Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fourth Report

3  INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

India and the United Nations

India's contribution to the United Nations

21. India was a founder member of the United Nations and since 1945, it has played an important and constructive role in the work of the international organisation. One of its key inputs is in peacekeeping. India has provided more than 55,000 military and police personnel to UN missions over the last 60 years. [32] The FCO stated that:

India is the third largest contributor to UN peacekeeping, with over 9000 troops and civilian police deployed on 12 UN peacekeeping operations. Over half are deployed to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The Indians have also supplied MONUC with attack helicopters, which have played an important role in disarming and demobilising the belligerents.[33]

In June 2006, India, together with the four other leading providers of peacekeepers, Bangladesh, Ghana, Nigeria and Pakistan, was elected as a member of the newly-created Peacebuilding Commission.[34]

22. India is active in the United Nations in other ways too. The FCO described India as "an influential member of the G77", the group of 130 developing countries in the United Nations.[35] In May 2006, India was elected onto the newly-established United Nations Human Rights Council, receiving 173 out of 191 votes.[36] India is one of the largest contributors to the core resources of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (of which it is also a recipient), and also gives significantly to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP).[37] After the US it was the principal donor, pledging $10million, to the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF).[38] India also put forward a candidate for the post of Secretary-General. Shashi Tharoor, the UN's current Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information, came second in the final ballot to Ban Ki-moon.

India's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council

23. India is one of the Group of 4 (G4), also comprising Brazil, Germany, and Japan, who have called for six more permanent seats on the UN Security Council: two from Asian states; one from Latin American and Caribbean states; one from western European and other states; and two from African states.[39] India first raised a bid for a permanent seat in 1994.[40] It argues that membership of the Security Council does not reflect the composition of the General Assembly, which has a majority of members from developing countries, and that developing countries, which are most often the objects of the Council's actions, must be involved in the decisions that affect them. India also points out that while membership of the Council increased from 11 to 15 in 1965, no new permanent seats have been added. It proposes that any expansion of permanent members should be on "agreed criteria, rather than by a pre-determined selection".[41]

24. The FCO explained that the UK has supported India's bid since 2003 because of its "contribution to the work of the UN, the size of its population, and the importance of its emerging economy."[42] During a visit to India in January 2007, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, reiterated the UK's support for India's bid in a keynote speech which called for the reform and modernisation of international institutions.[43] France[44] and Russia[45] also support India's candidature. Pakistan opposes India's bid.[46] China has remained silent on the issue,[47] although some quarters have indicated support.[48] The US has not expressly supported India's bid.

25. On balance, witnesses to our inquiry thought the UK was right to support India's bid. While noting that institutional difficulties would need to be overcome, Mr Roy-Chaudhury stated:

In the next 25 years, India will become the largest country in the world in terms of population and the third or fourth largest economy, so if you look at India using various parameters, it will be able to contribute to international security. There are structural requirements, but the disadvantages of not having India as a member of the Security Council may outweigh the advantages.[49]

Moreover he suggested that by "moving forward more effectively" on India's bid, the UK might be able to "capitalise" on the US' apparent reluctance to advance India's aspiration and strengthen bilateral relations with India.[50]

26. Dr Smith told us that India faced much competition for a seat and that high levels of poverty, ongoing regional conflicts and India's record on human rights and civil liberties were factors that would have to be considered. However, he also emphasised India's economic progress: "India has progressed over the past 10 or 15 years. I cannot stress too much just where India has gone during that time."[51]

27. Due to wider complexities, including China's opposition to Japanese permanent membership, progress on reform of the Security Council now appears to have stalled. We questioned the Foreign Secretary about the prospects for India's bid and expansion of the Security Council. She responded:

I certainly would not say that it is likely to happen very soon, not least because, as always, there is resistance to change among many people. The new UN Secretary-General has indicated to us that he is in favour of reform, […]. We will have to see how it goes, and whether it is a process that he can initiate.[52]

28. India has now also bid for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for the 2011-12 term, although it says that its ambitions for a permanent seat have not diminished.[53]

India's position on United Nations secretariat and management reforms

29. On the question of UN secretariat and management reforms, the FCO argued:

Reform should be increasingly in India's interest, as its own contribution to the UN regular budget will increase as its economy grows.[54]

India has stated that work on these reforms should be "intensified".[55] Yet with its G77 partners, India has expressed concern that reforms might decrease the influence of developing countries in the General Assembly and increase the control of major financial contributors over the Secretariat.[56] India also criticised the US' attempts to impose a budget cap on expenditure if sufficient progress was not made, which nearly caused a financial crisis in the UN in June 2006 until the US dropped this insistence.[57] India believes that member states "must pay their contributions unconditionally, in full and on time". [58]

30. We conclude that, given India's size, economic growth and large contribution to the work of the United Nations, there is a compelling case for granting it a permanent seat on the Security Council, as part of wider reforms of the United Nations. We recommend therefore that the British Government should continue its support for India's bid. We further recommend that the Government should encourage India to work to reassure other G77 members of the benefits of a more efficient United Nations.

Indo-US relations

31. As a large democracy, India is sometimes seen as a natural partner of the USA. Indeed India began its civilian nuclear energy programme in the 1950s with US assistance.[59] However, Indo-US relations have historically been limited. They hit bottom in 1971, when the US ordered the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal to deter Indian support for the Bengali secessionist movement in the then East Pakistan.[60] After India first tested a nuclear device in 1974, the USA ended nuclear co-operation and imposed tough requirements for US nuclear exports.[61] Successive US governments took the view that India's development of a nuclear arsenal was deeply irresponsible and should not be recognised, given India's status as a non-signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).[62]

32. Although the USA immediately responded to India's public nuclear tests in 1998 by introducing sanctions,[63] concerns about a possible Indo-Pakistani nuclear war forced the USA to start making diplomatic approaches to India.[64] The then US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, began a period of intensive engagement and in 2000, the then President Bill Clinton visited India—the first US presidential visit to India in 22 years.[65] Relations were also strengthened by the development of a rich and increasingly politically influential Indian diaspora in the US.[66]

33. Under the Bush administration, the USA began to see India beyond the "prism of India-Pakistan".[67] It removed many of the sanctions imposed on India following its nuclear tests.[68] June 2005 saw the signature of a ten year defence agreement between India and the USA. The USA and India also signed an "open skies" agreement in April 2005 allowing unlimited civilian flights between them.[69] India also moved closer to the USA. It supported President Bush on the International Criminal Court and missile defence, provided assistance to the US operation in Afghanistan by protecting US assets transiting the Malacca Straits, voted twice with the US against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) and even came near to sending troops to Iraq.[70] Strengthened ties culminated in an announcement in July 2005 of a "global partnership", including full civilian nuclear co-operation.[71]

THE INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL

34. The Indo-US nuclear deal includes a commitment by the USA to provide fuel to safeguarded reactors at Tarapur, as well as to consult on Indian participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), the international project to develop fusion power. In return India agreed to: separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities;[72] place all its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards; sign an Additional Protocol for civilian facilities; continue its unilateral test moratorium; work with the USA to establish a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; refrain from transferring technology to non-nuclear states; and secure its technology and materials by harmonising its export control systems through adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime.[73] However, the agreement entered into by India did nothing which would limit its nuclear weapons programme. Dr Gareth Price and Federico Bordonaro argued that while the US was not gaining immediately from the deal, it wanted to develop a partnership with India so that it could have a strategic counterweight to China.[74]

35. The UK Government supports the Indo-US deal and has amended its policy on the export of items on the NSG Dual-Use List accordingly.[75] The UK has also introduced the UK-India Civil Nuclear Contact Scheme to supervise and encourage contacts on civil nuclear issues.[76]

36. Critics argue that the US deal with a nuclear power which has remained outside the NPT undermines the fundamental bargain of the NPT, whereby non-nuclear states give up their right to nuclear weapons in exchange for peaceful co-operation on nuclear technology,[77] as well as hard-won measures to limit the proliferation of nuclear technology. Dr Smith commented:

It certainly smacks of double standards. I think that it was President Clinton who said, 'India will not be allowed to blast itself into the nuclear club,' […] That is, effectively, exactly what it has done. There is a process of acceptance and forgiveness, on the one hand, for a country such as India, but a very different view has been taken, of course, towards a country such as Iran.[78]

37. We asked the Foreign Secretary whether the UK was guilty of hypocrisy, because it was supporting the deal while condemning the nuclear activities of Iran. She replied:

No, I do not think we are, because India does not have the same track record as Iran. Although India is not, as you will know, a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, it is voluntarily coming forward with a number of safeguards.[79]

The FCO argued that these voluntary commitments would:

bring India further into, and thereby strengthen, the broader nuclear non-proliferation framework, of which the NPT is the cornerstone. In particular, the […deal] will reinforce the centrality to this framework of both IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol, and can only aid the latter becoming a universal standard.[80]

38. Mr Roy-Chaudhury agreed that the deal would ultimately strengthen the non-proliferation regime. He told us:

[…] one must look at the way in which the nuclear non-proliferation regime has developed over the past few decades. In this case, it is fairly clear that India, though adhering to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, was not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. […] My sense is that by bringing India into a de facto fold, we are looking at beefing up the non-proliferation regime […] We are now looking at an emerging world scenario in which the key will be India's greater responsibility towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime.[81]

39. The FCO stated that the deal would also bring other advantages:

In addition to its non-proliferation benefits, […it] can make a significant contribution to energy security, development, economic and environmental objectives for India and the international community.[82]

On the environmental benefits of the deal, President Bush has argued:

"As India's economy continues to grow, this partnership will help India meet its energy needs without increasing air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. It will also help reduce India's dependence upon imported fossil fuels."[83]

However, Mr Roy-Chaudhury, pointed out:

The nuclear power element of the deal, if you look at it closely, is minimal. Today, nuclear power accounts for 4% of India's energy demand—with a plan for nuclear reactors in the next 15 to 20 years, we are looking at that figure increasing to 10, 12 or 14% That is, of course, a much larger proportion of energy demand, but it is not going to solve India's energy problem and its energy insecurity.[84]

40. We accept that although India was free to make an agreement with the US having refused to sign the NPT (in contrast to Iran and North Korea), this agreement has exposed the US to accusations of openly double standards.

41. The deal is not yet concluded. Although the US Congress approved a Bill for the necessary waivers to US law in December 2006, it insisted upon being given the opportunity to review the final agreement. Moreover, it demanded that before it did so, the deal had to be submitted for approval to the IAEA, which will negotiate a Safeguards Agreement with India, as well as to the NSG.[85] Dr El-Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, has supported the deal.[86] However, the NSG failed to reach a consensus on the deal at its May-June 2006 plenary.[87] India and the US will have to get support from other NSG members at the next meeting in April 2007.[88]

42. Although India does not have to ratify the deal, it is possible for its opposition parties to force a Parliamentary debate, which might be followed by a vote.[89] There has been some opposition to the deal in India and other conditions added by Congress to the Bill[90] received some bad press in India.[91] However, rejection of the agreement in India is unlikely. Antony Stokes, Head, South Asia Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, commented:

Obviously, it is a matter for India to negotiate with the US, but given the statements that were made publicly when the deal was announced, the framework within which this will be negotiated is consistent with that sort of approach.[92]

Dr Price told us:

[…] many people will accuse the Government in India of selling out to the US, but those voices are becoming increasingly marginalised.[93]

Pakistan's nuclear weapons

43. Pakistan developed nuclear capability in the 1970s and first tested a nuclear weapon in 1998, a couple of weeks after India's 1998 tests. Like India, Pakistan is not a member of the NPT. Pakistan does not have a good record on nuclear non-proliferation—indeed Abdul Qadeer Khan, a leading personality in Pakistan's nuclear establishment,[94] ran an international black market nuclear network in the 1990s, which has been a matter of great concern to the USA, the UK and many other governments.

44. In July 2006, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denied that a parallel deal on civil nuclear cooperation could be reached between Washington and Islamabad.[95] The FCO stated that when the UK revised its export policy to India in August 2005, it had concluded that "it was inappropriate to make similar changes to our policy towards Pakistan" due to the revelation of the proliferation network that had been run by A Q Khan.[96] Pakistan is placing its hopes for a change of approach and a deal on China. At the NSG plenary in May 2006, China said it preferred a criteria-based approach which would allow a deal for Pakistan in the future. However, Pakistan was disappointed in November 2006 when an expected offer of civil nuclear cooperation from China did not materialise.[97]

45. We conclude that the weakness of the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime was seriously exposed when non-signatories India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests in 1998. We welcome the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal will bring India's civilian facilities further within the broader non-proliferation framework. However, the political significance of the US offering civilian nuclear cooperation to a non-signatory of the NPT has seriously undermined the NPT. We recommend that the Government work to ensure the NPT is updated to take account of the reality of India and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. We further recommend that urgent steps are taken to assist security and confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan.

Global climate security

46. In 2004 India had one of the lowest per capita emissions of greenhouse gases in the world.[98] However, given its expanding economy, its aim of bringing its citizens out of poverty and its anticipated population explosion, India's future energy use is likely to be "phenomenal".[99] Furthermore, coal is the most dominant source of energy in India and almost all of India's large coal reserves are of high carbon content and relatively low calorific value.[100] India therefore has the potential to cause significant global climate change.

47. India is a non-Annex 1 country within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change which means it has no set target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, which it ratified in 2002. India does accept the need to limit emissions. In an address to the Indian Science Congress in January 2007, Prime Minister Singh said:

we, in the developing countries, cannot afford to ape the West in terms of its environmentally wasteful lifestyles.[101]

48. However, India argues that the burden of reducing global carbon emissions lies with developed countries whose economies were built during their industrial revolutions in the nineteenth century on extensive fossil fuel use.[102] The FCO stated, "India is suspicious of any action that it perceives to be an attempt to lock it into emission reductions targets that might prove harmful to its economic growth."[103]

The Foreign Secretary reiterated this in evidence to us:

Certainly there is very much an expressed belief in India that they abide by, as we do, the principle of common differentiation of responsibility. They say, 'You, the developed countries started this problem; you will be the first to show us you can tackle it; and we will continue to discuss what happens next'.[104]

49. Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us:

we are seeing greater sensitisation on climate issues. When the British Foreign Secretary was in Delhi just after the report on climate change came out, there was greater receptivity towards it and its conclusions. However, I sense that Delhi would not want India to be seen as the first or only country to go ahead. Its position could be that it would like to see a consensus emerge on the issues, and other countries starting to moving forward. Then it could become a win-win situation. I cannot see India taking the lead on the issue. Whether it admits it or not, it would look towards China and ask whether the British Government were working with China before they tried to work positively with India.[105]

In the press conference following the last UK-India Summit in October 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair thanked India for the way it had participated in the Gleneagles G8+5 Climate Change dialogue and said he thought such dialogues were on their way:

to creating the right type of framework that will allow us once the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 to have a way forward that will involve all the major countries in the world, including America and China and India.[106]

50. We questioned the Foreign Secretary about the likelihood of India committing itself to emissions targets post-Kyoto. She answered:

I think we are a long way from that kind of conversation as yet, by which I mean that there is a huge amount of discussion going on about what should happen when the existing Kyoto protocol expires. […]The whole issue of whether Kyoto is followed up by a second round of target setting is at present in question and under discussion.[107]

51. We also asked the Foreign Secretary whether it was hypocritical of the UK to encourage India to use greener sources of energy when our per capita consumption is so high. She responded:

No, because we are not saying to India or any other developing country, 'I am sorry, we've had our growth and development but you can't have yours'. That is the opposite of what we are saying. We are saying that we believe that we should be part of an international move to help countries such as India grow in a sustainable way; […] not to have to go through the development process that we went through, but to leapfrog into a low carbon economy. […][108]

She added:

It is almost conventional wisdom that, despite our per capita consumption, we produce 2% of the world's emissions of carbon dioxide. If we saved all our carbon emissions, which I fear we are not likely to find it easy to do, a growing India or China could wipe that out quickly. That is why this is one of the most difficult challenges facing the world community.[109]

52. The Foreign Secretary also pointed out that it was in India's own interests to act against climate change:

One of the important aspects of all these discussions […] is that sadly countries such as India—not just Bangladesh, which is the example that everyone starts with—will be the first and the most severely affected by the impact of climate change.[110]

The FCO described the impact climate change would have on India and the South Asian region:

[it] could undermine domestic priorities in sustainable economic development and lead to regional conflict, migration and an increase in competition over natural resources. Temperature increase of 3-4 degrees centigrade over the next thirty years could cause Himalayan glaciers to shrink; areas that rely on glacial runoff would suffer severe shortages with 500 million people depending on the glacier-fed Indus and Ganges rivers for water. Desertification, deforestation, soil erosion and a reduced water table are already major problems—more climate change will worsen this. A one-metre sea rise would affect 5,763 square kms, and threaten another 7.1 million people. Goa would lose 4.3% of its land, including tourist areas. Rice and wheat production would drop significantly because of climate change. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh would be worst affected. Temperature rise would lead to increased pest populations and crop losses and vector-borne diseases such as malaria would invade new areas.[111]

53. India's increasing population, growing economy, energy-intensive industry, air transport and travel have already placed considerable strain on its own environment. Air pollution is a growing problem in Indian cities—for example, the Indian city of Ranipet has been listed among the ten most polluted in the world.[112] Deforestation has impacted on local ecological cycles and there is evidence of changing coast lines and monsoon patterns.[113]

54. India already has a good record on programmes for renewable and cleaner energy sources. The Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, set up in 1992, is dedicated to providing a coordinated response to renewable schemes. An International Energy Agency report stated that:

India has one of the largest programmes for renewable energy. It covers all major renewable energy sources: biogas, biomass, solar energy, wind energy, small hydropower and other emerging technologies.[114]

The Foreign Secretary told us:

before the Kyoto protocol came into force […] the Indians told me then that they had something like 30 CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] projects in the pipeline and ready to be approved. That was more than any other country in the world, so they have been well ahead of the game on that.[115]

She also commented:

About a year ago, […] an experienced British business player from the utilities sector, […] told me […] that he had gone to India in part because he felt that people such as he should share their expertise, but had come away convinced that the Indians could teach him far more about the use of renewables than he could teach them.[116]

55. Dr Lawrence Sáez informed us that:

India has taken a leading global role in renewable energy. At present, India is one of the world leaders in wind power generation, ranking fifth in the world (behind Germany, Spain, the USA, and Denmark) in total installed wind power capacity. Moreover, India is a world leader in the manufacturing of certain types of equipment for the use of photovoltaic energy conversion. For instance, India is the world's fifth largest manufacturer of silicon solar modules.[117]

He suggested that UK firms might be able to help India with the manufacture of wind turbines, offshore wind farms, and wave technology.[118]

56. The FCO told us that the UK was "actively engaged" with India on climate change through the ongoing Structured Dialogue on Climate Change (SDCC). This includes work on climate change impacts in India, vulnerability of certain sectors and adaptation strategies, study of barriers to transfer of low carbon technology and ensuring intergovernmental engagement.[119] Most of the UK-funded clean development mechanism projects are in India.[120] On 23 January 2007, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Rt Hon David Miliband MP, announced a second phase of bilateral work with India to identify and develop climate change adaptation strategies.[121]

57. We welcome the leading role India is playing in developing renewable energy sources. Nevertheless we conclude that India's growing use of non-renewable sources of energy will pose a major threat to global climate security in the future. India is right that the developed world has a responsibility to take the lead in reducing global emissions. However, it must also acknowledge its own likely future impact on climate change and recognise that it is in its own interests to enter the framework that succeeds Kyoto. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to work together with India to build trust on the climate change agenda, including through joint cooperation on developing renewable sources of energy and climate change impact and adaptation projects.

Energy security

58. India's energy demands will increase well beyond its current domestic capacity.[122] India has large proven reserves of (low-calorific) coal[123] and its Integrated Energy Policy aims to increase civil nuclear production and renewable energy sources.[124] However, India is "relatively poor"[125] in oil. Although it has the largest known proven crude oil reserves, 5,919 million barrels, this only constitutes 0.51% of the world's total. It also has "abysmal" levels of gas (1,101 billion standard cubic metres).[126]

59. India's energy security policy will have a direct impact on the UK's energy interests. The FCO told us:

Indian energy demand is driving up oil prices; India is investing in maritime capabilities to protect transit routes; state owned companies are buying oil and gas assets in countries that will influence their foreign policies in ways the UK may find difficult (eg Burma).[127]

60. India currently imports about 65% of its oil from the Gulf, but the FCO explained that India was now trying to diversify suppliers:

Indian investment in overseas oilfields has reached $10 billion in the last few years, not including a $25 billion deal with Iran. […] India is developing new relationships, for example in Sudan, where India has invested $750 million in oil; Nigeria where India negotiated a purchase of about 44 million barrels of crude oil per year on a long-term basis; and in Syria, where India recently finalised a contract for the exploration, development and production of petroleum with a Syrian company.

India is trying to gain a foothold in the Caspian basin. India has provided Tajikistan with a $40 million aid package and undertook to refurbish an air base near the Tajik capital Dushanbe.

The Russian territory of Sakhalin, Vietnam and Myanmar [Burma] are also potential suppliers to the Indian market and areas in which Indian firms have made major investments.[128]

61. India is trying to shift toward gas as a major energy source. Dr Price explained that this was because India did not like being dependent on world oil prices:

if the price of oil goes up, India's current account looks bad. With these longer-term accounts, […] you do the initial investment, but then you know what the price is, and you are not going to be subject to sudden current account problems.[129]

The FCO stated that India would become a significant importer of gas over the next few decades and that its cheapest option would be through pipelines from Central Asia and the Middle East, via Pakistan.[130] There are two main pipelines India is currently considering. The first is the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Iran is India's closest source of natural gas[131] and Iran, Pakistan and India have now agreed on a pricing formula for the delivery of Iranian gas for the 2600km-long pipeline, first proposed in 1994. An Iranian energy official has said that he hopes all other decisions will be taken by June this year.[132]

62. However, a big question hanging over the pipeline is that of security.[133] Dr Matthew Nelson, lecturer in the politics of Asia and Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies, told us it was unlikely to happen "any time soon" because:

The pipeline from Iran to India would pass […] through Baluchistan, where there is a great deal of ongoing unrest right now.[134]

Mr Roy-Chaudhury agreed. He told us:

My money at the moment would be on the deal not happening. […] Baluchistan in Pakistan, […is a] very difficult area in which to build pipelines and ensure their security.[135]

63. Another issue affecting the pipeline is India's new relationship with the United States. Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us:

India and Iran have a strategic relationship of sorts—India has the second-largest Shia community in the world after Iran. At the same time, a relationship is emerging between India and Washington. As we saw at the IAEA, when India voted against Iran and in favour of Washington, its relationship with Iran was predetermined to a large extent by its relationship with Washington. So, my sense is that it is going to be very difficult to keep both balls in the air. In terms of priority, Washington is clearly a far greater priority at this moment than Tehran, so I do not see practical movement on the pipeline proposal between India and Iran.[136]

He also suggested that if India were to become dependent on Iran for energy, Indian companies might violate any sanctions against Iran.[137]

64. However, Dr Price suggested that the US' concerns about Iran might be mitigated by the positive benefits that the pipeline would bring, as a Confidence Building Measure between India and Pakistan.[138]

65. The other major pipeline which India is considering is the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline. Witnesses told us that this proposal also faced challenges,[139] but that it was more likely to be built than the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline because of Gazprom's interest in the pipeline[140] and because of India's friendly relationship with the government of Afghanistan.[141]

66. It might also be possible for India to import small amounts of natural gas from Bangladesh or from Burma via Bangladesh, although the FCO stated that internal party politics in Bangladesh mean this was unlikely to occur.[142] Dr Charu Lata Hogg wrote that Bangladesh wanted trade parity with India to be a condition of a pipeline from Burma, a condition that India would not accept.[143]

67. We conclude that an agreement for India to build a gas pipeline through Pakistan would be likely to have a positive impact on the two countries' relations. However, India should be cautious about becoming too reliant on Iran for energy. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what representations it has made to India with regard to the proposals for both the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Iran-India-Pakistan pipelines.

The World Trade Organisation

68. India was a founder member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which preceded the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The FCO described India as "an important and active country within the WTO" and a "leading member of the G20 group of advanced developing countries".[144]

69. India has been a key participant in the Doha Development Round negotiations. It has agreed in principle to grant greater market access for industrial products and services in return for a lowering of agricultural tariffs by the European Union and the USA.[145] The FCO described India's position as:

driven by a mix of interests. India wants to protect […] about 600 million people who depend directly or indirectly on agriculture, particularly from subsidised imports and on non-agricultural market access—NAMA (protection of its infant industry and a fear of an influx of Chinese textiles and manufactured goods). At the same time, India recognises that an increasing number of its industrial sectors (pharmaceuticals, auto parts etc) are beginning to be globally competitive, hence there has been significant autonomous reductions in industrial tariffs in recent years, and it may be willing to go further as part of a WTO agreement.[146]

70. Dr Price agreed. He told us:

India's position on the WTO is almost set by the various interests that determine it. Farmers make up 60 to 70% of the population, and most of them operate on a small scale. That community is certainly fearful of foreign imports coming into India, and that determines agriculture. If you look at the services side—the high-flying IT sectors and so forth—they are much more liberal. They have tax advantages; they are globally competitive, so they want greater access, in terms of services. Industry groups, again, play a large part in determining policy towards manufactured goods imports. So in some areas India has a very defensive policy and in other areas it is very aggressive […].

There is certainly no generic support for liberalisation, but India's tariffs are coming down. They have halved over the past five or six years, but India's central Government remain reliant on customs duties and import and export duties for their own finances, so they are in a bind on that level as well.[147]

71. We asked the Foreign Secretary if she thought that India had been constructive in the Doha negotiations. She replied:

I think that two thirds of the population in India are still subsistence farmers and that is obviously a source of great anxiety to the Indian Government, as it would be to any Government. So I understand their concerns. Equally, there have been times when we have felt that India was perhaps being particularly cautious and not always taking the same view that we do about the potential value to all players in the world economy of an improved trade round, and of the Doha round in particular—but that is natural. That could be said of many other players and of many other countries.

Certainly we are encouraging—and have encouraged—the Government of India to share our desire for the trade round to succeed.[148]

72. We conclude that India could gain large benefits from a successful Doha Development Round and we recommend that the Government continues to urge India to take the most constructive approach possible in the newly resumed World Trade Organisation negotiations.

The Commonwealth

73. India's decision to continue its membership of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic in 1947 is believed to have influenced other Asian and African nations to join the organisation, shaping the modern Commonwealth.[149] India is the Commonwealth's largest state, containing almost 60% of its total population.[150] The FCO told us that India played an important role in the organisation:

It is the fifth largest contributor to the Commonwealth Secretariat's budget after the UK, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. India is an active member of key Commonwealth bodies, including the Committee on Terrorism and played a key role when a member of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG). India continues to show its commitment to the Commonwealth by being one of the principal donors for the Commonwealth Small States Office in New York.

India will be hosting the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi.[151]

74. We heard mixed views on India's perceptions of the Commonwealth today. Mr Roy-Chaudhury, told us that India saw the Commonwealth as an organisation of narrow importance:

there has been a major change in India's perspective on its foreign policy, especially in its relationship with the world.[…] If you are trying to prioritise it, India's relationship with Washington today is its top priority. Everything else, I think, takes a more limited perspective. My sense is that the Commonwealth would be included in that.[152]

75. However, Dr Smith believed that India would now be more likely to place higher importance on the Commonwealth:

yes, of course the main focus is on Washington, but India now sees itself as an emerging global player, and I think the view of the Commonwealth and the energy that India is prepared to put into the Commonwealth will be reflected in its global perspective, as that becomes a more dominant feature of foreign policy.[153]

76. The Foreign Secretary told us:

I think that India plays a very constructive role in the Commonwealth and is a very much respected and major participant, not least because of its sheer size and general influence. I suspect that the Indian Government might be a little concerned if you thought that they were not really interested in the Commonwealth but I certainly accept that, far more than in the past, they are nurturing and building links and partnerships within their region. That is a feature of what is happening in the region and is true of all players there including, for example, Australia.[154]

77. We welcome India's large contribution to the Commonwealth to date and recommend that the Government encourage India to continue to play an important role in the Commonwealth in the future.

India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum

78. India is a member of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, which was created in 2003. In a joint declaration after the first IBSA summit meeting in September 2006 the three nations' leaders outlined IBSA's achievements and future objectives:

[It] has become instrumental for promoting ever closer coordination on global issues between three large multicultural and multiracial democracies of Asia, South America and Africa, and contributed to enhancing trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa cooperation in sectoral areas.

The importance of the IBSA Dialogue Forum goes beyond its positive impact on India-Brazil-South Africa relations. The Forum, consisting of three large developing countries, provides a framework that will give additional impetus to further contacts between Asian, South American and African developing countries, thus contributing to strengthening South-South cooperation.[155]

79. The FCO described IBSA as follows:

[its] initial purpose […] was to foster south-south co-operation between three key regional developing nations and present a cohesive voice at the bargaining sessions anticipated for the Doha Rounds of WTO talks. The common challenges of poverty alleviation, economic development and social equity provided the early focus, but specific trade and sectoral issues also featured highly at the September 2006 IBSA Summit in Brasilia. IBSA is also seen by India as a potential gateway to wider regional markets already governed by customs unions (MERCOSUR and SACU) and some work on preferential trade arrangements between India and these two groupings is now underway. IBSA has also pressed for a more representative (multilateral) UN; specifically, India and Brazil support each other's candidature for inclusion as permanent members of the Security Council.[156]

80. We asked Mr Roy-Chaudhury about India's views of the significance of IBSA. He told us:

the way in which Delhi sees it is that those three countries could play a critical role in co-operating with one another through what is called south-south co-operation. In no sense does it have the priority that other relationships with India have, such as Washington's, but there is a sense that Brazil, for example, was a major emerging power about a decade or two ago. South Africa, again, has tremendous potential. […] It is difficult to see too many convergences of interests, if you look at it systematically, among the three countries. One is that there is a nuclear field in South Africa and Brazil. On the UN, also, there is something, but I do not see tremendous dynamism in all this.[157]

81. However, in her evidence to us the Foreign Secretary commented that:

The recent formation of IBSA—India, Brazil and South Africa—to work together on a variety of issues is another indication that people are recognising India's role and potential in the world.[158]

82. We welcome the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum as a mechanism for cooperation between rising democratic powers.

India and Japan

83. India's links with Japan are increasing.[159] Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us:

Japan is playing an increasingly important role, according to Indian perception. The problem essentially was over India's nuclear tests, when Japan came down very strongly—for obvious reasons—on India's tests in 1998, but that period is over, and today there is a strategic dialogue between India and Japan.[160]

Japan promoted India's participation in the first East Asian Summit in December 2005.[161] Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited India in December 2006, a visit which was reported as "paving the way" for Japan to support India's nuclear deal with the US at the next plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[162]

84. The rapprochement between India and Japan is motivated by a number of factors. First, both India and Japan share an interest in maintaining a stable balance of power with China in the region.[163] The second factor is increasing levels of trade. Japan was the fourth largest investor in India between 1991 and 2004 and over 70 Indian IT companies are expanding their operations to Japan.[164] Mr Roy-Chaudhury noted these political and economic links, but argued that the

bottom line for Japan is its energy resources. Japanese tankers take oil from the Persian gulf. They sail to the western part of India, and US naval forces are there. From Cape Comorin to the strait of Malacca and Singapore, there is no military presence other than that of the Indian navy. For Japan, strategically, it is important to work with India on security of sea lines of communication […][165]

85. India is also playing a role in defence diplomacy between Japan and China. Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us:

last June, […] during a period of difficulty between Japan and China, the Indian Defence Minister flew out to Tokyo, from Tokyo to Beijing, from Beijing to Singapore, and then back to Delhi—a route that very few Defence or Foreign Ministers would have dared to do. They would have not been welcome in either Tokyo or Beijing if they had gone to the other country first.[166]

India and Russia

86. India has continued to have close relations with its traditional partner, Russia. Ties are strong on defence, with Russia selling India conventional weapons to the value of $9.9billion between 1997 and 2004.[167] Dr Smith told us:

India is hungry for technology, which will help consolidate that relationship no end. There are cost benefits because of the cost of technology from the west.[168]

Mr Roy-Chaudhury noted that Delhi was also concerned about access to spare parts and technology. While Washington had imposed sanctions on India after its 1998 nuclear test, this issue did not exist "in terms of the India-Russia military relationship because the Russians had never imposed sanctions on India."[169] He argued that India's military relationship with Russia was now moving into the area of strategic defence. Russia and India were cooperating on the fifth-generation advanced strike aircraft and had both tested a cruise missile.[170]

87. India is also developing a relationship with Russia on energy, with Indian firms having made major investments in a joint energy venture in the Russian territory of Sakhalin.[171] Russia supported the Indo-US nuclear deal and in January 2007, Russian President Putin and India's Prime Minister Singh signed a draft deal under which Russia will build four nuclear power reactors in India. As the memorandum of understanding on the new reactors was signed, Prime Minister Singh commented, "Energy security is the most important of the emerging dimensions of our strategic partnership".[172] Federico Bordonaro suggested to us that Russia "would probably benefit from Delhi's disappointment" if the US-Indo nuclear deal failed to be implemented.[173]

88. We will consider the impact of Russia's energy deals with other nations on the UK's energy security in our forthcoming inquiry into Russia.

89. We recommend that the Government sets out in its response to this Report the impact of Russia's developing energy relationship with India on the UK.

India and the European Union

90. The FCO stated that "India and the EU have woken up to the importance of a strong relationship".[174] India and the EU have held annual summits since 2000 and signed a strategic partnership in September 2005. India has agreed to take part in the Galileo satellite navigation project, which will give it an alternative to the American GPS network and should improve cooperation between the Indian and European high-technology sectors. India is also contributing 9.09% to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) fusion project, which the EU is financing by 50%.[175] In 2005 bilateral trade between India and the EU grew by 20%.[176] A High Level Trade Group to explore ways to deepen bilateral commerce and investment was established in September 2005 and had its first meeting in July 2006.

91. However, we heard evidence that economic and political ties between Europe and India tended to be with individual member states rather than the EU as a whole. A recent report by Chatham House and the Fondation Robert Schuman on India's views of Europe described the strategic partnership between India and the EU as "shallow by any standards",[177] while Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us it existed "on paper".[178] EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India amounts to a tenth of that into China.[179] Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us:

If you look at trade statistics and at India's trade relationship with the EU, it is very clear that the bulk of the bilateral trade is between India and Britain. […]

My sense is that for India the EU essentially means Britain, whether that is in terms of trade relations, student and cultural exchanges or the political relationship. The only area where the EU is being seen now as a larger conglomerate of states is in issues such as the nuclear suppliers group, as a large number of EU member states are also members of the nuclear suppliers group. […] But practically, the EU relationship with India is, for India, largely a British-Indian relationship.[180]

92. France also has a longstanding relationship with India, having recognised very early on its potential as a market for high-technology goods.[181] In February 2006 both nations signed an Agreement on Defence Co-operation as well as a $270 million deal between India's Kingfisher Airlines and the French company ATR for 15 aircraft.[182]

93. Dr Smith suggested that relations between the EU and India would improve in the future:

Because of economic dynamics on both sides, there will be a need to recognise that they must work together much more. […] it tends to be via the UK at the moment, and that will erode over time.

One should not forget that Indian political culture, bureaucracy and so forth is a difficult animal to understand, get to know and deal with. That is getting easier. As India becomes more of an internationalised nation state, it is becoming a lot easier…[183]

94. The Seventh EU-India Summit on 13 October 2006 endorsed a report by the High Level Trade Group, which argued for a bilateral trade and investment agreement between the EU and India, that would aim to eliminate about 90% of tariffs in the next seven years. Yet the trade agreement still needs a European Council mandate for the Commission to open negotiations. Discussion on the draft negotiating mandate, presented by the Commission to Member States in December 2006, continues.[184] Analysts have warned that Member States may not be able to agree on the extent of any EU economic concessions with India.[185] However, Dr Smith told us:

It varies a little by sector perhaps. In agriculture, the EU and India are a very long way away, but if you look at services, […] I think that there might be much greater synergies between the EU and India, which could be taken forward …[186]

95. We asked the Foreign Secretary about the UK's position on the agreement. She replied:

We certainly welcome the proposal […] and want to move towards negotiations for quite a broad-based trade and investment agreement with India. [187]

However, in a supplementary note to the Committee she emphasised that the UK's "first priority" remained the Doha Development Agenda:

We want to ensure that the EU's next steps are consistent with maximising the prospects of an ambitious and pro-development outcome to the negotiations, as well as demonstrating the EU's continuing commitment to multilateralism. Nothing we or the EU does should undermine the DDA, and we need to ensure that any new regional and bilateral free trade agreements are complementary to the multilateral process, and can be building blocks to future multilateral rounds.[188]

96. In March 2007, an "essential elements" clause on democracy and human rights, included in all EU trade and cooperation agreements since 1995, and a clause on Weapons of Mass Destruction, became a "serious stumbling block" to an agreement on the draft mandate.[189] India described the former clause as a "deal breaker" and was also against the WMD clause. The European Commission has now proposed that the clauses be excluded from the agreement. Some Member States do not want to offend India and support a purely technical agreement, but others are concerned that the exclusion of these clauses is a risky precedent.[190]

97. We recommend that the Government urge its EU partners to work together to build stronger relations between the EU and India. In particular the UK should encourage Member States to agree on a negotiating mandate for a Free Trade Agreement with India.

Africa

98. Dr Smith and Mr Roy-Chaudhury argued that like China, India saw Africa as an alternative source of energy.[191] India also has a market for its goods in Africa, where its south-south cooperation built a tradition of sharing technology. Tata recently established a car factory in Senegal.[192] Dr Smith told us that there was a considerable Indian diaspora in Africa, including many important political figures in South Africa.[193]

99. However, Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us that in contrast to the comprehensive Chinese approach to Africa:

India does not have the capacity that China has in moving into Africa, providing financial resources and so on. Its priorities will, I think, relate to certain sectors, whether it is automobiles somewhere, energy elsewhere or whatever. There will not be an Africa-wide policy, and it will look closer to home.[194]

---

32   UN System in India, To Unite Our Strength: 60 Ways: Six decades of the United Nations in India 1945-2005, p 1 Back

33   Ev 42, para 102 Back

34   www.un.org/peace/ Back

35   Ev 42, para 101 Back

36   "India elected to Human Rights Council", The Hindu, 10 May 2006 Back

37   UN System in India, To Unite Our Strength: 60 Ways: Six decades of the United Nations in India 1945-2005, p 7 Back

38   "U.S., India and Qatar contribute to U.N. Democracy Fund", Embassy of the United States: New Delhi, India press release, 9 March 2006, www.newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ Back

39   Tabled Draft Resolution A/59/L.64, Security Council Reform, 6 July 2005. This resolution included the concession that the new permanent members would not be given the right of veto for at least 15 years. It was retabled by Brazil, India and Germany, without Japan, on 6 January 2006.  Back

40   Shairi Mathur, Voting for the Veto: India in a reformed UN Briefing Policy Centre, (London, 2006), Executive Summary Back

41   India's Position on UN Reform, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations New York, www.un.int/india Back

42   Ev 42, para 101 Back

43   Speech by Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the Confederation of Indian Industry, Bangalore, 17 January 2007, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/ Back

44   France was a co-sponsor of the G4 draft resolution of 6 July 2005. Back

45   During his visit to India in 2004, President Putin stated that "India is our candidate number one in terms of reforming the geographical representation of the Security Council". "Putin backs India's UN seat bid", BBC News Online, 4 December 2004, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

46   It is part of the Uniting for Consensus Group which have instead called for ten new non-permanent members eligible for re-election. Back

47   Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 98 Back

48   "The Chinese government values India's influence and role in international and regional affairs and is wiling to see a greater Indian role in the international arena, the United Nations included." Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese State Councillor during his visit to Indian, reported in "Beijing boosts Delhi's bid for UN council seat", Asia Times, October 26 2004  Back

49   Q 7 Back

50   Q 8 Back

51   Q 7 Back

52   Q 92 Back

53   "India stakes claim for non-permanent seat", The Indian Express, 4 February 2007 Back

54   Ev 43, para 103 Back

55   India's Position on UN Reform, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations New York, www.un.int/india Back

56   Ev 43, para 103 Back

57   "US Drops Insistence on UN Budget Cap for 2006", Reuters, 26 June 2006 Back

58   India's Position on UN Reform, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations New York, www.un.int/india Back

59   India's Tarapur nuclear reactors were built by the US as part of the Atoms for Peace programme. Back

60   Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods; The Strange Rise of Modern India, (London, 2006), pp 268-269 Back

61   The 1978 Nonproliferation Act required non-nuclear-weapon states, which included India under the NPT and US law, to place all of their peaceful nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to receive nuclear exports.  Back

62   India did not sign the treaty as it saw it as discriminatory. Back

63   "India Sanctions", The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 13 May 1998, www.state.gov/ Back

64   Ashton B. Carter, "America's New Strategic Partner?", Foreign Affairs, vol 85 no. 4, p 35 Back

65   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), p 27 Back

66   Qq 10 and 14 [Dr Price] Back

67   Q 10 [Dr Price] Back

68   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), p 27 Back

69   Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 96 Back

70   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), p 27 Back

71   "Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh", The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 18 July 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/ Back

72   In March 2006, agreement was reached on the separation of India's military and civilian nuclear facilities. 14 of India's 22 nuclear reactors will be classified as civilian and placed under safeguards. The other reactors, including the fast-breeder reactors, will remain as military facilities, outside IAEA safeguards. India can also continue to build additional breeder reactors and to decide whether to place them under safeguards. However, India will not be permitted to withdraw reactors from IAEA inspection once they have been placed under safeguards.  Back

73   "Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh", The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 18 July 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/ Back

74   Qq 11-12; and Ev 176 Back

75   Ev 38-39, paras 67-70 Back

76   Ev 39, para 71 Back

77   Ev 177 Back

78   Q 16 Back

79   Q 94 Back

80   Ev 39, para 76 Back

81   Q 16 Back

82   Ev 39, para 75 Back

83   "Statement by the President on Senate Passage of the United-States India Nuclear Cooperation ", The White House, 16 November 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/ Back

84   Q 42 Back

85   George Bunn, "US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Final Congressional Approval is Conditioned on Future Steps by India and Two International Organizations", Lawyers Alliance for World Security, 20 December 2006 Back

86   "IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S. and India Nuclear Deal", IAEA press release 2006/05, 2 March 2006 Back

87   "The NSG - Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime", NSG Statement, NSG Plenary Meeting, Brasilia, 1-2 June 2006 Back

88   George Bunn, "US - India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Final Congressional Approval is Conditioned on Future Steps by India and Two International Organizations", Lawyers Alliance for World Security, 20 December 2006 Back

89   "Bush signs US-India nuclear bill", BBC News Online, 18 December 2006, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

90   That the US president would be required to end the export of nuclear materials if India tested another nuclear device; that the US would not guarantee uninterrupted fuel supplies for reactors; and that India could not reprocess spent fuel. Back

91   "India could dump U.S. nuclear deal envoy", The Scotsman, 10 January 2007 Back

92   Q 99 Back

93   Q 10 Back

94   Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, (New Haven and London, 2003), p 194 Back

95   Ev 177 Back

96   Ev 39, para 72 Back

97   "Good deals, but no nukes for Pakistan", Asia Times Online, 28 November 2006, www.atimes.com/ Back

98   P.R. Shukla, "India's GHG emission scenarios: Aligning development and stabilization paths", Current Science, vol 90, number 3, February 2006, p 384 Back

99   Q 49 [Dr Smith] Back

100   Ev 160 Back

101   "PM's address at the 94th Indian Science Congress", Government of India Prime Minister's Office, 3 January 2007 Back

102   India Country Paper: Dealing with the Threat of Climate Change, Gleneagles Summit, July 2005, para 5, www.meaindia.nic.in/ Back

103   Ev 43, para 106 Back

104   Q 144 Back

105   Q 41 Back

106   "Press Conference with Prime Minister of India", Number 10 press conference transcript, 10 October 2006, www.pm.gov.uk Back

107   Q 144 Back

108   Q 145 Back

109   Q 146 Back

110   Q 145 Back

111   Ev 45, para 124 Back

112   The Blacksmith Institute, The World's Most Polluted Places: The Top Ten, September 2006 Back

113   Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, India's Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, 2004, pp 59, 60 and 101 Back

114   International Energy Agency: Coal Industry Advisory Board, Coal in the Energy Supply of India, 2002, p 23 Back

115   Q 144 Back

116   Q 158 Back

117   Ev 161 Back

118   Ev 161 Back

119   Ev 45, para 128 Back

120   Q 144 Back

121   "Defra announces second phase of key Indian climate change adaptation project", Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs press release 18/07, 23 January 2007 Back

122   Ev 44, para 114 Back

123   Ev 160 Back

124   Ev 44, para 114 Back

125   Ibid Back

126   Ev 159 Back

127   Ev 45, para 123 Back

128   Ev 44, paras 115-118 Back

129   Q 212 Back

130   Ev 44, para 119 Back

131   Ev 159 Back

132   "Iran gas price formula 'agreed'", BBC News Online, 26 January 2007 www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

133   Q 46 [Chaudhury] and Ev 185 Back

134   Q 209 Back

135   Q 46 Back

136   Q 44 Back

137   Q 45 [Chaudhury] Back

138   Q 211 Back

139   Ev 43, para 110 Back

140   Ev 44, para 120 Back

141   Q210 [Nelson] Back

142   Ev 44, para 121 Back

143   Ev 185 Back

144   Ev 44, para 107 Back

145   "Brazil and India to G-7: Will Cut NAMA Tariffs If EU, US Cut Ag Tariffs And Subsidies", BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 9 , number 42, 7 December 2005 Back

146   Ev 43, paras 107 and 108 Back

147   Q 33 Back

148   Q 141 Back

149   Ev 43, para 110 Back

150   Indian Ministry of External Affairs, India and the Commonwealth, p 1, www.meaindia.nic.in/ Back

151   Ev 43, paras 111-112 Back

152   Q 36 Back

153   Q 36 Back

154   Q 147 Back

155   "Joint Declaration of First IBSA Summit Meeting", Government of India Prime Minister's Office press release 3:1 1st, 14 September 2006 Back

156   Ev 43, para 113 Back

157   Q 37 Back

158   Q 92 Back

159   Ev 40, para 78 Back

160   Q 30 Back

161   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), pp 24-25 Back

162   "Benefits of Indo-US deal: Nuclear renaissance in the offing", The Tribune, 1 January 2007, www.india-newsbehindnews.com Back

163   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), p 25 Back

164   Chatham House and Fondation Robert Schuman, Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, (London, 2006), p 14 Back

165   Q 31 Back

166   Q 30 Back

167   Ev 126, para 6 Back

168   Q 31 Back

169   Q 32 Back

170   Q 29 Back

171   Ev 44, para 118; Q 29 Back

172   "India and Russia in nuclear deal", BBC News Online, 25 January 2007, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

173   Ev 177, p 4 Back

174   Ev 48, para 148 Back

175   Chatham House and Fondation Robert Schuman, Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, (London, 2006), p 22 Back

176   Chatham House and Fondation Robert Schuman, Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, (London, 2006), p 20 Back

177   Ibid, pp xi-xii Back

178   Q 26 Back

179   "China could learn from India's slow and quiet rise", Financial Times, 23 January 2006 Back

180   Q 26 Back

181   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), pp 25-26 Back

182   Chatham House and Fondation Robert Schuman, Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, (London, 2006), p 5 Back

183   Q 27 Back

184   Ev 75 Back

185   "EU and India agree to trade deal", BBC News Online, 13 October 2006, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

186   Q 28 Back

187   Qq 136-37 Back

188   Ev 75 Back

189   "EU-India trade pact stumbles", Financial Times, 4 March 2007 Back

190   "EU's India trade pact draft omits WMD, rights", Reuters, 5 March 2007 Back

191   Q 51 Back

192   Q 50 [Price] Back

193   Q 50 [Dr Smith] Back

194   Q 51 [Roy-Chaudhury] Back

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Prepared 4 May 2007