Ukraine: a wake-up call Contents

Chapter 4: Countering aerial threats

157.Missile and drone warfare remained a prominent feature of the war in Ukraine throughout the lifetime of this inquiry. Ukraine has repeatedly called for Western support for their air defences as Russia intensified its missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and on Ukraine’s energy grid, causing widespread electricity blackouts and injuring and killing civilians.136

158.The proliferation of drone systems has inserted a new operational layer below the traditional air domain, while maritime drones have also played a key role in offensive strikes in the Black Sea.137

Absence of air superiority

159.Witnesses to this inquiry repeatedly underscored the importance of air superiority, without which a conflict can fast turn into an attritional land war, as has been the case in Ukraine.

160.James Black, Assistant Director at RAND Europe, noted that both sides in the war have failed to exert air superiority, which has been a “particularly galling” situation for Russia as the side with more substantial capabilities at the start of the conflict.138

161.Ukraine has surprised analysts by its ability to deny Russia air superiority, despite Russia’s larger initial weapon stocks and more sophisticated platforms.139 At the beginning of the invasion, the Russian air force had a greater than 10 to 1 advantage over Ukraine in total combat aircraft and deployed around 350 aircraft for this war.140 However, a patchwork of Ukrainian air defence measures has been successful at stopping incoming missile threats and limiting the damage of Russian air assaults. Missiles have also played a critical role in the maritime domain, with Ukrainian missiles sinking the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, on 14 April 2022.141

162.Over the course of our inquiry, Russia stepped up its air campaign just as Ukraine’s air defence systems were being depleted while waiting for the US Congress to approve its military aid package. In that time, Russia was able to damage parts of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure142 and exert localised air superiority in pursuit of specific tactical gains. This has been observed in eastern Ukraine, where the use of glide bombs was instrumental in Russia gaining control of the town of Avdiivka—often described as the gateway to Donetsk—in February of this year. Russia has learned lessons from this approach, which it is now also applying in Kharkiv.143

163.Despite recent localised gains, Russia has not managed to exert overall air superiority. This has been put down to a number of factors, including the Russian forces’ inability to locate and destroy Ukraine’s aircraft and air defence systems, their restricted capabilities in the suppression and/or destruction of enemy air defences (S/DEAD), deficiencies in pilot training and knowledge of doctrine, and limited stockpiles of standoff munitions, i.e. those that can be launched from a distance to evade defensive countermeasures.144

Box 2: Suppression/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (S/DEAD)

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) focuses on temporarily suppressing enemy air defence systems, reducing their effectiveness, and allowing friendly forces to operate with less risk of being targeted. Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) aims at permanently destroying enemy air defence assets involving the use of precision-guided munitions.

Source: Northrop Grumman, ‘The Need for SEAD/DEAD’: https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/advanced-weapons/the-need-for-sead-dead [accessed 16 September 2024]

164.Enhancing air defences to deny Russia the ability to shape the ground war remains one of Ukraine’s top priorities. Without it, its ability to limit attacks on critical national infrastructure and slow or push back Russian territorial advances will be seriously comprised.

Insights for UK Defence

165.We fully endorse Lord Peach’s assessment that the “enduring lesson” emerging from this war is that “it is a folly to fight without air superiority”.145 We heard throughout our inquiry that the UK’s air defence systems have been hollowed out. This is deeply concerning. The UK’s air defences were described to us as “negligible” due to years of under-investment and an over-reliance on NATO partner capabilities.146 Witnesses were virtually unanimous in their assessment that there is a need for the UK to increase its investment in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD).147

166.To deliver air superiority, enemy threats from the air must be weakened. This can be done via Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) missions.

Box 3: Integrated air and missile defence (IAMD)

Integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) is a comprehensive approach to defending against an array of airborne threats, including aircraft, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. It uses a complex network of detection, command and control and engagement systems to detect, track and neutralise threats. Within NATO, IAMD is a continuous NATO mission, meaning it is a set of activities—underpinned by capabilities—that Allies undertake during peacetime, wartime, and crisis. In the UK, the RAF is designated as the lead service for IAMD and is responsible for promoting the use of advanced ground-based, airborne, at sea and space-based sensors, and an extensive range of air and missile capabilities, including countering uncrewed aerial systems.

Source: Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world (July 2023), pp 89–90: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64b55dd30ea2cb000d15e3fe/Defence_Command_Paper_2023_Defence_s_response_to_a_more_contested_and_volatile_world.pdf [accessed 1’6 September 2024]

167.We heard that the UK lacks suppression and destruction of enemy air defence capabilities, having retired the Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) in 2013.148 The ability to conduct long-range strikes from sea, in addition to land and air, is also crucial to DEAD. Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), suggested that Royal Navy ships have become “well-defended porcupines”, in that they can protect themselves but have an “insufficient capability” to conduct long-range strikes.149

168.Unlike Ukraine, the UK is comparatively protected by geographical distance from attacks by ground-based short-range missiles (and drones). However, there is no cause for complacency. In case of conflict between NATO and Russia, the UK would become an attractive target as it serves as the primary base for US forces entering Europe. Despite protections afforded by geography, the UK is still vulnerable to attacks from long-range missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and standoff munitions fired by combat aircraft and stealth fighters. Additionally, it cannot rely on European NATO allies to provide IAMD. The US is the only NATO member with substantial S/DEAD capabilities—no European NATO air forces have sufficient expertise or munitions stocks to conduct suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) at scale.150 This reliance on the US for Europe’s air defences is unsustainable. Should a future confrontation with Russia coincide with a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, there would likely be fewer US military assets available to reinforce Europe.

169.The Defence Command Paper published in 2023 noted that the UK would be stepping up efforts to deliver an integrated air and missile defence to protect itself “against attack from the skies, both overseas and at home”. The paper described the threat from the air as “at its most acute for over 30 years–as evidenced in the war in Ukraine”.151

170.In written evidence, the Ministry of Defence recognised the importance of IAMD and committed to enhancing “extant” IAMD capability.152 It referred to the planned upgrades to the UK’s maritime-based Sea Viper air defence system, which has Initial Operating Capability scheduled for February 2028,153 and the UK’s commitment to contribute a Ballistic Missile Defence Radar to NATO. The MoD’s response also highlighted the DIAMOND initiative (Delivering Integrated Air and Missile Operational Networked Defences) launched by the UK, which aims to promote air and missile defence interoperability within Europe in support of NATO, and the immediate focus of which is to increase the use of Ground-Based Air Defence.154

171.NATO leaders acknowledged the importance of IAMD at the 2023 Vilnius summit, with the Vilnius declaration making some commitments towards improving the readiness, preparedness, and interoperability of NATO’s IAMD, through regular training and rotational presence of air defence systems and capabilities across SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the eastern flank.155

172.While these developments are welcome, we note that they are still very much in their infancy and will require greater prioritisation, as well as significant time and investment to mature. IAMD and S/DEAD capabilities come at significant financial cost, both in terms of equipment and training.156 According to NATO’s own internal calculations, Europe currently only has a fraction of the air defence capabilities needed to protect its eastern flank.157

173.We have gathered persuasive evidence in favour of sustaining a collaborative approach to IAMD. Working with our European NATO partners on interoperability and joint procurement to fill capability gaps makes great sense and can manage some of the high costs involved by helping to deliver economies of scale.

174.Thales noted that whilst they have strong air defence experience and capability across Europe, it is important to recognise that no one industrial partner has the complete, ‘box ready’ solution to IAMD. As a result, a collaborative approach is key, and lessons on how this might come about can be drawn from other collaborative defence endeavours. Thales suggested that “it is worth considering whether a partnership style approach similar to the Aircraft Carrier Alliance or Team Tempest158 would [be] an appropriate construct to deliver IAMD for the UK”.159

175.As Stepan Stepanenko, Research Director of the Forum for Foreign Relations, pointed out, “the effectiveness of the UK’s air defence system hinges significantly on interoperability with systems operated by NATO allies”.160 This would ensure that in times of crisis, UK defence assets can seamlessly integrate with multinational defence mechanisms, enhancing the collective response efficacy and strategic adaptability of allied forces. He added that interoperability is “critical for maintaining a cohesive and unified defensive posture along NATO’s borders, particularly in scenarios that mirror the threats observed in Ukraine”.161

176.European partners are already cooperating on air defences via the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) aimed at improving European air defences and making them more interoperable through joint procurement, maintenance, logistics, and training, as well as through the exchange of air surveillance data.

Box 4: The European Sky Shield Initiative

The German MoD had identified gaps in its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) architecture prior to 2022. Specifically, it recognised the need to obtain Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS), undergo Patriot modernisation, and enhance territorial ballistic missile defence. The €100 billion special fund announced on 27 February 2022 allowed the Bundeswehr to move its AMD objectives from the planning to the procurement phase. On 29 August 2022, Chancellor Scholz announced that Germany’s European partners would be invited to join, formally setting up the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). On 14 September, the Bundeswehr State Secretary briefed representatives of various European countries on Germany’s plans. Namely, that Germany would procure German IRIS-T3, American Patriot, and Israeli Arrow-3 systems and that these capabilities could be procured together with European allies. The ESSI seeks to establish a ground-based integrated European air defence system with anti-ballistic missile capability.

Sources: ‘Germany to set up €100bn fund to boost its military strength’, The Guardian (27 February 2022): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/germany-set-up-fund-boost-military-strength-ukraine-putin [accessed 16 September 2024]; ‘Scholz revives vision for German-led air defense network in Europe’, Defense News (29 August 2022): https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/08/29/scholz-revives-vision-for-german-led-air-defense-network-in-europe/ [accessed 16 September 2024]

177.The UK is in talks to join the ESSI.162 However, some experts have expressed concern that extending an effective missile shield over the entirety of NATO’s European territory would be practically unfeasible and prohibitively expensive.163 Moving forward, it is important to assess the opportunities and challenges of delivering UK air defence collectively, and to engage with the ESSI accordingly.

178.The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the importance of air superiority, with air defences critical to avoiding an attritional ground conflict.

179.Under-investment has led to substantial vulnerabilities in the UK’s (and Europe’s) ability to defend itself from airborne threats. In the context of a worsening security environment, this is deeply concerning, and the new Government should pay greater attention to homeland defence.

180.Increasing investment in integrated air and missile defence and a credible plan to deliver operational S/DEAD capabilities in close collaboration with our European NATO allies should therefore be high on the list of defence priorities for the new Government.

181.European countries are coming together to deliver air defences collectively via the European Sky Shield Initiative, in which the previous Government had expressed an interest. We call on the new Government to provide an assessment of the merits of joining the initiative and update us on progress.

182.Vulnerabilities extend to the maritime domain. While the UK does have a maritime missile capability in the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, further investment is required to enable the Royal Navy to be deployed offensively and better project lethality.

The use of drones in Ukraine

183.Drones have become ubiquitous in the war in Ukraine and are being used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) purposes, as well as for direct attacks. This is true both for cheaper, mass-produced commercial models and for higher-end types purposefully designed for warfare.

184.Alongside the more expensive missile systems, both sides have utilised cheaper, mass-produced Chinese and Iranian-made drones. It is worth noting that the drones used in the Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel in April 2024 were of a similar design to those being used in the war in Ukraine and were employed using the same strategy of overwhelming air defences with a layered assault.164

185.We heard from Dr Ulrike Franke, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, that drones “are omnipresent on the battlefield” in numbers which are “truly staggering”.165 She stressed that “we are talking about hundreds of thousands of small drone systems being used, and lost, every month”.166 The high attrition rate of drones is partly due to the regular occurrence of “fratricide” as it can be “impossible to distinguish between friendly and hostile systems”.167

186.Russia is producing around 300,000 drone units per month and Ukraine is ramping up drone production to 150,000 per month, increasing from 50,000 in November 2023, with a view to producing two million First Person View168 drones by the end of the current year.169

187.The ubiquity of aerial drones has inserted an extra layer of weaponry between the land and air domains and has “augment[ed] the existing capabilities that both sides have, particularly offering new defensive options in the absence of air superiority”.170 First-person view drones have contributed to the increasing transparency of the battlefield due to their intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and those which have a kamikaze, or exploding, function have been used to conduct direct attacks. Despite their limited payload, they have been effective as anti-tank weapons and in swarm attacks.171

188.In May 2024, six NATO countries (Finland, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) announced that they are planning to develop a “wall” of co-ordinated drone systems to protect their borders from Russia.172

189.The use of drones in Ukraine has led to a continuous battle of technological one-upmanship, with each side improvising and innovating in the field to secure a temporary strategic advantage. Both sides in the war have invested heavily in electronic warfare to counter the threat of drones by jamming or spoofing GPS signals. It has been reported that, to date, 75% of drones on the battlefield in Ukraine have been lost to electronic warfare.173 Increasingly, when latest jamming technologies have become obsolete, both sides have also improvised by employing conventional shotguns for anti-drone operations.174

190.Advantages gained in drone warfare are often temporary as both sides are constantly competing for strategic advantage. Rapid learning and adaptation have been critical in an environment where adversaries are evenly matched. Both Russia and Ukraine are developing drones guided by artificial intelligence to circumvent jamming caused by electronic warfare systems.175

191.There is also the challenge of “cost asymmetry”, as taking down cheaper drones with expensive missiles is “unpalatable to the defender”.176 The UK’s high-power laser weapon, DragonFire, which is due to be in-service by 2027, could act as a cost-effective drone counter measure, contingent on new procurement reforms being implemented and technical challenges being overcome. It is worth bearing in mind that the US, which has been testing laser weapons for decades, has only recently been able to deploy a laser weapon which targets drones.177

192.The adaptability of drone systems can be enhanced by increasing their “modularity” so that there is more opportunity to introduce improvements incrementally. This approach is often referred to as spiral development and would ensure that offensive drone systems remained lethal in the face of new developments in electronic warfare. Dr Franke advocated for investment in a mixture of both high and low-cost solutions, supported by modularity:

“Sophistication and higher price are not something that we need to abandon. We need to think much more about modularity in these sophisticated systems—the ability to exchange, modernise, or even just change certain parts of your system as a response to a change in context or a change in enemy capability, and things like that”.178

Implications of drone warfare for the naval domain

193.In the naval domain, amphibious drones (both uncrewed surface vessels and uncrewed underwater vessels) have been “strategically decisive” in degrading Russia’s Black Sea fleet, exposing the vulnerability of shore-based maritime assets to uncrewed systems.179

194.These attacks have denied Russia the ability to blockade grain and other exports from leaving Ukrainian ports, a situation which would have had “a wider impact on inflation and food security or insecurity in parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East and north Africa”.180 However, it is worth noting that the Black Sea Fleet is one of the “less powerful components” of the Russian Navy and that, in a conflict with Russia, the UK would face Russia’s Northern Fleet which is “considerably more robust”.181

195.Nonetheless, there are some lessons that can be drawn. Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, highlighted the challenges of establishing a naval presence and projecting power in the littoral space off coasts amid the proliferation of weapons such as anti-ship missiles, uncrewed surface vessels, and drones at sea, “for all navies, it highlights that operating close to land, trying to impose naval presence and power in the littoral space off coasts, is becoming more challenging”.182

196.The war in Ukraine has exposed the sheer variety of possible drone threats in a conflict scenario, ranging from disposable and commercially available drones to high-end, sophisticated ones.

197.The UK should invest in research and development to maintain a strategic edge in drone technology (including amphibious drones), and support the rapid development of new technologies that can compete in contested environments. Given the pace of technological adaptations on and off the battlefield, UK Defence should place greater emphasis on spiral development and modularity to support continuous adaptation.

198.Military training should be revised to incorporate learning on the use of drones in Ukraine across all domains.

136 ‘Ukraine endures widespread blackouts as Russia attacks critical infrastructure’, The Guardian (23 June 2024): https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/23/ukraine-endures-widespread-blackouts-as-russia-attacks-critical-infrastructure [accessed 16 September 2024]

137 Q 13 (James Black) and Q 59 (Nick Childs)

138 Q 12 (James Black)

139 Q 12 (James Black)

140 Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Russia-Ukraine War’s Strategic Implications (20 February 2024): https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/9788893683159.pdf [accessed 16 September 2024]

141 BBC News, ‘Russian warship: Moskva sinks in Black Sea’ (15 April 2022): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61114843 [accessed 16 September 2024]

142 ‘Ukraine’s air defence struggle highlights risks to Israel’, The Financial Times (17 April 2024): available at https://www.ft.com/content/3599e470-c5aa-4e7e-b34c-4f157be956b6 [accessed 16 September 2024]

143 Unguided demolition bombs have been turned into standoff precision weapons by retrofitting them with GLONASS guidance systems. See also: Institute for the Study of War, Russian offensive campaign assessment (3 March 2024): https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%204%2C%202024%20%28PDF%29.pdf [accessed 16 September 2024] and The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), In Ukraine, Russia is beginning to compound advantages (8 July 2024): https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russia-beginning-compound-advantages [accessed 16 September 2024].

144 Q 12 (James Black) and written evidence from The Human Security Centre (IUD0010).

145 Q 57 (Air Chief Marshal the Lord Peach)

146 Written evidence from Northrop Grumman (IUD0007)

147 Q 16 (James Black); written evidence from Dr Stepan Stepanenko and John Holmes (IUD0004), the Human Security Centre (IUD0010), Prof Vince Connelly (IUD0012), and Thales (IUD0016)

148 Written evidence from Northrop Grumman (IUD0007)

149 Q 65 (Nick Childs)

150 Professor Justin Bronk, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), In Ukraine, Russia is beginning to compound advantages (February 2023): https://static.rusi.org/whr_regenerating-warfighting-credibility-nato_0.pdf [accessed 16 September 2024]

151 Ministry of Defence, Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world, CP 901 (July 2023), p 89: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64b55dd30ea2cb000d15e3fe/Defence_Command_Paper_2023_Defence_s_response_to_a_more_contested_and_volatile_world.pdf [accessed 16 September 2024]

152 Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence (IUD0015)

153 UK Defence Journal, ‘UK outlines when Destroyers will get missile upgrades’: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-outlines-when-destroyers-will-get-missile-upgrades/ [accessed: 16 September 2024]

154 Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence (IUD0015)

155 NATO, ‘Vilnius Summit Communiqué’: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm [accessed 16 September 2024]

156 See, for example: King’s College London, European Integrated Air and Missile Defence in NATO: Progress and Persistent Challenges (October 2023), p 10: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/warstudies/assets/paper-16-julia
-muravska-european-
integrated-air-and-missile-defence.pdf
[accessed 16 September 2024] and The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), In Ukraine, Russia is beginning to compound advantages (8 July 2024): https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russia-beginning-compound-advantages [accessed 16 September 2024].

157 ‘Nato has just 5% of air defences needed to protect eastern flank’, The Financial Times (29 May 2024): available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm [accessed 16 September 2024]

158 The Aircraft Carrier Alliance is a partnership between BAE Systems, Babcock, Thales UK, and the UK Ministry of Defence, formed to design and build the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy. Team Tempest encompasses four industry partners, BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, Leonardo and MBDA working together with the RAF’s Rapid Capabilities Office and the UK Ministry of Defence to deliver the RAF’s next generation combat aircraft, coming into service from 2035 to replace the Typhoon.

159 Written evidence from Thales (IUD0016)

160 Written evidence from Dr Stepan Stepanenko and John Holmes (IUD0004)

161 Written evidence from Dr Stepan Stepanenko and John Holmes (IUD0004)

162 ‘Britain in talks to join Europe’s new “Sky Shield”’, The Sun (30 April 2024): available at https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/27644129/britain-europe-air-defence-system-grant-shapps/ [accessed 16 September 2024]

163 iNews, ‘Would a missile shield like Israel’s Iron Dome stop a Russian attack on Britain?’ (6 May 2024): https://www.pressreader.com/uk/inews/20240506/281994677572729 [accessed 16 September 2024]

164 The Hill, ‘Iran’s attack on Israel built on lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine’ (7 July 2024): https://thehill.com/policy/international/4595937-irans-attack-on-israel-built-on-lessons-from-russias-war-in-ukraine/ [accessed 16 September 2024]

165 Q 11 (Dr Ulrike Franke)

166 Q 11 (Dr Ulrike Franke)

167 Written evidence from Northrop Grumman (IUD0007)

168 First Person View drones have a camera that wirelessly transmits a video feed to the operator, who has a first-person view of the environment where the drone flies.

169 Written evidence from Dr Stepan Stepanenko and John Holmes (IUD0004)

170 Q 11 (James Black)

171 Q 12 (James Black)

172 ‘Six Nato Countries plan “drone wall” to defend borders with Russia’, The Financial Times (26 May 2024): available at https://www.ft.com/content/949db465-cd27-4c66-9908-c2faa80b602b [accessed 16 September 2024]

173 Defense News, ‘Small drones will soon lose combat advantage, French army chief says’ (19 June 2024): https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/06/19/small-drones-will-soon-lose-combat-advantage-french-army-chief-says/ [accessed 16 September 2024]

174 Forbes, ‘Shotguns are Russia’s last line of Defense against Drones’ (6 May 2024): https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/05/09/shotguns-are-russias-last-defense-against-drones/ [accessed 16 September 2024]

175 Reuters, ‘How drone combat in Ukraine is changing warfare’ (26 March 2024): https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/ [accessed 16 September 2024]. For further information on the use of artificial intelligence in weapons systems and associated risks, particularly in relation to targeting, see: AI in Weapon Systems Committee, Proceed with Caution: Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems (Report of Session 2023–2024, HL Paper 16).

176 Q 11 (James Black)

177 Forbes, ‘U.S. Military is using laser weapons in battle’ (6 May 2024): https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2024/05/06/army-laser-weapons-drones/?sh=7297a911dd70 [accessed 16 September 2024]

178 Q 16 (Dr Ulrike Franke)

179 Q 13 (James Black)

180 Q 13 (James Black)

181 Written evidence from The Human Security Centre (IUD0010)

182 Q 59 (Nick Childs)




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