House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Sixth Report

3 MIGRATION JOURNEYS: FROM DEPARTURE TO RETURN

36. The impact of migration on development and poverty reduction depends on the nature of the migration, and also on the links which migration establishes between home and host societies. In this chapter we examine different stages of the migration journey, identifying a range of ways in which policy might be adjusted to make migration work better for development and poverty reduction.

Leaving and being left behind

37. At the risk of stating the obvious, migration journeys begin with the decision to move. The stimulus for migration matters for development, because it shapes the impact of migration both on the migrants themselves, and on those left behind. Migration works best for development when it is freely-chosen and when it is planned for. For migrants, supplies can be taken, the journey arranged, accommodation and perhaps employment at the destination organised, and plans made to keep in contact with those left behind. For receiving societies, plans can be made to integrate migrants and to maximise their contribution to the host society. For those left behind, plans can be made so that communities are not simply abandoned by a sudden exit of people. If migration is forced, unplanned and poorly regulated, migrants may find themselves vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers and smugglers, may not know where they are going or what they will do when they get there, and may not have been able to make plans to keep in touch with those left behind. As the Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, put it, referring in particular to women subject to trafficking and exploitation: "People who have to move due to circumstances that are not connected with their own personal choice are more likely to be vulnerable in terms of the conditions in which they find themselves living and those susceptible to being exploited."[88] Receiving societies may find themselves unable to cope with the sudden influx of migrants, and communities left behind may find themselves unable to cope without the resources and energies of those who have left, a situation often referred to as a "brain-drain".

THE "BRAIN-DRAIN", OR, THE EXPORT OF SKILLED LABOUR

38. The "brain-drain" - the loss of educated and skilled personnel at a rate faster than they can be replaced, resulting in a shortage of skills - is the most obvious way in which migration can harm the development prospects of the countries and communities left behind. Recent evidence suggests that whilst 88 percent of migrants to countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have at least a secondary education, most developing countries do not lose a huge proportion of their highly skilled citizens to the "brain-drain".[89] On average, perhaps five percent of secondary-educated and ten percent of tertiary-educated people from developing countries have become international migrants.[90] Nevertheless some countries do lose many people, and even a small loss can be significant for developing countries which lack a large pool of human capital. A recent paper by the Institute for Public Policy Research notes that: some 40 percent of tertiary-educated adults from Turkey and Morocco, and nearly a third of Ghana's, have emigrated to OECD countries; over half of tertiary-educated adults from the Caribbean live in the USA, including 75 percent of tertiary-educated Jamaicans and Haitians; over 10 percent of Mexico's tertiary-educated population lives in the USA, along with 30 percent of its doctoral graduates; and, the proportion of secondary-educated Nicaraguans and El Salvadorians living abroad amounts to 40 and 50 percent respectively.[91] In particular sectors - health and education - the "brain-drain" can be especially dramatic, with, for instance, 60 to 70 percent of Ghana's health professionals emigrating.[92]

39. In their submission the Commonwealth Business Council's AfricaRecruit programme described the outflow of skilled personnel from Africa to the developed world as "Africa's foreign assistance to the developed world".[93] From the Philippines, the migrants' organisation, Unlad Kabayan, describe the brain-drain as a new form of imperialism.[94] Developing countries, whose health and education systems are unable to provide basic health services, cannot afford to lose their skilled personnel, or their taxes. It is unfair, inefficient and incoherent for developed countries to provide aid to help developing countries to make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on health and education, whilst helping themselves to the nurses, doctors and teachers who have been trained in, and at the expense of, developing countries.

40. But whereas the export of skilled labour is an immoral "brain-drain" to some, to developed countries it can be a way of filling skills gaps in their economies, to migrants it is a way of improving their lives, and to some developing countries it is a way of tapping into the benefits of remittances, and the eventual return of skilled labour. The Philippines, for instance, trains more nurses than they need, deliberately, for the export market,[95] whilst other countries - Bangladesh, El Salvador, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, according to the IOM - also actively promote the foreign employment of their citizens.[96] In addition, some argue that the "brain-drain" may generate a positive dynamic within developing countries, and that there is therefore an "optimal level" of skilled migration.[97] There is some scepticism about this[98] but the suggestion is that people will have more incentive to pursue their education in order to increase their chances of migrating to the developed world, but that only a small proportion of them will actually migrate, leaving the developing country with a more educated workforce than it would otherwise have.[99] In the absence of good evidence about the extent of the "brain-drain" and its impacts it is difficult to assess the validity of this argument.[100]

41. It is too simplistic to say that the export of skilled labour necessarily results in a net loss to developing countries. The impact depends on the extent of remittances by the migrants, on the skills that they acquire whilst overseas, and on whether they return to their home country (see paragraphs 82—87 on return; see paragraphs 100—123 on remittances). And most importantly, it depends on whether the developing country's skill base is deep enough to cope with out-migration, and whether its labour markets and education and training systems have the flexibility to respond to the loss of personnel, without themselves becoming too focussed on the production of skilled labour for export and thereby neglecting the needs of the domestic economy.[101]

42. Highly-skilled labour migration from developing to more developed countries poses problems for many developing countries. One response would be to attempt to stop such migration. But in our view, this would be neither desirable or practical. Such a response would sever the links between developed and developing countries, along which remittances and other resources can flow.[102] And as well as curtailing the rights of individuals to move to pursue opportunities and to make the most of their skills,[103] it simply would not work. People would still move, but in the absence of legal channels for migration they would be pushed into the arms of traffickers and smugglers. A second response would be to compensate developing countries for the loss of skilled personnel. At first glance this seems a sensible response, but we agree with DFID; compensation is not the most appropriate response because it would be very difficult - that is, too expensive - to level up wage rates globally.[104] Such harmonisation of wage rates might also entail costs for developing countries; higher salary bills, and perhaps a loss of their comparative advantage.

REGULATING RECRUITMENT

43. To its considerable credit, the UK Government highlighted the tension between the UK's need to recruit staff to fill skills gaps in the National Health Service (NHS), and the needs of developing countries' health systems, in its second White Paper on International Development.[105] DFID in particular is fully aware of the development implications of highly skilled migration and international recruitment specifically.[106] The UK Government's response to this tension has been to develop a Code of Practice for NHS employers involved in the international recruitment of healthcare professionals.[107]The Code asks employers not to recruit actively from countries which would suffer as a result of losing staff. The Department of Health has worked with DFID to produce a list of countries from which there should be no active recruitment, based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee's list of aid recipients. Exceptional agreements have been reached with the Philippines, and with India - with the exception of those states which receive DFID assistance. These two countries have decided that they are content for the UK to recruit from them. The Department for Health also publishes a list of recruitment agencies which operate in line with the Code of Practice, and strongly advises employers to consult this list.

44. Welcome as the Code of Practice is, there are serious questions about its effectiveness. James Buchan, an expert on "brain-drain" and recruitment issues in the health sector, and on the operation of codes of conduct, explained to us that the Code should be assessed in terms of its content, coverage and compliance.[108] The content is fine, but the coverage is partial, and the level of compliance is unclear.[109] There are several loopholes in the NHS Code of Practice. One, it is a voluntary code with no enforcement powers; two, whilst it discourages active recruitment, it does not discourage employers from responding to enquiries from individuals in developing countries (so-called passive recruitment); three, it applies to England, but not to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland; and four, it does not apply to private sector recruitment agencies. This means that employers can get round the code through the use of private sector recruitment agencies. They can also circumvent the code by recruiting migrants who enter the UK for other reasons, but are subsequently employed by the NHS. Several issues need clarifying. How effective has the NHS Code of Practice been? What will the Government do to enforce the Code of Practice or to encourage NHS employers to adhere to it? Where does passive recruitment end, and active recruitment begin? Why is there not a Code of Practice for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales?[110] And perhaps most importantly, how significant a loophole is the fact that the Code does not apply to the private sector; specifically, how many health-workers from developing countries are employed in the private and public sectors, and how many of those employed in the public sector were initially recruited for the private sector?

45. In evidence to us, Hilary Benn acknowledged that there are clearly "issues to do with the activities of private recruitment agencies", which make for a situation where in this respect the code "clearly does not work".[111] We were pleased therefore to read about the Government's plans to tighten up the Code of Practice,[112] and look forward to seeing the detail of these proposals. They must be effective, and their effectiveness must be proven. James Buchan reported to us that the NHS cannot say how many nurses from developing countries it employs. He described this as "unfortunate".[113] We need not be so restrained. Data should be collected on the number of doctors and nurses born and trained in developing countries who are employed by the NHS. This is a gaping hole in the evidence-base for policies relating to migration and development. We also recommend that UK-based employers be required to use only recruitment agencies which are registered in the countries from which they are recruiting. In this way developing country governments might have some leverage over recruitment agencies,[114] or at the very least have some opportunity to plan for the impacts of recruitment.

46. Recruitment would be better regulated through international cooperation rather than unilateral or bilateral approaches which run the risk, first, of diverting migrant streams to receiving countries which are not party to an agreement, and second of displacing the problem of skills shortages onto neighbouring countries that are not covered by agreements. This illustrates that the international recruitment of health-workers is not simply a south-north issue. It is also a north-north issue, as UK-based personnel are tempted by higher salaries and better conditions in North America, and - more importantly from a development perspective - a south-south issue. That is, if one developing country seeks to replace the staff it has lost to the UK by recruiting from a neighbouring, probably poorer, developing country, it will be the poorest who will ultimately lose out. What chance then for the MDGs? We were interested to hear from Winston Cox, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, about initiatives to establish codes of practice relating to the recruitment of health workers and teachers.[115] The UK Government is a member of the Working Group which has developed the Commonwealth's Draft Protocol on the Recruitment of Teachers; we trust that this is a sign of its commitment. The UK is not a signatory to Commonwealth's Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers. By its support the UK could play an important role in improving the multilateral regulation of recruitment. We invite the Government to explain its position.

ADDRESSING THE PUSH FACTORS

47. Hilary Benn told us of a recent conversation he had with the head of the Ghanaian Health Service. The Secretary of State had expected to be taken to task about the UK's recruitment of health-service professionals, but the conversation revolved in large part around the push factors which lead many of Ghana's doctors and nurses to migrate.[116] The lesson to be drawn was that whilst recruitment does need to take account of developing countries' needs, attention also needs to be given to the conditions within developing countries that push doctors and nurses to work elsewhere. We agree; people want their skills to be well-used and rewarded. It is important therefore, that the UK works with developing country governments to make their health and education systems - the conditions, the pay, the prospects for professional development - suitable environments in which to work,[117] as well as vigorously promoting the good governance and political stability which is fundamental to sustainable development. Improving conditions in home countries so that skilled professionals have less incentive to migrate, is the first line of defence against the "brain-drain".[118]

TOWARDS A TRIPLE-WIN?

48. The "brain-drain" has to be tackled at both ends. Developing countries should, with the assistance of donors, seek to reduce the push factors which lead their professionals to migrate. Developed countries should - whilst factoring in the benefits of remittances, skill acquisition and return - ensure that their recruitment practices do not undermine the development prospects of developing countries. Further, it seems to us that there is the potential here for a development triple-win, a way of addressing the "brain-drain" issue which can be to the benefit of developed countries, developing countries, and migrants themselves.[119] If the NHS is to depend on overseas workers[120], then we recommend that the Government considers designing schemes to train nurses in developing countries for temporary employment for a specified number of years in the NHS, on the understanding that they would then return to their home country.Such schemes should be designed with the input of developing countries, migrants' organisations and employers. The nurses would have an opportunity to earn more and to acquire skills. The UK would receive a temporary influx of staff for its health service. The developing country would see an increase in its skills base. Such a scheme would need careful design, not least to ensure that migrants did return to their home countries. But the potential development benefits, and the fact that this would be a more cost-effective way of training nurses,[121] no matter where they ended up working, make it worthy of serious consideration. The costs of training nurses should not be borne by countries which do not benefit from their training.

49. With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with South Africa in October 2003 the UK has made a step towards establishing partnerships with developing countries on recruitment issues.[122] The Memorandum of Understanding sets out a joint approach to allowing the temporary migration of South African health service professionals into the UK so as to provide the UK with personnel, and to provide potential migrants with opportunities to learn new skills which on their return to South Africa would be of benefit to their home country. We acknowledge that "just training yet more nurses"[123] as Hilary Benn put it, will not in itself reduce the brain-drain, although it may help to address what appears to be a global shortage of nurses. However, in combination with efforts to address the push factors, such an approach has considerable potential to make migration work better - more fairly, and more cost-effectively - for development and poverty reduction.

Travelling, arriving and living

TRAFFICKING, SMUGGLING AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION

50. The ways in which migrants travel, the ways in which they are treated when they arrive in host countries or regions, and the lives they are able to lead once there, also shape migration's impacts on development. As regards the journey itself, trafficking and smuggling exploit the vulnerability and desperation of migrants and extract profits from their plight. There is a fine line between trafficking and smuggling. Smuggling moves people across borders in return for a fee. Trafficking is non-consensual, often involves violence and deception, and is done with the intention of profiting from the migrants' forced labour or sexual exploitation.[124] Women and children are particularly prone to trafficking. There is little reliable data, but estimates suggest that nearly half a million people, many of them women and children, are smuggled or trafficked into Western Europe every year, and two million are trafficked and smuggled globally.[125] Trafficking and smuggling is by no means an exclusively south-north phenomenon. Porous borders and a lack of resources to police these borders, ensure that trafficking and smuggling within and between developing countries remains a big problem. There is for instance a booming trade in women and children in South-East Asia for prostitution and sexual exploitation, and widespread illegal movement of children in West Africa to work in conditions approaching slavery.[126]

51. Illegal migration is risky and costly, and reduces the development benefits of migration. The profits extracted by traffickers and the fees paid to smugglers are resources lost to migrants and to their home countries.[127] Migrants who enter a country illegally with the help - requested or otherwise - of traffickers and smugglers are then subject to further exploitation and hardships including appalling living conditions, pitiful wages, and large debts. This reduces their ability to save, to remit and to return to their home countries. Illegal migration increases public resistance to all forms of migration, leads to the exploitation of vulnerable people - both by traffickers and smugglers en route to a host country or region, and by unscrupulous employers once there - and perhaps most importantly reduces the ability of home and host countries to respond to migration to make it work for development and poverty reduction.[128]

52. Illegal migration takes place when there is a demand for migrant labour in host societies, a supply of willing migrants in home societies, and a lack of legal channels to link these demands and supplies.[129] Oxfam - citing research by the Home Office - told us that there is strong circumstantial evidence that measures aimed at preventing access to the EU had "led to growing trafficking and illegal entry of both bona fide asylum seekers and economic migrants."[130] Even where there are legal channels for entry, migrants who are not aware of them, or who feel that such channels do not afford them quick enough entry into a country, may opt for illegal routes of entry.[131] One way of reducing illegal migration might be to open up more transparent and efficient channels for legal migration. Indeed, this is what the UK has been doing in recent years, through measures such as reform of the seasonal agricultural workers scheme and the introduction of sector-based short-term work schemes for hospitality and food manufacturing workers.[132] Migration, especially legal migration, can be of benefit to the UK, migrants, and their home countries. But whilst opening up channels for legal migration may undercut traffickers and smugglers, it will not satisfy the latent demand for migration. Migration still needs to be managed, and illegal migration tackled.

53. Tackling illegal migration requires concerted international action, including more support for Southern governments to address the issue, and to share lessons and experiences, particularly in a regional context.[133] For its part, the UK Government, and governments of other developed countries, need to address the issue of sex tourism which fuels the exploitation of women and children in south-east Asia particularly, and ensure that existing legislation protecting the rights of migrant workers is vigorously enforced. We were pleased therefore to hear that the UK has recently adopted the UN Trafficking Protocol and the EU Framework Decision on Trafficking for the Purposes of Sexual and Labour Exploitation, and is tightening up legislation on trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labour and the removal of organs.[134]

ECONOMIC MIGRANTS, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES

54. Our inquiry is primarily about economic migrants rather than refugees and asylum seekers. The efficiency of systems for processing asylum claims and determining who is and who is not a refugee is not something we have particularly addressed.[135] But there is clearly a huge overlap - in terms of migrants' motives, governments' policies, and public perceptions - between economic migration and refugee movements. Therefore we have some brief comments to make.

55. Migrants have multiple motives for moving, which makes it difficult to distinguish between economic migrants and people escaping persecution. And of course many economic migrants seek to claim asylum. Nevertheless we agree with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); if the international community is to give refugees the protection they need, then states must be able to differentiate between refugees and other sorts of migrants.[136] In this context, written submissions from the Corner House and from the New Economics Foundation called for the definition of refugees under the United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees (see figure 1) to be extended, to include people who have been displaced by development policies, or by environmental change induced by the developed world.[137] We have some sympathy with such proposals - people who have been displaced through no fault of their own deserve assistance, and attention needs to be given to the policies and practices which have led to their displacement. To extend the definition of "refugees", however, in the absence of increased financial commitments, would simply dilute the protection afforded to people fleeing persecution.

56. The fact that migrants move for multiple motives, and that streams of refugees and economic migrants are entangled, poses significant problems for policy, beyond the challenge of identifying refugees.[138] A policy that might be appropriate for dealing with refugees, might not be a suitable response to economic migration, and vice-versa. As UNHCR put it: "While there are obvious inter-linkages between refugee and migratory movements, they nevertheless each raise fundamentally different concerns and require distinct policy responses and legislative measures."[139] In particular, policies to control immigration - in particular, "non-arrival" policies to prevent migrants making it as far as a country's borders - can make it more difficult for refugees to find safe haven.[140] Governments, including the UK Government, need to ensure that they do not, in their enthusiasm to control migration - prevent refugees from gaining asylum. And if public confidence in a government's ability to control migration is to be maintained, asylum claims need to be processed fairly and quickly. If this is not achieved, public support for economic migration will disappear, and with it the potential development gains.

MIGRANTS' LIVES: RESOURCE USE, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND RIGHTS

57. The developmental impacts of migration, on migrants themselves as well as host and home societies are also shaped by the sorts of lives that migrants are able to lead once they have arrived at their destination.[141] This is the case for all migrants, both refugees and economic migrants, whether they end up in developing countries or developed countries. The ways in which migrants live - and the ways in which they are treated by the host authorities, by legal systems, by employers and by the wider public - can tip the balance of costs and benefits one way or the other, determining whether migration brings net benefits or net costs for migrants, for hosts and for migrants' homelands. To enable migrants to be active agents of development, certain conditions have to be met. As the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants argued: "If the potential utility of migrants as a development resource is to be realised a significant improvement in their employment and social conditions in the host countries will certainly be required."[142]

58. Migrants' lives shape the developmental impact of migration in many ways. For example, where migrants arrive in large numbers over a short period of time - as is the case with many refugee flows - there may be significant short-term impacts on local resources such as water, energy and food, or on local services such as health care or welfare benefits. In developing countries international humanitarian assistance ought to provide the additional resources needed. If such assistance does not materialise, then the consequences for both refugees and the host society can be severe, with conflict over resources in some cases exacerbating wider social and political tensions, and leading to violence and conflict.[143] In more developed countries, the issue of resource use may be seen in terms of migrants' claims on state benefits and welfare systems, although many migrants do not in practice have such entitlements.

59. Some facts bear repeating. A reader of the British press might assume that the UK is in the front-line of dealing with refugees. Such a view is incorrect and should not be allowed to mis-inform debates about migration. In the UK, there are 3.2 refugees per 1000 population; in Georgia, there are 51 per 1000; in Liberia there are 87 per 1000.[144] There are 100,000 Afghan refugees in the EU. In comparison Iran and Pakistan have hosted 1.4 million and more than 2 million Afghan refugees respectively.[145] Two-thirds of refugees are hosted by developing countries, with thirty-five percent of refugees living in the least-developed countries.[146]

60. Enabling migrants, including refugees, to live more productive lives which do not drain local resources would be better for migrants and refugees, for host societies, and for development and poverty reduction. Otherwise, hosting large numbers of refugees can be costly, with these costs falling disproportionately on the developing countries where most refugees are to be found. The UK contributes to the work of the UNHCR, which provides a structure through which countries can share the responsibility for dealing with refugees. However, there is already evidence of some developing countries becoming less willing to host refugees because they feel that developed countries are shirking their responsibilities.[147] It is essential that the UK contributes its fair share to international humanitarian assistance. There is also a need for both donors and developing countries - including government at national and local levels - to take into account the needs of refugees, and the implications for policy, in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.[148]

61. The extent to which migrants find themselves able or not to access resources and services in the same way as citizens of the host society, also plays a major role in shaping the impact of migration. Migrants are often less able to access services than the local population, because they have fewer rights and often an unclear legal status. For many hosting states this is a deliberate policy so as not to encourage migration. For migrants who have made the journey their social exclusion and lack of access to welfare benefits can have a devastating impact. Migrants in developing countries may end up living in informal low-income settlements or slums, where they are unable to connect to electricity, water and sanitation infrastructure and may find themselves unable to access secure land and housing.[149] They may also have poor access to health and education services, and - as we heard in relation to India - to subsidised food.[150] In Vietnam, we were told that unregistered migrants may also find that they are unable to access services including low-interest loans, free health care and exemptions from school fees provided under the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Programme. Further, even when migrants have been granted access to services, or to land for agriculture, such access may be withdrawn. Migrants are highly vulnerable to the denial of access, the undermining of rights, and to forcible eviction. For instance, migrants were expelled from Ghana following legislation in 1969, and migrants' right to own land in Côte d'Ivoire was removed in 1998.[151]

62. Host countries need to ensure that migrants living within their borders are able to live productive lives, enjoy adequate access to services, welfare services, and have their rights protected. We were pleased to hear that DFID is funding innovative rural livelihoods programmes in India which, by including support to migrants, are making a big difference to migrants' lives. Such initiatives include the development of a system of identity cards which can help to reduce the harassment which migrants face from police and other officials, and ways of working with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to help migrants and potential migrants to access information on wage rates, working conditions and rights.[152] Also in the context of India, we were told of the possibility of introducing computerised identity cards to enable migrants to obtain basic healthcare and education. There is also a joint-initiative by NGOs, donors and the state to provide migrants' children with education through a school for migrants' children.[153] We applaud such creative efforts to improve the lives of migrants, which will in turn help to make migration work better for development and poverty reduction. We trust that mechanisms will be put in place to ensure that policy-makers elsewhere can learn from these projects. In addition, governments should take better account of migrants and their rights as they reform their land tenure systems to ensure that migrants are able to work productively and without risk of sudden eviction.[154] This is something that donors might usefully encourage developing countries to do.

63. Migrants - especially those who have entered a country illegally, or who are awaiting decisions on their refugee status - are also likely to have less access to productive, well-paid, secure and formal employment, which makes good use of their skills.[155] The numbers of trained professionals from developing countries working in less skilled jobs in London is proof enough of this. This has a major impact on migrants' ability to contribute to their host societies, and to their homelands through remittances.[156] And those migrants who do find work are likely to be employed in sectors where there is little regulation or protection of employees' rights.[157] For example, in low and middle-income countries migrants - and particularly women migrants - may be employed in Export Processing Zones; in developed countries, as well as developing, they may be employed as cleaners, carers and domestic servants, or in the agriculture and horticulture industry where they may find themselves subject to exploitation by gangmasters, many of whom operate outside the law.[158]

64. Migrants need help to find suitable work, which will enable them to contribute economically to their host societies, as well as remitting resources home. For the UK, Oxfam recommends that the Government establish a comprehensive support and education system for migrants on their arrival, to educate migrants about the labour market and their legal rights and obligations as workers, to provide advice and support on finding a job and accessing services, to offer English language teaching, and information about life in the UK.[159] Such a programme would help migrants to find their place in society and to make migration work better for development and poverty reduction. We invite the Government to outline what it does to help migrants' integration in the UK, and to consider Oxfam's recommendation of a comprehensive support and education system. Similarly, where appropriate, the Government should encourage and help its developing country partners to establish similar schemes.

65. Authorities in host countries and regions have an important role to play in ensuring that migrants' rights - in employment and other spheres - are protected. Oxfam argue in their submission that refugees and asylum seekers should have the right to work, so that they can improve their lives and contribute to the host community.[160] Oxfam have told us that Home Office research disproves the idea that giving asylum seekers the right to work would increase the attractiveness of the UK to potential refugees and asylum seekers.[161] We would welcome clarification of the Government's views. If asylum seekers in the UK are not to be given the right to work, it is - as DFID acknowledged in oral evidence - important that quick and fair decisions are made about migrants' legal status so that they can enjoy the same labour market participation as UK citizens.[162] Governments should do their utmost to protect migrants' rights - through legislation and its enforcement, and through the provision of information - to ensure that they are not subject to exploitation by employers, gangmasters and employment agencies.[163] We welcome the swift progress of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Bill through Parliament; once this Bill becomes law it will be an important step in preventing the exploitation of workers, including migrant workers, by gangmasters.[164] Particular attention should be paid to those sectors in which female migrants work - including care homes, cleaning, and the hospitality industry - and which tend to be poorly regulated.[165] The protection of migrants and their rights should not be neglected in developing countries either; donors need to ensure that their developing country partner governments are aware of the benefits of migrant protection, and helped to design effective policies.[166]

66. The need to protect the rights of migrants is recognised internationally in the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) 1949 Convention no. 97 on Migration for Employment and 1975 Convention no. 143 on Migrant Workers, and in the UN's 1990 Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families.[167] But by May 2004, only 25 countries had ratified the UN Convention.[168] Most of the countries which have ratified are migrant-sending countries; so far no major country of destination has ratified the Convention.[169] Some of the means to protect migrants, and to regulate migration at the international level, are in place; what is lacking is the political will.[170]

67. Several organisations are urging the UK Government to ratify the UN Convention.[171] Oxfam argues that migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, and should therefore be entitled to special protection above that provided by existing legislation.[172] Noting that no other EU state has ratified the Convention, the Government says it has no plans to ratify the UN Convention, believing that it has "struck the right balance between the need for immigration control and the protection of the interests and rights of migrant workers".[173] The Government also believes that migrants' rights are adequately protected by existing legislation including the Human Rights Act of 1998.[174]

68. Care does need to be taken to ensure that the UK is not seen as a soft-touch for illegal migrants, and also to ensure that migrants' rights are not protected at the expense of the well-being of UK citizens. But there may be ways of protecting migrants and their rights which do not lead to the UK being a magnet for economic migrants. It is not immediately clear to us that there is a trade-off or balance to be struck between the rights of migrants once they are in the UK and immigration control. The argument that there is such a balance seems to rest on the assumption that if the UK ratified the UN Convention, then more migrants would come to the UK. We invite the Government to explain why it has not ratified the UN Convention and to provide us with the evidence to support the assumption that there is a trade-off between migrants' rights and immigration control (see also paragraph 65). We would also like to know how the Government came to the conclusion that it had struck the right balance; that is, how was the value of migrants' rights and the value of immigration control assessed?

69. If there is such a trade-off, then the benefits of providing better protection for migrants and their rights - for migrants, and for their ability to contribute to host and home societies - must not be discounted. As the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants explained, better protection of migrants' rights, including through ratifying the UN Convention, would: "create a more secure environment and protect many from the worst consequences of a marginal existence in the host country, such as exploitation, forced labour and below minimum health, education and welfare standards. The effect of making migration an undertaking in which there is a greater likelihood that the individual will prosper would in itself increase the capacity for productive investment in developing countries."[175] By ratifying the Convention, the UK, and the EU, would be making an important contribution to building a multilateral framework for migration management.[176] If there were a multilateral commitment on the part of all migrant-receiving countries to ratify the Convention, and to protect migrants' rights accordingly, then no one country would risk being seen as a soft-touch as a result of its ratification.

Returning, reintegrating and circulating

70. Better communications and well-established social networks mean that migrants feel the pull of employment opportunities in the developed world from far away, and are able to maintain links with their homelands once they have moved. Cheaper transport is making temporary and circular migration more of a possibility for some long-distance migrants. If migration is to be made to work better for development and poverty reduction, policy needs to respond to these new patterns of migration.[177] As Heaven Crawley, an expert on asylum and migration issues, explained:

178

71. Economic theory suggests that increasing the mobility of labour will increase the size of the global economy, offering scope for migrants, developing countries and developed countries to benefit. Economic modelling predicts that the global welfare gains from a modest increase in the volume of migration - increasing to 3 percent the proportion of the developed world's workforce made up of migrants from developing countries - would be very large, perhaps in the order of $150 billion per year.[179] This is more than twice the current volume of aid, three times the estimated amount of additional aid flows needed to finance the MDGs[180], and one and a half times the predicted gains from fully liberalising trade in goods and services.[181] There is plenty of scope for win-win outcomes.

72. Further, there is a desire on the part of migrants, developed countries and developing countries to see more temporary and circular migration. Many migrants feel a strong sense of responsibility to their homelands, and, having spent some time in a developed country, would like to return home, perhaps temporarily, if conditions were right.[182] Developed countries, whilst keen to employ the labour of migrants, are also keen to see migrants return home. Temporary migration relieves, or reduces, many of the political issues surrounding immigration into developed countries.[183] In fact well-designed mechanisms to facilitate temporary and circular migration could reduce the incidence of illegal immigration, and could act as an incentive for labour-sending countries to assume more responsibility for countering illegal migration.[184] Developing countries would like to see the return of their people - their human capital. If migration were more temporary and migrants returned home, then this would reduce the developmental down-sides of migration from developing countries.[185] India's success with building a software industry on the basis of returning migrants' Information Technology skills and social networks has shown that a "brain-drain" can be transformed into a "brain-gain".[186]

TEMPORARY MIGRATION SCHEMES

73. Temporary migration schemes which provide benefits for migrants, receiving countries and sending countries are perhaps the ultimate goal of migration policy. But past experience has led some to conclude that temporary migration inevitably becomes permanent. For some this is the lesson to be learned from Germany's guest-worker programme, where many Turkish guest-workers ended up as permanent residents.[187] There are also serious questions about the effectiveness of programmes to return and reintegrate migrants in their home countries (see paragraphs 82—87).

74. Nevertheless, we heard of many examples of temporary migration schemes which appear to have worked. In North America, long-established and successful schemes have provided both Canada and the USA with temporary migrant labour from Mexico and the Caribbean, as Masood Ahmed, DFID's Director General for Policy and International Division, acknowledged.[188] As regards the Canadian scheme, it is reported that no Mexicans have over-stayed in twenty-eight years.[189] Switzerland too has run a successful programme to provide labour to the hotel and service industry for nine years.[190] Schemes in the Gulf region have provided temporary contract labour both from developing and developed countries, with migrants not permitted - and in many cases having no desire - to remain permanently.[191] In summary, there are temporary migration schemes that work, and schemes that do not work. What is not in doubt is that there is a demand for workers in developed countries such as the UK, and demand for employment from people in developing countries.[192] There is a need to examine the evidence to learn the lessons and to understand what can be done to make temporary migration and assisted voluntary return schemes work and deliver development benefits.[193] The UK Government, working with the International Organization for Migration and other international organisations, should ensure that this challenge is taken up.

75. The UK Government deserves considerable credit for the steps it has taken to open up legal channels for temporary migration in particular sectors.[194] But this has been primarily in response to the labour market needs of the UK economy. There is scope to make such schemes deliver progress towards the UK's international development objectives.[195] Many migrant-receiving countries are keen to employ the skills of high-skilled migrants, but are less enthusiastic when it comes to low-skill migration.[196] In development terms this is regrettable as developing countries have plentiful supplies of low-skilled labour to export,[197] but cannot spare their highly-skilled personnel (but see paragraphs 38—42 on "brain-drain"). As economic models of increasing labour mobility predict, developing countries - and indeed developed countries - gain much more if the labour migration is low-skilled.[198]

76. The UK Government has begun to address this issue by broadening entry routes to the UK labour market through measures such as the reform of the seasonal agricultural workers scheme, and the introduction of sector-based short-term work schemes for the hospitality and food manufacturing sectors.[199] But more can be done. DFID, and through DFID, other development stakeholders - including migrants' organisations and labour ministries in key migrant-sending countries - should be consulted when the UK Government is designing and revising temporary migration schemes. If countries with a Department or Ministry concerned with the welfare of their overseas workers were given priority in such consultations, developing country governments might be encouraged to do more to protect their overseas workers.[200] The input of development stakeholders would make the schemes work better for the UK and deliver more benefits to developing countries. On 27 April 2004 the Prime Minister announced a wholesale review of the UK's immigration schemes; DFID must be fully involved in this review so that development objectives are fully considered.

77. If poor people from developing countries had more access to legal migration channels, then more development benefits could be had from migration. In their submission, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants suggest that migration ought to be regulated by an international authority - a reformed WTO or a new World Migration Organisation - whose rules would ensure that the arrangements for migration were demonstrably to the benefit of developing countries[201] (see paragraphs 145—148). More realistically, at least in the short-term, codes of conduct might be developed for recruitment into sectors beyond health and education, for instance, for domestic workers, the hotel industry and agricultural workers. Well-regulated recruitment agencies - offering transparent fee structures, involving migrant workers' associations, and rigorously enforcing minimum wage and other health and safety conditions in the workplace - could be given preferential access to legal immigration routes into the UK, providing an incentive for, and a model of, good practice.[202] In this way, the private sector's dynamism, and market incentives, could be employed for poverty reduction. More simply still, progress could be made in simplifying visa arrangements, and controlling the actions of unscrupulous agents who control access to the recruitment process.

SKILLS ACQUISITION

78. If migration were optimised for development, temporary migrants would acquire skills which they would be able to make use of on their return to their home country. In some cases, this will happen; Oxfam give the example of Albanian migrants returning to Greece with new agricultural skills which enabled them to increase their own vegetable production and to train other farmers.[203] But overall the evidence on migrants' acquisition of new skills is not encouraging, especially for low-skilled migrants. Early studies of Turkish guest-workers returning from Germany suggest that less than ten percent had received any useful training whilst in Germany. And recent research from Thailand shows that very few returning migrants had been employed in occupations which might have imparted new skills.[204]

79. These examples do not bode well for the ability of temporary migration to improve the skills of migrants. But they begin to explain why it is that temporary migration tends not to lead to human capital development; it is in part because of the sorts of jobs which migrants find themselves doing. If migrants were able to find suitable work, they might be in a better position to learn skills which would be useful on their return home. But there are limits to what policy can do. We may have to accept that temporary migrants prioritise earning as much money as possible before going home, rather than being keen to invest their time in learning new skills.[205] And as far as the host country and its employers are concerned, the priority is always likely to be using migrants' labour rather than providing migrants with transferable skills. Nevertheless in some cases - nursing and teaching for instance - temporary migration can enable migrants to learn new skills, and in many cases it can play a useful role in exposing migrants - as well as host societies - to new ideas and ways of doing things, some of which may be usefully continued or adopted after the migrant's return (see paragraph 127). The experience of VSO volunteers and their "volunteer journeys" may hold important lessons for efforts to improve the skills acquisition element of temporary migration.[206]

ENSURING THAT TEMPORARY MIGRATION IS TEMPORARY

80. For migrant-receiving countries the most pressing question is how to ensure that temporary migrants do not become permanent. The answer, in general terms, is to provide incentives for migrants to leave and to return home. This is primarily the responsibility of home countries - migrants will only return home if home is a place where they feel they can live secure and productive lives, free from hardship. But host countries can play their part too. One suggestion we heard was that of compulsory savings, whereby temporary migrants entering the UK would have to agree to pay a proportion of their earnings into a fund, which would then be made available to them on their return home.[207] This may seem draconian, particularly for migrants who earn little whilst in the UK, but it would be one way of providing an incentive for return. It would help to ensure that temporary migration really is temporary. It would also ensure that on their return home, migrants had resources to invest. If the conditions of temporary migration were well understood in advance by participants, and if a compulsory savings scheme were not used as a way of circumventing minimum wage legislation[208], there might be fewer objections. Alternatively, return could be encouraged by reimbursing migrants with a portion of their unused National Insurance contributions once they had left the UK. Given that migrants who leave will not be making a claim on their contributions, we consider that there is some sense of fairness in this suggestion.

81. Another way of encouraging exit and return would be to allocate quotas for temporary migration to migrant-sending countries, with these quotas being regularly revised depending on how many migrants have in the past returned.[209] This would give migrant-sending countries an incentive to create an economic and political climate which migrants would like to return to, but whether it would work, and whether it would be fair to essentially punish future potential migrants for the sins of previous non-returners is less clear.[210] There may be a way of making such a mechanism work by involving employment agencies. If such agencies operated under licence, their licences could be renewed only on the condition that the agency was able to show that an agreed proportion of the workers they had placed in the previous time period had gone home.[211] The Government should consider seriously the idea of involving employment agencies in making temporary migration schemes work, as well as the proposal to reimburse National Insurance contributions. It should also ensure that lessons are learnt and disseminated from the experience of other countries such as Canada and the USA with making their temporary migration schemes truly temporary.

SUSTAINABLE RETURN

82. If temporary migration is to deliver development benefits, the story must not stop once migrants have left the countries where they have been temporarily employed, or when they step foot back in their home country.[212] Migrants who return to their home countries can do much to stimulate development, but this will only happen if their return is sustainable and they are able to integrate back into their societies. Indeed, whilst many migrants would like to return to their homelands on a short, medium or long-term basis, most will only do this if they feel that the conditions are right.[213]

83. A variety of factors can dissuade migrants from returning. In many cases, these factors are the same factors which will have led migrants' to leave the country initially. First, migrants' sustainable return can be impeded by a lack of commitment on the part of their government.[214] It is easy for a government to say to its people overseas "come home, you are welcome", but, unless things have changed, returning migrants may well find themselves battling against the same issues of poor governance, bureaucracy and corruption which led to their departure.[215] And having been away, migrants may well find themselves excluded from the social networks which can provide a basis for integration and sustainable return. Returning migrants - with high skills, financial power, new ideas and perhaps different political views - may even be seen as a threat.[216] Returning migrants may also be faced by a lack of opportunities for employment which will enable them to use their skills, contribute fully to society and be paid adequately.[217] Returning public sector workers may find that they are stuck at a low-level on the career ladder having not "served their time" at home, and may find that they have forfeited some of their rights to social protection assistance.[218] Most straightforwardly, migrants' sustainable return may be hampered by a lack of basic health and education services, language barriers for children born overseas, and concerns about personal security. Such obstacles are considerable; those who attempt to overcome them to contribute to their homeland's development - such as the people we met in Hargeisa who had returned to Somaliland from London and Sheffield - are little short of heroic.

84. As Masood Ahmed, DFID's Director General for Policy and International, put it, "people go back primarily when they have something to go back to."[219] To ensure that people do have something to go back to, governments, with the support of donors, need to:

be serious about welcoming migrants back;
make progress with improving governance and tackling corruption;
ensure that pay structures and progression within the civil service do not unfairly penalise migrants who have worked elsewhere and may have acquired useful skills; and,
help returning migrants to find suitable jobs, or to set up their own businesses

85. The IOM has considerable experience in Asia, in Latin America and in Africa with programmes to facilitate sustainable voluntary return.[220]The IOM works with governments of the countries of origin to identify suitable candidates and find them employment, financing their return and assisting with their reintegration, to contribute to rebuilding and strengthening the country's human resources.[221] Specific measures to encourage and assist return and reintegration may include tax exemptions, financial assistance with moving costs, seed capital to establish a business, and citizenship rights for spouses and children. The Commonwealth Business Council's AfricaRecruit programme plays a similar role in matching employers with potential returnees.[222]The IOM's Return of Qualified African Nationals programme returned about 2000 people over the course of the 1990s; its programme for the return of Afghans - initially with funding from DFID - has thus far returned 536 people, although no data is available on how many of these returnees stayed on after the period of programme support.

86. The IOM's experience in running these schemes has shown that encouraging return and facilitating successful integration is not easy, especially when the economic and political conditions in the country are not attractive, and it is a labour-intensive process.[223] In part as a result of its earlier experiences, the IOM's latest programme for the return of qualified nationals - Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) which is currently running in ten African countries - focuses more on temporary return and tapping the diaspora.[224] We were pleased to hear that DFID and the EU are supporting programmes including the IOM's MIDA and pilot schemes in Ghana and Sierra Leone.[225] It is only through learning from experience that the best ways of facilitating sustainable return can be discovered.

87. There is value in donors such as DFID learning about sustainable return. But in the absence of improvements in the economic and political conditions in migrants' home countries, any scheme to facilitate sustainable return is likely to fail. Indeed, if the conditions are not right, the return or repatriation of large numbers of migrants can place huge demands on a developing country, raising the potential for instability, conflict and renewed out-migration.[226] Donors who provide incentives and opportunities for returnees in an environment which is not conducive to sustainable development, are throwing their money away.[227] If developing countries are to benefit from the sustainable return of their migrants, they need to pursue policies - better governance, less bureaucracy, and economic growth - which will make migrants want to return, and which will ensure that those migrants who have returned have a sense that they, and their country, are moving towards a brighter future.

FACILITATING CIRCULAR MIGRATION

88. As Hilary Benn explained in evidence to us, for some migrants it is not a choice of either living in their home country, or living overseas. Rather it is about how to live their lives in two countries.[228] There is some evidence that if migrants feel that a decision to return home is not irreversible, they will be more likely to make such a decision. So for instance, if migrants in the UK knew that they would be able to come back, they may well be more willing to take a chance and try to return home for a period of time.[229] There is considerable evidence - including from the USA's Green Card scheme - to show that easier re-entry encourages migrants to return, perhaps temporarily, to their homelands.[230] Prior to their countries entry into the European Union, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek migrants were keen to settle permanently. Once they had residence rights across Europe, the need to stay was reduced.[231] Conversely, when the USA tightened border restrictions with Mexico, Mexican migrants stayed longer, fearing that if they left they would not be able to re-enter.[232] Preserving the freedom to circulate seems to be a condition of workers being willing to return home.

89. Circular migration might be encouraged by the introduction of flexible citizenship or residence rights.[233] The UK, for instance, allows individuals to hold dual nationality.[234] This is a good start, but there should perhaps be more flexibility and scope for re-entry, including for migrants who do not have dual nationality. And if circular migration is to be encouraged, migrants' home countries also need to accept dual nationality. Otherwise, as is the case with Sierra Leone, returning migrants will be faced with the requirement to surrender their British citizenship and with it their passport to circular migration.[235] The UK Government should explore the potential development benefits which might be gained from more circular migration, and - alongside its developing country partners - should examine the different ways in which such circular migration might be encouraged. The Government should also consider whether there is scope - in sectors such as health where developing countries would benefit a great deal - to help migrants to return home temporarily by offering leave of absence from employment and other forms of assistance.[236]

GATS MODE 4 AND SOUTHERN LIBERALISATION

90. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides, under the auspices of the WTO, a framework for liberalizing international trade in services. The GATS Agreement works through a request and offer process in which countries make requests and/or offers for enhanced market access.[237] GATS outlines four ways in which services can be provided (traded) internationally. GATS Mode 4 refers to a section of the agreement which covers one of the four ways in which services can be supplied (traded) across borders, by the temporary movement of natural persons. Thus far few countries have made either offers or requests, and those offers that have been made have been largely concerned with high-skilled and intra-corporate transfers. The World Bank reports that 40 percent of Mode 4 commitments are for intra-corporate transfers, and another 50 percent are for executives, managers, specialists and business visitors.[238] If the mobility of workers from developing countries - including unskilled workers - could be enhanced under GATS Mode 4, then there would be significant benefits, both for developed countries which face growing skills gaps, and for developing countries.[239]

91. Economic Needs Tests are a second obstacle to GATS Mode 4 providing a framework for orderly migration and the resultant development benefits. Such Tests provide countries with an opt-out from their commitments to enhance labour mobility, a safety valve to go back on commitments to admit workers if their admission is proving economically harmful or politically unpopular. If the nature of a country's Economic Needs Test is not clearly set out, then that country can hardly claim to have open borders, or predictable and transparent admission procedures.[240] Further, as Oxfam note, whilst there are similar safety valves elsewhere in the WTO - anti-dumping and countervailing duties - WTO members cannot refuse to import foreign goods on the grounds that domestic substitutes are available; nor does the agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) allow a government to refuse to award patents because the local economy does not need them. If GATS Mode 4 is to deliver well-ordered labour migration for the provision of services, then Economic Needs Tests need to be made more transparent, harmonised across countries and ideally removed altogether, except for temporary safeguards as is the case in other areas of international trade. Finally, it is worth noting that GATS includes nothing to prevent migrant workers' rights being infringed; again, the contrast with TRIPS' efforts to stop the infringement of intellectual property rights is stark.[241]

92. Developed countries are reluctant to make commitments under GATS Mode 4 for understandable reasons. Migration remains a very sensitive subject, over which countries are anxious to retain their control.[242] Indeed many NGOs and developing countries have similar concerns about entering into other GATS agreements.[243] In addition, migration is seen by most countries as the province of Home Affairs, rather then Ministries for Trade, Labour or Development.[244] Unless there are effective mechanisms for achieving policy coherence between Ministries, the potential of migration to capture trade, labour and development benefits is likely to be missed (see paragraphs 151—167).

93. In its present guise GATS Mode 4 amounts to a "positive, though somewhat limited step in the direction of greater international labour mobility."[245] It could amount to a bigger step if countries made more commitments, if commitments extended to unskilled labour, and if the use of Economic Needs Tests was more transparent and less frequent. In the absence of such changes, developing countries will see few benefits from GATS Mode 4. DFID reported that the UK's position on GATS Mode 4 is widely viewed as being among the most progressive. The Government should make the UK's policy stance on GATS Mode 4 clearer and explain what the UK is doing to promote an agenda which will be to the mutual benefit of the UK and developing countries.[246] The Government should also clarify its position on a simplified GATS visa.

94. Another possible reason for the slow progress made with GATS Mode 4 is the reticence of many developing countries. Many developing countries restrict immigration. As such they might find it politically difficult to find themselves embroiled in negotiations which require them to open up their labour markets too.[247] Developing countries' restrictions on the immigration of skilled workers may be short-sighted; the economic logic of migration, suggesting that migration should be liberalised, is knocked off-course by politics in the south, just as it is in the north.[248] As is the case with trade liberalisation more widely, developing countries could secure benefits from liberalising south-south migration, perhaps through the establishment of regional passports, and by making it easier for skilled people from the north to offer their services in developing countries. There is a pool of people in countries such as the UK who are keen to employ their skills in developing countries; developing countries should take advantage of this. As regards south-south migration, we were interested to hear that the European Commission is working with the African Union on migration management in Africa. We would welcome further information about this.[249]

95. There is much scope to make migration work better for development, and to ensure that it delivers benefits for host societies, home societies and migrants themselves. By working on its various dimensions, policy can shape the nature of migration to make it more development-friendly. Overall, migration is best when it takes place within a framework of law and policy which looks after the interests of migrants, receiving communities, and those left behind. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants sets an ambitious aim, suggesting that: "The task is to ensure that all movements across the globe take place within a framework of law and policy which will properly allocate the rights and obligations of all parties participating in the process."[250] This should be the goal.

Somaliland

96. During our visit to East Africa in January 2004, the Committee paid a brief visit to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. The visit raised questions about the way in which the UK's development policy relates to Somaliland, a territory which largely corresponds to the former British Somaliland. Following independence in 1960, it joined together with the former Italian Somaliland to form a unified country. The union was not a happy one. The dictator, Siad Barre destroyed Hargeisa, causing a reputed 50,000 deaths and mass evacuation. Somaliland has now declared itself independent but this status has not been recognised by any other nation. In the meantime, the rest of the territory known as Somalia has collapsed into anarchy and is without a functioning government. Much of the territory seems to be run by warlords. Peace conferences have been held in various venues but they have failed to produce a settlement. Somaliland has refused to take part in these conferences, as it is adamant that it should be independent. Other parts of Somalia are united in their opposition to the independence of Somaliland.

97. Somaliland's non-recognised status restricts the aid which it can receive. It qualifies only for humanitarian relief and not for long term development assistance from national donors such as DFID, the EU or multilateral bodies such as the World Bank. But Somaliland shows a far higher quality of governance than elsewhere in Somalia: it has two Houses of Parliament; the president is elected, local government elections have been held, and parliamentary elections are scheduled. Somaliland's desire for independence has been backed by an internationally-monitored referendum. Guns have been taken off the streets and there are properly-constituted police and armed forces. Formidable assistance has also been given by the considerable Somaliland diaspora to assist the recovery of their homeland. In short, the country is behaving in a way that the international community would wish. But there must be a very real danger than unless its stability is recognised and supported, Somaliland will slip back into the chaos found elsewhere in Somalia. We suggest that DFID clarifies its position on whether it sees it as being in the interests of the people of Somaliland and the wider area that such limited assistance is given. It is very difficult to involve the private sector to develop Somaliland's resources when the country is not recognised. This is particularly apposite when there are reported to be Al Qa'ida activities in the area. Here is a moderate government which is endangered by the general unrest in the area.

98. DFID is not the only government department involved. We therefore seek assurances that the Government is pursuing a joined-up approach to its policy on Somaliland. The unrest in Somalia has had major disruptive consequences for its neighbours. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should clarify its position on the issue of recognition, particularly if Somaliland continues to govern itself in a responsible and democratic way, while the other parts of Somalia continue as a failed state. The Home Office is also involved. Somalis have for many years been one of the largest national groups to settle and seek asylum in the UK. Now the Home Office is compulsorily repatriating those who have been unsuccessful in obtaining asylum. At the camp in the grounds of the former State House in Hargeisa, we saw for ourselves the unsatisfactory living conditions for those who have been returned. We would welcome a response from the Government on the measures it has taken to assist the successful resettlement of those who have been repatriated.

88 Q 327 [Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development] Back

89 Ev 252 [Oxfam memo]; Richard Adams, International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain: A study of 24 labor exporting countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3069, June 2003. See http://econ.worldbank.org/files/27217_wps3069.pdf Back

90 B. Lindsay Lowell, Allan Findlay and Emma Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising highly skilled migration from developing countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, IPPR, May 2004, p. 5. Available at http://www.ippr.org/research/index.php?current=19&project=183 Back

91 Ibid. p.6 Back

92 Q 10 [Sharon White, DFID] Back

93 Ev 188 [Commonwealth Business Council (CBC) Africa Recruit memo] Back

94 Ev 277 [Unlad Kabayan memo] Back

95 Q 133 [Dr Nicholas Van Hear, Senior Researcher, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford] Back