Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marks the return of conventional warfare to Europe, challenging the strategic assumptions that have shaped Western and UK defence policies for decades.
Our inquiry set out to gather interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider the implications for the Government and the UK’s Armed Forces. Our first key conclusion is that the invasion represented a failure of NATO’s deterrent posture towards Russia. Although the invasion may yet prove to be a strategic miscalculation, Putin’s assessment was that NATO’s response would not represent a credible threat to his ambition. This collective failure by the West calls for a clear-eyed examination of why our policy of deterrence was unsuccessful and a systematic re-assessment of the assumptions that underpinned it.
Secondly, notwithstanding some notable responses from individual nations including the UK, the invasion has exposed fundamental weaknesses in both UK’s and NATO’s military strength. Within the UK, it has raised serious questions regarding the preparedness of Government, society and the defence industrial base to support conventional warfighting at scale. We are under-prepared to respond to the heightened global threat environment and, in particular, meet the growing threat from Russia.
More specifically, we found that the UK’s Armed Forces lack the mass, resilience, and internal coherence necessary to maintain a deterrent effect and respond effectively to prolonged and high-intensity warfare. In a war with Russia, our Armed Forces would need to be capable of fielding second and subsequent fighting echelons at the same time as providing military support to the protection of critical national infrastructure within the UK. Also, if we are to support our NATO allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe with a land force, we will have extremely long lines of communication along which ammunition, equipment, manpower and rations need to travel. Protecting such lines of communication needs sufficient troops and “teeth” units, which the UK cannot currently field. This is because our Forces’ size and structure has been predicated on the belief that conflicts would be resolved within weeks, rather than years. In particular, the evidence we heard pointed to the size of the Army being inadequate, with a burdensome bureaucracy making recruitment more challenging than it needs to be. Strengthening recruitment and retention for all three services should be a priority for the new Government. Enhancing the role of the Reserves presents an untapped opportunity to build mass, but for this to succeed, the Government must define their role much more clearly, fund them appropriately and put effort into incentivising people to join.
We also heard how Russia has been attacking Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure to inflict physical and psychological damage—both through hybrid and conventional means. The UK is not insulated from these threats and, in fact, has been an attractive target for Russian cyber and electronic attacks. The dismantling of mechanisms for mobilisation and for protecting the UK’s Civil Defence Infrastructure after the Cold War, however, has left the UK vulnerable. There is an urgent need for a whole-of-Government effort to build resilience and better protect the UK’s critical national infrastructure.
The war in Ukraine has also underscored the need for an agile industrial base to meet the demands of a dynamic battlefield and underpin our Armed Forces’ credibility. However, the UK’s procurement methods remain cumbersome and lack the agility required to keep pace with the rapidly evolving nature of modern warfare, particularly in cases where conflict is between states which are technologically evenly matched. A culture shift around risk across both Government and industry is necessary, and the Government must transform its approach to procurement to keep pace with accelerating development cycles.
Events in Ukraine have demonstrated that defence is not just about physical capabilities, it is also about resilience and the psychological readiness of the nation. Engaging the broader society in defence is crucial. This involves integrating civilian capabilities, fostering community engagement, breaking down barriers between the public and the military, and addressing the emotional aspects of national defence. Currently, the public’s awareness of the true state of the UK’s defence posture is alarmingly low. The mindset of a nation under genuine threat is absent, and there is an urgent need to invest in shaping how people perceive the value of defence. The Government must develop a compelling value proposition that resonates with citizens, emphasizing the importance of national security in their daily lives and moving beyond the notion that defence is solely the military’s responsibility. The Government can learn valuable lessons from other nations, such as the Scandinavian concept of “total defence”.
The war in Ukraine has thrown the role of alliances at a time of war into the spotlight. Russia is attempting to offset its decline in relations with the West by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key Global South countries. We should be deeply concerned by this development and be more proactive in building relationships with those countries in the Global South where Russia (and others) are seeking to extend their influence. The UK should harness its respected soft power as a diplomatic force and international development actor in support of alliance building.
The UK’s security is closely tied in with Europe’s security. As the US refocuses its priorities towards the Indo-Pacific, the need for engagement with Europe and the EU becomes even more pressing. We welcome the new Government’s commitment to negotiate a security pact with the EU, which has the potential to deliver improved collaboration with our European partners.
Our overarching conclusion is that the war in Ukraine is a wake-up call to the UK’s relative decline as a full-spectrum military power. In truth, we are a medium-sized regional power, but our commitment to retaining global influence, particularly through our nuclear and maritime capabilities, makes some of our other military aspirations unaffordable. We now lack a coherent model to augment our relatively small Armed Forces with the capabilities needed to sustain or deter warfighting. Such a comprehensive model should be a key aspiration of the Strategic Defence Review and will undoubtedly rest on an ability to better leverage technology, industry, the Reserves, allies and wider society.
Ukraine has provided a sobering reminder of the dangers posed by complacency and outdated assumptions in defence policy. In our report UK Defence Policy: From Aspiration to Reality? we raised concerns about the lack of clarity in Government policy documents regarding priorities and the difficult choices necessary when resources are limited. Governments have, so far, lacked an honest narrative about Defence’s ambition, resources, threats and risk. The new Government must ensure that its response to the Strategic Defence Review clearly outlines its priorities for UK Defence and provides a realistic roadmap for turning aspirations into reality.
The UK must commit to spending more on defence, spending it better, and leveraging its alliances by design. If clearer priorities are set, there is a real opportunity for the UK to build a more resilient and capable Armed Forces and, as a result, better protect the UK and play a more influential role in strengthening NATO, ensuring the collective security of its member states.
We submit this report to the Government and the Strategic Defence Review for consideration.