Early warnings, information and donor
response
10. We strongly endorse DFID's support for
a regional approach to the improvement of early warning systems.
Food crises are likely to recur in southern Africa in the coming
years. It is vital therefore that famine early warning systems
are strengthened at both regional and national levels:
· Firstly,
by improving crop production forecasts, especially of non maize
food-crops including cassava, and assessments of their contribution
to food availability and consumption;
· secondly,
by strengthening vulnerability assessment at national and sub-national
levels, including systematic monitoring of market prices and better
understanding of the analytical linkages between poverty, seasonality,
and access to food;
· thirdly,
by incorporating non-official data sources, such as qualitative
NGO reports and monitoring by vulnerability committees, into official
early warning systems. (Paragraph 57)
We agree.
Non-cereal foods are too often omitted from crop
production forecasts. Attempts are now being made by national
Vulnerability Assessment Committees to include crop estimates
of roots and tubers into crop assessments. Already there are signs
that size of the cereal gap has been reduced by the inclusion
of cassava in those areas where it is a major crop.
The process for carrying out vulnerability assessments
in Southern Africa has developed considerably in the past two
years. Three vulnerability assessments are now planned each year
and the latest round is establishing baselines in several key
countries against which both short and long-term trends in vulnerability
will be measured. There are few examples globally where vulnerability
is being analysed on this scale with so much multi-sectoral interest
and buy in. At a Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
meeting in Gaborone in March 2003, donors, NGOs and regional Government
representatives agreed greater integration of early warning and
vulnerability systems covering a wider range of food security
indicators. Recommendations were produced for the SADC Council
of Ministers to provide official endorsement of the proposals.
11. Implementing these improvements to early
warning systems in Southern Africa will require a commitment of
financial resources and technical expertise from the donor community,
national governments and regional organisations, notably SADC.
We urge DFID to support reasonable requests for financial and
technical assistance. (Paragraph 58)
We agree. DFID is the major donor supporting national
Vulnerability Assessments in Southern Africa having contributed
£750,000 to the regional programme since the crisis began.
These funds will last until August 2003, which will allow the
next round of post harvest assessments to take place in April/May.
DFID is collaborating with SADC in designing a regional food security
programme in which understanding and measuring vulnerability is
a major component. This will be key to understanding and quantifying
vulnerability both during food crises and in making links to longer
term poverty.
12. Agricultural market information systems
should be introduced or strengthened as a matter of urgency in
all southern African countries. Lessons should be learned from
the Indian Famine Codes and Kenya's Turkana District drought monitoring
system, about how to incorporate price information into national
and regional early warning systems. In addition to monitoring
food prices and supplies in local markets, these systems should
also collect data on agricultural input supplies and prices (especially
fertiliser), and possibly also livestock prices and volumes, as
"distress" sales of livestock at low prices are widely
acknowledged as a robust indicator of livelihood stress. (Paragraph
69)
National Famine Early Warning Systems in the region
(funded by USAID) now routinely include price and market analysis
in their monthly reports. This type of information is also part
of the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information Systems (FIVIMS)
system that is being promoted by FAO. Factors such as restrictions
on cattle movement to limit disease outbreaks and how they impact
on incomes from livelihood sales are also included. There remain
concerns over the timeliness of this information but systems are
improving.
The humanitarian response
13. We were impressed in Malawi with the coordination
between NGOs involved in the delivery of food aid and humanitarian
assistance. In the medium term, such tasks ought to be performed
by government, but NGOs are providing an essential and much-needed
service. (Paragraph 80)
We partly agree. The experience of the past year
has shown the value of using comparative advantage of various
stakeholders. Governments are being encouraged to define core
functions of Ministries to improve efficiency of services and,
where appropriate, hand over responsibility for implementation
to those better suited. Government has a clear responsibility
for overall co-ordination and policy, but can leave implementation
to others, which may mean NGOs or the private sector, probably
through some form of performance-based contract system.
14. We are concerned at the lack of coordination
within and between the donor community and regional institutions
on food insecurity in southern Africa. On the basis that we believe
food crises are likely to recur in the region, we believe it is
unrealistic and unfair to expect regional governments in the immediate
future to implement alone effective co-ordination between multiple
organisations and institutions. As part of its evaluation of the
UK response to the southern Africa emergency, DFID should assess
the effectiveness of its working relationships with international,
regional and national partners, including NGOs, and should draw
lessons for improved coordination among multilateral and bilateral
agencies. (Paragraph 83)
We agree. Some aspects of this question are also
likely to be addressed by evaluations carried out by other organisations
such as the World Food Programme.
15. We applaud these efforts by the international
community to deliver effective relief programmes in the face of
political indifference or hostility by certain governments. DFID
and its partners in the international community must strive to
maintain freedom from political interference in their responses
to humanitarian emergencies, while at the same time ensuring that
the humanitarian imperative remains the overarching principle,
irrespective of the nature of the regime or difficulties in relationships
between international actors and national governments. (Paragraph
86)
We agree.
16. We take the view that Zambia's decision—and
especially the refusal to accept milled maize which could not
possibly have impacted on Zambia's future export potential as
it cannot germinate—was mistaken, particularly in the context
of widespread hunger. (Paragraph 94)
We agree.
17. We recognise that GM is a complex and
fast-moving technology, but we believe that the UK Government
should seek to build a consensus on the use of GM food aid, and
agree a clear and coherent policy on GM maize if it is to succeed
in persuading food aid recipients of its benefit. (Paragraph 95)
We will consider how this might be taken forward
given that each country will need to decide whether they will
restrict import of GM, taking into account the latest scientific
information and the impact of any restriction on humanitarian
efforts in their country.
18. DFID and other donors—but not the
USA which is a non-signatory—are bound, under the Cartagena
Protocol on bio-safety, to respect the right of aid-dependent
governments to refuse genetically-modified commodities if these
are offered as food aid. We were pleased to hear Clare Short state
that: "We take the view under the Cartagena Convention, the
bio-diversity convention, that every country has the right to
decide for itself whether to import GM food or seeds and needs
the capacity to be able to think about it and make the decision
in an intelligent way". It seems to us that this is at heart
an issue of governance; an accountable government, making decisions
intelligently, would surely not opt for a policy of rejecting
GM food aid when many of its citizens face starvation? (Paragraph
97)
We agree.
19. Donors should make every effort to provide
food and non-food aid of a type and form acceptable to recipients.
Looking beyond the current emergency, donors should also make
more concerted efforts to source food staples locally as this
is likely to be nutritionally-appropriate and culturally-preferred,
is less likely to be genetically-modified, and will often be cheaper
than shipping food aid from Europe and North America. In regions
like southern Africa, where markets are relatively well-developed
except in the most isolated rural areas, more consideration should
be given to providing relief aid in the form of cash rather than
food, as this maximises choice and supports rather than undermines
local food producers and traders. (Paragraph 98)
We agree. South Africa has been the major source
of commercial maize supplies for the region this year, but widescale
exports resulted in an increase in the price for its own domestic
consumers. Informal trade in maize from northern Mozambique and
southern Tanzania into Zambia and Malawi played a key role in
meeting the cereal shortfall. Much of this trade is informal and
in some instances illegal as it avoids phytosanitary and customs
controls. It thrives because it meets local needs. Sourcing locally
or in adjacent countries is less successful where large consignments
are required in a short time. Where grain is not grown in commercial
quantities suppliers often struggle to meet bulk orders, deliveries
are delayed and quality may not meet internationally acceptable
standards leading to rejection at border crossings. While accepting
that in most instances cash is preferable to food, there are occasions,
such as in Zimbabwe recently. where even those with cash are unable
to buy food and direct food deliveries are the only way to improve
access. In Lesotho and Swaziland all the food needs for the two
countries could have been sourced from South Africa and would
have promoted the rural marketing networks but in the event much
of the maize was provided in kind by the US government.
20. There is no room for complacency, but
the humanitarian response has so far been a success. Overall,
we commend DFID and its partners in the international community
for responding generously to the crisis in Southern Africa in
2002, after a slow start and in the face of difficult governance
contexts in several countries. (Paragraph 99)
We agree that the response was largely successful.
21. We urge the donor community and its regional
partners (governments, SADC, NGOs and civil society) to establish
contingency plans, such as pre-positioning of food stocks in the
region, technical support to national safety net programmes, including
better planned and transparently-managed Strategic Grain Reserves,
and greater dialogue with the private sector to enhance coordination
between public and private food flows. Those responsible for ensuring
food security in the countries of southern Africa—including
national Governments, the SADC-Food Agriculture and Natural Resources
Vulnerability Assessment Committee, DFID, World Food Programme
(WFP) and other bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs and community-based
organisations active in poverty reduction activities in the region—must
establish clear criteria for predicting food shortages, declaring
humanitarian emergencies, and mobilising relief resources. This
requires institutional strengthening and coordination. To this
end, national governments and their donor partners should consider
establishing permanent Food Security and Evaluation Units, probably
located in Ministries of Agriculture, which would liaise closely
with local Vulnerability Committees. (Paragraph 100)
We partly agree. Ideally, SADC should play a major
role in regional contingency planning, encouraged and supported
by donors as necessary. The recent Gaborone meeting (see response
to Recommendation 10 above) developed proposals for food security
covering regional and country-specific requirements. However,
it remains unclear when these will be agreed and put into effect.
There are also arguments against maintaining Strategic Grain Reserves
since they are expensive to operate and, in South Africa, there
is a very well developed private sector capacity to store grain.
A balance between government and private sector is required and
also between cash and grain reserves.
SADC's Food and Natural Resources Secretariat already
provides a home for regional vulnerability monitoring but provides
few funds for the regional Vulnerability Assessment Committees
(VACs). So long as enthusiasm for national vulnerability assessments
does not fade once the immediate problem has been resolved, these
provide truly national fora. They bring together a range of sectors
and partners who now have the attention and interest of their
respective governments as well as UN agencies involved in crisis
management. DFID's role in supporting country and regional VACs
is covered in the response to Recommendation 11.
In Malawi, significant progress has already been
made towards a comprehensive long-term National Food Security
Strategy. This will include production, storage, marketing and
trade issues. Technical assistance has already been provided to
the National Food Reserve Agency to improve management of the
Strategic Grain Reserve with new, transparent systems for stock
control, accountability and purchase and release criteria. Although
efforts will be made to ensure the systems are as cost effective
as possible, it is recognised by local stakeholders that full
cost recovery is not likely and that some social costs to the
Malawi Government and donors will have to be accepted.
22. As for the longer term, steps must be
taken to reduce vulnerability to food production shocks. These
will include: encouraging diversification away from maize and
even out of agriculture for some of the population; providing
appropriate support to poor households affected by HIV/AIDS; and
where direct budgetary support is given, prioritising household
food security within Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes. (Paragraph
101)
We partly agree. In many marginal areas where food
insecurity was most manifest in 2002, agriculture plays a minor
role in people's livelihoods. Other sources of income are often
more important and failure to understand these fully may have
over emphasised the impact of crop failure in areas where cropping
is opportunistic and crops fail most years. For Malawi, food security
is explicitly indicated as a major component of the Safety Nets
and Social Protection pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP). In accordance with the National Safety Nets Strategy
a range of interventions, including agricultural input support,
employment income opportunities, humanitarian feeding and direct
welfare transfers, is already being provided. Unfortunately, safety
nets are less well developed elsewhere in the region although
there is increasing awareness of the need for strategies that
address social protection providing that they do not undermine
existing informal and social networks. DFID will continue to support
the development of such strategies within national PRSPs.
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