Submission from The Maranatha Community
(SC-15)
BACKGROUND
The Maranatha Community is a nationwide movement
and network of Christians in all denominations. Comprising thousands
of active members of churches of all traditions, it is committed
to healing, unity and renewal of faith. Formed 28 years ago,
its members have been very deeply involved in care and relief
work, and it has also taken the initiative in broad areas of national
concern both in Parliament and throughout the country.
SUMMARY
The convening of the Speaker's Conference
is based on the premise that various groups of people should be
represented in the House of Commons by a number of MPs in proportion
to those groups' presence in the UK population.
We do not consider that the present "disconnection"
between many of the electorate and Parliament is attributable
to particular groups being insufficiently represented. Rather,
we believe it is attributable to what is widely perceived as a
lack of integrity of Government and of politicians as a group,
and to loss of confidence in the Civil Service.
Any person appointed to a public position
or task should be the best suited of those available, subject
as necessary to citizenship and residence
The determination of suitability should
take account of motivation and personal or group objectives.
We consider that the biasing or restriction
of selection lists would limit the ability of voters to select
as their representatives those whose suitability, in their view,
surpassed that of other candidates.
We consider that people fit to be elected
as MPs should, by definition, be able to represent the concerns
of minority groups within their constituencies. We do not, therefore,
consider that the non-proportionate presence among MPs of particular
groups causes, per Se, any problems in the governmental
process. Moreover, the acceptance of "group" candidates
would almost certainly favour skilled and well funded campaigning
groups at the expense of quiet "suffering" groups and
those less able to campaign effectively.
We consider that introducing proportionate
presence in Parliament for specific groups would be therefore
be fraught with danger, and could easily lead to effective disenfranchisement
of the "silent majority" of the UK population.
Overall, we therefore consider that the
premise upon which the Speaker's Conference is based is fundamentally
flawed, misconceived and inappropriate, and threatens the very
concept of Parliamentary democracy itself.
1. Situation
1.1 The convening of the Speaker's Conference
is based on the premise that various groups of people should be
represented in the House of Commons by numbers of MPs in proportion
to those groups' presence in the UK population.
1.1.1 This implies that MPs cannot properly
represent members of groups to which they themselves do not belong.
1.1.2 It further implies that all groups
of the population are equally well able to represent themselves.
1.1.3 Moreover, its implementation would
depend upon choosing which groups should be proportionately represented
in the House of Commons and which should not. It would also depend
upon the accurate measurement of the proportion of the population
belonging to the privileged groups.
2. Representation and Voters' Attitudes
2.1 There is now a dangerously low level
of "connection" between a large proportion of the electorate
and politicians. Elected representatives themselves, whether MPs,
MEPs or local councillors, are increasingly acknowledging that
there is a deep and widening gulf between them and the general
public.
2.2 The active membership of constituency
parties has generally diminished, to the extent that in many cases
it may not now be representative of the numbers favouring particular
parties' attitudes and policies. Party membership is generally
small in comparison with, for example, the thousands of church
members in most constituencies.
2.3 Altogether, it is beyond question that
there is widespread disillusionment with politicians and the political
process. This was powerfully illustrated by the low turnout at
the last General Election, leading to the Government being elected
by barely more than a fifth of the electorate. Inevitably this
has led to the passing of legislation which is widely unpopular
and which, in some instances, may be opposed by the majority of
the electorate.
2.4 In recent years there have been many
indicators that the gap between people and politicians is increasingly
becoming actual alienation. For example, the proliferation of
powerful quangos has done much harm to the democratic process.
In addition to this there is widespread unease about the inhibition
of free, democratic voting procedures through the heavy imposition
of the party whip system.
2.5 Moreover, denying the people the opportunity
to express themselves, whether the issue is the Lisbon Treaty
or Parliamentary approval of a third runway at Heathrow, gives
an oppressive tone to government. In addition, failure to uphold
sound principles and moral standards in Parliament has contributed
to the growth of a generation or more of young people who are
confused about what is right or wrong or true or false. Many of
these young people have no strong and reliable framework upon
which to build their lives, no clear appreciation of the demands
and boundaries of responsible citizenship, and no sense of why
they should have anything to do with our processes of government
or wish to do so.
2.6. We do not consider that this disillusionment,
disconnection and alienation, extending as it does not only to
the young or to people with radical points of view, but also to
many of the thoughtful and moderate majority of our people, stems
primarily or even significantly from the non-proportional presence
in Parliament of different groups. We consider that it results
primarily from a loss of trust and confidence in MPs and the parliamentary
process, attributable to:
2.6.1. The perceived lack of integrity of
many politicians.
2.6.2. The perceived arrogance, unwillingness
to listen, or lack of genuine interest in the voter's problems,
of many politicians.
2.6.3. The perceived willingness of those
in power to use a Parliamentary majority to push through measures
for which they have no mandate and/or which do not have public
support.
2.6.4. The perceived unwillingness of many
MPs to accept reasonable and proper levels of accountability to
the Nation.
2.6.5. A loss of confidence in the Civil
Service to act dispassionately in the public interest under the
direction of the Monarch in Parliament, consequent upon the recent
considerable politicization of the Service.
2.7. Since the main roots of the widespread
sense of helplessness, distrust, or de facto disenfranchisement
do not lie in the non-proportional presence of particular groups
among MPs, these problems will not be ameliorated by measures
to bias representation towards members of those groups. Indeed,
if voters who are already disenchanted with Parliament began to
perceive that elections were being "fixed" in this way,
their attitudes to politicians would only become even more negative.
Their trust in Parliament and their willingness to become involved
in the national or local government process, even by turning out
to vote, would be further diminished rather than improved.
2.8. The true route to restoring healthy
engagement between people and Parliament is to enable men and
women to be elected as MPs who are people of integrity, genuinely
empathise with their constituents' issues, and are willing to
do something about those issues and communicate with their people.
3. Principles
3.1. We take as a first principle that the
person elected or otherwise appointed to any post or task in the
service of our Nation should be the one best suited to it of those
available.
3.2. We consider that this principle should
normally be applied regardless of ethnic origin, colour, gender,
sexual orientation, religious belief, wealth, social background
or, subject to practicalities, disability.
4. We affirm that in some cases this principle
should be qualified in that the person must be a British citizen
with the right of residence in the United Kingdom (or who is resident
in the UK)
4.1. We further affirm that in addition
to intellectual or physical ability, knowledge, experience, etc,
"best suited" must necessarily take account of motivation
and the suitability of personal or group objectives.
An extreme example illustrates the point: it would
not be appropriate to appoint as Chief of the Defence Staff a
person, however able and otherwise suited, whose first loyalty
was to a foreign power or who had become a pacifist.
Correspondingly, no person should be appointed to
a public position who might reasonably be expected to try to exploit
public office to further an individual or group objective not
openly declared as Government policy prior to a General Election,
or contrary to the public interest.
5. Special considerations applicable to Members
of Parliament
5.1. The fundamental purpose of having Members
of Parliament is that they should represent their constituents.
The "best suited" principle therefore calls for voters
to have a choice of candidates who are each skilled to represent
them, so that they can select the one whose suitability as a representative,
in their view, surpasses that of the others.
5.2. This immediately rules out skewed representation
brought about by the inappropriate biasing or restriction of selection
lists before potential candidates are put to the voters concerned.
5.3. Furthermore, it is not necessary for
a candidate to have first-hand experience of everything the constituents
do, or share everything that they aspire to, in order to make
a good representative. Does an MP for a mining area need to have
been a miner, or an MP for Crewe to have worked on the railways?
5.4. We recognise that voters commonly give
a high priority to party membership in choosing whom to elect,
meaning simply that they put party affiliation at the head of
the list of representational attributes they seek.
5.5. This predominance of party over other
factors in present-day politics is in our view a regrettable characteristic,
preventing, as it does, many people who would make excellent MPs
from standing as independents with any hope of success. It alone
may often prevent the person who is the best suited to represent
a constituency from being elected. (And where party politics rule,
of course, the valuable concerns and potential contributions of
voters for losing parties in any constituency are almost certain
to be neglected or under-represented if they vary from the policy
of the winning party.)
5.6. To go beyond those inevitabilities
of the present system and introduce, whether by party policy or
electoral law, a process that restricted the selection of party
candidates to members of particular groups would further increase
the likelihood of shutting out potentially admirable MPs.
5.7. There is widespread recognition that
the present financial crisis engulfing our Nation is not attributable
to financial causes alone, nor even primarily to those causes,
but has been brought about by an underlying spiritual barrenness
and moral malaise. In these circumstances, it is increasingly
important for MPs to put national wellbeing above party and group
interest. Selecting candidates to stand for Parliament specifically
to represent minority interests would run directly contrary to
the ethos that is required to bring our Nation back from its present
position of great social and structural danger.
6. Proportionality and Parliament
6.1. We take it as a matter of definition
that people fit to be elected as MPs should be able to represent,
when it is in the constituency or national interest, the concerns
of minority groups within their constituencies. We do not, therefore,
regard the non-proportionate representation of minority groups
as causing, per se, any problems in the governmental process.
Given the first statement above, we consider the term "proportionate
presence" more suitable than "proportionate representation"
when referring to numbers of MPs from any group.
We prefer the term "non-proportionate"
to "unbalanced" because the latter implies that something
is necessarily wrong.
6.2. On the other hand, we foresee substantial
problems arising if interest groups were able to claim a right
to a proportionate presence in Parliament. For example:
6.2.1. Who would determine which groups
should qualify for proportionate presence and which should not?
How could the impartiality of these arbitrators be ensured?
6.2.2. Which categories of groups should
be included and which excluded? Where should the boundaries be
drawn, and why should they be drawn there? Should dentists, Muslims,
the elderly, anti-vivisectionists and the pro-hunting lobby qualify
equally for proportionate presence? If not, why not?
6.2.3. How would groups be defined and their
membership determined? Some interest groups regularly represent
themselves as speaking for a much larger number of the population
than they do. If proportionality were accepted, who would determine
the proportions to represent?
6.2.4. Who would ensure that interest groups
have objectives in line with the moral health and other best interests
of the Nation?
6.2.5. How would skilled and well funded
campaigning groups be prevented from obtaining a disproportionate
Parliamentary presence compared with quiet "suffering"
groups and those unskilled in campaigning? The likelihood is that
the latter, probably including some of the most vulnerable and
already disadvantaged people in our society, would be further
disadvantaged and proportionately disenfranchised.
7. Benefits and Disadvantages
7.1. As soon as questions like those above
are asked, it becomes evident that introducing proportionate presence
in Parliament for specific groups would be fraught with danger.
7.2. Who, for example, would speak for the
"silent majority" of ethnic English, Scots, Welsh and
Irish citizens of our countries who hold to the characteristic
values which, in the past, were defining and distinguishing characteristics
of our Nation, and which remain the source of some of our greatest
strengths?
7.3. Further, the concept of proportionality
presupposes that all groups are equally able to speak for themselves
and to handle constituency tasks, and that outsiders could not
or would not adequately represent them. A moment's consideration
shows this proposition to be flawed: children, for example, are
not able to speak for themselves as a group or to handle constituency
tasksit devolves upon adults to seek and protect their
best interests in Parliament.
7.4. Similarly, the concept assumes that
members of all groups are equally available to stand for Parliament.
This is not so. For example, men and women have different roles
in life, especially in relation to parenthood. The feeding and
nurturing roles of mothers call for their presence with young
children in a manner different from the role-modelling and relationship-building
presence of fathers. This, quite apart from any other factor,
affects the availability of women for election.
7.5. Again, those who care for elderly and
disabled members of their families are almost certainly far from
proportionately present among MPs. While we would not wish for
a moment to suggest that carers should not become MPs if they
felt able to do so, in many instances a carer's relationship with
the person they care for uniquely equips them for their caring
role. Undoubtedly, a present or former carer speaking in Parliament
from experience will carry more weight than most MPs without that
experience. But nevertheless we consider that most carers would
readily entrust their Parliamentary representation to MPs who
do their jobs properly.
8. Why do more women, people from ethnic minority
groups and disabled people not become MPs?
8.1. Some disabilities may make it difficult
for an otherwise well suited person to fulfil the responsibilities
of an MP. Appropriate specialist help or the provision of specific
aids at Westminster might make it possible to reduce these limitations
and enable more disabled people to stand for Parliament if they
chose. This would obviously be desirable.
8.2. More generally, however, we believe
this question is best answered by turning it round: why do some
people want more women, members of ethnic minority groups and
disabled people to become MPs?
8.3. We believe that this concern can arise
for two main reasons:
8.3.1. Some may be taken in by the apparently
natural proposition that everyone is best represented by someone
of their own kind. As we have shown, this is a false premise.
8.3.2. Others may be acting from doctrinaire
motives not necessarily associated with the best interests of
the Nation.
9. Conclusions
9.1. There is clearly a most urgent need
to bring new life to the decaying democratic process in the United
Kingdom. However, we do not believe it is the responsibility or
the prerogative of either Parliament or Government to impose its
will, and perhaps its prejudices, upon the electorate by selecting
or restricting who may be their representatives.
9.2. For the reasons given above, we do
not share the view implicit in the terms of the Speaker's Conference
that the disparity in the presence of various groups in the House
of Commons needs to be "rectified" in every instance.
We consider that in many respects it may be perfectly acceptable,
and, indeed, in certain areas, highly desirable.
9.3. The process of proportionate presence,
if it were introduced, would be open to much potential mischief
and misuse.
9.4. We are very much more concerned that
attempts to bias the presence of groups in Parliament in this
way could readily lead to the effective disenfranchisement of
either:
9.4.1. The natural populace of these islands,
or
9.4.2. The ungrouped majority who hold mainstream
opinions.
9.5. There would be much more to be said
in favour of, for example, promoting means of ensuring the election
of more independent candidates as MPs, to serve in the same beneficial
ways as the cross-benchers in the House of Lords.
9.6. Skewing the selection of Parliamentary
candidates intrinsically runs contrary to the principle of seeking
to ensure that the best suited candidate is elected to serve each
constituency.
9.7. Indeed, the way the proposals have
been advocated in some quarters suggests that they are in truth
no more than tool to introduce a privileged level of presence
in Parliament for one or more militant activist groups.
9.8 We believe, therefore, that the move
to secure proportionate presence among MPs of members of selected
groups is misconceived and inappropriate. Indeed, we consider
that it threatens the very concept of Parliamentary democracy
itself.
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