House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Sixth Report

2 MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: LOOKING FOR DEVELOPMENT GAINS

Understanding migration and development

12. If Governments are to make migration deliver benefits in terms of poverty reduction, then policies need to be based on a sound understanding of the complex relationship between migration and development.[14]Knowledge of the patterns of migration, the reasons for it, and its developmental impacts are the key building blocks for policy. In this chapter we outline the patterns of and reasons for migration. The remainder of the report explores migration's developmental impacts.

PATTERNS OF MIGRATION

13. The United Nations Population Division estimates that 175 million people - 2.9 percent of the world's population - currently live outside their country of birth. In absolute terms, this is an increase of 100 million since 1965; in percentage terms it is an increase from 2.3 percent to 2.9 percent of the world's total population. It may well be the case that many more people would like to migrate, but there is currently - in contrast to the impression given in some parts of the media - no "tidal wave" about to crash on the shores of the UK or the developed world as a whole.[15]

Figure 2: International Migrants, 1965-2000

Year	International Migrants (stock) - millions, and percentage of total population
1965	75 (2.3%)
1975	84 (2.1%)
1985	105 (2.2%)
1990	120 (2.3%)
2000	175 (2.9%)[16]

Data source: International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2003

14. Of the current stock of international migrants, 60 percent live in the developed world, and 40 percent in the developing world. Fifty-six million migrants live in Europe, 50 million in Asia, and 41 million in North America.[17] Around nine percent of international migrants - 16 million people - are refugees. Refugees are overwhelmingly to be found in developing countries: Asia houses 9 million; Africa 4 million; and the developed world as a whole only 3 million. Developing countries are also home to most of the 25 million Internally Displaced Persons - people who have been forced to leave their homes, but who are not classified as refugees because they have not crossed over a national border.[18] Figures on international migration overall fail to capture the vast scale of migration that also takes place within countries. For instance, there are estimated to be 200 million temporary and seasonal migrants in India, and 120 million internal migrants within China.[19]

15. South-north migration has important implications for development and poverty reduction in developing countries - not least because of the links it establishes between the rich world and the poor world.[20] But migration is not primarily a south-north phenomenon.[21] Most migration, and especially the migration of the poor, takes place within and between developing countries.[22] For example: many countries in south-east Asia for instance are heavily-reliant on cheap migrant labour from neighbouring countries[23]; international migration from Vietnam between 1994 and 1999 of 300,000 is far exceeded by the 4.3 million people who migrated within Vietnam over the same period[24]; and, in many developing countries, urbanisation is fed by large volumes of rural-urban migration.[25]

16. A very high proportion of migrants, and perhaps even the majority, migrate on a temporary basis, either for a number of years before returning home, or migrating to and fro each year.[26] For instance, many Haitians go backwards and forwards between their home country and the Dominican Republic.[27] And in India, temporary, circular, and seasonal migration, with people moving in response to opportunities for agricultural work, or for off-farm rural employment in construction and services, has long been part of poor people's lives.[28] Much south-south migration, especially temporary, circular and seasonal migration, falls between the cracks, with migration unrecorded and migrants undocumented. Because of their lack of documentation, and the absence of protective legal frameworks, such migrants have few rights, are vulnerable to exploitation, and are largely invisible to policy-makers.[29] Policies aimed at delivering development and poverty reduction should not start from the assumption that migration is a rare occurrence, a south-north phenomenon, or a one-off event. Policies need to be based on an understanding of the multi-faceted nature of migration, including temporary, circular and seasonal migration, within and between developing countries, as well as from south to north.

17. We received some evidence suggesting that there had been a feminisation of migration, with women making up an increasing proportion of migrant flows.[30] But other witnesses argued that the proportion of female migrants has been constant over the last 40 years, pointing out that in 1965 women made up 46.6 percent of international migrants.[31] There may have been some change in the way in which women migrate; whereas women once moved to follow their husbands, now women increasingly move independently,[32] responding to economic opportunities and seeking financial independence and personal empowerment.[33] There is no doubt that some economic activities - domestic service, tourism, commercial sex-work, and some manufacturing industry - create a demand for female workers.[34] In such contexts, women may well make up the majority of migrants. In general however, it seems unlikely that there has been a significant increase in the proportion of migrants who are women. Rather, there is a welcome increase in awareness of the fact that women migrate,[35] and that gender has an impact on the experience of migration. Given the heightened vulnerability of female migrants to trafficking and exploitation, it is essential that policy is not based on the assumption that migrants are male. Policy-makers must pay careful attention to the experiences and concerns of female migrants to ensure that their migration is beneficial.

REASONS FOR MIGRATION

18. Distinctions are often drawn between types of migrants (voluntary or forced), between their motivations for moving (economic or non-economic), and between "push" and "pull" factors in motivating migration.[36] Voluntary migrants choose to move; forced migrants do not. Economic migrants move to gain access to resources or to improve their employment opportunities, whereas non-economic migrants move to escape persecution. Migrants responding to push factors are leaving places where life is a struggle, migrants responding to pull factors are moving to places where they think they might prosper.

19. Making distinctions between migrants and their motives is necessary in order to ensure that refugees fleeing political persecution are afforded protection and asylum (see paragraphs 54—56). But people who move often have multiple motives,[37] and the places from which they move often have multiple problems - a lack of economic opportunities and political instability - linked by the common thread of poor governance.[38] Forced migrants may retain some choice as to where they flee; voluntary migrants may be escaping depths of poverty and insecurity which give little room for choice. Economic migrants may be fleeing persecution as well as poverty. Policy-makers may seek clarity, but the line between voluntary and forced migration and economic and non-economic migrants is frequently blurred.[39]

20. Nevertheless, conceptual categories such as "push" and "pull" factors may help us to understand migration. As regards the "push" factors, migrants may be motivated to leave a place for reasons ranging from the economic and demographic (poverty, unemployment, low wages, high fertility rates, lack of basic health and education), to the political (conflict, insecurity, violence, poor governance, corruption and human rights abuses), the social and cultural (discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender or caste), and the environmental (harvest failure, resource depletion, and natural and/or man-made disasters).[40] In terms of "pull" factors, perceived economic opportunities - broadcast by an increasingly global media - are key. Migrants are attracted by the possibility of employment, better standards of living, greater opportunities for personal and professional development, and family reunification whether their journey takes them to a nearby town, to the capital city, to a neighbouring country, or to a distant land.[41]

21. Migrants are motivated by various combinations of push and pull factors against a background of transport and other costs.[42] In some circumstances, migration may begin as a result of push factors - drought, lack of work - and then, when migrants return with stories of a better life elsewhere, and family networks which link home and host regions are established, be driven more by pull factors.[43] Or, migration may be initiated following a community making contact with, and learning more about, the outside world.[44]Identifying push and pull factors does shed some light on the reasons for migration, but it is perhaps more useful to see migration as one of the options which poor people and households have for managing their risks and sustaining their livelihoods.[45] If people felt that their current place of residence provided them with adequate chances for secure lives, free of poverty, and with the prospect of improvement, then they would not feel forced to move. Achieving this is a matter of improving the prospects for sustainable development in developing countries, and, as we heard clearly from Sierra Leonean migrants in Southwark, ensuring that the right structures - of governance, for education, for health - are in place.[46] Understanding migration as part of the range of poor people's livelihood options has important implications for policy. Migration and migrants should not be seen as problems to be dealt with. Migration presents both challenges and opportunities. Migrants are people trying to improve their lives and must be treated accordingly.[47]

22. This understanding of migration also serves to emphasise that migration cannot be divorced from the wider international system of economics and politics which shapes the lives of poor people. So, for instance, small farmers' ability to survive on the land may be damaged by the dumping of subsidised agricultural produce by the EU, and the provision of food aid in kind by the USA.[48] With this livelihood option closed off, they may face little choice other than migration to the capital city, or perhaps, if they have the resources, to the developed world. In seeking to manage or respond to migration, policy-makers in the developed and developing world should consider carefully the impacts of a range of other policies, on issues including aid, trade, investment, arms exports, climate change, human rights, corruption and governance (see paragraphs 151—167).

THE MIGRATION HUMP

23. Migration requires resources. Poor people lack resources, including finance or access to the social networks and social capital which help to make migration possible.[49] So the poorest people tend not to migrate, or more precisely, they do not migrate far.[50] As the New Economics Foundation put it, "although international travel is cheaper and more accessible than at any other time in history, the cost of a plane or train ticket is still well beyond the reach of the majority of the world's population."[51] Whilst the poor may migrate locally, long-distance migrants tend to be those with access to financial resources and social networks.[52]

24. The fact that poor people tend not to migrate internationally is described in aggregate terms by the phenomenon of the "migration hump".[53] The migration hump (see figure 4) describes the relationship between outward migration and level of a country's development. What the migration hump shows is that there is little migration at low levels of development (zone A), but that as development takes place and income levels rise, so too does migration (zone B). People become more able to migrate, and - as it takes time for increased income levels and consumer demand to translate into increased domestic production and opportunities for employment[54] - they remain subject to strong economic pushes and pulls. Migration continues to rise with income levels until an income threshold is reached.[55] Once this threshold is reached, and the domestic economy begins to offer people opportunities at home, migration starts to taper off (zone C).[56] So, for example, Spain and Portugal were some-way up the migration hump in the 1960s and 1970s, and witnessed rapidly increasing levels of out-migration. During the 1980s and 1990s as they passed over the hump, net outward migration decreased and has now been reversed.[57] Italy and South Korea have followed similar trajectories.[58]

25. The migration hump raises very important issues for policy. As the poorest do not migrate, or do not migrate far, it cannot be assumed that policies which help migrants will also help the poor.[59] As Councillor Blango, the Sierra Leonean Mayor of Southwark, explained: "It is not everybody in such countries or every family that has the opportunity of having a member of the family overseas".[60] We must not lose sight of the main question: what is the impact of migration on those left behind in developing countries? A second implication which poses a dilemma for those who would like migration management to reduce migration, is that developed countries cannot expect to solve their immigration problems by reducing poverty in developing countries. Indeed the migration hump suggests that if we are successful in reducing poverty, we should expect increased out-migration from developing countries.[61] But there may be aspects of development - democracy, good governance, gender equality - which developed countries might promote, and which might have the effect of reducing the push factors that encourage migration, leading to a situation where migration is an informed choice rather than a desperate option.[62] Improving governance is of the utmost importance; better governance would make some migrants less desperate to leave, and - by encouraging migrants to remit and perhaps to return - would also make that migration which does take place more development-friendly. This is primarily the responsibility of developing country governments.

Designing policy: Identifying development wins

26. Just as development and levels of poverty shape the nature and level of migration, so too does migration impact upon development and poverty. Recent research by the World Bank suggests that a ten percent increase in the share of migrants in a country's population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living on less than $1 per day.[63] Even when migration does not directly involve the poor, it still affects them, and its benefits can be harnessed to improve their livelihoods.[64] But the developmental impact of migration depends upon the nature of the migration in question and on the links which migration establishes between home and host societies.[65] In chapters three and four we explore various dimensions of migration, and for each of them suggest ways in which policy might make migration more development-friendly. (Figure 5 sets out this framework of analysis with a few dimensions of migration shown for illustrative purposes; figure 8, at the start of chapter five, summarises our findings).

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIGRATION

27. Mainstream economic theory suggests that global economic output would be maximised by abolishing restrictions on migration. Increasing the mobility of labour would allow resources to be allocated more efficiently. Labour would be more productively employed - there are more jobs for people to do in the UK than in Malawi - and total economic output would increase.[66] This logic, when it is applied to capital mobility, is the basis of the Government's enthusiasm for the liberalisation of trade in goods and services. Given the vast potential gains from liberalising the movement of workers, the economic case for more migration is clear.

28. So much for economic theory; the real world is different. First, as the British Bangladeshi International Development Group put it: "For inevitable political reasons, a can of beans has more rights of free movement across the globe then someone in the developing world, even though in principle both people living in absolute poverty and the makers of the can of beans would prosper more if freedom of labour was dealt with equally."[67] There is a difference between the free flow of goods and the free movement of people, and a need to balance the right of sovereign states to control their borders and pursue their national interests, with individuals' rights to mobility.[68] Second, as with trade liberalisation, the benefits of enhanced migration, and the costs, are distributed unevenly both between and within countries and social groups, depending on how they are affected by migration.[69]

29. In host countries, the economic impact of migration may be felt in terms of tax revenues, welfare spending, migrants' consumption of public services including health, education and housing, wage rates, employment levels and overall economic growth. And the impact of migration may also be felt in other ways: cultural enrichment, increased diversity and innovation, or social and ethnic tensions. In the UK there has been much debate about the economic impact of immigration. The Government - whilst acknowledging that the data is far from perfect - maintains that the effects are "small but positive", suggesting the resultant revenue receipts for the exchequer outweigh extra welfare payments by £2.5 billion, and that immigration adds a quarter of one percent to growth in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[70] However, whilst immigration may lead to economic growth, it will not necessarily increase the host society's per capita income.[71] Whether the balance is positive or negative - overall, or on a per capita basis - depends on the nature of the migration, and on whether the migrants are able to prosper in the host country.

30. There are costs and benefits for migrants themselves. On the plus side, migrants have the opportunity to accumulate wealth and skills,[72] working in a context where their labour and skills can be employed more productively and for greater reward, and where they may feel more secure. On the minus side migrants may suffer from a lack of access to health, education and other services,[73] poor living conditions, and exploitation - by traffickers en route, and then by employers - no matter whether they have moved from a village to a town in India, or from Somaliland to London. Home countries and communities left behind by migrants are also affected. On the plus side, migration can provide an outlet for under-employed skills, reducing unemployment and increasing wages. It can also increase the incentives for people to pursue higher education,[74] generate remittances, lead to the return migration of people with new and improved skills,[75] expose developing countries to different ideas and values,[76] and establish links which may be used in future for trading and business purposes.[77] But there are significant costs too for home countries and the communities left behind, including the creaming-off of skilled and educated people, the loss of their energies and potential taxes, a reduction in the domestic pressures for economic and political reform, and the undermining of family and other support structures.[78] Such dynamics will further undermine the livelihoods of the chronically poor.[79]

31. Migration's costs and benefits will be distributed unevenly. Economic theory suggests strongly that migration will increase global economic output, giving scope for win-win outcomes, but many of the developmental gains are likely to impose costs for some. To take the UK as an example, immigration may add to the UK's economic output, but depending on the benefits which migrants claim, the taxes they pay, and the jobs they do, immigration may benefit high-skilled British workers, but be at a cost to the low-skilled, and may benefit consumers but cost tax-payers.[80] We should not be surprised at this. Economic restructuring distributes its costs and benefits unevenly.[81] This of course is where politics comes in, distributing the gains and losses from migration. At a domestic level this is complex; when we add an international dimension this complexity is increased.

EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY?

32. There may be some win-wins and cost-free ways of making migration work for development, but these are likely to be few. Policy design should therefore be about finding the most effective and efficient ways to make migration work for development and poverty reduction. To do this, one would need to identify which dimensions of migration matter most in terms of their developmental impact, what the direction of this impact is, and then design policies which can be used to shape the various dimensions of migration to influence its overall developmental impact. It is then the job of governments - which are primarily concerned with protecting and pursing the interests of their citizens[82] - to determine how far they want to go in making their migration-related policies development-friendly. This should involve factoring in the non-economic costs and benefits of migration, distributional issues, and other policy objectives (see paragraphs 151—167). Finally, a wise development agency will want to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of migration as a route to poverty reduction, with other sorts of development interventions.

33. Unfortunately the evidence-base for policy on migration and development is very poor.[83] There seems to be no model of the relationship between the various dimensions of migration and development. It was noticeable that several expert witnesses - and this is not to criticise them - were unable to provide evidence-based answers to what one would think were basic questions. Asked about the relationship between international migration and development, Joseph Chamie, the Head of the UN's Population Division - the man who would know - explained that because of the lack of good data, "Right now, we are unable to say precisely what is going on."[84] In their written evidence, the International Organization for Migration stated:

34. There is also a lack of information about the numbers of people trafficked[86]; the role migrant communities themselves, smuggling networks and government policy play in shaping migration flows; the contribution of migrants to their host countries; migrants' contribution to their home countries through remittances and other mechanisms; and, the impacts of return migration. Data on some issues, illegal migration and unofficial remittances for example, are inherently difficult to collect. But policy should not be designed on the basis of hunches and anecdotes. If development policies are to be well-designed, on the basis of a sound understanding of the causes and consequences of migration and development, then the evidence-base urgently needs improving. In particular, better data on internal migration is needed.

35. We were pleased to hear that DFID acknowledges the need to improve the evidence-base, and is making efforts - through its Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex, and with the World Bank - to improve the situation. Sharon White, DFID's Head of Policy, stated that in 18 months' time the information base would be much better. We shall see. The IOM suggests that the Government produce a short annual report on migration to the UK from developing countries. By providing information about who is coming to the UK, where they come from, what they do in the UK, to what extent they are remitting, and whether and when they return to their countries of origin, and by outlining what the Government is doing to make migration more development-friendly, such a report could do much to raise awareness about the linkages between migration and development.[87] We support this proposal and recommend that the Government takes it up.

14 For useful overviews of migration and development see: IOM, The Migration-Development Nexus, 2003; Christina Boswell and Jeff Crisp, Poverty, International Migration and Asylum, Policy Brief No.8, United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2004; Kathleen Newland, Migration as a Factor in Development and Poverty Reduction, Migration Policy Institute, 1 June 2003; Kimberley Hamilton, Migration and Development: Blind faith and hard-to-find facts, Migration Policy Institute, 1 Nov 2003; IOM, International Migration and Development: The potential for a win-win-situation, June 2003; Ronald Skeldon, Migration and Poverty, Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 17(4) pp. 67-82, 2002. Back

15 Q 57 [Professor Ronald Skeldon, Member, University of Sussex Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty] Back

16 Some of the increase from 1985 to 2000 is accounted for by the dissolution of the USSR - new borders and countries have been established; people who have not moved find themselves classified as "international migrants". Back

17 Ev 124 [Department for International Development (DFID) memo] Back

18 Ev 249 [Oxfam memo] Back

19 Ev 124 [DFID memo] Back

20 Q 78 [Professor Richard Black, Director, University of Sussex Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty] Back

21 Q 4 [Masood Ahmed, DFID] Back

22 Ev 124 [DFID memo]; Ev 228 [New Economics Foundation (NEF)] Back

23 Ev 276 [Unlad Kabayan memo] Back

24 Ev 212 [IOM memo] Back

25 Ev 206 [IIED memo] Back