Conclusions and recommendations
1. This
report does not seek to assess the findings and conclusions of
the Government's White Paper. That will be the focus of our next
inquiry. (Paragraph 6)
2. Any decisions on
the future of the UK's deterrent should be taken on the strategic
defence needs of the country. Our intention in making this report
is to ensure that the House of Commons, and the public, are aware
of the manufacturing and skills base issues which will need to
be addressed if a decision is made to renew the submarine-based
deterrent. We recommend that the Government respond to this report
in good time for publication before the debate in the House of
Commons on the White Paper in March 2007. (Paragraph 7)
3. The Ministry of
Defence believes that the UK should retain onshore a sovereign
capability in the design, construction, operation, maintenance
and decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines. It is important
that the public understand clearly the reasons for this. We call
upon the MoD to provide, in its response to this report, a fuller
explanation of the need for this sovereign capability. (Paragraph
31)
4. Witnesses to our
inquiry maintain that the UK's current manufacturing and skills
base is already at the minimum level necessary to sustain a viable
onshore submarine industry. (Paragraph 39)
5. Witnesses to our
inquiry agreed that the complexity and uniqueness of a nuclear
submarine, and of the environment in which it operated, called
for special skills, facilities and oversight not supported by
any other shipbuilding programme. (Paragraph 42)
6. We share our witnesses'
concern about the shortage of science and engineering graduates,
project managers and skilled and experienced technical staff,
but this raises questions which go far beyond the scope of this
report. (Paragraph 45)
7. The UK submarine
industry draws on a uniquely skilled and specialist workforce.
Retaining that skills base will be essential if the UK decides
it wants to continue to design, build and maintain nuclear-powered
submarines. The skills base is now at a critical level. Any further
erosion of the workforce may have significant implications for
the future of the submarine programme. Sustaining skills in this
sector is only possible with regular and continuous submarine
work. (Paragraph 46)
8. Even if the decision
is taken not to procure a Vanguard successor, a specialist skills
base will have to be retained in order to build SSNs and maintain
and finally decommission the UK's existing fleet of nuclear-powered
submarines. Some indication of the order of costs would be helpful
in considering arguments about affordability and we ask that the
MoD provide some information about this in their response to this
report. (Paragraph 47)
9. The submarine construction
supply chain is fragile and is particularly susceptible to gaps
in the programme. Extended gaps are likely to result in an erosion
of the UK's submarine manufacturing and skills base. There is
also a risk that single source suppliers will abandon the supply
chain in pursuit of more regular and assured work. If the UK intends
to build a successor to the Vanguard-class, or maintain an SSN
capability beyond the current Astute order book, the supply chain
will have to be sustained. To achieve this, the MoD must give
clear direction and certainty about the future submarine programme
in order to encourage industry to invest. We call upon the MoD
to provide, in its response to this report, an assessment of whether,
how and at what cost the submarine supply chain could be maintained
for the construction of future SSNs in the absence of a positive
decision on a Vanguard successor. (Paragraph 54)
10. Without a new
SSBN it is possible that there would be insufficient demand for
nuclear submarines to sustain the industry. It is important to
recognise that there is an interrelationship between SSN and SSBN
construction. (Paragraph 61)
11. It is clear that
the gap between the Vanguard and Astute submarine programmes had
a serious and debilitating impact on the UK's submarine industry
and put at risk the future of the UK's submarine fleet. If the
Government wants the UK to continue to design and build nuclear-powered
submarines, it will be essential to maintain a regular rhythm
of submarine construction. Reducing the frequency of construction
below 22 months would be risky. Without a regular build "drumbeat",
the UK skills base will erode and it may prove impossible or prohibitively
expensive to recreate. (Paragraph 64)
12. It is important
that the MoD and industry agree promptly on a price for future
Astute-class orders. Clarity and certainty about the future submarine
programme is necessary if industry is to continue to invest in
the manufacturing skills base. The MoD must also demonstrate that
it has learned the lessons from the Astute programme, and implemented
a much tighter contractual relationship with BAE Systems, before
it commits expenditure to a new SSBN build programme. (Paragraph
65)
13. The Government
will need to consider carefully whether the potential long-term
benefits of designing a completely new submarine, in which through-life
affordability is built in from the start, could outweigh the cost-benefits
of maximising commonality of design with existing submarines.
And it will need to judge whether efforts to maximise commonality
with existing submarines would be enough to sustain the specialist
submarine design base in the UK. (Paragraph 67)
14. Using a well-tried
reactor in the new submarines would minimise design-related risk,
but in the longer term there might be benefit in both safety and
design costs in investing in a new generation of reactor technology.
(Paragraph 68)
15. We recommend that
the MoD make clear in its response to this report the timetable
for the procurement of the new submarines it proposes. This should
indicate by when it will need to decide whether to opt for radical
redesign or commonality of design for the submarine platform and
for the nuclear reactor, and when it will need to decide between
a three- or four-boat package. (Paragraph 69)
16. A decision to
abandon the construction of nuclear submarines would have a profound
impact upon local communities, particularly at Barrow. Nevertheless,
we believe that employment factors should not be decisive in the
debate on the future of the deterrent. (Paragraph 75)
17. If there were
no successor to the Vanguard-class submarine, there would be an
ongoing need to retain onshore a capability to support and, ultimately,
to decommission the current SSBN and SSN fleet. We call upon the
MoD to state in its response to this report how much it would
cost to sustain that capability. (Paragraph 76)
18. It is essential
that the Naval Base Review take into account the implications
for the future of the submarine industry. (Paragraph 97)
19. Affordability
must be a fundamental consideration in any new submarine programme.
The Government is right to emphasise that orders for a Vanguard
successor will be contingent on industry driving down and reducing
costs and ensuring value for money throughout the submarine programme.
Industry must deliver on this requirement. (Paragraph 98)
20. We are concerned
that insufficient attention has been given to the costs of through-life
support. While we understand that DML is not a supplier to the
Astute programme, it seems odd and regrettable that the company
responsible for through-life support on the UK's nuclear-powered
submarines has had so little input into the design of the class.
If the affordability of the submarine programme is to improve,
it is essential that through-life costs are taken into consideration
at the initial design phase. Far greater emphasis must be placed
on this consideration before the design of any Vanguard successor
submarine begins. (Paragraph 99)
21. If the UK goes
ahead with procuring a successor to the Vanguard-class submarine,
it is essential that industry collaborates far more extensively
than it has done to date to drive down and control costs in the
manner envisaged by the Defence Industrial Strategy. Promoting
greater industrial collaboration should be a key priority for
the MoD. In turn, the MoD must provide industry with clarity and
consistency about operational requirements and specifications.
It is vital that lessons are drawn from the problems experienced
with the Astute-class programme. (Paragraph 105)
22. Developing a Vanguard
successor would be a huge undertaking. It is essential the MoD
has the capacity to manage such a programme effectively. Any shortfall
in preparedness must be addressed as a matter of priority. The
MoD's shortage of systems engineers and project managers—skills
essential at the start of a programme of this kind—is a
cause of serious concern. If the decision is made to renew the
deterrent, it is essential the MoD commit sufficient resources
to the programme from the beginning. It will be desirable to bring
in skills from industry. We recommend that the MoD state, in its
response to this report, how it intends to address its skills
shortages. (Paragraph 115)
23. We recommend that
in advance of any debate in the House of Commons on the future
of the deterrent, the MoD clarifies what additional investment
the Government intends to make at the AWE as a result of the recommendations
contained in the White Paper. (Paragraph 130)
24. The MoD and the
AWE must apply the lessons from the A91 episode in managing the
new infrastructure investment at Aldermaston. (Paragraph 131)
25. Many observers
have seen the investment programme at Aldermaston as a sign that
the Government had already decided in principle to retain and
renew the UK's nuclear deterrent. We accept Ministers' assurances
that this was not the case. We accept too that investment in buildings
and infrastructure at AWE was becoming time-critical, which might
suggest that the decision on the future of the deterrent should
have been taken in the last Parliament. But we are less convinced
that investment in the new Orion Laser, the supercomputer and
hydrodynamic facilities could not have waited for a decision in
principle on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. If the
investment was made to respond to requirements of regulators,
the Government should state this in its response to this report.
Large-scale investment should follow, and not precede, policy
decisions of such paramount importance to the nation. (Paragraph
146)
26. The widespread
suspicion about the work of the AWE and the Government's investment
there is partly a consequence of the secrecy which surrounds its
work. We fully accept the need to maintain secrecy about some
aspects of its work, but there is a case for greater openness,
not least to ensure that the public is aware of the positive contribution
the AWE makes to the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. (Paragraph 147)
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