in this area”.430

295.We took further evidence about whether there was a case for a more structured foreign policy and security relationship between the UK and the EU during the course of this inquiry. Several witnesses expressed support for this proposal. For example, Baroness Ashton thought that more structured cooperation would “ensure that the voice that we can have in those debates is as clear and as well listened to as possible”.431 She noted that “in the context of security and defence matters, there is already a well-trodden path of agreements that can be made between the EU and third countries that enable them to participate and to be part of missions that operate all over the world”. Ms Loiseau argued that more structured cooperation in foreign policy and security was “our common interest” and cited a range of areas in which she considered that greater cooperation would be desirable, including EU defence missions.432 Mr Sikorski proposed that the UK should become involved in what is currently the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, a body established in 2021 for US-EU cooperation on trade, economic and technology issues.433

296.Sir Julian King considered that ad hoc cooperation in the context of the Ukraine crisis had been effective but saw the case for more structured arrangements as being to “future-proof your relationship and make sure the momentum is there when, hopefully, there are quieter times”.434 Ms Dennison, meanwhile, identified “a risk, from an EU perspective, that the incentive for that informal approach will go down over time because it risks diluting the co-operation within the EU” format.435 Professor Richard G. Whitman, Dr Joelle Grogan and Jannike Wachowiak (UK in a Changing Europe) suggested that a more structured security dialogue could create “more predictability and stability” in the UK-EU foreign policy and security relationship and that it could enable cooperation on longer-term challenges such as relations with China and economic security.436 Dr Martill similarly argued that more formal structures “even at a low level” would enable engagement on an agenda “beyond existing crises”.437

297.A more sceptical view on the benefits of more structured cooperation arrangements was expressed by Professor Menon. He felt that “not very much at all” would have been different if a structured cooperation framework had been included within the TCA.438 Referring to the experience of cooperation on Ukraine, he considered that the existing relationship “works pretty well in a time of crisis”. Pressed on whether a structured arrangement would be more beneficial in relation to other issues, he emphasised that “political leaders interact with their counterparts, particularly from the larger member states, in many fora where they can talk and co-ordinate on matters such as China”.

298.Although Mr Rogers thought that UK-EU cooperation should be “taken further where it is in the interests of both parties”, he considered that there was also a “great deal of opportunity” to build on “minilateral” relations between the UK and groups of EU Member States.439 He envisaged “creating islands of co-operation that will support the overall effort of the larger multinational structures, whether the EU or NATO”. The Henry Jackson Society also favoured developing minilateral relations, highlighting the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) as a “useful forum to influence EU foreign policy while not being bound by defence and security treaties with the EU”.440 However, some other evidence submissions noted that Member States were reluctant to develop relations with the UK outside EU frameworks for fear of alienating other EU members and that attempts by the UK to “bilateralise” relations with EU countries post-Brexit had only been “partly successful” to date.441

299.The EU Ambassador told us that, compared to the UK, the EU has “more structured co-operation with other partners, which we consider useful”.442 He suggested there would be “no objections” on the EU side to developing more structured arrangements with the UK, similar to those envisaged in the Political Declaration. Nevertheless, he noted that a “more normal battle rhythm has been established” recently at least in official-level contacts, for example meetings between the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Secretary-General of the European External Action Service, which are now being held twice per year.

300.The Foreign Secretary argued that when it comes to cooperation with the EU “what matters is what works” and that existing ad hoc cooperation had “worked very well”.443 He suggested that there were benefits to the “flexibility” of being able to put together different cooperation arrangements in response to specific situations, as had been the case following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Regardless of institutional arrangements, he felt that the UK and EU were “natural partners” on issues such as relations with China, given the UK’s importance as an international actor in foreign policy and security.444 He did not think the UK was in the position of needing to go to the EU and ask, “Please can we join your China dialogue?”.

301.We welcome the Foreign Secretary’s confirmation to us that the current ad hoc arrangements for cooperation with the EU on Ukraine have worked well. This reinforces the evidence we heard that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new context for UK-EU engagement on foreign and security policy that was absent when the Trade and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated.

302.The nature and scope of the five-year review of the TCA remains unclear. Nevertheless, given the change in context, the Government and the EU should consider which of the informal arrangements (operating outside the structures of the TCA) established to facilitate the UK and EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been of particular benefit to both parties and merit being made permanent.

303.While acknowledging the Foreign Secretary’s point that flexibility can sometimes be an advantage in responding to specific situations, we continue to believe that there would be considerable value in more structured arrangements for forward-looking cooperation between the UK and the EU in relation to longer-term challenges such as policy towards China. This would build on the successful experience of reactive cooperation with the EU since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it would complement relations with individual Member States and groups of them. To facilitate this, the Government should approach the EU with a view to establishing more regular, forward-looking formats for cooperation on major foreign and security policy issues.

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