Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fourth Report

4  SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

India, Pakistan and the question of Kashmir

100. There is great potential for trade between India and Pakistan if they can improve their relations. Like India, Pakistan has seen rapid economic growth over recent years, with GDP growth of 8.6% in 2005.[195] Dr Charu Lata Hogg described trade between Pakistan and India as "promising" and noted that;

Bilateral trade has increased from $157 million in 1997-98 to $343 million by March 2004."[196]

When we crossed via Wagah from Amritsar in India to Lahore in Pakistan we witnessed queues of lorries waiting to unload goods onto lorries on the other side of the border and hundreds of Indian bearers carrying sacks of onions on their heads walking to Pakistan, while hundreds of Pakistanis carried boxes of Afghan dried fruit in the other direction. As we have already discussed, there is a big potential for gas pipelines through Pakistan to India. However, because India and Pakistan's relations are dominated by the unresolved question of Kashmir, there is at present only limited trade between these two nations. Dr Charu Lata Hogg wrote:

The dispute over Kashmir is central to India's foreign policy concerns and draws on much of its diplomatic energy and resources.[197]

101. The dispute has also had an impact on the UK, not least because of its impact on community relations in British cities where conflicts originating in the subcontinent can be a factor in local politics. In addition witnesses told us that in the past terrorist training camps might have trained British Kashmiris.[198] M J Gohel told us that it was through such experience that some had ended up "as the new generation of recruits for al-Qa'ida and the global jihad movement".[199] The Foreign Secretary said:

Increasingly across the world, we are seeing a process of informal relationships among a whole variety of groups that might have originated in a particular regional dispute but are now looking more widely. With regard to the disputes that have arisen in that particular area, there has always been the possibility that they may have some resonances here.[200]

102. Kashmir is also critical to security in the region. As recently as 2002, India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, came very close to war. At the time, the then Foreign Secretary Rt Hon Jack Straw MP told the House:

"Intense diplomatic efforts and decisions made in recent days by the Governments of India and Pakistan give grounds for some optimism, and tensions have eased a little. None the less, with 1 million men under arms on either side of the line of control in a high state of readiness, the risks of a conflict remain significant. As both countries are in possession of nuclear weapons, the potential consequences for the region and for the wider world are devastating."[201]

Background

103. The current "Kashmir question" originated when India and Pakistan obtained their independence from the UK in August 1947. Partition gave the autonomous rulers of the different states the choice to join India or Pakistan, given their state's geographical position and the religion of their inhabitants. The Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, was a Hindu. However, the majority of the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir were Muslims. Maharajah Hari Singh prevaricated, but his hand was eventually forced when in October 1947 Pashtun tribesmen, supported by Pakistani government officials, raided across his borders. Hari Singh then agreed that Jammu and Kashmir would join India.[202] Nehru, who was himself a Kashmiri Pandit, also despatched troops into Kashmir that month, although whether India did so before or after the Instrument of Accession was signed is hotly disputed.[203] The first India-Pakistan conflict in October 1947 left two thirds of the state under Indian control, including the majority Muslim Kashmir valley as well as Hindu Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh.

104. In January 1948 India referred the question of Kashmir to the United Nations. Various UN proposals endorsed the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir, but India and Pakistan could not agree on the prerequisites for such a vote.[204] Fighting continued between India and Pakistan throughout 1948, until a ceasefire came into effect on 1 January 1949, which divided Kashmir by the ceasefire line.

105. In 1965 India and Pakistan battled again over Kashmir, after which they agreed a ceasefire line identical to the 1949 position.[205] In 1971 India's provision of military support to Bengali secessionists in the war for independence of East Pakistan triggered another conflict. After the war the then Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zilfikar Ali Bhutto signed the 1972 Simla agreement, which included a provision to rename the ceasefire line the Line of Control.[206] In 1984 India and Pakistan fought over the Siachen Glacier, an area so geographically hostile that it had not been defined on the Line of Control, and in 1999 the two armies clashed at Kargil, after Pakistani troops crossed the Line of Control there. In the summer of 2002, the two nations almost went to war again following an escalation of tensions.

106. A ceasefire along the Line of Control was agreed in November 2003. However, the FCO stated:

The situation in Kashmir continues to be of concern. Cross-Line of Control terrorist groups continue to operate in Indian-administered Kashmir, and there are almost daily attacks.[207]

107. The map below shows the disputed area of Kashmir. The two nations also dispute their border between Pakistan's southern Sindh province and India's state of Gujarat along an esturine creek known as Sir Creek.

Map of the Disputed Area of Kashmir

Source: United Nations Cartographic Section

Indian and Pakistani positions

108. Since 1947, India's position has been that the accession of Kashmir to India was legal and final.[208] India takes the Simla agreement to be the basis of its relations with Pakistan and contends that the UN resolutions are obsolete.[209] It rejects any plebiscite in Kashmir, arguing that the withdrawal of Pakistani troops was a prerequisite and never occurred.[210] India has also pointed to the autonomy enjoyed by Kashmir under the Constitution of India.[211]

109. Pakistan's traditional position is that Kashmir should be governed from Islamabad because of its majority Muslim population.[212] Pakistan does not accept that the Simla agreement supercedes the UN resolutions. In the past it called repeatedly for India to hold a plebiscite. Professor Sumantra Bose, Professor of International and Comparative Politics, London School of Economics, explained that this did not include an independent or sovereign Kashmir as an option:

The Pakistani sponsorship of the plebiscite is very legalistic […] The Pakistani understanding of the plebiscite has always been that it should be limited to two options: India or Pakistan, the two sovereign states.[213]

110. However, Professor Bose, told us that both the Indian and Pakistani governments had shifted from these traditional positions. On the Indian position he explained that:

[t]he Indian stance on Kashmir is characterised by some ambivalence […] for the home audience in India, Indian officials tend to emphasise that Kashmir, including the 'Pakistani-occupied' portion of Kashmir, is an integral part of India, with the obvious implication that the matter is settled […] On the other hand, for the international audience Indian leaders do say that there is a bilateral dispute with Pakistan, in which case the matter is not settled. A second dimension of ambivalence is involved, in that India still formally lays claim to the Pakistani-controlled part of Jammu and Kashmir; but at the same time, for the last 50 years […] Indian leaderships have both privately and publicly made it known that their first preference would be the conversion of the line of control in Kashmir into the formal international border with Pakistan.[214]

111. On the Pakistani side, Professor Bose told us that in 2004 President Musharraf had accepted that the plebiscite was obsolete and that an alternative solution had to be found.[215] Since then President Musharraf has gone further, outlining an idea for a solution with four elements:

First, identify the geographic regions of Kashmir that need resolution. At present, the Pakistani part is divided into two regions: the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir. The Indian part is divided into three regions: Jammu, Srinagar, and Ladakh. Are all these on the table for discussion or are there ethnic, political, and strategic considerations dictating some give and take?

Second, demilitarise the identified region or regions and curb all militant aspects of the struggle for freedom. This will give comfort to the Kashmiris, who are fed up with the fighting and killing on both sides.

Third, introduce self-governance or self-rule in the identified region or regions. Let the Kashmiris have the satisfaction of running their own affairs without having an international character and remaining short of independence.

Fourth, and most important, have a joint management mechanism with a membership consisting of Pakistanis, Indians and Kashmiris overseeing self-governance and dealing with residual subjects common to all identified regions and those subjects that are beyond the scope of self governance.[216]

Independence movements

112. The question of Kashmir is further complicated by calls for Kashmiri independence by some groups in Kashmir and abroad. Following the discredited elections of 1987, in 1989 an indigenous uprising against Indian rule started, led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and supported by Pakistan.[217] Other groups fighting for independence emerged in the 1990s, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.[218] At present, groups calling for independence represent a range of opinions, from extremists to the moderate wing of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a loose grouping of Kashmiri political parties opposed to Indian rule.

113. However, independence is not supported by all the inhabitants of Kashmir.[219] About one-third of the 10 million population in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir is Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh.[220] Professor Bose told us:

It is important to understand that the pro-independence sentiment is as much the preserve of an ethno-linguistic community as anything else. It is to do with the sense of Kashmiri culture, history and tradition that revolves around the Kashmir valley.

Obviously, the Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists of Indian-controlled Kashmir want no part in pro-independence activity. However, pro-independence appeals also largely fall on deaf ears among Muslims in Indian-controlled Kashmir who are not Kashmiri-speaking and part of the cultural orbit of Kashmiriness.[221]

114. Victoria Schofield, journalist and author of "Kashmir in the Crossfire", added that it was difficult to assess the level of support for the independence movements:

The problem is that, because of the way the elections are set up, those people will not contest any elections controlled by the Indian Government, so it is very difficult to understand what body of public opinion is behind them.[222]

115. Calls for independence in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir ["Azad Kashmir"] are strongest in Mirpur. However, Professor Bose told us, that there were significantly more independence supporters on the Indian side than on the Pakistani side.[223] Ms Schofield told us that in 1990, it had been a "major political movement" but that now it was:

a completely different genre of revolt […]While they grumble about their rights and the manipulation of the elections, they do not really think that their situation will change. They see essentially the importance of the Mangla dam and Pakistan will not give up on that, no more than it will give up on Northern Areas with the Karakoram highway. The most that they feel that they can push for is compensation when the level of the Mangla dam rises or falls. It really is not a movement that is comparable with the valley movement.[224]

116. Witnesses explained that pro-independence Kashmiris were not always clear about their aims.[225] Dr Nelson told us:

the relationship between the ideal of independence, as a rhetorical and political story, and the practicalities of a movement for independence and what that would mean in negotiations in Kashmir are somewhat different things.[226]

He added:

For example, people in Azad Kashmir who appear to favour independence have been asked what they might mean by that. At that point, the notion of a separate Kashmir raises questions about, for example, crossing a border between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad and they will say, 'Oh, I do not mean independence in that sense, because how would I go to work in Rawalpindi, or how would I visit my sister in Islamabad? Would I need a visa for that?'[227]

117. On the objective of a vote on self-determination, Dr Price told us that there were many potential difficulties. For example, there was an issue over whether the many Pandits (Hindu Kashmiris) who had left should be given a vote.[228] Dr Nelson pointed out that Mirpuris and Kashmiris from the Valley would have very different views about what a solution might look like.[229] Ms Schofield commented:

It is now a movement of dissent. […] Increasingly, […] independence is an idealistic idea […] Even some of the pro-independence Kashmiris are suggesting that what they mean by that is good governance.[230]

Professor Bose added that the movement was very factionalised with inept leadership and weak organisation.[231]

118. We asked witnesses about the extent to which the insurgency had become an international and Islamist movement rather than a localised struggle. Ms Schofield, responded:

It is a development that really occurred even before the insurgency began, when the Muslim United Front, the group of political parties that contested the […1987 elections in Indian-administered Kashmir], was formed […]. It is a known fact that those elections were rigged and the MUF was not able to get its candidates elected. […] That is where there was more Islamic identification of the political movement. Because it was the MUF it was able to speak from the mosques.

If you speak to the JKLF now it says, 'No, we are a Kashmiri movement and we want the Hindus back, we want the Sikhs to stay, we want everybody. It is for our independence.' It very much tries to make clear that […it] is not a Muslim movement at all. From the outside, you get more identification of it being a Muslim movement, but it does not have the extremism and radicalism that we see in other Islamic movements. That was never part of Kashmir's make-up. It had a far more Sufistic, softer face of Islam. [U]nfortunately, as the movement was radicalised with more militants coming from Pakistan and the remnants of the Afghan jihad moving over, the speech and appearance of certain elements seemed more Islamic. However, […] the actual, genuine independence movement is more of a Kashmiri one.[232]

Professor Bose told us:

There are two current factors. First, a lot of people in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in the insurgency-affected areas, feel that they have been abused because they are Muslims by a state—India—that although it might not be a Hindu state, none the less is largely led and run by non-Muslims and whose personnel on the ground in Kashmir, in particular the security forces, are predominantly non-Muslim also. […]

Current factor No. 2 is that of course this feeling that has developed since the insurgency really took off in 1990 is very much fed and stoked by Pakistani sources and most of all by the groups of so-called Jihadist orientation which see the armed struggle in Kashmir specifically as a struggle to liberate a Muslim land and people from alien, infidel occupation.[233]

119. We also heard that the Kashmiri diaspora in the UK might not always reflect views on the ground. [234] Ms Schofield told us:

The diaspora is a very vocal body that I think has formed many opinions in Britain. The fact is that a lot of the diaspora are not from the valley at all. They are from Mirpur.

[…] There has been friction between the two groups […] On one hand, the [valley Kashmiris] are grateful that the [Mirpuris] have raised international awareness of the Kashmir issue, but on the other they are slightly irritated that the Mirpuris have been putting it about that they suffered. […] it is the valley Kashmiris who feel that they have suffered. It is arguable that if the state were put back together again, there would be a row between the Mirpuris and the Kashmiris, who do not speak the same language. Isolated from the ground realities, the [Mirpuris] have been much harder on their objectives for an independent Kashmir.[235]

Dr Price commented:

Last time I was in Srinagar, what came across was the phrase, 'We want them to leave us alone.' That referred to the militants as much as anyone else. There is tiredness of the conflict, which might not always be reflected by people abiding in the UK or the militants themselves.[236]

The peace process

120. In April 2003 the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf took the peace process forward with a series of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) including the opening of a bus route between the two sides of Kashmir. India restored full diplomatic links with Pakistan in May 2003. A militant attack in October 2003 on Kashmir's Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's residence failed to throw the rapprochement off course. In January 2004 President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee announced the beginning of a "composite dialogue", aimed at resolving disputes, including Kashmir.[237]

121. In our July 2004 Report into "Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism" we wrote that it was "encouraging" that the relationship that had been developed between Musharraf and Vajpajee had been transferred to the new Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.[238] Developments under the Congress-led coalition in India have included a Second Round Table conference between Prime Minister Singh and Kashmiri interlocutors, although excluding the All Party Hurriyat Conference owing to its internal fissures, and talks on the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir and Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch in May 2006 with Pakistan. In September 2006 Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf agreed to take a series of measures to promote peace, including the establishment of a Joint Control Commission to tackle terrorism in Kashmir. Both sides have also agreed to re-affirm the Indus Water Treaty, to jointly survey the boundary pillars at Sir Creek, to set up a nuclear hot line, and to upgrade an existing hotline between India and Pakistan's senior military officers. [239]

122. We asked witnesses about the extent to which a solution was being pursued behind closed doors. In response, Dr Nelson, commented that if backchannels were to produce an agreement it would be "difficult to make public and bring forward".[240]We also questioned witnesses about the likelihood of a quick resolution. Ms Schofield said that she thought this was unlikely. Rather, the process would "just continue ticking over".[241] She added:

In a way, it would almost be dangerous if there were [a speedy resolution], because if it were too dramatic, it could be quickly reversed.[242]

123. Ms Schofield and Charu Lata Hogg suggested that the dispute over the Siachen Glacier might be resolved more quickly,[243] but Professor Bose said that there had been "no definite forward movement on the issue of Siachen" and that there was "no sign of a resolution to that in sight".[244] Dr Nelson said that even if it were resolved it would not necessarily lead to a broader agreement.[245]

124. Professor Bose suggested that there were two main obstacles to peace:

The Indian preference is to drag out the peace process as much as possible. By contrast, the Pakistanis are eager for swift results. There is a chance of Pakistani restlessness and impatience piling up and leading to a loss of faith in the peace process as a whole. The second problem […] is that the substantive positions on what a solution to the Kashmir dispute would look like are very far apart. For example, Musharraf keeps talking about what would amount to a joint India-Pakistan condominium of Kashmir, an idea that has been around for the past 50-plus years. That implies a direct Pakistani role in what is today Indian-controlled Kashmir, and that is unacceptable to the Indians.[246]

125. Dr Price told us:

the danger of focusing on proposals is in thinking that there is a magic solution out there. A large part of the issue with Kashmir is the process, and there is a positive process going on.[247]

He also warned:

Do not have the idea that we are on a steady path to peace—it is far from unfeasible that the situation on Kashmir could deteriorate.[248]

126. We asked witnesses about the link between Pakistan's domestic politics and the peace process. The argument has been put forward that Pakistan's army and its Inter Service Intelligence agency (ISI) do not want progress on the peace process because Kashmir bolsters their position within Pakistan.[249] However, Dr Nelson and Dr Price denied that Pakistan's military establishment was using Kashmir as source of legitimacy.[250]

127. Nevertheless witnesses pointed out that the Pakistani leadership faced difficulties in negotiating with India. Professor Bose commented:

Kashmir has been Pakistan's secret national cause since 1947, and there is a wide and prevalent irredentist view about it among the elites and the masses in Pakistan. At the same time it has become increasingly clear that an indefinite conflict or indefinite state of confrontation with India over the Kashmir issue is not a serious strategic option for Pakistan. Pakistan is caught in a bit of a cleft stick.[251]

Ms Schofield told us:

It is clearly a running sore […] It costs a lot of money and in a way means that Pakistan cannot get on with its life and relations in South Asia. It is a logical area to move forward on. But large segments of Pakistani society have an emotional attachment, and in a way it is a vicious circle, because the Government plays to those emotional attachments. Their domestic community is expecting something more on Kashmir than merely giving up after 60 years and accepting what they refused to accept in 1948-49. In other words, the line of control as the international frontier, which makes it very difficult for any Government.[252]

However, Ms Schofield felt that the younger generation would be more likely to accept some compromise with India. [253]

128. In light of the forthcoming elections in Pakistan, we asked how important President Musharraf was to the peace process. Ms Schofield told us, "President Musharraf has made some remarkable progress […] He is determined that it is in Pakistan's interest to resolve the issue".[254] She believed that the orthodox lobby opposed to the peace process was not likely to "hold much sway" in the elections, but warned:

the danger is that a very discontented member of the lobby manages to get to Musharraf before or immediately after the elections and the whole apple cart is upset.[255]

President Musharraf has already upset religious hardliners by pushing through legislation to take rape out of the controversial Hudood Ordinance, based on Sharia law, and into the Pakistani Penal Code.[256] In March 2007, President Musharraf faced one of the biggest challenges to his rule when his suspension of Pakistan's Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, provoked powerful protests from lawyers. These protests were continuing at the time this Report was agreed.[257]

129. Dr Nelson argued:

Certainly, when it comes to Musharraf's role in the process, my sense is that he is quite influential, but he is not the only possible spokesperson from Pakistan.[258]

Dr Price reminded us:

People in India said the same thing about Vajpayee. […] Now, Manmohan Singh has come to power, but the process has continued in a similar vein.[259]

130. On the question of Kashmiris' participation in the peace process, witnesses argued that Kashmiris had not been sufficiently involved.[260] However we learnt that separatists faced difficulties in participation. Ms Schofield told us:

The assassination of Professor Abdul Ghani Lone was a clear indication that, when there is recognition that we actually do have to talk to the Indian Government, one loses one of one's nine lives pretty quickly. That fear always exists among the All Party Hurriyat Conference that, if they look like they are too close to negotiating with the Indian Government, they will not survive.[261]

Dr Nelson asked, "who would the Kashmiri spokesperson be?".[262]

Joint cooperation against terrorism

131. In September 2006 Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf agreed to establish a Joint Control Commission to tackle terrorism in Kashmir. India and Pakistan have also agreed to convene a joint anti-terrorism panel. After a meeting between Pranab Mukherjee, Indian foreign minister, and Pakistani leaders on 13 January, officials said that this new panel would help to expedite communications in times of crisis, particularly after terrorist attacks.[263]

132. The FCO explained that:

[i]n recent times Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)—have conducted attacks in both India and Pakistan. […]

Recent attacks in India include the Delhi bombs (29 October 2005) with around 60 fatalities; an attack on a police Special Task Force station in Hyderabad; shootings at an Indian Institute of Science conference in Bangalore (28 December 2005, one dead); the Varanasi bombings (7 March 2006); the Mumbai bombings (11 July 2006 nearly 300 killed); and the bomb attacks in Malegaon (8 September 2006, at least 30 killed).[264]

We also received evidence that, following the 2005 earthquake, terrorist organisations had used relief operations as a means of building support.[265] On 19 February 2007 another terrorist incident hit the headlines. A bomb had exploded on a train travelling from New Delhi to Lahore, leaving 66 dead.[266] Despite this attack, the Indian and Pakistani governments went ahead with their Joint Commission meeting two days later.

133. There has, however, been criticism of the initiatives for cooperation against terrorism. Two statements in particular proved controversial in India, one by the Prime Ministers saying that the fact "is that terror is a threat to Pakistan. And it has been a threat to India. We need to have a collective mechanism to deal with it," and a second by the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan and Foreign Secretary designate Menon stating: "We must drive a distinction between terrorist elements in Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism." Critics claimed that these statements amounted to an exoneration of Pakistani policy and of the complicity of its government in attacks on India.[267] However, Dr Price told us that it was "worth asking about the extent to which that was political point scoring."[268]

134. Following the bombings in Mumbai, police there made statements that Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence agency (ISI) played a role in support of LeT and the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in planning the July bombings.[269] Witnesses told us that Pakistan had supported the insurgency movement in Indian-administered Kashmir. Ms Schofield argued:

clearly there has been sustenance and support [of the insurgency] to such an extent that a lot of the local Kashmiris complain that it has been taken over by Pakistan.[270]

135. Professor Bose commented:

it is difficult to deny the claims of the Indian military and the Indian diplomatic establishment that the Pakistan military have for a long time—since at least 1987—been up to their neck, or even their eyes, in supporting and even sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir. […] It is clear that, given the sophistication and quantity of weapons and equipment that insurgent groups have, their high calibre of training, and signs of logistical support from across the line of control, a professional military establishment has been at work in supporting insurgents.[271]

However, witnesses suggested that such support was now far weaker than it had been in the past. Dr Price told us:

There has certainly been a big change from five or 10 years ago, when links were much stronger.[272]

Professor Bose commented:

Pakistan's support for insurgency in Kashmir is like a tap that is sometimes turned on full blast and at other times is reduced to a trickle. To the best of my knowledge, it has never been entirely shut off, but the speed and velocity has been modulated over the years. Over the past three years, direct and active support by the Pakistani military has been reduced to more or less a trickle following the 1999 and 2002 crises.[273]

136. Dr Nelson told us there was a danger that terrorist incidents could increase because of this reduction in Pakistan's support:

recent evidence suggests that many of the jihadi organizations once supported by Musharraf—organizations now increasingly neglected in the context of a wider strategic shift away from clandestine activities in Kashmir towards clandestine activities in Afghanistan (for example, organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad, now known as Jama'at or Tanzeem-ul-Furqan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, now known as Jama'at-ud-Dawa)—[…] are likely to become even more aggressive as they begin to feel themselves crowded out or threatened with strategic (and financial) abandonment.[274]

Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

137. Initially, India reacted to the insurgency in Kashmir by increasing its military presence and introducing direct rule from Delhi. India's reaction through its paramilitary Special Operations Groups and other policing or military measures were much criticised for ignoring human rights concerns and using practices such as summary detention and torture.

138. Conditions have improved from the mid 1990s low.[275] Elections were held in 1996 and 2002. Since 2003 India has held talks with Kashmiri separatists such as the moderate wing of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), even allowing them to travel to Pakistan.[276]

139. However, the FCO stated:

Human rights violations by the security forces have reduced in recent years but are still a cause of concern.[277]

Amnesty International expressed concern that the National Human Rights Commission in India could not investigate human rights abuses by the army.[278]

140. India has established five Working Groups to consider ways to improve the situation in Kashmir, which include considering how to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and governance in Kashmir.[279]

141. At present, the Northern Areas of Kashmir controlled by the Pakistani government are a dependency administered by the federal government. In 2000 a Legislative Council was established, which has some legislative, administrative and judicial powers, including the ability to impose local taxes. Yet the new council has no real financial or legislative autonomy and when Pakistan voted in 2002, the Northern Areas remained outside the political process.[280]

UK involvement

142. In our July 2004 Report into "Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism" we recommended that the "Government encourage both parties to prioritise their work towards a resolution". [281]

143. We heard mixed views from witnesses about the extent to which the UK should get involved in the peace process. Ms Schofield and Dr Nelson argued that the Pakistani government would welcome Britain's involvement in the peace process, but only if Britain pushed Pakistan's position.[282] Ms Schofield told us the Indian government was "absolutely allergic to anything that smacks of third-party mediation." She believed Britain could only play a role in the humanitarian aspects of Kashmir by highlighting human rights abuses on all sides.[283] Dr Price commented:

One of the biggest things that we have seen recently is India's acceptance of the UN involvement in Nepal. So India is growing more accommodating towards multilateral intervention. At the moment, I do not think that that growing accommodation would extend towards Kashmir, whether it was intervention by the UN or another country. That is something that is changing on India's side, but we are not quite there yet, I think.[284]

144. Professor Bose disagreed. He believed Britain could play a wider role:

Britain is regarded as a relatively benign influence in the subcontinent, so there would not be any great opposition per se to Britain playing a greater role of some sort, as long as that role were played very discreetly and with the utmost attention to diplomacy.

Britain could play a constructive role as part of a broader, concerted, multilateral effort to push the India-Pakistan peace process along. […] I am fairly sure that without discreet but stronger international support for the India-Pakistan peace process, it will not yield dividends or results.[285]

Dr Smith also thought the UK could get involved in the peace process and argued that the UK was "still well thought of in the region".[286]

145. Dr Nelson believed that it was not appropriate for the UK to propose solutions. Instead he argued it could "facilitate and encourage dialogue".[287] Mr Roy-Chaudhury argued that there were two areas in which such facilitation could occur:

One, of course, is to ensure that the peace process becomes institutionalised. Today we have a situation where […t]alks are being held at different levels, but there could be a break, if there were a major disaster in either country. […] It would be useful to find out whether there are stakeholders in both India and Pakistan who could try to ensure that the dialogue remains on track, whatever the political relationship between the two countries, in which case the UK could play an important role in back channel diplomacy.

The second matter that could turn out to be substantial is something that both India and Pakistan have talked about […] Both President Musharraf and the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, have said that the future of Kashmir could lie in making the line of control irrelevant—[…] the UK could play a positive role in trying to flesh out what both countries mean.[288]

146. The FCO wrote:

As a close friend of both countries, we remain in regular contact with India and Pakistan, and we will continue to encourage both countries to seek a durable resolution to all the issues outstanding between them, including over Kashmir.[289]

The Foreign Secretary said that the UK Government was "encouraging and have always encouraged negotiation",[290] but that

[i]t is for the parties themselves to see what is the best ground on which they can reach agreement and find the best way forward. It might be the kiss of death for us to express a preference one way or the other.[291]

147. We welcome the recent Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir question and their cooperation against terrorism. We conclude that the UK should encourage India and Pakistan to make further progress on the peace process, but that the Government should not get directly involved in negotiations nor try to suggest solutions to the question of Kashmir, unless requested to do so by both India and Pakistan.

India, Pakistan and Afghanistan

148. The FCO noted, "[d]ifficulties in the India-Pakistan relationship can sometimes spill over into relations with Afghanistan."[292] Apart from the Taliban's five year rule, India has always had quite good relations with Afghanistan and it is now its largest regional donor.[293] Mr Griffin, journalist and author of "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan", told us that during the period the Taliban was in power in Afghanistan,

Afghanistan became associated very much with the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines jets flying into Kandahar and its association and support from the ISI made it look like simply another manifestation of Pakistan's unofficial policy of running proxy terrorist operational wars against India, whether in Kashmir or in the south, or against urban targets.[294]

He believed that to a large degree, India saw Afghanistan as "part of its security problem with Pakistan." It was therefore enthusiastic to become a "generous big brother to a new kind of democracy" there. However, it has avoided any involvement in developing Afghanistan's military capacity out of fear of antagonising Pakistan. [295]

149. Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the other hand, have a decades-old relationship of mistrust rooted in Afghanistan's claims to Pashtun-majority areas on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.[296] Pakistan gave critical help to the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s in an attempt to reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan[297] and it is now concerned about its loss of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban.[298] In 2003 the opening of several Indian consulates in Afghanistan became a bone of contention between Indian and Pakistan. Pakistan's government accused the consulates of carrying out terrorist activities, stating: "we are watching them with anxiety, with deep concern. […] they are there to disrupt relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan."[299] Pakistan has also been irritated by Indian companies winning construction contracts, such as that for the road from Kandahar to Spin Boldak, the Afghan town that borders the Pakistani town of Chaman.[300]

150. Afghanistan's President Karzai has repeatedly and publicly held Pakistan responsible for the current insurgency. However, the FCO commented:

Pakistani help is essential in combating the Taliban threat to Afghanistan, including to UK troops deployed there.[301]

In March 2007 Pakistani security forces announced the capture of Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, a senior Taliban leader, in Quetta.[302]

151. Pakistan's President Musharraf has strongly denied that either Pakistan's government or its Inter Service Intelligence agency (ISI) have given support to the Taliban.[303] Frédéric Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes that Pakistan is correct when it asserts that Afghanistan is trying to place some of the blame of its own failure to achieve stability on its neighbour, but that there is also clear evidence of Pakistan's role in the insurgency.[304] In January 2007 the US expressed frustration that Pakistan was not doing more to tackle Taliban militants within its borders.[305] The following month Vice President Dick Cheney warned Pakistan that the US could cut aid to the country if Pakistan did not increase efforts against the Taliban.[306]

152. Mr Griffin argued that Pakistan appeared to be practising a dual policy:

there seems always[…] to be a situation where, on the one hand, Pakistan is rooting out and shooting at incursionists and terrorists in Afghanistan, while another element of the Pakistani military-industrial base is encouraging, financing and training them.[307]

Dr Nelson agreed. He argued that the Pakistani government had distinguished between foreign al Qaeda miscreants and local Taliban sympathisers, assisting with the pursuit of the former while at the same time supporting, or at least failing to oppose, the Taliban resistance in Afghanistan. He argued that from the perspective of Pakistan "these distinctions make a great deal of sense: one side devoted to addressing the scourge of 'international' terrorism; the other devoted to preserving a sense of 'strategic depth' in the context of regional political affairs."[308]

153. Dr Nelson noted that commentators had stated that the Taliban could not be defeated militarily.[309] He argued that cross-border Pashtuns should be brought into a dialogue about the political situation:

it is […] important to understand the domestic politics within each country[…]. Both Governments have found that Pashtuns are an important constituency, and […] one aspect of Pashtun politics involves the Taliban. […] Some realism here would be helpful. […] I think that recognising the politics of the Taliban as opposed to simply its militancy, and separating the politics of the Taliban from the politics of al-Qaeda, can be fruitful in our thinking about the different configurations.[310]

154. A meeting President Bush hosted for the two leaders in September 2006 produced vague plans for tribal jirgas on both sides of the border.[311] These have not yet taken place, but they remain on the agenda.[312] The idea of a joint jirga is supported by the UK government as a means of reducing tensions in the border area.[313]

155. In Pakistan, President Musharraf has already held his own jirga in North Waziristan where an agreement was reached with local tribesmen which called upon them to expel foreign militants and end cross-border attacks in return for a reduced Pakistan army presence in the region. On this agreement, Dr Nelson commented:

militarily, that did not have the same impact in Afghanistan as Musharraf was promising in Washington that it would, although it has probably reduced the stress on the Pakistani military, which I believe had as many as 70,000 forces in north and south Waziristan at one point, so there have not been quite as many attacks on Pakistan.[314]

156. A military-to-military tripartite commission of senior military and diplomatic representatives of the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan has been formed. In June 2006, General Richards, the then British Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), also participated. The Foreign Secretary told us that there was some evidence to suggest that this military-to-military Commission was improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[315]

157. We asked witnesses about the prospects for an improved situation in Afghanistan. Mr Griffin, made the assessment that the Taliban were now "a much more professional fighting force", in terms of planning, flows of funding, training and military technique and warned that they had the potential to become more successful against air bombs if they coordinated attacks.[316] He believed the situation was "going to get worse before it gets better".[317]

158. Dr Price told us:

A lot of international aid and assistance has been given to Afghanistan, but the benefits have been rarely seen by the average Afghan. […] So there is the assumption of widespread corruption within the Afghan Government, which is creating disillusionment, and a much more profitable arena for the opposition—primarily the Taliban—to operate in.[318]

159. Antony Stokes, the Head of the Afghan Group at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office told us that there was a "momentum to try to generate some mutually beneficial relationships in the economic sphere" between the three countries, such as trade, oil pipelines and water-sharing.[319] He pointed out that, for example, there had been discussions about creating a regime of international transport routes so that goods would not have to be unloaded from one lorry and then loaded on to another at borders.[320] Afghanistan has also recently joined the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), which has a commitment to create a free trade area in the region.

160. We recommend that the Government continue to urge the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to take steps to improve security on their border.

Sino-Indian relations

161. India and China still dispute a large swathe of territory, Aksai Chin, captured from India by China in the 1962 war between the two nations. This area is very barren but strategically important for the Chinese as it joins Xinjiang to Tibet.[321] India also disputes Pakistan's 1963 border agreement with China, in which China handed over parts of Kashmir under its control to China. Mr Roy-Chaudhury and Dr Smith told us that the war was still remembered in India, which had performed very badly in the conflict.[322] However, Mr Roy-Chaudhury argued that a quick resolution to the boundary dispute was not crucial:

[…] the key is that for both India and China, the sense is that the territorial dispute will continue but it is important to put a political perspective on it. So the border dispute is not expected to hamper the other aspects of the relationship between India and China, whether trade, diplomatic or political.[323]

162. Witnesses told us that relations between India and China were "a mixed bag".[324] Political ties between China and India are deepening. In April 2005, during the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to India, the two nations signed an agreement for a "strategic partnership for peace and prosperity", which included an Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question.[325] In 2005 China formally recognised the border state of Sikkim as part of India,[326] and in May 2006 a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries' defence ministers. These events were a remarkable turnaround given that as late as 1998, India had given concerns over China's nuclear weapons as a reason for its nuclear tests.[327]

163. A key reason for the lowering of Sino-Indian tensions is the state of the two nations' economic relations. Trade is booming between the two giants—China is India's second largest trading partner and is expected to overtake the US as India's largest trading partner within five years.[328] Both recognise the potential in each other's growing markets. During President Hu Jintao visit to India in November 2006, the first visit by a Chinese head of state to India for ten years, the two nations agreed to try to double their levels of trade to $40billion a year by 2010.[329]

164. However, Dr Price suggested that trade might not drive good relations in the future to the extent being expected:

In the past few years, trade between India and China has soared, but most of that consists of Indian iron ore meeting China's needs. In the first six months of this year, India's trade to China dropped […] It is too early to say, but the assumption had been that India's exports to China would carry on growing at 30 or 40%, and that that would put everything else into the background. Now that has stopped; a couple of weeks ago India passed a new law to screen investments from China, which made it more difficult for Chinese companies to invest in a lot of sectors. It might be that an approach emerges that is far from hostile but more sceptical.[330]

165. Federico Bordonaro told us that another challenge to India's relationship with China would be "China's thirst for energy".[331] India is seeking oil in many of the same places as China, such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Africa, and has lost some contracts to Chinese competitors. For example, in August 2005 the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) beat a bid by an Indian consortium, Oil and National Gas Corporation(ONGC)-Mittal, to buy PetroKazakhstan[332] and in October 2005 China won an exploration deal in Angola, despite an initial agreement between Shell and ONGC's overseas arm, because Angola's national oil company wanted the stake to go to Chinese oil companies.[333] However, dialogues on managing energy competition have taken place between India and China and the two nations signed an agreement on co-operating on securing crude oil in January 2006.[334] In the same month the ONGC and the CNPC made a successful joint bid for a stake in a Syrian oil field. [335]

166. There are concerns in the Indian establishment about China's military and naval prowess and fears that Beijing practices containment against India by backing Pakistan's nuclear capacity and in its relations with Sri Lanka, Burma and Nepal.[336] Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Liang-Chi Russell Hsiao told us that India was "growing wary" of China's access to the Indian Ocean.[337] Federico Bordonaro argued that the main motivation for the $8.13 billion invested by India into Project Seabird, which involved the creation of an air force station, a naval armament depot, and missile silos and the building of a major naval base, INS Kadamba in Karwar, Karnataka state, was increased Sino-Pakistani co-operation:

faced with geographic constraints, the Chinese successfully proposed to Islamabad in 2001 the sharing of the Gwadar naval base. This latter serves the Chinese purposes in three ways: first, it serves as a tool to secure Beijing's access to the Gulf's resources; second, it is a useful military base to counter Washington's influence in Central and South Asia (in fact, the Sino-Pakistani agreement came into being just four months after U.S. troops entered Kabul in 2001); third, Gwadar functions as an excellent wedge between India and the Middle East and as an offset against India's naval power.[338]

At the same time, India is strengthening its relations with Taiwan.[339] There was also very strong critical domestic reaction in China to the US-Indo nuclear deal.[340]

167. The FCO wrote that:

Relations between India and China matter to the UK at economic, military and strategic levels. How these two countries get along together will have an impact on the wider world for many years to come.[341]

We agree.

168. Good relations between China and India are going to be very important to the international community in the future. We recommend that the Government welcomes areas of cooperation between India and China and encourages even closer relations between the two nations in the future.

Sri Lanka

169. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been waging a violent campaign in Sri Lanka over the last 20 years to try to achieve a separate state or at least federal devolution in the north and north-east of the country. Violence has increased greatly over the last year; although so far neither party has renounced the 2002 ceasefire, it appears dead in all but name.[342] The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. There were over 3000 deaths related to the conflict between February and November last year[343] and by 24 January this year there had already been 80 civilian deaths.[344] Dr Price told us that "the issue of child recruitment in Sri Lanka has been a major one".[345] In March 2007 tens of thousands of civilians fled for refugee camps following intensified fighting in east Sri Lanka.[346]

170. We were told in evidence that for the next few months levels of violence was likely to worsen.[347] The FCO wrote that:

The absence of a roadmap for a negotiated settlement is increasingly of concern—achieving broad political support in the South for a credible political offer to the Tamils will require a bold lead from President Rajapakse.[348]

However, Sri Lanka's president is in a dilemma- if he holds his army back and restarts negotiations with the LTTE he might alienate nationalists in the coalition government, but further military action risks chaos in Sri Lanka.[349] Dr Smith told us that one of the problems in Sri Lanka was that the bargaining power of the LTTE had not been recognised by the Sri Lankan government and the international community:

Effectively what […the LTTE] is being asked to do is go back to the situation before 1983 […] which of course the LTTE is never going to do […] when it also knows that it has broken the monopoly of force once controlled by the Sri Lankan Government.[350]

171. India has had talks with Norway, the formal facilitator in the peace process, about the situation in Sri Lanka, and has called on the Sri Lankan President to end the killing of Tamil civilians and set out his vision of devolution.[351] However, India prefers to leave the direct role in conflict resolution to Norway,[352] despite requests from the Sri Lankan president for it to play a greater role in the peace process. [353] India had a peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990,[354] but had its fingers badly burnt by its intervention, not least through the assassination of the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber in 1991.[355] Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi, is leader of the ruling Congress party.[356] India has a 60 million strong Tamil population. Mainly based in Tamil Nadu, the Tamil community in India are larger than that in Sri Lanka.[357] Tamil Nadu's ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party is a key member of the national coalition government.[358] India has been affected by the large number of Sri Lankan refugees that have moved back to India as a result of the renewed fighting.[359]

172. We asked Dr Smith what the extent of Indian involvement in Sri Lanka should be. He replied:

The best thing that can be said to the Indians about Sri Lanka is, 'Be constructive.' India is involved however you look at it […] because it is the hegemon in the region and because it does not want outsiders such as China and the United States […] messing around in the south Asian back yard. […]

Let me give you an idea of how that works in practice. Several years ago, when the Sri Lankan Government was worried that troops might need to be air lifted from the high security zone in the north, the obvious candidate—which it immediately approached—was the United States. The United States said, 'Talk to India.' The message for India was that it could not have it both ways—if it were to play a major regional role, it had to overcome the problems that it had had and the mistakes that it had made, and to move forward rather than looking back all the time.[360]

He added:

India […] could play a constructive role by dealing with the practical political issues on the ground, which I think have been overlooked or ignored by the international community. We know the international community has problems when it comes to looking at partition, confederation and so on.[361]

173. Dr Price pointed to the Indian evacuation of Sri Lankan and Nepalese citizens from Lebanon as an example where it had used its hegemonic status "very beneficially".[362] He commented:

My opinion is that the links between Tamils in southern India and Tamils in Sri Lanka is a justification for not getting involved rather than something real. There are a couple of Tamil parties that make speeches about the LTTE, or Tamils in general, but they are not particularly mainstream.[363]

Mr Roy-Chaudhury suggested that India should be urged to consult with other major powers on Sri Lanka.[364]

174. During our visit to Chennai, we heard a range of views on what the UK's involvement in Sri Lanka should be. Some Indian commentators believed that the UK should become more involved, but many warned that the UK should not interfere in Sri Lanka as it would not understand the nuances of the conflict. We asked witnesses in the UK about this. Dr Price suggested that the UK could play a specific role and gave the example of policing.[365]

175. The FCO praised Norway's work so far.[366] The Foreign Secretary told us:

[…]we are continuing to use whatever channels we have to encourage people in Sri Lanka to return to and concentrate on a potential peace process.[367]

She explained that Rt Hon Paul Murphy MP, the former Northern Ireland Secretary, and others with experience of the Northern Ireland peace process had been to India to share their expertise.[368] Rt Hon Ian McCartney MP, the Minister with responsibility for human rights in the FCO, reiterated the UK's concerns in a meeting on 10 January with his Sri Lankan counterpart and Gareth Thomas MP, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Development, has raised these issues with the visiting Minister.[369] Paul Murphy has also travelled to Sri Lanka to share his experience of the Northern Ireland peace process.[370] However, the LTTE is now a proscribed organisation in the UK[371] and on the EU list of terrorist organisations. Antony Stokes told us that the FCO was working closely with the Home Office and police to clamp down any fund-raising activity in the UK.[372]

176. We are very concerned about the situation in Sri Lanka. We recommend that the Government urge India and the international community to take a stronger lead in pushing for peace.

Bangladesh

177. Despite India's historic role in the creation of Bangladesh, relations between the two nations have always been difficult.[373] Dr Price explained to us that this was largely due to the internal politics of Bangladesh,[374] a country in which democracy had not yet bedded down:

Bangladesh has democracy in the sense that it has elections, but in terms of accepting the results of elections, each party that has lost has taken to protesting in the streets from the mid-1990s onwards. […I]n terms of the wider issue of rights and so forth democracy has a long way to go to be entrenched in Bangladesh.[375]

The International Bangladesh Foundation expressed similar concerns. It explained that thousands of activists were in detention without trial and argued that Bangladeshi minorities were being subjected to an "endless State sponsored campaign of religious and ethnic cleansing".[376]

178. The return to power of the "anti-Indian" [377] Bangladesh National Party (BNP) in coalition with Islamist parties in 2001 led to a cooling of relations between India and Bangladesh. The FCO told us that India was:

concerned over the influence of the Islamist parties and by the rise of Islamism and terrorism in Bangladesh.[378]

In August 2005 there were 450 simultaneous bomb attacks in Bangladesh.[379] Federico Bordonaro wrote that Islamic radicalism would "continue to pose a threat to India's stability and to complicate Delhi's political relations with Bangladesh",[380] which has "developed Islamist networks".[381] India believes that Islamic military organisations, including al-Qaeda have structures in Bangladesh.[382]

179. Bangladesh has been in political turmoil over the last six months. The situation stemmed from concerns by the opposition party, the Awami League, that the caretaker administration was biased towards the ruling BNP. (In a unique constitutional arrangement introduced in 1996, Bangladesh has a system where an interim government takes power in the run up to an election). The Awami League said it would therefore boycott the polls and called for the elections to be delayed and voters' lists updated. There were hundreds of demonstrations, blockades and clashes.

180. The caretaker administration decided that it would hold elections in spite of the Awami League boycott threat. As a result it faced growing international pressure about the legitimacy of any such polls. The Foreign Secretary for example, called on the caretaker government and the Election Commission to create the right atmosphere and effective mechanisms required to bring all parties to participate in the elections.[383] On January 11, the United Nations, European Union and the Commonwealth suspended their election observation missions in Bangladesh.

181. These factors led to the resignation of the President of the caretaker government, President Iajuddin Ahmed, and a State of Emergency was declared on 11 January. The Awami League have now agreed to contest the elections under the new army-backed interim administration, led by Fakhruddin Ahmed.[384] A new party, the Nagorik Shakti (Citizen's Power) party, led by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel-prize-winning microfinancier, has now entered Bangladeshi politics, for long a two party affair.[385] Police in Bangladesh have now filed murder charges against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.[386]

182. Bangladesh's economy has performed well over the last decade, with GDP growth of over 5% per year—6% in 2005/06.[387] However, Dr Price warned that Bangladesh was

coming to a position where the political situation is starting to impact. A small example is the power projects that take more than five years. The parties alternate each time there is an election, so as soon as the new Government come in, they scrap previous power projects because it is assumed that they must have been corrupt, so they start their own ones. Now it is getting to the point where power shortages are becoming more and more of an issue. That is a direct way in which the political situation is starting to impact on the economy.[388]

There are also concerns that if problems continue, violent militants Islamist fringe groups, such as the Jagrata Muslim Janata and the Jamaat-ul-Muhajideen, who are opposed to the country's secular liberal tradition, will benefit.[389]

183. We asked witnesses about the impact of Bangladesh's political problems in the wider region. The Foreign Secretary commented:

I think that there is general concern, because there is a recognition that any failed state always has an impact on its neighbours and on stability in the region.[390]

184. However, Dr Charu Lata Hogg told us that India viewed Bangladesh "as more of an irritant than a threat".[391] Dr Price told us that the impact was currently confined to Bangladesh, but that India had "concerns that it could spill over".[392] One of these was the potential for a larger influx of refugees into Northeast India. Large scale illegal immigration has been a continuous source of tension between the two countries..[393] New Delhi claims that about 20 million Bangladeshis are living illegally in India and should be repatriated, an allegation Dhaka denies.[394] The FCO told us that 12 million was not an unrealistic figure.[395] India is building an eight-foot security fence along the 4,000km border with Bangladesh.

185. Another area where the situation in Bangladesh might affect the region more broadly is in gas. Dr Price told us:

The complete lack of empathy between the two main parties, and in particular the leaders of the two main parties in Bangladesh, […] is a big factor that holds back Bangladesh and the export of its gas.[396]

Dr Price also pointed out that the problems in Bangladesh posed a particular threat to "north-east India, which is cut off apart from a small chicken neck, so it cannot trade with other parts of India so well." [397]

186. In a written answer in January the FCO said that the UK is "monitoring developments closely", "broadly welcomes the opportunity for conditions to be established which are conducive to credible and participative elections" and "urges that the full processes of democracy and civil rights be restored to the Bangladeshi people promptly".[398]

187. We asked witnesses when they believed the postponed elections would be likely to be held. Dr Price told us that it was likely to "be a while".[399] Antony Stokes told the Committee that:

There has been no public statement on that, nor have we had a firm commitment from the caretaker Government privately, but we have been encouraging them to consider committing to an electoral process that will allow for elections quickly.[400]

188. We asked the Foreign Secretary whether the Commonwealth could play a role in the situation. She replied:

As for whether there is anything specific that the Commonwealth can do to help, I am quite sure that that is something that the Commonwealth Secretariat is looking at as we speak, but it depends a little bit on how things go in the near future. The existing interim Government are saying all the right things about tackling corruption and the need to improve the electoral process, electoral commission and so on. Obviously, they have only been in power for a few days, so one must hope that they will follow through on those ideas.[401]

189. We recommend that the Government continues to monitor closely the situation in Bangladesh and that it consider a possible role for Commonwealth mediation or other assistance to help establish a stable democratic process.

Nepal

190. The situation in Nepal is now far more positive. Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us that Nepal was now entering "a key period in Nepal's history, where there is a prospect of an end to the insurgency".[402] This period of instability began in February 1996 when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) led a "People's War", which resulted in about 13000 deaths.[403] The insurgency progressively intruded on the middle ground occupied by parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. The House of Representatives was dissolved in May 2002 and elections to local government bodies cancelled in August 2002. In October 2002 King Gyanendra deposed the government, giving as a reason the government's inability to conduct general elections. He subsequently appointed three different governments, and on 1 February 2005 took permanent executive control. [404]

191. The King's actions led to huge demonstrations by the major parties and his popular support waned. There was a huge uprising against the King in April 2006, which led to the House of Representatives being reinstated on 28 April and the King being stripped of most of his powers. The Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) then engaged in negotiations which produced a comprehensive statement of understanding in November 2006.[405]

192. On 15 January 2007 the Maoists took their seats in an interim parliament and on 18 January the Maoist leader Prachanda announced that the parallel government set up by the Maoists during their insurgency was to be abolished.[406] Elections to a Constitutional Assembly are planned to be held in June 2007. Mr Roy-Chaudhury described these as "encouraging developments",[407] but noted that "tremendous concerns" remained, including the "tremendous mistrust between the Maoists and the military and […] differences over the monarchy".[408]

193. India has been very concerned about the civil war in Nepal.[409] India played a role in helping to reach agreements between the political parties, the King and the Maoists, supported the attempts of the SPA to bring the Maoists into government and "[a]fter initial hesitation" realised the value of the United Nations providing technical assistance to the peace process.[410] India has also given Nepal a substantial aid package[411] In particular it was worried about increased criminal activity, such as smuggling, in border areas and unrestricted migration.[412] It also feared a potential collaboration between the Maoists in Nepal, and the Naxalites - an insurgency run by the Communist Party of India (Maoists) - in India.[413] We asked Dr Price about what the impact on India would be now that the Maoists were in the Nepalese government. He replied

The rhetoric from the Maoists was at first very anti-Indian. They are still talking about renegotiating some of the treaties and so on. In practice, however, people recognise that when they come to power in Nepal, they have to live with India. India is the country that Nepal trades with and it is where its economic opportunities will come from through hydroelectricity and such like. The big unknown about Nepal is the extent to which the Maoists will temper their aims once they are in power. […]With regard to the Naxalites, the Maoists have already said that they will not give any support, and certainly not any military support, to Naxalites working in India, but they might give some kind of moral support for the cause.

That leads on to whether something can be done in Nepal to resolve the core grievances that led to the Maoist uprising—things such as unfair land ownership and so forth. […] There is a long way to go in this thinking. But if something comes from that, does that then present some kind of model for India? […] some ideas that come from Nepal could be used in some format in some of the more backward districts in India where the Naxalites are most active […].[414]

194. We asked witnesses about the role the UK could play in Nepal. Mr Roy-Chaudhury suggested that the UK should work with the US and India "to facilitate stability". [415] He added:

There is a sense, not only from India's point of view, but from Nepal's point of view, that it will be difficult for India to be involved unilaterally, so there needs to be broader involvement.[416]

Professor Michael Hutt argued in his submission that the UK had an important role to play in Nepal to help the country meet the aspirations of those Nepalese who had participated in the Maoist insurgency, to help develop a culture of democratic leadership and to improve the higher education sector.[417] The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the UK had been the first country to pay £1 million into the UN fund for helping to maintain peace and stability in Nepal and that it had increased its development aid to the country.[418] The UK is the second largest provider of development assistance to Nepal, donating £30 million in 2005-2006.[419]

195. In January 2007 there were reports of violence in southern Nepal, where the Madheshi people say the interim constitution does not incorporate their demands for greater autonomy, better representation in parliament and the removal of hill dwellers from important local jobs. Madheshis make up 33-45% of Nepal's population but are vastly under-represented in government and in the army, which tend to be dominated by hill-dwellers. Nepal's home minister has now invited the Terai groups for talks ahead of the June elections, but the Chairman of the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum has said that he requires a formal invitation.[420] In a written answer, Dr Kim Howells MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said the UK government was "deeply concerned" about this unrest and warned that the failure to acknowledge the demands of the Madheshis had "the potential to undermine the prospects for elections to the Constituent Assembly."[421] In March 2007 Nepal's parliament passed an amendment to the constitution, which addressed some of the concerns of the Madheshi people by changing the country from a unitary to a federal state and increasing the number of constituencies in the south.[422]

196. We recommend that the Government offer support through its Global Opportunities Fund and assist the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to help develop democratic institutions and political parties in Nepal.

197. We further recommend that the Government pushes for and supports a strong international observer presence in Nepal for the elections planned for June.

Water-sharing

198. Water is becoming an increasingly rare resource in South Asia. India currently has a number of water disputes with its neighbours: a dispute with Pakistan over the Wular Barrage, a dispute over the Farakka Barrage with Bangladesh and a dispute over the Mahakali River Treaty with Nepal. These are exacerbated by growing populations and by high dependency on agriculture.[423] The Director of the UN's Millennium Project, Professor Jeffrey Sachs, recently warned that India would face severe water shortages and that it had only been able to feed its population in the past by using water in an unsustainable way.[424] Dr Price told us:

The problem is that water-sharing really is a zero-sum game—water tables are shrinking and populations are growing. It is a major issue of concern, and is going to continue to be an issue of concern[425]

199. India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. Dr Price described it as:

the most successful treaty between India and Pakistan […]Until last year, they never used international arbitration, so the treaty lasted through various wars that took place during that time.[426]

However, since 1985 India and Pakistan have been in dispute over India's Tubul Navigation Project on the River Jhelum, which Pakistan believes violates the Indus water Treaty. The Indus Waters Commission has failed to resolve the issue and it has been part of the Composite Dialogue between the two nations.[427]

200. The Mahakali River flows along the Nepal-India western border. It has huge potential for hydroelectric power, but Indo-Nepali cooperation on the river systems has been slow. Tensions grew following India's construction of the Tanakpur Barrage on the Mahakali in 1998. [428] Dr Charu Lata Hogg told us:

"The Tanakpur episode during which India failed to inform Nepal that it was making use of a small piece of Nepalese territory to construct an embankment to protect Nepalese territory from possible backwater effects from the Tanakpur Barrage, has loomed large in the Nepalese consciousness contributing to the fall of the government."[429]

201. Water-related tensions in South Asia, however, are greatest between India and Bangladesh, given that 54 rivers flow from India into Bangladesh.[430] In 1997 the two countries signed an agreement, which is renewed annually, on water-sharing, but the fall from power of the Awami League led to a cooling of relations.[431] The two nations have several water-related disagreements.

202. First, India and Bangladesh have accused each other of causing the erosion of riverbanks on their international boundary by constructing concrete embankments. Second, Bangladesh believes India has reduced water flow along the River Ganges, known as Padma in Bangladesh, as a result of India's construction of the Farakka Barrage across the Ganges in 1970. Dhaka has also accused Delhi of being slow in sharing data about river flows for flood control purposes. Bangladesh has also opposed India's plans for a $15 billion project to link rivers across the country in order to divert excess water in the north to water-deficient states in the south, which Bangladesh claims will affect river flow through the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers systems into Bangladesh.[432]

203. We conclude that there is potential for increasing conflict over access to water in South Asia. We recommend that the Government monitor this situation carefully and that it encourages South Asian nations to use water in a more sustainable way.

Regional integration

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

204. Established in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is made up of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan (new member). It aims to "accelerate the process of economic and social development" among member nations.[433] The FCO explained that progress on this objective had been limited, in particular, by relations between India and Pakistan. [434] Dr Price agreed. He told us:

The big problem with SAARC is that the political disputes between India and Pakistan get in the way of substantial progress.[435]

However, Dr Charu Lata Hogg argued that

SAARC still remains a largely consultative body, which has shied away from undertaking even a single collaborative project in its 20 years of existence. While most of the failings of SAARC could be laid on the door of India's tensions with Pakistan, there appears to be a deep resistance to doing anything collaborative in the region as a whole. Smaller countries like Bangladesh have used SAARC as a regional dispute settlement mechanism […].[436]

205. One area of collaboration between all seven original SAARC members is the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in January 2004.[437] SAFTA formally came into effect on 1 January 2006. The agreement will be implemented in stages. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are due to reduce their tariffs to 20% by 2007 and then down to zero in a series of annual cuts by 2012. The other four nations have until 2016 to reach full implementation.[438]

206. However the FCO described SAFTA as "not particularly ambitious". In a supplementary note to us the Foreign Secretary explained:

the real test of the effectiveness of SAFTA will be in the 'sensitive' lists. These are lists of goods temporarily exempt from the above tariff reductions. Each country has submitted long lists of sensitive goods (for example, India's is 744 items, Pakistan's is 1200).The SAFTA agreement says that members will have to agree the sensitive lists, which could involve drawn out negotiations. […]

Further negotiations are likely to continue on other trade issues as well, for instance: Rules of Origin - specifying the conditions that would have to be met by products to qualify for applications of reduced customs tariffs on export to another SAARC Member State; Mechanism for Compensation of Revenue Loss for Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Nepal in the event of revenue loss resulting from lowering of customs tariffs in terms of the Agreement; and Technical Assistance.[439]

Mr Roy-Chaudhury told us that internal trade within SAARC was about 30% or less than SAARC nations' global trade. By contrast 70% of ASEAN nations' total trade was within ASEAN.[440] He added:

Delhi has never felt that there is much momentum in SAARC. There are complementarities among the countries in SAARC, in terms of their manufacturing processes and culture and so on. From Delhi's perspective, there is the problem of Pakistan's refusal to provide a certain economic status to India that India has provided to Pakistan. SAARC and the south Asian free trade area sound good politically but they are not going to be implemented in the short term.[441]

207. The FCO suggested that BIMSTEC, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation, made up of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Bhutan and Nepal, could in theory displace SAARC. BIMSTEC members have endorsed a proposal for a free trade agreement by 2017 and India, Sri Lanka and Thailand have committed to trade liberalisation by 2012.[442] The FCO argued:

Whether it does or not will be largely up to India, the potential lynchpin of BIMSTEC. If India wants to get the best out of BIMSTEC's potential it will have to re-energise its economic reforms and improve its infrastructure, especially in the underdeveloped East and North East. But in the day to day Indian international trade agenda BIMSTEC does not feature much.[443]

208. Dr Price told us:

More important than SAARC, at the moment anyway, are the bilateral agreements between different countries, particularly between India and Sri Lanka. There is now talk of a free trade area or bilateral trade agreement between India and Bangladesh. Essentially, while the relationship between India and Pakistan remains poor, although improving, SAARC is not going to go anywhere fast. I think that is why India is focusing on bilateral agreements, not just within the region but also with other countries, such as Thailand and Singapore.[444]

209. At the 2005 Dhaka SAARC Summit, Japan and China were accorded observer status. In April 2006 SAARC members also agreed in principle for the US and South Korea to be admitted as observers. It has been suggested that the interest of extra-regional powers in becoming observers shows that SAARC has the potential to become a stage for power politics.[445] Mr Roy-Chaudhury suggested that the one way in which the region might become more integrated would be through energy:

There are various proposals to bring energy from central Asia, via Afghanistan or Pakistan, into India. There are three or four proposals for pipelines and if that takes off, I think that we are looking at a massive growth area and massive interdependencies among SAARC countries, particularly between India and Pakistan, which will impact positively on the peace process.[446]

210. We conclude that the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) is unlikely to greatly increase internal trade between countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation unless further agreements can be reached on trade issues, such as items on 'sensitive lists', which remain to be negotiated. The Government should welcome the steps taken so far to develop an institution that strengthens relations between countries in South Asia and encourage further progress in future.

SHANGHAI CO-OPERATION ORGANISATION (SCO)

211. India became an observer in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) in 2005. The SCO is made up of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran and Pakistan were given observer status at the same time as India. The FCO stated:

The SCO is primarily centred around economic co-operation and Central Asian security-related concerns (terrorism, separatism and extremism) but the overall geo-political direction of the organisation is being driven by Russia and China towards curbing Washington's influence in Central Asia.[447]

The FCO claimed that India had not applied for full membership of the FCO for fear of undermining its developing relationship with the US. [448]

212. However, Mr Roy-Chaudhury gave two other reasons for India's hesitation:

One is that there was a concern in Delhi that if it applied for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China would want reciprocal membership of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. […] The second reason is that China was not particularly excited about India's full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and India was not keen to push it, if that was not quite what China wanted.[449]

213. The Foreign Secretary told us:

We do indeed treat the council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation very seriously and we recognise both its existing importance and its potential.[450]

214. In our inquiry into East Asia we concluded that the SCO "had the potential to evolve into an alliance of authoritarian powers opposed to the West, and may aid China's efforts to establish control over Central Asian energy reserves."[451]

215. We welcome the fact that India has joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as an observer. We recommend that the Government should urge India to discourage the SCO from becoming an organisation hostile to the West.

ASSOCIATION FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

216. India has a "Look East" policy, as part of which it has gradually been increasing its engagement with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), made up of Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.[452] It became an ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 2002,[453] signed the "ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity" in November 2004,[454] and is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). India took part in the first and second East Asia Summits (in December 2005 and January 2007 respectively) and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) in September 2006.[455] Indian trade with ASEAN grew from 8.5% of its total trade in 2003 to 9.3% of the total in 2004.[456] India is currently negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN and has already entered into a FTA with Thailand and Singapore. [457]

217. Mr Roy Chaudhury told us:

On south-east Asia, that is a different world for India. It is a world in which there is far more manoeuvrability and flexibility of options. There are no inherent constraints such as are present in the south Asian dynamic because of historical relationships and so on.[458]

218. However, the FCO wrote:

India attaches some importance to these relationships, but they are not at the top of its foreign policy priorities. It is much closer to some countries, eg Singapore, than others.[459]

---

195   Ev 36, para 42 Back

196   Ev 185, p 3 Back

197   Ev 184, p 2 Back

198   Q182 [Griffin] Back

199   Ev 152 Back

200   Q 110 Back

201   HC Deb, 10 June 2002, col 595 Back

202   Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, (New Haven and London, 2003), p 64 Back

203   Ibid, p 65 Back

204   Ibid, pp 71-72 Back

205   Ibid, p 74 Back

206   Q 75 [Bose] Back

207   Ev 37, para 53 Back

208   Q 76 [Schofield] Back

209   Q 75 [Ms Schofield] Back

210   Q 75 [Ms Schofield] Back

211   Ev 184 Back

212   Ev 184 Back

213   Q 76 Back

214   Q 75 Back

215   Q 76 Back

216   Pervez Musharraf, In the line of fire, (London, 2006), p 302 Back

217   Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, (New Haven and London, 2003), pp 82-83 Back

218   Ibid, pp 82-83 Back

219   Qq 76, 83 and 88 [Ms Schofield] and Q 87 [Professor Bose] Back

220   Ev 35, para 40 Back

221   Q 87 Back

222   Q 83 Back

223   Q 87  Back

224   Q 87 Back

225   Q 76 Back

226   Q 179 Back

227   Q 179 Back

228   Q 180 Back

229   Q 178 Back

230   Q 83 Back

231   Q 84 Back

232   Q 88 Back

233   Q 88 Back

234   Q 177 [Dr Price] Back

235   Q 85 Back

236   Q 180 Back

237   The areas of dialogue agreed were: Peace and Security; the Wular Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project; the Siachen Glacier; Sir Creek; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; Terrorism and Drugs and the Promotion of friendly exchanges. Back

238   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2003-2004, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 441, para 255  Back

239   Ev 185 Back

240   Q 171 Back

241   Q 79 Back

242   Q 80 Back

243   Q 80 and Ev 184 Back

244   Q 81-82 Back

245   Q 172 Back

246   Q 81 Back

247   Q 169 Back

248   Q 170 Back

249   Q 78 [Schofield] Back

250   Q 173 Back

251   Q 78 Back

252   Q 78 Back

253   Q 79 Back

254   Q 79 Back

255   Q 79 Back

256   "Strong feelings over Pakistan's rape laws", BBC News Online, 15 November 2006 Back

257   "Pakistan judge protest escalates", BBC News Online, 13 April 2007 Back

258   Q 171 Back

259   Q 170 Back

260   Q 85 [Schofield], Q 169 [Nelson], Q 181 [Price], Ev 102 Back

261   Q 85 Back

262   Q 169 Back

263   "India and Pakistan set up crisis panel", Financial Times, 14 January 2007 Back

264   Ev 37, paras 56-57 Back

265   Ev 153 Back

266   "Leaders condemn India train blast", BBC News Online, 19 February 2007 www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

267   Dr. Subhash Kapila, "India-Pakistan Havana Agreement (September 2006), Perspectives and Implications" South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No 1959 Back

268   Q 183 Back

269   "Pakistan 'role in Mumbai attacks'", BBC News Online, 30 September 2006, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

270   Q 91 Back

271   Q 91 Back

272   Q 184 Back

273   Q 91 Back

274   Ev 80, para 43 Back

275   Ev 117 Back

276   "Kashmir leaders to visit Pakistan", BBC News Online, 25 May 2005, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

277   Ev 37, para 53 Back

278   Ev 117 Back

279   Ev 37, para 51 Back

280   "Looking within the other Kashmir", Asia Times, 20 February 2003  Back

281   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2003-2004, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 441, para 256 Back

282   Q 82 [Schofield] and Q 175 [Nelson] Back

283   Q 82 Back

284   Q 176 Back

285   Q 82 Back

286   Q 40 Back

287   Q 174 Back

288   Q 40 Back

289   Ev 37, para 52 Back

290   Q 104 Back

291   Q 106 Back

292   Ev 41, para 90 Back

293   Q 195 [Griffin] Back

294   Q 195 Back

295   Q 195 Back

296   Frederic Grare, 'Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-9/11 era", Carnegie Papers, Number 72, October 2006, p 3 Back

297   Ev 35, para 40 Back

298   "Pakistan reiterates charge against Indian consulates", The Hindu, 15 September 2003 Back

299   "Indian consulates in Afghanistan monitored: Pak", The Hindu, 28 July 2003 Back

300   "India-Pakistan rivalry reaches into Afghanistan", Christian Science Monitor, 12 September 2003 Back

301   Ev 32, para 10 Back

302   "Taliban leader captured", Financial Times, 2 March 2007 Back

303   International Crisis Group, Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No quick fixes: Asia Report No: 123, 2 November 2006, p 24 Back

304   Frederic Grare, 'Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-9/11 era", Carnegie Papers, Number 72, October 2006, pp 4-5 Back

305   "US pressures Pakistan over Taliban", Financial Times, 17 January 2007 Back

306   "Aid at risk, U.S. warns Musharraf", International Herald Tribune, 22 February 2007 Back

307   Q 184 Back

308   Ev 78, para 21 Back

309   Q 191 Back

310   Q 187 Back

311   'Karzai for jirga to crush Taliban', BBC News Online, 11 October 2006, www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

312   Q 188 [Nelson] Back

313   Q 118 [Beckett] Back

314   Q 188 Back

315   Q 115 Back

316   Qq 185, 186 and 191 Back

317   Q 191 Back

318   Q 193 Back

319   Q 116 Back

320   Q 119 Back

321   Qq 90-91 Back

322   Q 17 Back

323   Q 18 Back

324   Q 17 [Mr Roy-Chaudhury and Dr Smith] Back

325   "India and China sign pact on 'peace and prosperity'", International Herald Tribune, 12 April 2005 www.iht.com/ Back

326   "India, China reach new trade heights", Asia Times, 22 June 2006 Back

327   C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol 85, number 4 (July/August 2006), p 24 Back

328   Q 17 Back

329   "India and China 'to double trade'", BBC News Online, 21 November 2006 Back

330   Q 18 Back

331   Ev 176 Back

332   "India discreet, China bold in oil hunt", Asia Times Online, 29 September 2005, www.asiatimes.com/ Back

333   "India, China pin down $573m Syria deal", Asia Times Online, 29 September 2005, www.asiatimes.com/ Back

334   "China and India forge alliance on oil with aim of ending 'mindless rivalry'", Financial Times, 13 January 2006 Back

335   "India, China pin down $573m Syria deal", Asia Times Online, 29 September 2005, www.asiatimes.com/ Back

336   Q 17 [Mr Roy-Chaudhury] and Ev 176 Back

337   Ev 180 Back

338   Ev 177 Back

339   Ev 179 Back

340   Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 99 Back

341   Ev 42, para 100 Back

342   Q 19 [Dr Smith] Back

343   Ev 32, para 15 Back

344   HC Deb, 24 January 2007, 1850W Back

345   Q 202 Back

346   "Civilians flee Sri Lanka fighting", BBC News Online, 10 March 2007 Back

347   Q 207 [Dr Price] Back

348   Ev 32, para 15 Back

349   "Sri Lanka's president poised between war and peace", Financial Times, 9 January 2007 Back

350   Q 20 Back

351   Ev 40, para 84 Back

352   Q 203 [Mr Price] Back

353   Ev 40, para 85 Back

354   Q 21 [Mr Roy-Chaudhury] Back

355   Ev 40, para 84 Back

356   Q 20 [Dr Smith] and Q 204 [Mr Price] Back

357   Q 21 [Mr Roy-Chaudhury] Back

358   Q 20 [Dr Smith] Back

359   Q 204 Back

360   Q 19 Back

361   Q 20 Back

362   Q 22 Back

363   Q 204 Back

364   Q 21 Back

365   Q 200 Back

366   Ev 38, para 62 Back

367   Q 126 Back

368   Q 126 Back

369   HC Deb, 17 January 2007, 1214W Back

370   Q 126 Back

371   Q 129 Back

372   Qq 128 and 129 Back

373   Ev 40, para 80 Back

374   Q 23 Back

375   Q 198 Back

376   Ev 186 Back

377   Q 23 [Dr Price] Back

378   Ev 40, paras 80-83 Back

379   Ev 38, para 60 Back

380   Ev 176 Back

381   Ev 177 Back

382   "Bangladesh political crisis slams India", Australian, 28 October 2006 and Ev 37, para 54 Back

383   Q 133 Back

384   "Bangladesh alliance decides to fight elections", Financial Times, 14 January 2007 Back

385   "Another fine mess", The Economist, 24 February 2007 Back

386   "Ex-Bangladesh PM in murder case", BBC News Online, 11 April 2007 Back

387   Ev 132 Back

388   Q 199 Back

389   "Bangladesh: a democracy in crisis", The Guardian, 9 January 2007 Back

390   Q 133 Back

391   Ev 184 Back

392   Q 197 Back

393   Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 103 Back

394   Ev 184 Back

395   Ev 34, para 33 Back

396   Q 197 Back

397   Q 197 Back

398   HC Deb, 16 January 2007, 994W Back

399   Q 199 Back

400   Q133 Back

401   Q 133 Back

402   Q 24 Back

403   Ev 38, para 61 Back

404   Ev 163 Back

405   Ev 163 Back

406   "Nepal rebel powers to be halted", BBC News Online, 18 January 2007 www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

407   Q 21 Back

408   Q 24 Back

409   Ev 40, para 86 Back

410   Ev 40, para 87 Back

411   Ev 40, para 87 Back

412   Ev 40, para 86 Back

413   Ev 40, para 86, Ev 184, and Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 103 Back

414   Q 208 Back

415   Q 24 Back

416   Q 24 Back

417   Ev 163 Back

418   Q 135 Back

419   Ev 162 Back

420   "Violence spreads in south Nepal,", BBC News Online, 25 January 2007 www.bbc.co.uk/news Back

421   HC Deb, 25 January 2007, col 1925W Back

422   "Nepal changes into federal state", BBC News Online, 9 March 2007 Back

423   Chietigj Bajpaee, "Asia's Coming Water Wars", Power and Interest News Report, 22 August 2006 Back

424   "China and India warned their water is running out", The Guardian, 23 January 2007 Back

425   Q 213 Back

426   Q 213 Back

427   Chietigj Bajpaee, "Asia's Coming Water Wars", Power and Interest News Report, 22 August 2006 Back

428   Ibid Back

429   Ev 185 Back

430   Ev 185 Back

431   Ev 40, para 81 Back

432   Chietigj Bajpaee, "Asia's Coming Water Wars", Power and Interest News Report, 22 August 2006 Back

433   www.saarc-sec.org/main.php Back

434   Ev 41, paras 92-3 Back

435   Q 214 Back

436   Ev 184 Back

437   Ev 41, paras 92-93 Back

438   Ev 75 Back

439   Ev 41, para 93 Back

440   Q 38 Back

441   Q 38 Back

442   Ev 42, para 98 Back

443   Ibid Back

444   Q 215 Back

445   Sreeradha Datta, "S.A.A.R.C.: A Potential Playground for Power Politics", Power and Interest News Report, 17 April 2006 Back

446   Q 38 Back

447   Ev 42, para 97 Back

448   Ibid Back

449   Q 39 Back

450   Q 124 Back

451   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 261 Back

452   Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Back

453   Ev 42, para 95 Back

454   Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 101 Back

455   Ev 42, para 95 Back

456   Chatham House and Fondation Robert Schuman, Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, (London, 2006), p 23 Back

457   Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising but Uphill Road Ahead", Asian Survey, vol XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, p 101 Back

458   Q 38 Back

459   Ev 42, para 96 Back

---

Prepared 4 May 2007