115.International engagement is integral to deterrence and escalation management. Diplomacy can convey unambiguous messages and present a united front to an opponent, making clear the cost of escalation. Alliances and security partnerships can amplify defence capabilities, and deliver assurance and deterrence. The contrast between the experiences of Ukraine and Georgia, compared with those of NATO members Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, is a case in point.
116.The war in Ukraine galvanised much of the world in condemnation of Russia, but also exposed the limits of and constraints on support. Additionally, the war has revealed the role of China as a key decisive enabler of Russia.
117.Since Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion, the UN’s 193 member states have voted on six emergency special session resolutions addressing various concerns with regard to Ukraine.98 Most countries supported the first resolution in March 2022 condemning Russia’s invasion, with only a quarter of voting states not in favour. However, all those either abstaining or voting against the resolution were countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia—i.e. within what is often referred to as the ‘Global South’. This pattern held in subsequent votes and few countries in those regions have imposed sanctions on Russia or given material support to Ukraine.99
118.Russia’s approach to the Global South has been to exploit grievances against the West and rely on the Soviet Union’s historical support for decolonisation to forge closer partnerships. This narrative resonates particularly in Africa and Asia, where the central story explaining the past couple of centuries is the struggle of national liberation against colonial power and exploitation. As former Portuguese Europe minister Bruno Maçães wrote for the New Statesman, during travels through Asia and Africa “it quickly became obvious to me that Ukraine’s plight would receive a lot more sympathy in the Global South if it were presented as a war of national liberation. It particularly helped if you described Russia as the last European empire”. Nevertheless, most Western democracies, Maçães explained, are reluctant to embrace this narrative, with implications on their efforts in building a global coalition.100
119.Since the invasion, Foreign Minister Lavrov has paid multiple visits to key countries, while Putin courted leaders from Africa at a Russia-Africa summit and hosted a parliamentary conference in 2023. Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in March 2023, devotes a distinct section to Africa for the first time and talks about a polycentric world in opposition to Western ‘neo-colonialism’.101 Moscow also hosted its first Russia-Latin America conference last year.102
120.The significance of these diplomatic initiatives should not be overstated—the Global South is not a homogenous ‘bloc’ and countries will have their own interests and individual pragmatic responses to Russian approaches. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that Russia is willing to flex its diplomatic muscle to exploit grievances in the Global South against the West. Many developing countries view Russia’s war in Ukraine and the West’s competition with China as diversions from pressing issues for the Global South like debt, climate change, and the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. When urged to denounce Russia’s aggression, they have highlighted the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of Western hypocrisy and double standards. Additionally, there is dismay over the disparity between the West’s empathy for the war victims in Ukraine and their apparent indifference to the suffering of people in other regions. 103
121.Realpolitik has certainly played its part in determining the positions of certain countries on Russia’s war against Ukraine. India, for instance, has traditionally been dependent on Moscow for military supplies. In early July 2024, India and Russia agreed to boost trade between their two countries, defying Western efforts to squeeze the Russian economy over its invasion of Ukraine. During his trip to Moscow on 8 July 2024, India’s Prime Minister Modi and President Putin pledged to increase annual bilateral trade to $100bn by 2030, up from $65bn at present, with India importing more Russian oil. Prime Minister Modi praised Russia as India’s “all-weather friend” during his visit. The Kremlin hailed the trip as a sign Ukraine’s Western supporters have failed to isolate Russia or generate support for Kyiv in developing countries. 104
122.Some countries have not just refused to impose sanctions, but actively supported the Kremlin by enabling or allowing the procurement of sensitive Western military goods and dual-use technologies for onward export to Russia. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have been identified as the main, but by no means the only, countries engaged in this practice.105 Imports of high priority dual-use goods from the West to Kyrgyzstan have reportedly jumped by over 1,682%, and to Kazakhstan by more than 333%.
123.It is evident that Russia is increasing its own outreach in these countries to counter Western attempts at international isolation and mitigate the impact of sanctions. This, however, should not prompt defeatism in the West. The UK is well placed to make its own proposition to key countries in the Global South. As explained by experts Olivia O’Sullivan and Bronwen Maddox in a Chatham House research paper, in the Global South the UK can “build relationships by seeking a consistent role where it has credibility and expertise - poverty reduction, climate policy, technology governance, arms control, scientific research”.106 This resonated with evidence submitted to us by the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based transatlantic, foreign policy and national security think tank. They told us that “the UK has a prominent role on the world stage, evident by its position in the UNSC and the G7”, and that it “therefore needs to shift from a subordinate position of reliance on the US to other, more local, partnerships as well as accept greater personal responsibility”. The Society also stressed the importance of “maintaining a physical presence in regions of potential conflict”.107
124.In parallel, Russia is cultivating an “Axis of the Sanctioned”108, forging deeper connections with Iran and North Korea, both of which, in exchange for Russian oil and gas as well as diplomatic and military know-how, are supporting Russia’s war effort: North Korea has become Russia’s largest external supplier of shells, while Iran is supplying Russia with Shahed drones.109 In early June 2024, President Putin visited Pyongyang where he promised to build a new security “architecture” to counter the West. It is not clear exactly what the new agreement will involve but, for the time being, it is unlikely to be a full mutual defence treaty.110 It remains to be seen how these relationships will evolve, but an alignment of countries that are opposed to the post-World War II international order could be deeply destabilising and pose a serious threat to the West on multiple fronts.111
125.Another significant development is the deepening Sino-Russian relationship. Shortly before the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping declared that their countries’ friendship had “no limits” and there were “no ‘forbidden’ areas of co-operation”.112 The war has only brought these two countries closer together, particularly in the economic sphere. Trade between Russia and China has increased sharply since the imposition of Western sanctions, hitting record levels in each year since the invasion of Ukraine. While China has been adamant that it is not allowing weapons sales to Russia, it has provided machine tools and microelectronics which are bolstering Russia’s defence industrial base.113
126.Sino-Russian cooperation is deepening beyond the context of Ukraine, extending into areas of particular interest to UK security, such as the Arctic. As outlined in the Committee’s report, Our friends in the North: UK Strategy towards the Arctic, there is growing collaboration between Moscow and Beijing in the region. The report highlights that while China’s current footprint in the Arctic, outside of Russia, is limited, concerns about China’s long-term strategic intentions are valid, warranting close monitoring.114
127.The threat of an increasingly prominent Sino-Russian strategic alignment has been recognised by NATO members. In a NATO communiqué published at the Washington Summit in early July 2024, member countries labelled China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its “no-limits partnership” with Russia and its large-scale support for Russia’s defence industrial base.115
128.Since February 2022, the UK has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine and has often been among the first Western allies to provide some key capabilities. To date, the UK has pledged £12.7 billion in support to Ukraine, of which £7.6 billion is in military assistance. This includes £3 billion for military assistance in 2024/25. The UK is providing both lethal and non-lethal weaponry, including tanks, air defence systems and long-range precision strike missiles.116 By early 2024, the UK had trained 30,000 Ukrainian troops through its Operation Interflex and was due to train another 10,000 by the middle of the year.117
129.In providing support to Ukraine, the UK has also demonstrated a good level of cooperation and coordination with European partners. British-designed curricula were used to inform the EU’s own training mission for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and by the end of 2022 it was announced that the UK would join the EU’s Military Mobility PESCO project. Meanwhile, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, The Netherlands and Romania have contributed on a bilateral basis to Operation Interflex. Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Lithuania have also contributed financial resources to the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine, used to procure lethal and non-lethal military equipment. The UK is also part of a group of 23 nations, led by France, working to improve Ukraine’s artillery arsenal.118 The extent to which the UK collaborated with European partners was highly praised by the EU High Representative Josep Borell: “for the last two years, our co-operation with the UK in helping Kyiv resist Russia’s aggression has been nothing short of exemplary”.119
130.It is clear, also, that the US remains the key actor for European security. Some analysts have argued that it was US support that solidified European countries in their willingness to provide support to Ukraine.120 The US, however, is increasingly pivoting to the Indo-Pacific to counter its main competitor, China. This has raised concerns that the US could become less engaged in Europe at a time when war has returned to the continent. There are also uncertainties over what a potential Trump or Trumpian administration would mean for European security, with fears it could result in disengagement and embolden Russia.
131.Questions on US support extend beyond the situation in Ukraine, with broader implications for the future of the Alliance. Retired Air Marshal Edward Stringer told us, “if there is going to be a sense of a slight US retreat from the defence of Europe, it is not just the American spend and muscle that is going to be missed; it is the American brain, which in many ways has led the NATO effort”.121 According to Stringer, it is the US that has been leading standardisation efforts in NATO, with European partners following suit. Most importantly, the Air Marshal told us, if the European pillar of NATO is going to have to stand up, it will have to think through how to revamp that sense of military leadership within NATO that so far mostly came from the US.122
132.The war in Ukraine had already re-focused the UK’s security priorities towards Europe, but forging security partnerships with European allies has acquired a new urgency to mitigate against the risk of a less Europe-focused US. Labour’s manifesto set out the new Government’s ambition to “seek an ambitious new UK-EU security pact to strengthen cooperation on the threats we face. We will rebuild relationships with key European allies, including France and Germany, through increased defence and security co-operation”. This commitment has so far been backed with actions. In the very early days of this Government, the new Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon David Lammy MP, met with key European counterparts in Germany, Poland and Sweden.123 Prime Minister Keir Starmer made rapprochement with Europe a priority at both the European Political Community Meeting in Oxfordshire and at the NATO Summit in Washington. At the NATO Summit, President Joe Biden welcomed Starmer’s intention to establish closer relationships with Europe.124
133.Russia’s war on Ukraine has driven a closer UK–EU working relationship on security matters.125 However, despite the demonstrated willingness to re-engage with Europe and closer collaboration on certain projects in support of Ukraine, the new Government might find its broader goals difficult to achieve. The EU’s approach towards third-country partners remains unchanged. As Tim Lawrenson, Associate Fellow at the IISS, told us, “it is one of those areas where you would think a war in Ukraine on Europe’s borders would have changed the mindset enough to start trying to address that, but it has not happened yet, and it needs to”.126
134.There is a specific set of restrictions for non-EU countries wishing to join EU-led defence initiatives. Notably, the level of integration with the EU Single Market decides the viability of defence cooperation with EU initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The current rules for participating in EU initiatives make it virtually impossible for third countries to join. Tim Lawrenson explained that “the rules that you see in almost every one of those instruments say, in essence, that third countries are welcome to participate, but only if they accept rules that, frankly, no third country would be able to accept. It just does not work”. According to Lawrenson this explains why, for instance, there is no third-country participation in the EDF, which is the largest current programme with €8bn funding (about 15% of all EU research and development).127
135.An inquiry by the House of Lords’ European Affairs Committee gathered extensive evidence on the limits of the EU’s current rules to third country participation. Their final report, published on 31 January 2024, expressed regret that, despite the close alignment of their strategic objectives, third party rules pose a significant barrier to cooperation between the UK and the EU. The Committee urged the Government to press the case with the EU for changes to third-party rules that would facilitate greater UK engagement.128
136.These findings resonated with evidence gathered by our committee. Mr Lawrenson noted that the EU’s eagerness to effectively explore and legally spell out advanced forms of security cooperation with the UK will much depend on the latter’s willingness to commit itself to cooperation in the first place: “Those barriers are not insurmountable. There is an appetite in the EU, particularly on defence, to change some of those rules or to allow a closer relationship with the UK, not least because of the current situation, but we are not really pushing it.”129 There is now a unique opportunity to do so through a UK-EU security pact and we encourage the new Government to work creatively with the EU to overcome technical barriers.
137.Some analysts have argued that the focus on improved UK-EU cooperation should be to deliver added value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War, rather than on formal agreements.130
138.Besides EU rules, there are some inherent characteristics to European defence governance that make collaboration difficult, particularly on joint procurement. Mr Lawrenson explained that European states “see having an industry as important for their autonomous ability to act, but it is also about employment and economics in some cases”.131 Therefore, wars like the one in Ukraine, in the end, produce competitions between states in production and between their national defence industrial champions. Air Marshal Stringer elaborated on how these inherent dynamics can affect warfighting: “if you look across Europe, part of the problem is that each country has its own champion, and it sponsors that champion. Everybody is procuring one or two of some quite expensive stuff. That is very unwieldy, and it is very difficult to pull all that together and fight a conflict with it”.132
139.In the process of revamping a UK-EU security partnership it is therefore important to think about European defence cooperation in terms of structures that can best accommodate multinational endeavours in the inherently competitive European defence industrial base. The Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) published by the Johnson Government in March 2021 introduced partnering principles for defence and security capability collaboration. The UK’s starting position for international programme negotiations is based on ‘best athlete’ partnering principles and full decision-making rights. The approach includes aligning objectives based on military capability, budget, international influence and industrial policy, and establishing a delivery-focused government and industry framework with clear accountability and minimal bureaucracy. Partnerships should be based on national strengths with proportionate returns on investment, collaboratively developed and owned technology and a common long-term support strategy.133
140.The partnering approach introduced by the DSIS has so far underpinned the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between the UK, Italy and Japan. It could extend beyond it and inform a framework for pragmatic cooperation with EU partners.
141.The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF, see Box 1) represents another success story of international defence cooperation and it could have conductive power towards promoting similar formats in Europe. Lord Peach told us that the JEF could become a forum for closer cooperation: “We have quite a lot we can learn from our Scandinavian friends and their industries. Perhaps in future reviews we should be looking to work with like-minded, friendly industry groups and groupings, rather than having to do everything individually”.134
The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a UK-led coalition of ten northern European countries. It provides a collective military capability, deterrent, and expeditionary force focused on security in the High North, North Atlantic, and Baltic Sea region. The Foundation Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2015, and full operational capability was declared in 2018. The JEF is designed to complement NATO and other existing alliances. The UK acts as the principal decision-maker, with other member states deciding whether to contribute forces or otherwise participate in the activity or operation. The JEF member states are the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. |
Source: Joint Expeditionary Force, ‘About the JEF’: https://jefnations.org/about-the-jef/ [accessed 16 September 2024]
142.Similarly, Air Marshal Stringer suggested that the UK could use the JEF as a testbed for building a shared and integrated defence industrial base: “If we get that right and we burden-share across those 10 nations, this will be a great example for NATO and EU nations that are going to have to do the same thing”.135
143.The war in Ukraine has thrown the role of alliances at a time of war into the spotlight. Following the invasion, Russia is attempting to offset its decline in relations with the West by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key Global South countries, including India. This has allowed Russia to undermine the effectiveness of Western sanctions and avoid international isolation, while also increasing its strategic depth.
144.Russia’s collaboration with China, Iran and North Korea, in particular, is of concern. It could lead to a substantial deterioration of the threat environment we face and pose a significant strategic challenge to the West.
145.We recognise that there are limited options for the UK Government to respond to this challenge, but it should aim to maintain the broadest possible coalition of countries to counter Russian narratives and send clear signals about unacceptable behaviour.
146.As the UK Government is facing a world where the Global South is becoming more assertive, with some countries leaning towards China or Russia, it is vital for the UK to be more proactive and have a strategy on how to engage with the Global South. Specifically, the UK should build relationships by seeking a consistent role where it has credibility and expertise. In particular, the UK Government should leverage diplomacy and reinvigorate its role as an international development actor to offer an alternative value proposition to those countries in the Global South particularly exposed to Russian and Chinese influence.
147.To counter the neo-colonial narrative deployed by Moscow in the Global South, diplomatic efforts of the UK and its Western allies should keep the focus on Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and portray Russian actions in Ukraine as imperialistic.
148.We welcome the communiqué agreed by NATO members at the Washington Summit labelling China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This reinforces the evidence we heard that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a window of opportunity for the deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship.
149.It is imperative that the UK Government continues to pay close attention to the development of the Sino-Russian relationship, both in the context of the Ukraine war and beyond. In addition to developing distinct strategies for Russia and China, the Government should develop a comprehensive strategy that takes account of the potential for a deepening Sino-Russian relationship, particularly in critical areas for UK security, such as the Arctic.
150.The UK has shown leadership in providing military support for Ukraine and has developed a good level of cooperation and co-ordination with European partners. We welcome the new Government’s commitment to negotiate an ambitious security pact with the EU. This could represent an important step towards rebuilding credible conventional deterrence.
151.There are, however, challenges within EU rules and practice to third-country participation. We therefore recommend that the new Government starts to discuss third-country involvement rules early on in any negotiations to understand the EU’s willingness to adjust them, which would provide clarity on the parameters for the negotiations.
152.The Government should ensure that pragmatism underpins a security deal with the EU. The purpose of any UK–EU cooperation should first and foremost be to deliver additional value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War. Negotiations should prioritise pragmatic areas for cooperation, rather than institutional landmarks.
153.We have received persuasive evidence about the value of the JEF and its potential as a testbed for other formats of defence cooperation with European partners.
154.The Government should maintain the UK’s leadership role within the JEF and set ambitious objectives for the initiative, such as closer industrial integration among the member countries. There are lessons learnt from the JEF that can be applied to the broader European context. We urge the Government to explore how a similar format could be applied with a different set of countries to tackle a different mission.
155.The United States has long been a cornerstone of European security, but it is also reasonable to expect a gradual shifting of US priorities, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming US election. The trajectory of a re-focus towards the Indo-Pacific region is clear.
156.As we continue to rely on the vital yet evolving partnership with the US, the Government and its European allies must visibly increase their preparedness by committing more resources—both human and financial—towards our collective security.
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101 Chatham House, ‘Russia is using the Soviet playbook in the Global South to challenge the West—and it is working’, (16 May 2024): https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working [accessed 16 September 2024]; European Parliamentary Research Service, Russia in Africa: An Atlas (February 2024): https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/757654/EPRS_BRI(2024)757654_EN.pdf [accessed 16 September 2024]
102 President of Russia, ‘Opening of the Russia-Latin America Parliamentary Congress’ (29 September 2023): http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72401 [accessed 16 September 2024]
103 Internationale Politik Quarterly, ‘The Global South is a Geopolitical Reality’ (29 June 2023): https://ip-quarterly.com/en/global-south-geopolitical-reality [accessed 16 September 2024]
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105 Euractiv, ‘EU sanctions on Russia “massively circumvented” via third countries, study finds’: https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eu-sanctions-on-russia-massively-circumvented-via-third-countries-study-finds/ [accessed 16 September 2024]. On Turkey, see: Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Centre, ‘Closer ties to the West don’t mean Turkey will give up on Russia’ (26 February 2024): https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/02/closer-ties-to-the-west-dont-mean-turkey-will-give-up-on-russia?lang=en [accessed 16 September 2024].
106 Chatham House, ‘Three foreign policy priorities for the next UK government’ (14 May 2024), p 34: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/three-foreign-policy-priorities-next-uk-government [accessed 16 September 2024]
108 Foreign Affairs, ‘Russia’s Axis of the Sanctioned’ (6 October 2023): https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-axis-sanctioned [accessed 16 September 2024]
109 Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea’ (22 May 2024): https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea [accessed 16 September 2024]
110 ‘Putin lands in North Korea to sign security deal and meet Kim Jong-un’ The Times (18 June 2024): available at https://www.thetimes.com/world/asia/article/putin-to-sign-north-korean-security-deal-on-first-visit-since-2000-b5hk7rvhq?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Best%20of%20Times%20-%20Wednesday%2019th%20June%202024&utm_term=audience_BEST_OF_TIMES [accessed 16 September 2024]
111 Foreign Affairs, ‘Russia’s Axis of the Sanctioned’ (6 October 2023): https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-axis-sanctioned [accessed 16 September 2024]. See also: Fox News, ‘“We haven’t seen a threat like this since WWII, Gen. Kean warns”’, (20 June 2024): https://www.foxnews.com/media/we-havent-seen-threat-like-since-wwii-jack-keane-warns [accessed 16 September 2024].
112 President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China’ (4 February 2022): http://www.en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 [accessed 16 September 2024]
113 CNN Business, ‘How the Ukraine war brought China and Russia closer together’ (15 May 2024): https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/15/business/china-russia-ties-ukraine-war-intl-hnk-dg/index.html [accessed 16 September 2024]
114 International Relations and Defence Committee, Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic (1st Report, Session 2023-4, HL Paper 8)
115 NATO, ‘Washington Summit Declaration’ (10 July 2024): https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm [accessed 16 September 2024]
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117 Ministry of Defence, The Rt Hon Grant Shapps and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak, Press release: 30,000 Ukrainian recruits trained in largest UK military training effort since the Second World War on 10 November 2023: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/30000-ukrainian-recruits-trained-in-largest-uk-military-training-effort-since-second-world-war [accessed 16 September 2024]
118 Centre for European Reform, Working Hand in Hand? EU-UK Co-operation in Supporting Ukraine (May 2024): cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/working-hand-hand-eu-uk-co-operation-supporting-ukraine#FN-5 [accessed 16 September 2024]
119 Josep Borrell Fontelles, ‘In a dangerous world, Europe and Britain need each other’, EEAS (21 July 2024): available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/dangerous-world-europe-and-britain-need-each-other_en [accessed 16 September 2024]
120 The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Challenges and barriers that limit the productivity and competitiveness of UK defence supply chains (July 2021): https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/uk-and-european-security-five-key-lessons-ukraine-war [accessed 16 September 2024]
123 BBC News, ‘New foreign secretary wants to reset EU-UK ties’ (7 July 2024): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cne4wypn23wo [accessed 16 September 2024]
124 Politico, ‘The Tories are gone—and Britain is moving closer to Europe again’ (12 July 2024): https://www.politico.eu/article/keir-starmer-britain-europe-closer-ties-joe-biden-alliance-backing/ [accessed 16 September 2024]
125 European Affairs Committee, The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK– EU relationship (First Report, Session 2023–4, HL Paper 48)
128 European Affairs Committee, The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU relationship (First Report, Session 2023–4, HL Paper 48)
130 The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), What can the new government’s proposed EU-UK security pact achieve? (8 July 2024): https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/what-can-new-governments-proposed-uk-eu-security-pact-achieve [accessed 16 September 2024]
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