TARGETED SUBSIDISED INPUTS
120. The provision of targeted, subsidised,
inputsseeds and fertiliseris another way of simultaneously
addressing food security needs and promoting longer-term development.
Malawi has been something of a pioneer in this regard. During
our visit, we saw packs containing 5 kilograms of seed, 10 kilograms
of fertiliser, instructions on planting, and leaflets about HIV/AIDS
being distributed. DFID and other donors have supported the provision
of "Starter Packs" since 1998/99. According to Carlos
Barahona and Sarah Levythe leaders of the team which has
evaluated this programme for DFIDtwo-thirds of smallholders
in Malawi cannot afford to purchase inputs. They argue that this
is the key reason for the under-production of maize, sharp rises
in food prices, and resultant food security crises. The DFID-financed
'Starter Pack' and 'Targeted Inputs Programme' has partially offset
the declining access to inputs associated with economic liberalisation
(currency devaluation, removal of subsidies, and collapse of rural
credit).[221]
Introduced as a post-drought rehabilitation programme in the mid-1990s,
the free distribution of agricultural inputs aimed to promote
both household and national food security. Because of concerns
that it was unsustainable and undermining markets, the programme
was reduced from a universal to targeted distribution in the season
preceding the 2001/02 food crisis.[222]
As an immediate response to the crisis, DFID launched a Winter
Targeted Inputs Programme in mid-2002, and the Government of Malawi
announced a return to universal free inputs distribution for the
2002/03 farming season.
121. There has been criticism of the "stop-go"
nature of what is now termed the Targeted Inputs Programme, and
of the speed with which the programme was scaled down. Some commentators
have suggested that the reduction in the Targeted Inputs Programme
contributed to the food shortages of 2001/02. This may be so,
but had other factors not come togethererratic rainfall,
logistical problems, the sale of the grain reservethe phasing
out of the Targeted Inputs Programme might not have been implicated
in a crisis. Inputs programmes and their phasing out should be
well-planned, but they cannot be based on perfect foresight. Indeed,
Clare Short explained to us the converse risk that Targeted Inputs
Programmes might seek to do too much, and hence increase dependency
on free inputs. As the Secretary of State recalled: "We were
involved in the Starter Packs of seeds and fertiliser scheme but
then government wanted us to broaden and broaden it, and we did,
and there was a big growth in production and then, of course,
prices dropped and we think we overdid it, but it is easy to be
wise after the event."[223]
Figure 14: The Malawi Targeted Inputs Programme, 1999-2002: Stop and go?
|
Year
| Weather
| Beneficiaries (households and % coverage)
| Total Harvest
| Targeted Inputs Programme Contribution
|
1998/99
| Good
| 2.86 million
100%
| 1 650 000 MT
| 500 000 MT
|
1999/2000
| Good
| 2.86 million
100%
| 1 860 000 MT
| 350 000 MT
|
2000/01
| Moderate/Poor
| 1.5 million
50%
| 1 420 000 MT
| 75 000 MT
|
2001/02
| Moderate/Poor
| 1 million
33%
| 1 280 000 MT
| 40 000 MT
|
Source: Ev 122, para 7 [Carlos Barahona
and Sarah Levy memorandum]
122. Targeted Inputs Programmes can play
an important role in achieving food security. To do so they must
be part of a longer-term rural development strategy which, over
time and where possible, reduces dependence on free inputs, making
inputs more affordable and accessible by raising rural incomes
and promoting rural development.[224]
We urge DFID to continue its support for Malawi's Targeted Inputs
Programme, and to work with other Governments to examine whether
such schemeswith carefully planned exit strategiesmight
enhance their food security and longer-term development prospects.
123. Donors and governments in southern Africa
urgently need to find ways of making yield-enhancing inputs (fertiliser
and seeds) accessible to smallholder farmers at affordable prices.
The free distribution of inputs, whether universal or targeted,
in Malawi or elsewhere, is a useful interim measure but does not
provide an appropriate model for a sustainable long-term solution
to food insecurity. An alternative proposal made to us by Stephen
Carr, to amend the existing rural public works programmes so that
participants are paid with vouchers for agricultural inputs, rather
than in food or cash as at present, should be seriously considered.[225]
124. The key principle of effective social protection
strategies is that they must not undermine longer-term sustainable
development. As we were told by DFID officials, this meshing of
approaches, and time horizons, has not been systematically achieved
in southern Africa.[226]
Ideally, social protection measures ought to actively contribute
toas well as not underminesustainable development.
The challenge is to devise asset-building social protection measures
which are investments in production rather than simply protective
of consumption.[227]
Short-term assistance and focused safety nets must contribute
towards longer term goals of improving governance, reducing dependency,
nurturing functioning and equitable markets, developing infrastructure,
and increasing agricultural productivity.[228]
Finally, effective social protection strategies, whilst addressing
short-term needs, mustby including plans for the phasing
out of certain forms of assistance such as free inputs programmes
where possiblelook to a future where such measures are
employed less frequently and less widely.
180