



HOUSE OF LORDS

Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform
Committee

3rd Report of Session 2024–25

End of Session 2023–24 Report

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The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee

The Committee is appointed by the House of Lords each session, most recently on 8 November 2023, and has the following terms of reference:

- (i) To report whether the provisions of any bill inappropriately delegate legislative power, or whether they subject the exercise of legislative power to an inappropriate degree of parliamentary scrutiny;
- (ii) To report on documents and draft orders laid before Parliament under or by virtue of:
 - (a) sections 14 and 18 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006,
 - (b) section 7(2) or section 19 of the Localism Act 2011, or
 - (c) section 5E(2) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;

and to perform, in respect of such draft orders, and in respect of subordinate provisions orders made or proposed to be made under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001, the functions performed in respect of other instruments and draft instruments by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments; and

- (iii) To report on documents and draft orders laid before Parliament under or by virtue of:
 - (a) section 85 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998,
 - (b) section 17 of the Local Government Act 1999,
 - (c) section 9 of the Local Government Act 2000,
 - (d) section 98 of the Local Government Act 2003, or
 - (e) section 102 of the Local Transport Act 2008.

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Publications

The Committee's reports are published by Order of the House in hard copy and on the internet at www.parliament.uk/hldprcpublications.

Committee Staff

The staff of the Committee are Jen Mills (Clerk) and Kiran Kaur (Committee Operations Officer).

General Information

General information about the House of Lords and its Committees, including guidance to witnesses, details of current inquiries and forthcoming meetings is on the internet at <http://www.parliament.uk/business/lords/>.

Contacts for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee

Any query about the Committee or its work should be directed to the Clerk to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Legislation Office, House of Lords, London, SW1A 0PW. The telephone number is 020 7219 3103. The Committee's email address is hldelegatedpowers@parliament.uk.

End of Session 2023–24 Report

INTRODUCTION

1. This is our end of session report for session 2023–24. It is designed, in part, to monitor the concerns we raised in *Democracy Denied? The urgent need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive*,¹ and follows a similar end of session report published in 2023.²
2. The focus of this report is twofold:
 - to give an account of the activity of the Committee during session 2023–24, including the response of the Government to our recommendations (Part 1), and
 - to reflect on the bills in session 2023–24 and consider whether—or not—they demonstrate a commitment by government departments to apply the principles and other recommendations set out in *Democracy Denied?* in the preparation and framing of primary legislation, and to provide feedback on their accompanying delegated powers memorandums (DPMs) (Part 2).

1 DPRRC, *Democracy Denied? The urgent need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive* (12th Report, Session 2021–22, HL Paper 106)

2 DPRRC, *End of Session 2022–23 Report: Democracy Denied? Update* (5th Report, Session 2023–24, HL Paper 32).

PART 1: COMMITTEE ACTIVITY DURING SESSION 2023–24 AND THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

3. The 2023–24 session was less busy for the Committee than its predecessor; in part because it was shorter, but also because of a lighter legislative load. Nonetheless we considered some lengthy bills, such as the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (408 pages with 335 clauses and 27 Schedules), the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill (300 pages with 157 clauses and 15 Schedules), the Media Bill (184 pages with 56 clauses and 12 Schedules), the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill (244 pages with 123 clauses and 12 Schedules) and the Renters (Reform) Bill (206 pages with 140 clauses and 6 Schedules). Other less lengthy but nonetheless notable bills included the Post Office (Horizon System) Compensation Bill, the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill and the Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill. The total page count for the government bills we considered during session was 1,718, with DPM pages (including supplementary DPMs) running to 824 pages.
4. We met nine times and published 24 reports. We considered 59 bills, of which 21 were government bills and 38 private members' bills.
5. Of the 21 government bills, we published substantive reports on the following 10 bills: the Pedicabs (London) Bill [HL],³ the National Insurance Contributions (Reduction in Rates) Bill, the Automated Vehicles Bill [HL], the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill, the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, the Media Bill, the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill, the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]⁴ and the Renters (Reform) Bill.
6. Those 10 bills represent 48% of government bills; this compares to the 2022–23 session, in which we made recommendations on 45% of government bills.

Government response rate to recommendations

7. The 2023–24 session was unusual in that more of our recommendations did not receive a response (55%) than did (45%). In some cases this was probably because, when the General Election was called at short notice, bill timetables were accelerated (or bills fell altogether) leaving no time for the Government to respond to the Committee. However, that does not account for the lack of response to our reports on the National Insurance Contributions (Reduction in Rates) Bill or the Victims and Prisoners Bill. Of the five bills on which we made recommendations but did not receive responses, three became law and two fell.
8. In our end of session report for session 2022–23⁵ we set out our rationale for moving from a description of the Government's "acceptance rate" to measuring its "positive response rate", which covers instances where our recommendations are accepted either in full or in part. In the 2022–23 session, the positive acceptance rate was "over 50%"; in this session, it was

3 The Committee had no comment on the Bill itself, but did report on a government amendment.

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5 DPRRC, *End of Session 2022–23 Report: Democracy Denied? Update* (5th Report, Session 2023–24, HL Paper 32), para 11.

26% for recommendations overall, but 57% for those recommendations which received a response.

9. We note in particular that the Government responded positively to all of our recommendations regarding the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill.

Other work

10. We also considered the delegated powers in the draft Rail Reform Bill, and provided a submission⁶ to the House of Commons Transport Committee to inform their pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill.

⁶ Written evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee ([RRB0077](#))

PART 2: ASSESSMENT OF BILLS IN SESSION 2023–24 AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES AND OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS SET OUT IN *DEMOCRACY DENIED?* AND FEEDBACK ON DPMS

Bills in 2023–24 assessed against *Democracy Denied?*

11. *Democracy Denied?* concluded that there was an urgent need for the balance of power between Parliament and the executive to be re-set. It said that the new order should be based on two fundamental principles:
 - first, that primary legislation, and powers conferred by it, should be drafted on the basis of the principles of parliamentary democracy (namely parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and the accountability of the executive to Parliament); and
 - second, that the threshold between primary and delegated legislation should be founded on the principle that the principal aspects of policy should be on the face of a bill and only its detailed implementation left to delegation.

12. In December 2023 we considered the **National Insurance Contributions (Reduction in Rates) Bill**, the purpose of which was to deliver on the commitment in the Government’s Autumn statement to cut the rate of National Insurance contributions. As it went through all of its stages in one day, contrary to our usual practice⁷ we reported on the Bill before Second Reading. The Bill included a Henry VIII power⁸ subject to the negative procedure. In our report we noted: “We have previously expressed the view, both in our *Democracy Denied?* report and in our guidance for departments, that there is a presumption that Henry VIII powers will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, and accordingly that, where a lower level of scrutiny applies, a full explanation should be given in the memorandum”, and concluded that the Department had failed to provide an adequate explanation.⁹ The Government did not respond to our report.

13. In the same meeting we considered the **Automated Vehicles Bill [HL]**, the purpose of which was to set the legal framework for the safe deployment of self-driving vehicles in Great Britain. Our report on this bill was critical of the use of delegated powers to create new criminal offences, and again of the use of the negative procedure in relation to a Henry VIII power.¹⁰ The Government did not accept our recommendations on either of those points, but did respond positively to our recommendation against using delegated powers to set maximum monetary penalties.¹¹

14. Finally in that meeting we considered the **Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill**, which regulated competition in digital markets and made provision for the protection of consumer rights. Our recommendations repeatedly proposed constraints on how the powers set out in the Bill

7 The Committee usually reports on bills after introduction in the House of Lords and before Committee stage.

8 Henry VIII powers are delegated powers which enable a minister, by delegated legislation, to amend, repeal or otherwise after the effect of an Act of Parliament.

9 DPRRC, *3rd report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 26), paras 5 and 8.

10 DPRRC, *3rd report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 26), paras 29 and 35.

11 DPRRC, *9th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 58), Appendix 1.

could be used.¹² The Government responded positively to two of our five recommendations.¹³

15. In January 2024 we considered the **Victims and Prisoners Bill**, which made provision for victims of crime and for the activities and release of prisoners. In our report we drew attention to an inappropriate delegation of power and the application of the negative procedure to it.¹⁴ The Government did not respond to our report.
16. In February we considered the **Data Protection and Digital Information Bill**, which aimed to update and simplify the UK’s data protection framework, and which fell part-way through its Committee Stage when the General Election was called. We drew attention to a provision in the Bill which conferred powers with legislative effect, but not contained in legislation and therefore not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, an approach we described in *Democracy Denied?* as “perhaps the most striking and disturbing of recent developments that have had the effect of shifting the balance of legislative power from Parliament to the executive”.¹⁵ We recommended that those powers should be made subject to the affirmative procedure.¹⁶ The Government did not respond to our report in writing before the end of the Session, although we would not have expected a response before the end of Committee Stage. In debate, Viscount Camrose (the responsible Minister) stated “we take [the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee] very seriously, and we will respond to that report ... ahead of Report”,¹⁷ but on the point of substance he stated that “the Government feel that it is more appropriate for the Secretary of State to have the power to set the rules of the trust framework with appropriate consultation, rather than for the power to be exercised by regulations”,¹⁸ which indicates it is unlikely the response would have been positive.
17. In the same month we considered a government amendment to the **Pedicabs (London) Bill [HL]**, which altered the Bill so that regulations made by Transport for London would not be subject to parliamentary procedure, rather than being subject to the negative procedure as they were in the original version of the Bill. Here we took issue with the supplementary delegated powers memorandum, which misrepresented the effect of the amendment.¹⁹ The Government’s response defended the amendment rather than the explanatory material.²⁰
18. In March we considered the **Media Bill**, which made changes to the legal framework for the regulation of public service broadcasting, to the regulation of on-demand programme services, and to the legal framework for radio. We suggested one area in which the House may have wished to seek additional information as the delegated powers memorandum did not provide adequate justification for certain powers,²¹ and recommended that a number of other

12 DPRRC, *3rd report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 26).

13 DPRRC, *13th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 81), Appendix 1.

14 DPRRC, *7th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 44), paras 6 and 9.

15 DPRRC, *Democracy Denied? The urgent need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive* (12th Report, Session 2021–22, HL Paper 106)

16 DPRRC, *10th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 60), para 23

17 HL Deb, 17 April 2024, [col 343GC](#) [Lords Grand Committee]

18 HL Deb, 17 April 2024, [col 344GC](#) [Lords Grand Committee]

19 DPRRC, *10th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 60), paras 33–34

20 DPRRC, *14th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 884), Appendix 1

21 DPRRC, *15th report*, (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 85), para 4.

powers be subject to the draft affirmative or made affirmative procedure.²² The Government did not respond to our report in writing before the Bill went through its Report Stage and Third Reading on 23 May, and the Minister responsible for the Bill did not refer to the Committee's report during Committee or Report Stage debates.

19. Later that month we considered the **Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill**, which reformed the law of property particularly in relation to home ownership. We made five recommendations across the Bill; in some cases advising that certain powers be subject to the affirmative rather than negative procedure, removing one power from the Bill, and applying parliamentary procedure to certain provisions where it would otherwise not have applied.²³ The Government responded positively to all of our recommendations.²⁴
20. In April we considered a government amendment to the **Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]**, the effect of which was to allow the Secretary of State to change the list of public authorities to which a certain provision of the Bill applied. This was a Henry VIII power but was, under the terms of the amendment, only subject to the negative procedure. We have long held the view that there should be a rebuttable presumption that Henry VIII powers should be subject to the affirmative procedure. On this occasion, in accordance with this principle, we recommended that the scrutiny procedure should be upgraded from the negative to either the draft affirmative or made affirmative procedure.²⁵ The Government's response was that the negative procedure was "the most appropriate and proportionate way of providing ... oversight in this case".²⁶
21. Finally, in May we considered the **Renters (Reform) Bill**, which aimed to reform the law relating to rental accommodation but which fell before its Second Reading in the Lords. We advised that one power should be subject to the affirmative procedure, one Henry VIII power was inappropriately wide and should have been removed from the Bill, and that another power was excessively wide and should have been re-stated with a greater degree of precision.
22. It is apparent from those conclusions and recommendations that the principles of *Democracy Denied?* have not yet been fully assimilated by government departments. However, the relatively limited number of recommendations despite some reasonably long bills indicates that progress has been made compared to previous sessions.

DPMs during session 2023–24

23. Departments are required to provide a delegated powers memorandum (DPM) with every government bill, and a supplementary DPM for government amendments which introduce new delegated powers. On occasion, a DPM will be provided with a private member's bill which has the support of the Government. Their principal purpose is for the Government to explain and justify the delegated powers in a bill, including the level of scrutiny applied to them.

22 DPRRC, [15th report](#), (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 85), paras 9, 13, 16, 21, 24 and 27.

23 DPRRC, [16th report](#), (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 90).

24 DPRRC, [19th report](#), (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 106).

25 DPRRC, [18th report](#) (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 100), para 7.

26 DPRRC, [24th report](#) (Session 2023–24, HL paper 124), Appendix I.

24. The DPM is an influential document. It gives a department the opportunity to tell the Committee and the Houses why Parliament should agree to confer the powers being sought by ministers; if drafted comprehensively and well, it may meet a point which we might otherwise have raised in a report. We also believe that the preparation of a DPM may have an internal-disciplinary effect within departments (that is, of course, if the DPM is drafted alongside the bill²⁷); and we have been told that the knowledge that the DPM will be scrutinised by the Parliamentary Business and Legislation (PBL) Committee, chaired by the Leader of the House of Commons, will also have that internal-disciplinary effect.²⁸ In their response to *Democracy Denied?*, the Government told us that the PBL Committee was, amongst other things, focused on scrutinising the quality of supporting documentation in order to ensure the Government was “properly supporting Parliament in its scrutiny function”.²⁹
25. Only one DPM was poor enough that we felt we needed to comment on its overall quality: we said of the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill that “some explanations in the Memorandum we found disappointing”.³⁰ There were, however, numerous instances where the explanations of, or justifications for, individual powers fell short. In response to *Democracy Denied?* the Government said that the Office of the Leader of the House of Commons would welcome specific examples of DPMs which we felt had failed to meet the standard required. These instances are therefore listed in the Table below.

27 There are indications that this is sometimes the case. For example, the Media Bill’s DPM explains that the affirmative procedure is appropriate for clause 44, when the Bill provided for the negative procedure to apply other than where primary legislation is being amended, suggesting that the Bill and the DPM were not drafted alongside each other.

28 See reference to the evidence of Richard Heaton, then First Parliamentary Counsel and Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office, in DPRRC, *7th Report* (Session 2014–15, HL Paper 39), para 5.

29 HM Government, *Government response to the Democracy Denied? The urgent need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive report* (24 January 2022), p4: <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/8672/documents/88067/default/>

30 DPRRC, *16th report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 90), para 1.

Table 1: DPM critiques

Bill	Department	Comment (and report number)
National Insurance Contributions (Reduction in Rates) Bill	HM Treasury	“There is only a very brief explanation in the Memorandum as to why the negative resolution procedure applies to all exercises of the powers, and there is no acknowledgment of the fact that it is exceptional to provide for a Henry VIII power to be subject to such a level of scrutiny. ... We do not consider this explanation to be adequate” (3rd Report)
Automated Vehicles Bill [HL]	Department for Transport	<p>“No explanation is therefore provided for a key divergence from the two precedents to which the Memorandum itself refers.” (3rd Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum doesn’t explain why all amendments to such legislation should be subject only to the negative procedure.” (3rd Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum makes no mention of this, despite the Committee’s Guidance for Departments on the role and requirements of the Committee [requiring either avoidance or explanation]” (3rd Report)</p>
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill	Department for Business and Trade	<p>“Given the Memorandum’s unconvincing explanation for the clause 6(2) power, the House may wish to press the Minister for a fuller explanation. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, we regard clause 6(2) as containing an inappropriate delegation of power that should be removed from the Bill.” (3rd Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum offers three reasons for not attaching any parliamentary procedure to the making of the rules. ... We are not convinced by these reasons.” (3rd Report)</p> <p>“the Memorandum adds: “Subsequent exercises of the power (in clause 231) will be amending or limiting the regulations and as such the negative procedure will provide an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.” We find this explanation unconvincing. Who is to say that subsequent exercises of the power in clause 231 will merely amend or limit the regulations?” (3rd Report)</p>

Bill	Department	Comment (and report number)
Victims and Prisoners Bill	Ministry of Justice	<p>“The Memorandum has a section headed “justification for taking the power”. The first sentence (paragraph 153) is not a justification but a statement of the power itself. The second sentence is a statement of the purpose of the power (rather than its justification) even though there is a section on purpose that precedes the section on justification.” (7th Report)</p> <p>“Not only is the justification for the delegated power unsatisfactory, the justification for the negative procedure is also unsatisfactory.” (7th Report)</p>
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill	Department for Science, Innovation and Technology	<p>“the use of these devices—and the level of scrutiny applied to them—should be clearly identified in the delegated powers memorandum and fully justified. We do not consider that the reasons given by the Department meet this high threshold” (10th Report)</p>
Pedicabs (London) Bill [HL]	Department for Transport	<p>“The Government’s supplementary delegated powers memorandum (paragraphs 3 and 4) offers two reasons. ... the second reason is unsound.” (10th Report)</p>
Media Bill	Department for Culture, Media and Sport	<p>“The Memorandum does not say anything about how the relevant private interests will be protected in the absence of the hybrid instruments procedure applying.” (15th Report)</p> <p>“a full explanation giving the reasons for choosing that procedure should be provided in the Memorandum. We do not consider that the Department’s explanation meets this threshold.” (15th Report)</p> <p>“Given this background [of accepting a DPRRC recommendation to take a different approach in relation to the Online Safety Bill in the 2022–23 session] we are surprised that no reference is made in the Memorandum to our earlier report on the Online Safety Bill, or as to why the Department considers that this case differs from that one.” (15th Report)</p>

Bill	Department	Comment (and report number)
Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities	<p>“The Memorandum does not identify clause 16 as containing a Henry VIII power ... [and so] it offers no reason (let alone a compelling one) why it should not use the affirmative procedure like the great majority of Henry VIII powers.” (16th Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum says that the limitations on the power to make regulations are unlikely to involve policy issues that attract in-depth parliamentary debate. Given that the power to make redress regulations contains over thirty components, including the ability to amend or repeal any Act of Parliament, clause 16 regulations cannot be dismissed as technical and unlikely to be of interest to Parliament.” (16th Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum justifies the power “in case the need should ever arise where a certain type of manager should not be replaced with a substitute manager”. What need? What type of manager? The Memorandum is silent on these matters.” (16th Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum says that the Government “intends only to provide exemptions should they be required”. Naturally, but the question remains: when might they be required? The Memorandum adds that the power will only be used “in extremely limited circumstances”. What sort of circumstances? One example in the Memorandum would have been helpful.” (16th Report)</p>
Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]	Home Office	<p>“In our report <i>Democracy Denied?</i>, we ask Departments to ensure that, where the negative procedure has been chosen on the ground that there is a need to act more quickly than allowed by the draft affirmative procedure, the memorandum explains why the made affirmative procedure cannot be applied instead. No such explanation has been given in this case” (18th Report)</p>

Bill	Department	Comment (and report number)
Renters (Reform) Bill	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities	<p>“We have long pointed out that every Henry VIII power ... should be clearly identified in the Memorandum. But clause 3(8) is not identified in the Memorandum as a Henry VIII power. ... Because the Memorandum does not mention that clause 3(8) contains a Henry VIII power, it offers no reason (let alone a compelling reason) why it should not use the affirmative procedure like the great majority of Henry VIII powers.” (22nd Report)</p> <p>“The Memorandum offers no justification even for the negative procedure. Under the heading “justification for the procedure” we are told that the power will ensure the Government can prevent leaseholders from being adversely impacted by the reforms if further issues come to light. But this is a justification for the power rather than for the procedure.” (22nd Report)</p> <p>“The Department’s justification for this wide Henry VIII power occupies just eight lines in the Memorandum.” (22nd Report)</p> <p>“the scope of the power in paragraph 19 is anything but narrow. Ministers are free to set the “eligibility criteria” that must be met by tenants, there being nothing in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes or the Memorandum indicating (a) what these criteria might be, (b) what they might include or (c) the circumstances in which they might be available.” (22nd Report)</p>

26. The frequency with which we have commented adversely about a DPM is disappointing; and, as the Table shows, the poor standard is not confined to one or two departments but ranges across government departments. We reiterate the statement from our End of Session 2022–23 Report: “Failure to provide DPMs which are complete, comprehensive and accurate is a serious matter not only because it means that Parliament is not being appropriately supported in its scrutiny function but also because, more fundamentally, it casts doubt on the quality of decision-making underpinning the inclusion of delegated powers in a bill”.³¹

Next steps

27. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from the 2023–24 session: its legislative processes were curtailed and at short notice, so we have an incomplete picture of the Government’s engagement with our recommendations.
28. In April 2024, the Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, then-Leader of the House of Commons and the Rt Hon Lord True CBE, then-Leader of the House of Lords responded to our previous End of Session report.³² They assured us that “the Government is committed to drafting high quality, proportionate legislation and continues to carefully consider the use of delegated powers before legislation is introduced into Parliament”, and we hope the same can be said of the new Government. We encourage the new Government to ensure that,
- DPMs are scrutinised and challenged by the PBL Committee,
 - when this Committee comments adversely on a DPM, this is drawn to the attention of the PBL Committee and the relevant minister, with a view to ensuring that the same errors are not repeated, and
 - the principles set out in *Democracy Denied?* are assimilated within bill teams and legislative drafters.
29. We will continue to monitor and report on the compliance of government bills and their accompanying DPMs with the principles of *Democracy Denied?*, and will approach the new Leaders for further discussions if we feel it would be beneficial to the House.
30. Over the last Parliament we saw some progress in the proportionate use of delegated powers in legislation and the quality of the explanatory material provided, but there is still room for improvement. We encourage the new Government to continue that process of improvement and ensure that the delegated powers in the legislation they introduce reflect an appropriate balance of power between Parliament and the executive.

31 DPRRC, *End of Session 2022–23 Report: Democracy Denied? Update* (5th Report, Session 2023–24, HL Paper 32), para 46.

32 DPRRC, *20th Report* (Session 2023–24, HL Paper 110).

APPENDIX 1: MEMBER'S INTERESTS

Committee Member's registered interests may be examined in the online Register of Lords' Interests at <https://parliament.uk/hlregister>. The Register may also be inspected in the Parliamentary Archives.

For business taken at the meeting on 9 October 2024, Members declared no interests.

Attendance

The meeting was attended by:

Lord Carlile of Berriew, Baroness Chakrabarti, Baroness Finlay of Llandaff, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, the Earl of Lindsay, Lord McLoughlin (Chair) and Lord Rooker.