APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE FIRST REPORT
FROM THE COMMITTEE IN SESSION 2002-03, ON AFGHANISTAN: THE TRANSITION
FROM HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
II. RESOURCES
1. Recommendation: We welcome the involvement
of regional donors in making pledges to Afghanistan. For too long
it has been the same set of countries which put their hands in
their pockets when it comes to giving development aid. We urge
the UK government to seek to encourage other developed countries
to play their full part in the international development system
(paragraph 13).
Government response: We also welcome the involvement
of a number of regional donors in Afghanistan. We agree that other
countries could also play a greater role in the international
development system. DFID already has some contact with those countries
that are observers at the OECD Development Assistance Committee
(eg South Korea, Hungary, Poland), both within the DAC and sometimes
bilaterally. We encourage them to build poverty reduction into
their programmes from the outset and consider how their still
limited funds can be used most effectively to this end, building
on existing best practice within the donor community.
2. Recommendation: There needs to be a rolling
programme of pledging, measured against progress on the ground
in Afghanistan, to give all donors a chance to demonstrate their
continuing commitment and to ensure that they will not leave Afghanistan
as a job half completed. There should also be a timetable within
which the international community aims to hand over areas of responsibility
to the Afghan Transitional Administration (paragraph 17).
Government response: In January 2002, in Tokyo, the
international community pledged $4.5 billion for Afghanistan.
The pledges covered periods from one to 5 years. At the Afghanistan
Development Forum (ADF) in Kabul in March, donors reaffirmed their
commitment to provide over $1.8 billion in 2003/04. We agree that
it would be best for donors to pledge funds to a rolling medium-term
expenditure framework of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration
(ATA). We welcome the ATA's presentation of a three year Development
Budget at the Afghanistan Development Forum. The ATA announced
its intention to hold a further pledging conference to cover estimated
needs of $15-20bn over the next five years later in 2003. The
UK at the ADF reaffirmed its Tokyo commitment to provide £40m
per year for five years and announced that this could be increased
by up to another £40m over the next three years, depending
on the performance of Afghanistan, particularly in reforming the
public administration.
The ATA has assumed responsibility for the development
of Afghanistan and for directing international assistance to priority
needs. Donors have undertaken to use their funding to support
the priorities set out by the ATA in their Budget, including through
the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The speed at
which donors will move towards direct budget support, however,
must be based on evidence of progress in building government capacity,
and not a pre-determined timetable.
3. Recommendation: Sufficient funds must be available
for both reconstruction and humanitarian relief and better information
about needs will be important in determining how much money is
required. We understand the problems involved in separating humanitarian
and reconstruction spending but consider that DFID and the international
community needs to have a clear strategy, or at least set out
milestones, for moving from humanitarian relief towards supporting
reconstruction and development. This could involve the prioritisation
of humanitarian work which also provides long-term benefits, such
as the supply of clean drinking water. (paragraph 21).
Government response: We agree. In 2002-3 approximately
50% of our funding was for humanitarian assistance. For future
years we are planning to increase substantially the proportion
of our programme for longer-term reconstruction and development.
The ongoing humanitarian component of our strategy will contribute
to our longer-term development strategy, by aiming to reduce the
vulnerability of poor people and promoting the reintegration of
refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.
4. Recommendation: We believe that the use of
loans, as part of a managed economic strategy, will allow the
Afghan economy to develop, decreasing its reliance on grant aid
and helping to demonstrate that Afghanistan: "is a place
where investors can put money with confidence, knowing that they
can get a return on their investment and they will be able to
repatriate the profits" (paragraph 25).
Government response: We agree. DFID has taken the
lead among donors in helping to clear Afghanistan's arrears to
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in order to facilitate
concessional borrowing. However, anything less than total forgiveness
of Afghanistan's outstanding bilateral debts will endanger the
sustainability of current plans for concessional borrowing from
the IFIs. The importance of developing a sustainable debt management
strategy can therefore not be overemphasised.
5. Conclusion: The Afghan Transitional Administration
struggles to maintain its credibility because it is under-resourced
and not seen by Afghans as delivering those basic public services
that people expect from their governments, let alone broader reconstruction.
It is essential that the Afghan Transitional Administration establishes
its legitimacy; the future stability of the entire country depends
on this Administration's ability to govern until an elected government
takes over. (paragraph 27).
Government response: We agree that it is important
that the Transitional Administration is seen to deliver by the
Afghan people. This requires reform and good public information
as well as control of resources.
6. Conclusion: There is a tension between the
desire to have Afghan-led development and the need to channel
resources where there is the capacity to spend them. (paragraph
33).
Government response: We agree that there is a tension
between Afghan-led development and the need to channel resources
where there is the capacity to use them effectively—we are
working to try to achieve this in parallel.
At the recent Afghanistan Development Forum, the
ATA set out key principles for development assistance to ensure
that both of these objectives are met. The ATA has set out a development
strategy and its priorities for the next three years in its National
Development Budget. Donors are asked to channel their funds in
order to ensure that these priorities are delivered. The ATA has
requested that donors channel some funding through the Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). However as the administration
has limited capacity, it has asked donors to disburse the rest
of their funds directly to implementing national priority development
programmes.
7. Recommendation: Capacity and institution building
will need to be given a higher priority and quickly if the Afghan
Transitional Administration is to govern effectively and plan
for the longer term. (paragraph 35).
Government response: Capacity and institution building
is essential. It is already beginning in key areas—for example
work on a budget process, payroll and banking arrangements, and
measures to maximise domestic revenue collection. This needs to
be extended across the whole of government, as well as to the
private sector. Addressing these structural issues must continue
to be balanced with meeting more immediate needs.
8. Recommendation: We understand the Secretary
of State's concerns about the Afghan Transitional Administration
and echo her call for urgent civil service reform. But we also
think that putting some money into the parts of the Administration
which have reformed would not necessarily be a wasteful exercise.
It would help identify where weaknesses lie. At some point soon
donors have to take a risk and be willing to allow more funds
to be channelled through those areas in which the Afghan Transitional
Administration has demonstrated significant progress (paragraph
36).
Government response: We do not agree that putting
money through government systems is the best way to determine
where the weaknesses lie. Such weaknesses should be assessed before
UK public money is channelled through other governments' budgets.
However, we agree that the Afghanistan Transitional Administration
is not monolithic. Therefore, we are ready to channel financial
assistance through the Administration where it shows it can deliver
effective services to the Afghan people. We have, for example,
encouraged the ATA and the World Bank to ensure that resources
for the operating and maintenance budgets of provinces are provided
by the ARTF. In other cases, we will have to continue to fund
implementing organisations directly, until the Administration
has the capacity to manage such funds themselves.
9. Recommendation: What is needed are not more
co-ordination meetings but rather a rationalisation of existing
procedures (paragraph 38).
10. Recommendation: We welcome the transfer of
the Afghan Support Group's responsibilities to the Afghan Transitional
Administration as part of the move towards a development forum
informed by and involving consultative groups (paragraph 38).
Government response (9 & 10): We agree that the
new consultative group process, leading to an annual Development
Forum, should rationalise donor co-ordination mechanisms under
Afghan leadership. We are determined to help to make this a success.
11. Recommendation: We are concerned that UNAMA
is not, in practice, co-ordinating the strategies of the UN Agencies
and as such is unable to act as an "effective bridge between
the international community and the will of the Afghan Transitional
Administration". The UN should be given due credit for its
work on what is a difficult task but, in line with its mandate
which it was given at Bonn, the UN should consider how it can
improve the co-ordination which it is providing. UNAMA should
be playing the lead role in countering the perception that the
UN is operating as a parallel structure to the Afghan Transitional
Administration rather than an assistant to and advocate for Afghan-led
reconstruction (paragraph 39).
Government response: We believe that UNAMA has done
a good job in difficult circumstances but that co-ordination of
UN agencies could always be improved. We have provided assistance
to UNAMA to help them fulfil their co-ordination responsibilities.
We believe that all donors and the ATA itself, as well as UNAMA,
could do more to dispel the false claims that have been made by
senior figures that the UN is operating as a parallel structure
to the ATA. The recent budget process has demonstrated very good
co-ordination between the ATA and UNAMA.
12. Conclusion: NGOs have been providing services
across all sectors in Afghanistan throughout the 23 years of conflict
and, in some cases, for even longer. The larger NGOs have provided
substantial public services, such as health and education, where
there would otherwise be none. They have also acted as implementing
partners to the UN within their own mandates, carrying out the
work on their behalf to reach the vulnerable. At the moment, in
the absence of public service delivery through the Afghan Transitional
Administration, NGOs remain the main service providers (paragraph
40).
Government response: Local and international NGOs,
the private sector, and UN agencies are all key service providers
in areas where the government itself lacks the capacity or reach
to provide them.
13. Recommendation: It is right that international
aid workers receive international salaries but local employees
should also receive fair pay which, at the very least, lifts them
out of poverty (paragraph 41).
Government response: We agree. DFID keeps the salaries
and benefits of its staff appointed in-country under review, to
ensure that it provides a fair wage, consistent with local market
conditions. Local salaries in Afghanistan's public service are
very low. The number of civil servants is too high and effectiveness
extremely low. This should be addressed as part of wider public
administration reforms to improve productivity.
14. Recommendation: Keeping administrative costs
and overheads down must be a priority for all donors but especially
for those, such as the UN, which are not directly accountable
to electorates. It is interesting to note that the Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit have interpreted the UN approach
of leaving a light institutional footprint as being a "well
intentioned and much needed initiative to control agency management
costs". One way to address criticisms of high transaction
costs would be to ensure full transparency in the spending following
disbursement although it is important that any measures to increase
transparency are resource neutral in their impact (paragraph 44).
Government response: We agree. UNAMA is currently
in the early stages of work to harmonise procurement costs across
UN agencies, and to increase transparency. The ATA is also looking
to set up a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit as part of its work
on increasing the efficiency of development programmes. We will
monitor both these initiatives and continue to support efforts
to minimise transaction costs, in order that official development
assistance has the maximum impact in Afghanistan.
15. Recommendation: We recommend that greater
use is made of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
with the aim of it becoming the main pool of donor funding from
which the Afghan Transitional Administration, UN and NGOs can
bid for allocations. Use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF) can solve the tension between, on the one hand, a
wish to see reconstruction led by Afghans and for the international
community to leave a "light footprint" and, on the other,
the wish to move resources where there is the capacity to use
them (paragraph 46).
Government response: We agree in principle that the
ARTF is a good transitional solution for pooling donor resources
for Afghanistan, where the conditions are not yet right for direct
budget support. We are working to ensure that it is in practice
an effective channel for development assistance. We welcome the
initiative of the ATA at the ADF to increase the proportion of
the ARTF which will be used for development investments, rather
than recurrent salary costs, which are problematic as indicated
in our response to recommendation 13.
III. SECURITY
16. Conclusion: Persistent insecurity hampers
humanitarian relief and is one of the main obstacles to reconstruction.
(paragraph 49).
Government response: We agree that persistent insecurity
hampers both humanitarian relief and reconstruction. This is particularly
true in the south of the country. Both the UN and NGOs continue
to provide relief throughout the country. They keep the scale
of their operations under review in the light of the levels of
security threat.
17. Conclusion: Without a specific peacekeeping
mandate Joint Regional Teams (JRTs) will be able to do little
to bring security to the population and may not enhance the aid
effort either. We are also concerned about the lack of information
about JRTs and recommend that the UK Government issue a statement
detailing British involvement and setting out the mandate, range
of duties and composition of existing and planned JRTs (paragraph
56).
Government response: Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(previously called JRTs) are now being rolled out across the country.
Initial reports indicate that the first PRTs have been favourably
received in the provinces to which they have deployed, with a
reduction of reported security incidents and improvements in the
security environment for reconstruction activities. The UK Government
is committed in principle to leading a PRT and is currently engaged
in the necessary planning work. Consultations with the NGOs have
informed that work and we should expect to continue to maintain
that close liaison in the event that we deploy a UK-led PRT. We
have involved NGOs closely in the consultation process and will
continue to do so when the UK PRT is rolled out. Further information
will be issued on the details of the prospective UK-led PRT once
a decision has been taken on its deployment.
18. Recommendation: Special emphasis will need
to be placed on making the police and military genuinely integrated
ethnic forces, not simply an extension of Northern Alliance power
(paragraph 59).
Government response: The £5 million UK contribution
to ANA salaries was conditional on the ANA being established as
a multi-ethnic force under the control of a civilian MOD. We are
satisfied that the US-led training and reform programme and President
Karzai's ANA decree of 2 December 2002 satisfy these conditions.
The Germans are similarly focussed on producing a police force
that is ethnically inclusive, gender-sensitive and aware of its
human rights obligations. The FCO is looking to play a more active
role in police reform and multi-ethnicity and transparency will
again be preconditions of UK support.
19. Recommendation: We see no clear alternative
to the approach described by the Secretary of State as saying
to the warlords: "Security is now coming outside Kabul, the
international community is not going away, American power is not
going away, the government will be strengthened, there will be
a national army. "Come inside the tent or you are nowhere."
(paragraph 60).
Government response: Noted.
20. Recommendation: Given the timescale involved,
we believe that the creation of a national army should proceed
in step with progress in building the democratic institutions
and systems of accountability to the political administration
to allow it to function as an army should. (paragraph 60).
Government response: We agree. The creation of a
transparent, civilian run Ministry of Defence is central to the
military reform process and also to the US led assistance programme.
21. Recommendation: We are concerned that too
great an emphasis may be placed on the creation of a national
police force. This strikes us as one area where an incremental
and sectoral approach may be more rewarding. A priority for central
government is the protection of Afghanistan's porous borders and
the securing of customs and other revenues. The establishment
of a border protection force might confer considerable benefit
in the medium term, as a precursor to the final establishment
of a national service. (paragraph 61).
Government response: The German government is leading
on Police reform. They are finalising a strategy for training
that will ensure consistent standards for all provincial police
forces, and help separate police from their loyalties to local
militia leaders. The size of the task of creating a police force
means that the reform will be incremental. However, we are keen
to minimise the risk that a sectoral or regional approach or would
bring differing standards and codes of police conduct. It would
also not address the problem of local factional loyalties as provincial
governments are not yet fully accountable to the centre. The question
of whether to continue with Kabul-based training or to embark
on a new programme of provincial training cadres has yet to be
decided. The UK has pledged a £0.5m contribution to a US/Nordic
initiative to establish a border police training programme. The
Nordic countries involved are not yet committed to taking this
on.
22. Recommendation: We hope that DFID will also
play a major part in driving forward a disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR) programme and that it emphasises the importance
of this issue to other donors along with the need to give financial
settlements to former fighters (paragraph ).
Government response: By the end of the financial
year 2002-03, the UK will have disbursed nearly £2.5 million
to the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme for DDR, from joint
FCO-MOD-DFID Global Conflict Prevention Pool funds. The UK pledged
just over £2 million (US$3.5 million) of this at the Tokyo
DDR conference in February as part of the international community's
support under a UN/Japanese lead (including a US$35 million pledge
from the Japanese). We are very aware of the need to provide financial
support to ex-combatants and are looking at ways of doing so,
especially for former militia members who transfer into the new
national army.
23. Conclusion: We are conscious, however, that
no disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme
will succeed unless it is underpinned by the employment opportunities
that will come with economic development (paragraph 63).
Government response: We agree.
24. Recommendation: Policy towards regional power
holders needs to be reviewed continually in the light of what
we hope will be the Afghan Transitional Administration's growing
legitimacy and eventual control over revenue collection (paragraph
65).
Government response: We agree. The UK and international
donors continue to support extending the legitimacy of the Afghan
Transitional Administration (ATA) in the regions. The ATA has
undertaken to increase the flow of revenue from the provinces
to Central Government. At the ADF, the ATA undertook to publish
a White Paper on customs reform within the next weeks. It intends
to increase revenues remitted to the centre by over 100% in 2003/04.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will play a key role in
extending the influence of Central Government.
25. Conclusion: We believe the funding of "warlords"
by the international community to be a short-sighted approach
to the fight against terrorism which undermines the long-term
objective of achieving stability and security within the country
and across the region (paragraph 65).
Government response: We agree. We encourage the international
community not to fund warlords and instead to put resources into
strengthening the position of the Afghan Transitional Administration.
Many former warlords realise Afghanistan has changed, and that
it is now in their best interests to work with the Bonn Agreement.
In an effort to break their stranglehold on power, President Karzai's
decree of 16 December separated military and administrative powers
in the regions. We understand that most regional leaders have
expressed willingness to comply and we now need to ensure they
do so. We are actively involved in the further institution building
and security sector reform that will need to be effective before
central government is able to establish its authority throughout
the country.
The Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration signed
by Afghanistan and her neighbours in Kabul in December 2002 is
an important step forward in developing policies of non-interference,
friendship, mutual respect and co-operation between the signatories.
The government is considering ways to encourage the signatories
of the declaration to develop it into an effective basis for practical
action.
26. Recommendation: We are concerned about reports
of human rights abuses against prisoners and note the comments
made by the International Committee of the Red Cross, calling
for prisoners to have their legal status determined on an individual
basis. There is also, we consider, a lack of equity in the policy
under which a line has been drawn under warlords' past crimes,
while those acting under their authority have been imprisoned.
We recommend an examination of the situation of such prisoners
and their release where possible (paragraph 65).
Government response: We welcome the progress the
Afghan Transitional Administration have made to overturn the Taliban's
laws. However, it has much more work to do to implement international
human rights standards. The international effort to restore security
and stability to Afghanistan will be vital to build an environment
in which human rights can flourish.
The NGO Penal Reform International received FCO funding
last year to launch a penal reform programme in Afghanistan. The
programme includes training of prison officials and some rehabilitation
of prisons; and has the support of the Ministry of the Interior
and the Commissioner of Prisons. The British Embassy in Kabul
has raised the treatment of prisoners with the Afghan Transitional
Administration, most recently in November 2002.
It is for the Afghan Transitional Authority and the
Afghan people themselves to decide how to deal with past crimes.
We stand ready to play a supportive role if assistance is requested.
We would expect the UN to be at the heart of any investigation
into alleged war crimes. We welcomed the establishment of the
Human Rights Commission in June 2002 and are providing £1
million to support its work. The Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission is already considering how best to address the difficult
issue of transitional justice. The key to success in Afghanistan
is to develop institutions that allow Afghans to make choices
for themselves.
We have provided £1m in emergency funding to
the ICRC this year. This is intended to assist the ICRC with the
full range of their activities in Afghanistan.
27. Conclusion: The problem seems not to be a
lack of law, but a lack of clarity over which laws are enforceable,
and a lack of any mechanism through which to enforce them (paragraph
66).
28. Conclusion: At present there is no clear indication
of where suitable people to appoint as judges, lawyers or police
officers will be found. Such practical concerns underpin the whole
security issue and the successful operation of a fully-functioning
criminal justice system.
(paragraph 66).
Government response (27&28): The Italians are
the lead donor on Justice Sector Reform and held a conference
in Rome from 19-20 December, which agreed on the development of
a new co-ordination mechanism for assistance in this sector. UNDP
and the Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) have agreed a programme
for Rebuilding the Justice Sector in Afghanistan. This programme
includes the rationalisation and codification of the Afghan legal
code and the development and education of cadres of judges, lawyers
and justice sector professionals involved in prosecution of cases,
including the police. The UK has pledged to contribute £1m
from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool over the next year to
this programme. Nationwide surveys will start soon on the physical
infrastructure of courts and the available number of judges including
their present educational status.
29. Conclusion: We welcome the signing on the
22 December 2002 of a regional non-interference declaration by
Afghanistan's closest neighbours, although we are concerned about
the absence of Russia, India and Saudi Arabia as key signatories
(paragraph 67).
Government response: We refer also to the answer
given to question 25. The Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration
signed by Afghanistan and her neighbours in Kabul in December
2002 is an important step forward in developing policies of non-interference,
friendship, mutual respect and co-operation between the signatories.
We are considering ways to encourage the signatories of the declaration
to develop it into an effective basis for practical implementation.
We continue to raise the need for constructive dialogue
and coordinated assistance towards Afghanistan between regional
countries that might be pursuing separate interests.
The Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration was agreed
between Afghanistan and those countries that border her. Russia,
India and Saudi Arabia were not asked to sign the Declaration
as they are not immediate neighbours of Afghanistan.
30. Recommendation: We recommend that DFID and
other donors, together with the UNDP, carry out an assessment
of how opening up regional trade might help the Afghan economy,
benefit long-term reconstruction and provide alternative livelihoods
for militiamen and poppy farmers (paragraph 67).
Government response: The World Bank is committed
to carrying out a study on regional trade issues and prospects.
We will work with them on the study in the framework of the local
Consultative Group on Trade and Investment.
IV. CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
31. Recommendation: You cannot ignore the need
to build structures and institutions if you are ever to move beyond
providing humanitarian relief (paragraph 69).
Government response: We agree. Building the structures,
institutions and capacity for long-term development must happen
in parallel with meeting immediate humanitarian needs. We refer
also to the responses given to 3 and 7, above.
32. Recommendation: Food for work programmes address
the issue of availability of food. But often the food is available,
the problem is that people do not have the money to buy it (paragraph
70).
Government response: We agree that cash-for-work
programmes will very often be more appropriate than food-for-work
programmes. We have urged WFP in this direction, and they have
agreed that food aid should only be provided to approximately
2m of the 4.3m Afghans classified as 'vulnerable' in the expectation
that the remainder will be covered by cash for work programmes.
A major 'National Emergency Employment Programme' had been launched,
with multi-donor funding, to address this need.
33. Recommendation: Afghanistan is the victim
of a chronic rather than an acute food shortage. Food aid in Afghanistan
is now the wrong response, as it is in other parts of the world
where it has also failed to address food shortages. What is needed
is an improvement in food security (paragraph 70).
34. Recommendation: There are still vulnerable
communities inside Afghanistan but, by and large, we endorse a
move from food to cash for work. We understand the difficulties
of such a transition in an fragile economy but the response has
to be to build the economy rather than persist in policies which
undermine food production. (paragraph 70).
Government response: There will always be some need
for food aid for particular vulnerable groups and remote communities
that have been subject to natural disasters. However we support
an emphasis on improved food security. This will entail not only
an emphasis on cash for work schemes to improve access and affordability,
but also attention to the efficiency and sustainability of agricultural
systems to improve self reliance of rural communities and supply
food to the domestic market.
V. DRUGS
35. Recommendation: The success of the (poppy)
eradication programme was soured when, in Kabul, Ashraf Ghani
complained that the donor community had failed to honour what
he saw as its side of the bargain by providing support for alternative
livelihoods as a compensation package. He described it as the
single issue which had lost him most credibility within the government
and in the regions affected. (paragraph 71).
Government response: Alternative livelihoods are
key to the sustainability of any attempts to eliminate poppy cultivation
and support has been provided. Caution should be applied in providing
any immediate income replacement measures, in areas affected by
eradication, as perverse incentives may be created which encourage
further growing of poppy. Sustainable alternative livelihoods
can only be built gradually through broad economic development.
This is primarily the responsibility of Afghanistan itself. Substantial
assistance is being provided from the international community
but there is a tendency to blame either the UN or the international
community for lack of progress on difficult issues.
36. Conclusion: The gradual build-up of a law
enforcement and judicial system will, we hope, marginalise the
illegal activity of poppy production. There will then be a chance
to offer farmers something which, while not as lucrative as poppy
growing, will nevertheless have tangible benefits. The Secretary
of State told us that although poppy farmers could not realistically
be tempted away from poppy cultivation with the promise of equally
valuable crops, they could and should be offered the alternative
of "a better life that is a legitimate life" which would
also allow them to reap the benefits of stability and provision
of public services such as education for their children. We commend
this approach. Of course, none of this deflects from the UK's
responsibility to address its own demand for the drug. As Clare
Short pointed out, "if we get Afghanistan to the point where
there is no drug production, it will come to the UK from somewhere
else." (paragraph 75).
Government response: Noted.
VI. GENDER
37. Recommendation: DFID has a good track record
in its commitment to gender issues and could act as an advocate
for a thorough gender main-streaming approach within all donor
activities and in political dialogue with the government. DFID
should ensure that funding is provided for a gender audit (paragraph
78).
Government response: DFID is committed to supporting
gender mainstreaming and has mainstreamed the approach with regard
to its own programmes. Both DFID and the FCO advocate gender mainstreaming
to our international partners, and the approach has been adopted
by the Government and the UN. UNIFEM is working with the Ministry
of Women's Affairs to develop its national strategy and to mainstream
gender into the work of other Ministries, including though a gender
analysis of data on government programmes. We are closely monitoring
the work of the Constitutional Commission, whose draft constitution
should provide a legal framework for women's rights.
We are committed to working with the ATA to
support their efforts in mainstreaming gender equality into the
reconstruction effort. We do not currently intend to provide support
directly to the Ministry of Women.
38. Recommendation: We believe that education
to secondary level, for both boys and girls, must be a priority
and, in the long-term, will be the best method of addressing gender
issues. (paragraph 79).
Government response: Education to secondary level
for both boys and girls is a major challenge for Afghanistan and
one of the key priorities in the Transitional Administration's
National Development Framework. Educational status is a key proxy
measure for gender equity, as well as an important method for
increasing awareness of gender and human rights issues. But gender
issues must be addressed across all aspects of Afghanistan's development,
as described above.
VII. REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE
39. Recommendation: What is essential is that
the Afghan Transitional Administration has a sustainable refugee
return programme. Neighbouring states will have to be helped as
well if forced or unsustainable repatriation is to be avoided
(paragraph 81).
Government response: We have recently provided £3.5m
to the ICRC, UNHCR and WFP to assist with refugee returns and
support for refugee and IDP camps, both inside and outside the
country. We are concerned to ensure that refugee returns are sustainable
so as not to overload the fragile capacity and infrastructure
of those areas with a high expected number of returnees. We agree
that this is critical both to ensuring continued and improved
provision of services to those in the region and to those who
have recently returned. It is also important that the returns
are stable and are provisioned adequately so as to avoid enflaming
ethnic and regional grievances.
Support to those organisations working with refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), including support to
ensure that refugee camps outside the country are properly funded,
will form a major plank in the humanitarian component of our strategy
for the coming year.
VIII. HUMAN RIGHTS
40. Conclusion: The task now is to create a constitution,
build institutions and a structure of accountability within which
these regional power holders have to operate. We hope that the
Human Rights Commission will be a vehicle for this.
(paragraph 82).
Government response: We agree. The constitution making
process is critical for establishing a framework for inclusive
government in which all significant interest groups have a stake.
Key to the success of this process is ensuring an appropriate
level of consultation, and feeding in of lessons learnt from elsewhere—for
example on an appropriate balance between local autonomy and central
control. DFID are providing support to the United Nations to facilitate
the consultation process.
We understand that the first draft of the new constitution
is in keeping with the principles set out in the Bonn Agreement.
However there is an opportunity for fundamentalists to affect
the text before or at the Constitutional Loya Jirga in October.
We are supporting the work of the joint Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission/ UNOHCHR/UNAMA programme of work for the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission who are establishing offices
outside of Kabul.
Secretary of State for International Development
28 March 2003
| 
