• Accessibility
• Email alerts
• RSS feeds
• Contact us

Ukraine: a wake-up call Contents

---

Chapter 5: Space, cyber and the electromagnetic environment

199.Advanced economies rely heavily on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), which provide positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services. They are essential to the operation of critical national infrastructure and are used, for example, to synchronise mobile phone call time-stamp financial transactions, and support safe travel by aircraft, ships, trains, and road vehicles. A 2023 report published by London Economics on the economic impact of a disruption to GNSS in the UK found that a seven-day outage could cause an economic loss of £7.64 billion.183

200.Aside from having critical civilian applications, satellites are essential to defence, feeding into systems that deliver secure communications; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR); and PNT services. They also support the functioning of networked artillery systems and long-range precision ammunition.

201.Satellites are so integral to the conduct of modern warfare that it is unsurprising that attacks and interference have featured heavily in the war in Ukraine, mostly in the form of cyber and electromagnetic attacks.

Box 5: Defining electromagnetic and cyber warfare

NATO defines electromagnetic warfare (EW) as a “military action that exploits electromagnetic energy to provide situational awareness and create offensive and defensive effects”. Jamming of electromagnetic signals to disrupt communications and navigation systems is a typical feature of EW, as is electronic masking to reduce one’s electromagnetic footprint, or the use of electromagnetic energy to confuse or deceive an enemy system. In this report we use the term electromagnetic and electronic warfare interchangeably. Electromagnetic warfare is distinct from cyber warfare. NATO policy documents explain that: “Broadly speaking, cyber operations use various hacking techniques to infiltrate and disrupt a target’s computer systems, in order to obtain intelligence or degrade the target’s capabilities. EW uses directed energy to cut off access to the electromagnetic spectrum, blocking signals between technologies and rendering them inoperable.”

Source: NATO, ‘Electromagnetic warfare’: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_80906.htm [accessed 16 September 2024]

202.Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), which are designed to incapacitate or destroy satellites through a kinetic attack in space, have not yet been used in warfare. However, China, India, Russia, and the United States have successfully shot down their own satellites to demonstrate their ASAT capabilities.184 ASAT tests are rare, as space powers recognise that the debris generated from these physical attacks can impact the orbits of their own satellites.185 Nonetheless, months before the start of the war, in November 2021, Russia conducted an ASAT test, destroying one of their defunct Soviet-era satellites. In hindsight, this could be interpreted as a show of force prior to the invasion of Ukraine. In May 2024, the US announced that it believed Russia had likely launched an anti-satellite weapon into low-earth orbit.186 This raised concerns that as Russia’s space capabilities are currently lagging behind those of other space powers (last year, Russia only launched 60 satellites while the US launched 2,221) there may be a scenario where Russia would be willing to forfeit its own use of an orbit in order to degrade and destroy it for others.187

203.Yet despite this, for now it is in the cyber and electromagnetic arenas that Ukraine’s war in space is being played out.

Cyber warfare in Ukraine

204.Space capabilities encompass “ground control, uplink, downlink, industry and supply chains”, which “can all be vulnerable to cyber attack, IP theft or kinetic attacks during crisis or times of war”.188

205.On the morning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia launched a cyber attack on the Viasat satellite network which was at the time providing internet to Ukraine. Within a matter of days, Starlink, a subsidiary of SpaceX, was able to deploy 5,000 terminal kits to Ukraine, enabling communications to be re-established via its constellation of small satellites in low-earth orbit.189

206.Aside from the Viasat satellite network attack, Russia has used cyber warfare for both disinformation purposes and to target critical national infrastructure, for example by attacking Ukraine’s biggest mobile network operator, Kyivstar, in December 2023.190

207.Although cyber operations on the Russian side have been intense and frequent, they have not had a decisive effect on the course of the war. This is predominantly the result of successful Ukrainian countermeasures, supported by state-sponsored and commercial Western capabilities. We heard that the UK provided support via GCHQ and the National Cyber Security Centre, while the US lent support via Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. In addition, Ukraine has received significant support from “cyber-threat companies such as Microsoft, the Slovakian company ESET, and Google and its cyber-threat arm, Mandiant”.191

208.The deployment of cyber capabilities is likely to be a supportive feature of modern warfare where adversaries are technologically matched, and would likely be deployed by Russia in any future conflict with NATO.

209.Both Russia and China have already demonstrated a willingness to deploy cyber attacks against the UK and its allies. The Henry Jackson Society told us that “leading up to 24th February 2022, there was a significant surge of 450% in cyber attacks originating from Russia, which continued after the invasion with a dramatic rise in distributed denial-of-service attacks against US national security targets”.192 Russian state-sponsored hackers have targeted UK parliamentarians, think tanks, and academics in recent years.193 Similarly, Chinese actors have targeted parliamentarians and the UK Electoral Commission.194 Most recently, Russian ransomware group Qilin was responsible for the theft of 300 million NHS patient records in June of this year, which led to serious disruptions in several NHS hospitals in England.195

210.These attacks serve as a reminder that the UK is vulnerable to cyber attacks and that there is a pressing need to build resilience. We heard that weak and outdated cyber security systems in the public sector and parts of critical national infrastructure (CNI) are a particular area of vulnerability (which could be exacerbated were Russia to ‘win’ in Ukraine).196 ADS emphasised that “national security is not just about traditional defence capabilities, and therefore there is a need for the UK to draw together capabilities from the security and civilian industrial base as well, to ensure a blended, total defence of the UK”.197 In short, there is a need to involve the whole of society in strengthening the UK’s resilience (see also Chapter 2).

211.Ukraine’s difficulties with damage to its CNI—which requires organised manpower to repair—underscore the significance of this issue. The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that cyber attacks and attacks on CNI will likely be a feature of future conflicts.198 Professor Michael Clarke warned that the UK has some vulnerabilities in this regard, including “weak and outdated cyber security systems in the public sector and in areas of critical national infrastructure. Russia is already the greatest single source of ongoing cyberattack against the UK and the number and severity of attacks might increase exponentially”.199 The dismantling of the UK’s Civil Defence infrastructure following the end of the Cold War has created a gap, as there is no equivalent to the USA’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or similar agencies found in other EU states. Instead, although the UK has a National Protective Security Authority, the responsibility for protecting critical national infrastructure is fragmented across police forces, local authorities, and government departments.

Electromagnetic (EW) warfare in Ukraine

212.The war in Ukraine offers a unique case study for understanding the role of electromagnetic warfare in modern conflict. Air Chief Marshal the Lord Peach, former Chief of the Defence Staff and Chair of the NATO Military Committee, told us that the war in Ukraine “is the densest, most complex and dangerous electronic operating environment we have ever seen”, especially in comparison to past conflicts of an expeditionary nature.200

213.Electronic or electromagnetic warfare exploits the electromagnetic spectrum for strategic gain. For example, threats can be detected by scanning for electronic signatures emitted from enemy platforms, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Once identified, energy can then be directed towards disrupting or neutralising enemy operations, often through jamming GPS signals, but also through the deployment of electronic decoys to mislead sensors. Electromagnetic warfare is also used for defensive purposes to shield personnel, platforms, communications and equipment.201

214.Since the onset of the war, both sides have employed a variety of EW tactics and technologies to gain an upper hand. On the battlefield, Ukrainian forces have successfully employed EW to disrupt Russian unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which are critical for reconnaissance and targeting. This has not only hindered Russian operational capabilities but also provided Ukrainian forces with critical intelligence and situational awareness. Conversely, Russian forces have utilised EW to jam Ukrainian communications and navigation systems, attempting to create confusion and disrupt coordination among Ukrainian units.202

215.However, Ukrainian forces have faced several challenges as a result of EW. Dr Franke, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and Mr Black, Assistant Director of the Defence and Security research group at RAND Europe, highlighted that EW has made it harder for Ukrainian counteroffensive activities to go undetected and avoid Russian interference. The increase of sensors has been a feature of this war, which has made it more difficult to move around undetected on the battlefield, meaning forces are having to be very alert to how they are managing their electronic signature.203 This has had a direct impact on command-and-control structures, as (to keep their electronic signature to a minimum) troops are often having to operate on their own, without being able to communicate with high-level commanders. Mr Black explained that EW is requiring Ukraine’s forces to be more mobile and dispersed, and to alternate between connected and disconnected states, “being seen and unseen, which forces the Ukrainian troops to operate in very different ways and demands quite different skills and aptitudes from them at different times”.204

216.The high density of electronic emissions in the conflict zone has also made it difficult to distinguish between friendly and enemy signals, which, as set out in Chapter 4 in relation to drones, has led to fratricide and operational inefficiencies.

217.Additionally, the rapid pace of technological advancements in EW has necessitated continuous adaptation and innovation, straining the resources and capabilities of Ukrainian forces.Technological one-upmanship has been a feature of this conflict, as both sides are needing to adapt and innovate to ensure platforms and capabilities, such as drones, are protected and remain lethal.

218.Electronic tactics have not been restricted to Ukraine and are part of Russia’s toolkit of hybrid attacks on the West. Russian jamming of civilian airlines is pervasive in the Baltic and Kaliningrad area, around the Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean.205 Most notably, in March 2024, it was reported that an RAF plane carrying the then Defence Secretary Grant Shapps had its GPS signal jammed while flying near Kaliningrad.206

219.Given the prominent role that electronic warfare has played in Ukraine and the UK’s vulnerability to hybrid attacks, General Sir Nick Carter’s assessment that we do not have “the electronic warfare capability that we need” should be of concern to the Government.207

The role of commercial actors

220.While the 1990–91 Gulf War was given the moniker “the first space war”, the Ukraine war has been referred to as “the first commercial space war”.208 Services provided by commercial partners have proven to be a great advantage to Ukraine, helping to counter Russian cyber and jamming activities. As set out above, SpaceX, extended free access to its Starlink satellite internet service to Ukraine shortly after Russia’s invasion in 2022. Ukraine now relies extensively on Starlink, with around 42,000 terminals used by the military, hospitals, businesses, and aid organisations.209 Companies like Microsoft, Google and ESET have been involved in counter cyber operations, while Maxar has been providing high-quality imagery of Russian activity through their satellites.210 Maxar has also played a role in documenting war crimes in Ukraine, for example by providing time-stamped satellite imagery which proved that Russian troops killed civilians in Bucha in 2022, contradicting Russian denials.211

221.Dr Franke, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, also commented that cutting-edge technological development is shifting away from the state and mainly taking place in private companies, “which is something both sides need to grapple with”.212

222.As discussed in Chapter 2, engaging with non-traditional defence suppliers has become a pressing policy priority. However, this is a relatively recent shift, and it is crucial to monitor emerging lessons from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The extensive participation of commercial entities in the Ukrainian war effort is already providing valuable insights that could inform future strategies.

223.Speaking on the benefits that commercial partnerships can offer, Theodora Ogden, Space Policy Analyst at RAND, noted that “private companies are arguably more agile than government and able to launch new systems quite rapidly”.213 This was demonstrated by the fast deployment of Starlink after Russia’s invasion. Juliana Suess, Research Fellow at RUSI, also noted that “resilience” of the full space ecosystem can be achieved through commercial partnerships, enabling “space powers to have capabilities and assets in different orbits, that work through different frequency bands, for example”.214

224.Furthermore, partnering with the commercial sector could be used to leverage emerging technologies, such as AI and Quantum, for defence purposes with an urgency that the Government would be otherwise unable to achieve on its own.215

225.We agree with the MoD’s assessment that “the ability to operate in cyberspace depends on partnerships between military, civilian and industry”.216 This applies equally to the electromagnetic environment. In an era of increasing attacks on space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and cyber, it is crucial that a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to defence, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is adopted.

226.However, the significant involvement of private companies in defence also carries risks. Ms Suess told us that “the partnership with SpaceX … has also highlighted the dangers of such an arrangement”.217 For instance, there are questions regarding the extent to which commercial companies can be relied upon for continuous service and held accountable during conflict. Ms Ogden commented that, on several occasions, Elon Musk “has reportedly risked Ukrainian access to the communications network and limited the use of Starlink, particularly in controlling Ukrainian unmanned systems in the Black Sea”.218

227.In written evidence, Dr Stepan Stepanenko, Research Director at the Forum of for Foreign Relations, and Maj Gen (Rtd) John Holmes DSO OBE MC cautioned that there are systems that are simply too sensitive and should be protected from corporate influence:

“The UK must ensure that its communication and targeting systems operate outside of external, including private and corporate, influence, ensuring continuous operation in battlefield environments. A prerequisite for this is the use of proprietary and government controlled and owned technologies, both in terms of hardware and software. Considering the cost of production and operation of such systems, and the potential danger to personnel life in case of cyberattacks, the risk of private or corporate operation is too high.”219

228.Ms Suess advised us that the distinction between the public and private sector in the space domain is not always clear cut, given that “the majority of funding for commercial ventures still comes from states and the majority of clients are still states”.220

The importance of integrating space, electromagnetic and cyber capabilities

229.We heard how, at a tactical level, the integration of space, the electromagnetic environment and cyber generates significant strategic advantages. Ms Suess pointed out that Russian operations have been hindered by a lack of integration: “ We have seen that Russia has not really been able to use its space capabilities to the full extent that one might expect of a space power … At times they are not integrated at the tactical level that would enable troops to act in a tactically relevant manner. The command-and-control structures are simply not integrated or set up to make use of space.”221 While Russia has not yet fully leveraged its space capabilities to the level one might expect of a space power, it is important to note that they are quick learners and could still leverage their capabilities in the future.

230.Defence company Northrop Grumman noted that Ukraine has managed to retain an information advantage over Russia by integrating electronic warfare capabilities with civilian sources:

“Using multiple sensors and sources on the battlefield, their military has successfully integrated data from crewed and uncrewed systems, and military and consumer sources, including mobile phones, to create actionable intelligence on the enemies’ locations and movements. In this way, Ukraine has generated a meaningful Information Advantage over Russia”.222

231.Lord Peach emphasised that one of the key lessons from Ukraine is that “the way we fight needs to be integrated. More than land, sea and air, and therefore joint, this now requires a full integration of intelligence information, space and cyber”.223

232.A pre-condition of integration is having access to a pool of people with the right technical skills across the Armed Forces. We heard different views about the existing expertise across UK Defence.

233.Lord Peach was positive about the skills available, noting that “the UK has a respectable electronic warfare industry… I reassure you that we have the skills in all three services where we need them”.224 However, General Sir Jim Hockenhull KBE ADC Gen, Commander of Strategic Command, highlighted the shortage of people and skills as a key concern in a speech delivered in February: “The area where I’ve got the greatest concern around the cyber and electromagnetic domain is in people and skills. There is a national, if not a global, shortage of the types of skills that we need for people to have in the cyber and electromagnetic domain.”225

234.Discussions about increasing mass should, therefore, not be limited to size, but also focus on recruiting and developing the right skills. General Sir Nick Carter emphasised the importance of integrating technology into training programmes: “The sorts of technologies that we deduce from what we have seen in Ukraine, such as air defence, drones, electronic warfare and robots more broadly, need to be integrated into the training.”226 This could include updating simulators and other training tools to reflect the latest advancements in military technology.

235.We also heard that there is a lack of IT expertise within the MoD and the Armed Forces. A senior IT professional working for Defence, who wished to remain anonymous, warned that although “well-motivated, experienced and trained IT professionals… exist… they are the exception and not the rule”. They also noted that “the UK is seriously in danger of being outclassed by the likes of China”.227

236.The MoD’s written submission noted that a unified career management has been introduced “to improve the armed forces’ ability to retain and develop personnel in specialist roles”, including cyber, but it is unclear what impact this has had so far. The MoD also acknowledged that there was a need to set out “a new alliance” with industry and that further investment in cyber and electronic capabilities was required.228

Responding to the rapid change of innovation

237.The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the critical role innovation and rapid adaptation play in staying ahead in the cyber and EW domains. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have continuously evolved their strategies and capabilities in response to the dynamic battlefield environment. This has necessitated continuous adaptation and innovation in the field.

238.Adaptability on the battlefield is not a new phenomenon, but new technologies are accelerating the pace at which this is happening. It is clear that future conflicts between enemies with comparable technological capabilities will require a high degree of agility and flexibility, and UK Defence needs to be ready to respond to this. Lord Peach noted the importance here of “learning the lessons from Ukrainians on manufacturing and adapting in the field”. While he was making a wider point, it also applies to cyber and electronic warfare. He added: “If you can adapt in the field, you can adapt and survive or tackle the threat. If you have to go way back across the globe to modify something over weeks and months, maybe you cannot. It is about being able to operate forward with civilians and contractors, as well as deployed forces, and understanding what works from the Ukrainians”.229 This will require a shift in how industry operates, which, at present, is not geared up for “those types of rapid feedback loops”.230

239.In addition to developing the capacity to react in real time, we learned about the significance of putting in place a more comprehensive system for compiling lessons learned on cyber and electronic warfare. The MoD’s written submission singled out the absence of a warfare centre for the Cyber and Electromagnetic domain as a “significant gap which denudes our ability to draw together a coherent analysis of domain lessons. Investment in this capability is required to ensure that we are able to draw together independent observations and insights from across Defence, understand their significance and respond accordingly”.231 At this stage it is unclear what plans, if any, the new Government has to set up such a centre.

Monitoring and protecting UK space assets

240.The creation of UK Space Command in 2021 was welcomed by witnesses, as “a single point of focus for emerging threats in the space domain”.232

241.Although there have not been any kinetic attacks on satellites in conflict, Ms Suess stressed the importance of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA). These enable UK Space Command to know “exactly where our satellites are, who is approaching them and what is around them”.233 While the UK currently collaborates with the US, sharing data collected at its RAF Fylingdales base, Ms Suess noted that the UK and Europe are still “very reliant” on the US for their SSA and SDA data.234

Conclusions and recommendations

242.Space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare (EW) are closely interlinked and have featured heavily in the Ukraine war. They will likely form an integral part of future warfare between technologically capable states.

243.It is therefore imperative that the UK enhances its space, cyber and EW capabilities, focusing on developing resilient and adaptive systems that can operate in highly contested environments, like the one we are witnessing in Ukraine.

244.The ability to conduct cyber and electronic warfare, and deploy electronic countermeasures to avoid detection, should be seen as a core capability for the UK’s Armed Forces. The Government should learn lessons from how the Ukrainians have deployed and responded to electronic warfare attacks, including through dispersal techniques, and innovative command and control structures.

245.Ukraine has shown that rapid technological innovation and adaptation are essential to stay ahead of adversaries. The Government should focus on building UK Defence’s capacity to adapt and innovate quickly in or near the battlefield.

246.Maximum strategic advantage can only be obtained if space, cyber and EW are integrated across domains. We note that under the previous Government, the MoD announced the creation of an Integration Design Authority to support integration. While this is a welcome development, it is people and skills and industry—including the leveraging of commercial partnerships—that will determine the success of such integration.

247.The new Government should work together with the private sector to formulate options for attracting high-tech talent to the defence sector and design flexible career paths that build skills and grow Defence’s expertise in cyber and electromagnetic warfare.

248.This will require training and learning lessons directly from colleagues in the Ukrainian forces and working closely with industry. The Government should adopt a more flexible approach to bringing in commercial actors, while acknowledging some of the unique challenges these partnerships can entail around, for example, accountability or reliability.

249.The Government should ensure that cyber, EW and emerging technologies are fully integrated into the next edition of the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. In addition, it should give serious consideration to the creation of a warfare centre for the cyber and electromagnetic domain.

250.Developments in Ukraine are relevant to UK national security and, in particular, the protection of its critical national infrastructure (CNI).

251.The reliance of modern economies on space-based technologies makes them a prime target for hybrid attacks. Cyber and electronic tactics deployed in Ukraine by Russia have been used elsewhere, including against the UK and its allies. It is therefore essential that the new Government focuses on building greater resilience into the UK’s CNI.

252.The UK’s fragmented police forces and limited military resources may struggle to handle the increased civil defence burden in the event of hostile actions, such as sabotage of CNI. The Government should thus consider the merits of establishing a centralised civil defence agency, akin to the US’ Federal Emergency Management Agency.

253.The new Government should also invest in Space Situational Awareness and Space Domain Awareness capabilities, for which it heavily relies on the US.

---

• A-Z index
• Glossary
• Contact us
• Freedom of Information
• Jobs
• Using this website
• Copyright