Summary of conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1.This report, as usual, provides conclusions and recommendations for the Government to respond to within two months. We are additionally submitting this report to the Strategic Defence Review for consideration by the external reviewers. We welcome that the new Government has moved swiftly to launch its Strategic Defence Review. (Paragraph 5)
2.Given the deteriorating global threat environment, the Government cannot afford to delay setting defence priorities and articulating how much money will be available to UK Defence. The Government should ensure that the Review is completed to schedule, and implement its findings promptly. We call on the Government to keep the Committee updated on the Review’s progress and subsequent implementation. (Paragraph 6)
3.As highlighted in our 2023 report, ‘UK defence policy: from aspiration to reality?’, Government policy documents often fail to clearly articulate the Government’s priorities and the hard choices that need to be made in the face of competing pressures on limited resources. We call on the new Government to ensure that its response to the Strategic Defence Review provides a clear sense of the Government’s priorities for UK Defence and how it plans to turn aspirations into practice. (Paragraph 7)
4.The new Government has yet to set the levels of future defence spending, pending the outcome of the review. It remains to be seen if 2.5% of GDP represents a suitable increase in defence spending, and we note that any increase should be seen in the context of decades-long defence cuts and recent inflationary pressures on the defence budget. Unless significant efficiencies are found, laser-sharp priorities are set and hard trade-offs are made, an increase to 2.5% of GDP may not be enough to meet the UK’s growing defence needs. (Paragraph 8)
5.We also acknowledge that some of the recommendations in this report will have cost implications. While there will be other pressing demands on the UK Budget, the new Government should nonetheless give careful and swift consideration to our recommendations. (Paragraph 9)
The underlying importance of deterrence
6.Deterrence is key to avoiding future conflict. In light of the ongoing threat from Russia, and the deteriorating global security environment, there is a need to re-establish credible deterrence in the UK and across Europe. This includes both nuclear and conventional deterrence. (Paragraph 18)
7.We need to re-learn some of the Cold War lessons around deterrence and escalation management and apply them to a new context. (Paragraph 19)
8.Equally important is understanding the human aspects of war. There was clearly a failed assessment of Putin’s will to fight in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine. The UK and NATO should focus on developing a better understanding of Putin’s strategy and intentions—including what influence others (like China) may have on his decision-making—while strengthening de-escalation mechanisms. This would provide for more robust deterrence, helping decision-makers distinguish between posturing and the actual risk of nuclear weapons being used, while mitigating against escalation by accident. (Paragraph 20)
9.The ‘will-to-fight’ applies not only to Putin and other political leaders, but to their armed forces and their civilian populations as well. There are also other human aspects that determine the outcome of wars including, motivation, determination, memory of past victories and defeats, culture, and stamina, and all are essential elements for any consideration of deterrence, defence, and de-escalation. (Paragraph 21)
Building mass
10.All in all, the evidence we heard points to the current size of the British Army being inadequate. While size is not the only measure of capability, we are concerned that the Army cannot, as currently constituted, make the expected troop contribution to NATO. We therefore question whether the British Army is prepared to meet the growing threat posed by Russia to European security. (Paragraph 34)
11.The Armed Forces continue to face recruitment and retention challenges, which must be addressed urgently. We call on the new Government to set out what plans it has to address these, whether it will implement the recommendations of the Haythornthwaite Review and, if so, what the timetable would be. (Paragraph 39)
12.The Defence Recruitment System (DRS) is burdened by excessive bureaucracy, particularly in its medical evaluation process, which has become overly cautious and risk averse. This has led to unnecessary rejections and delays, discouraging many potential recruits. (Paragraph 40)
13.To increase recruitment numbers and enhance the efficiency of the process, the DRS should take a more balanced and risk-tolerant approach to its medical examinations and accelerate the process of resolving marginal cases. (Paragraph 41)
14.The Reserves provide a cost-effective model for building mass. By investing in the Reserves—both ex-regular and volunteer—the UK can enhance its capability and war readiness, contributing to deterrence and sustaining its armed forces in warfighting scenarios. (Paragraph 47)
15.The new Government should prioritise reinvigorating the Reserves. It should respond to General Sir Nick Carter’s review, clearly articulating what role(s) it expects the Reserves to undertake and how they should be organised to effectively supplement and support our Armed Forces. (Paragraph 48)
16.A reduction in Reserve workforce numbers confirms that the capability of the Reserves has declined over the last few years. To reverse this, a co-ordinated response is needed that includes incentives for joining and provides clarity of purpose for all units. The new Government should also re-assess its funding for the Reserves to ensure it delivers on demanding training, appropriate scales of equipment, and sufficient logistical and administrative support. (Paragraph 49)
17.A resilient industrial base underpins Defence’s credibility as a fighting force. Our evidence consistently showed that the UK’s defence industry is unprepared for high-intensity, prolonged conflict due to decades of budget cuts and reduced industrial capacity since the end of the Cold War. Our witnesses strongly emphasised the role that the Government should play in reversing this process. (Paragraph 75)
18.There is a significant trust deficit between the defence industry and the Government. The defence industry has expressed the need for clear, long-term commitments to effectively increase production and meet wartime demands. The MoD needs to transition from a traditional customer-supplier relationship to one that ensures sustained collaboration, consistent follow-through on commitments, and which fosters early and transparent engagement. (Paragraph 76)
19.The procurement process needs to be more agile and willing to take risks, as successfully demonstrated by the Ukrainian forces’ rapid innovation and collaboration with the private sector during the war. There needs to be a culture change around risk. The Government will have to transform how it buys weapons to keep up with the need for much faster development cycles. (Paragraph 77)
20.Non-traditional defence suppliers, such as start-ups, SMEs and tech companies, are key for accelerating the pace of delivery, but they face a unique set of barriers in accessing the defence market. The new UK Government needs to facilitate a ‘broad church’ of industry engagement, beyond the defence sector and into relatively new sectors of the economy. (Paragraph 78)
21.There are risks attached to increasing collaboration with commercial partners who, traditionally, have not been involved in defence. The new Government will need to be alert to these risks and work to mitigate them. In particular, the Government should conduct careful risk assessments when deciding whether to allow private companies access to certain systems, such as sensitive communication and targeting systems. However, a proportionate approach should be taken in less sensitive areas, fostering collaboration with non-traditional partners by ensuring that bureaucratic burdens are kept as low as possible. (Paragraph 79)
22.Engaging the whole of society in defence is crucial for building a resilient and prepared nation. This involves the integration of civilian capabilities, community engagement, and the emotional aspects of national defence. (Paragraph 85)
23.As a first step, the UK Government should build public understanding around the role the general population can play in building national resilience and contributing to national security and defence, moving beyond the notion that defence is the sole responsibility of the military. Plans must be developed in consultation with the general public, so that communities have ownership over plans and are motivated to participate in them. The UK Government should learn from the experiences of other nations, such as the Scandinavian concept of ‘total defence’. (Paragraph 86)
24.The Government should continue to invest in high-end technologies while ensuring that it rebuilds and maintains adequate stockpiles of conventional munitions. This dual investment strategy will provide UK Defence with the flexibility to respond to various types of threats. (Paragraph 93)
25.We call on the Government to conduct an assessment of the balance the UK should strike between high-end and conventional weapons to enhance effectiveness and sustain operations. This assessment should also consider the mix of capabilities among NATO’s European members and take account of the potential for burden-sharing across the Alliance. (Paragraph 94)
26.The Government should urgently reconsider its policy for disposing of old weapons stocks and consider ‘mothballing’ them instead, ensuring that the accounting and IT infrastructure is updated to support this move. While there may be costs attached to this, as well as to maintenance, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the ongoing effectiveness of retired capabilities. (Paragraph 100)
27.Our evidence showed that while there has been some progress in increasing joint procurement and harmonising defence systems among NATO allies, more needs to be done. Fragmentation hinders interoperability and cohesive defence efforts, as evidenced by Ukraine’s current logistical struggles with maintaining capabilities. (Paragraph 111)
28.The UK should reinvigorate existing NATO mechanisms, such as the national armaments directors’ forum and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, to enhance cooperation and standardisation efforts among member states. (Paragraph 112)
29.Joint procurement initiatives and strengthened industrial collaboration with key allies, including non-European states, are essential for enhancing the cost-effectiveness, scalability, and interoperability of defence capabilities. (Paragraph 113)
30.Interoperability is not an end in itself. While pursuing interoperable solutions, the Government should be mindful of maintaining a diversity of capabilities and promote innovation. For example, the Government should review with industry how faster feedback loops could be developed that would support agile innovation. (Paragraph 114)
Nurturing partnerships
31.The war in Ukraine has thrown the role of alliances at a time of war into the spotlight. Following the invasion, Russia is attempting to offset its decline in relations with the West by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key Global South countries, including India. This has allowed Russia to undermine the effectiveness of Western sanctions and avoid international isolation, while also increasing its strategic depth. (Paragraph 143)
32.Russia’s collaboration with China, Iran and North Korea, in particular, is of concern. It could lead to a substantial deterioration of the threat environment we face and pose a significant strategic challenge to the West. (Paragraph 144)
33.We recognise that there are limited options for the UK Government to respond to this challenge, but it should aim to maintain the broadest possible coalition of countries to counter Russian narratives and send clear signals about unacceptable behaviour. (Paragraph 145)
34.As the UK Government is facing a world where the Global South is becoming more assertive, with some countries leaning towards China or Russia, it is vital for the UK to be more proactive and have a strategy on how to engage with the Global South. Specifically, the UK should build relationships by seeking a consistent role where it has credibility and expertise. In particular, the UK Government should leverage diplomacy and reinvigorate its role as an international development actor to offer an alternative value proposition to those countries in the Global South particularly exposed to Russian and Chinese influence. (Paragraph 146)
35.To counter the neo-colonial narrative deployed by Moscow in the Global South, diplomatic efforts of the UK and its Western allies should keep the focus on Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and portray Russian actions in Ukraine as imperialistic. (Paragraph 147)
36.We welcome the communiqué agreed by NATO members at the Washington Summit labelling China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This reinforces the evidence we heard that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a window of opportunity for the deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship. (Paragraph 148)
37.It is imperative that the UK Government continues to pay close attention to the development of the Sino-Russian relationship, both in the context of the Ukraine war and beyond. In addition to developing distinct strategies for Russia and China, the Government should develop a comprehensive strategy that takes account of the potential for a deepening Sino-Russian relationship, particularly in critical areas for UK security, such as the Arctic. (Paragraph 149)
38.The UK has shown leadership in providing military support for Ukraine and has developed a good level of cooperation and co-ordination with European partners. We welcome the new Government’s commitment to negotiate an ambitious security pact with the EU. This could represent an important step towards rebuilding credible conventional deterrence. (Paragraph 150)
39.There are, however, challenges within EU rules and practice to third-country participation. We therefore recommend that the new Government starts to discuss third-country involvement rules early on in any negotiations to understand the EU’s willingness to adjust them, which would provide clarity on the parameters for the negotiations. (Paragraph 151)
40.The Government should ensure that pragmatism underpins a security deal with the EU. The purpose of any UK–EU cooperation should first and foremost be to deliver additional value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War. Negotiations should prioritise pragmatic areas for cooperation, rather than institutional landmarks. (Paragraph 152)
41.We have received persuasive evidence about the value of the JEF and its potential as a testbed for other formats of defence cooperation with European partners. (Paragraph 153)
42.The Government should maintain the UK’s leadership role within the JEF and set ambitious objectives for the initiative, such as closer industrial integration among the member countries. There are lessons learnt from the JEF that can be applied to the broader European context. We urge the Government to explore how a similar format could be applied with a different set of countries to tackle a different mission. (Paragraph 154)
43.The United States has long been a cornerstone of European security, but it is also reasonable to expect a gradual shifting of US priorities, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming US election. The trajectory of a re-focus towards the Indo-Pacific region is clear. (Paragraph 155)
44.As we continue to rely on the vital yet evolving partnership with the US, the Government and its European allies must visibly increase their preparedness by committing more resources—both human and financial—towards our collective security. (Paragraph 156)
Countering aerial threats
45.The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the importance of air superiority, with air defences critical to avoiding an attritional ground conflict. (Paragraph 178)
46.Under-investment has led to substantial vulnerabilities in the UK’s (and Europe’s) ability to defend itself from airborne threats. In the context of a worsening security environment, this is deeply concerning, and the new Government should pay greater attention to homeland defence. (Paragraph 179)
47.Increasing investment in integrated air and missile defence and a credible plan to deliver operational S/DEAD capabilities in close collaboration with our European NATO allies should therefore be high on the list of defence priorities for the new Government. (Paragraph 180)
48.European countries are coming together to deliver air defences collectively via the European Sky Shield Initiative, in which the previous Government had expressed an interest. We call on the new Government to provide an assessment of the merits of joining the initiative and update us on progress. (Paragraph 181)
49.Vulnerabilities extend to the maritime domain. While the UK does have a maritime missile capability in the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, further investment is required to enable the Royal Navy to be deployed offensively and better project lethality. (Paragraph 182)
50.The war in Ukraine has exposed the sheer variety of possible drone threats in a conflict scenario, ranging from disposable and commercially available drones to high-end, sophisticated ones. (Paragraph 196)
51.The UK should invest in research and development to maintain a strategic edge in drone technology (including amphibious drones), and support the rapid development of new technologies that can compete in contested environments. Given the pace of technological adaptations on and off the battlefield, UK Defence should place greater emphasis on spiral development and modularity to support continuous adaptation. (Paragraph 197)
52.Military training should be revised to incorporate learning on the use of drones in Ukraine across all domains. (Paragraph 198)
Space, cyber and the electromagnetic environment
53.Space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare (EW) are closely interlinked and have featured heavily in the Ukraine war. They will likely form an integral part of future warfare between technologically capable states. (Paragraph 242)
54.It is therefore imperative that the UK enhances its space, cyber and EW capabilities, focusing on developing resilient and adaptive systems that can operate in highly contested environments, like the one we are witnessing in Ukraine. (Paragraph 243)
55.The ability to conduct cyber and electronic warfare, and deploy electronic countermeasures to avoid detection, should be seen as a core capability for the UK’s Armed Forces. The Government should learn lessons from how the Ukrainians have deployed and responded to electronic warfare attacks, including through dispersal techniques, and innovative command and control structures. (Paragraph 244)
56.Ukraine has shown that rapid technological innovation and adaptation are essential to stay ahead of adversaries. The Government should focus on building UK Defence’s capacity to adapt and innovate quickly in or near the battlefield. (Paragraph 245)
57.Maximum strategic advantage can only be obtained if space, cyber and EW are integrated across domains. We note that under the previous Government, the MoD announced the creation of an Integration Design Authority to support integration. While this is a welcome development, it is people and skills and industry—including the leveraging of commercial partnerships—that will determine the success of such integration. (Paragraph 246)
58.The new Government should work together with the private sector to formulate options for attracting high-tech talent to the defence sector and design flexible career paths that build skills and grow Defence’s expertise in cyber and electromagnetic warfare. (Paragraph 247)
59.This will require training and learning lessons directly from colleagues in the Ukrainian forces and working closely with industry. The Government should adopt a more flexible approach to bringing in commercial actors, while acknowledging some of the unique challenges these partnerships can entail around, for example, accountability or reliability. (Paragraph 248)
60.The Government should ensure that cyber, EW and emerging technologies are fully integrated into the next edition of the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. In addition, it should give serious consideration to the creation of a warfare centre for the cyber and electromagnetic domain. (Paragraph 249)
61.Developments in Ukraine are relevant to UK national security and, in particular, the protection of its critical national infrastructure (CNI). (Paragraph 250)
62.The reliance of modern economies on space-based technologies makes them a prime target for hybrid attacks. Cyber and electronic tactics deployed in Ukraine by Russia have been used elsewhere, including against the UK and its allies. It is therefore essential that the new Government focuses on building greater resilience into the UK’s CNI. (Paragraph 251)
63.The UK’s fragmented police forces and limited military resources may struggle to handle the increased civil defence burden in the event of hostile actions, such as sabotage of CNI. The Government should thus consider the merits of establishing a centralised civil defence agency, akin to the US’ Federal Emergency Management Agency. (Paragraph 252)
64.The new Government should also invest in Space Situational Awareness and Space Domain Awareness capabilities, for which it heavily relies on the US. (Paragraph 253)