House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report

2 The worsening development situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

24. In this Chapter, we discuss the situation in the OPTs where, despite having received large amounts of development assistance, the quality of life for the majority of Palestinians has deteriorated, especially since 2000.[36]

The socio-economic situation

25. The OPTs have the potential to become economically vibrant given the right circumstances. Together they are endowed with fertile agricultural land, good access to ports and fishing waters, a well-educated and industrious population and potentially good health care facilities.[37] As the previous International Development Committee stated in its report, the OPTs are not an obvious candidate for development assistance.[38] On our visit we were told by a number of interlocutors that they did not wish to be aid recipients; they simply wanted the opportunity to build up a vibrant economy and an independent Palestinian state.

26. The international community is committed to achieving a reduction in levels of hunger and poverty through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals reflect a growing consensus that poverty alleviation should be the primary goal of development policy for donor countries. However the donors' role in the OPTs has been reduced to that of providing humanitarian or emergency assistance, with development put on hold pending a political outcome. David Shearer, the Head of OCHA in the OPTs, gave the following explanation about the role of donors there:

"I think all of them recognise that this is an unsustainable situation and it is getting worse. There is a search looking for ways in which to slow the deterioration in the hope that somewhere along the line there is going to be some sort of a political development or some sort of a change. The question is, at what point do donors say, 'We cannot do any more', or say, 'Actually Sudan is in a lot worse state than the Palestinian territory and we cannot do it'? Or they say that Israel … is withholding the major PA revenue, which are the customs revenues, and that there is somehow more pressure on Israel to pass those over because they are Palestinian revenues. Or the other aspect, is that there still is an occupation and under international law Israel is responsible for the welfare of the Palestinians. So it is a question of where that threshold comes in terms of paying out in the hope, or, in a sense, saying, 'enough, we need another situation; we need to change the circumstances'."[39]

27. Reducing poverty is not the responsibility only of donors. Recipient governments also have a role to play. The case of the OPTs is somewhat unique, since there is no self-government as such. The Palestinian Authority, created after the 1993 Oslo Peace Agreement, has limited domestic responsibilities which, since March 2006, it has been unable to fulfil. However even prior to the formation of the Hamas-led government, the PA, heavily dependent on Israel for its economic survival, has been constrained by the policies and actions of Israel.

28. The current socio-economic situation in the OPTs is not simply a product of the election of Hamas in 2006, but part of an ongoing deterioration in living standards which began in 2000 with the start of the second intifada. Before 2000 the economies of Israel and the Palestinian territories were closely linked. There was significant trade between them and many Palestinians were able to work in Israel.[40]

29. The previous International Development Committee's report stated:

"The operating environment in the OPTs is one of conflict. Israel's security measures: curfews, movement restrictions, the security barrier, and the network of settlements; are preventing Palestinians from accessing services, as well as inhibiting humanitarian and development work. Above all, they are destroying the Palestinian economy and creating widespread poverty."[41]

These comments remain valid today but socio-economic conditions have deteriorated even further. Today there is even greater insecurity for both Palestinians and Israelis, a worsening humanitarian situation, and increased levels of poverty and hardship for Palestinians.[42]

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

30. The real gross domestic product (GDP) of the OPTs declined by about 9% in the first half of 2006, and was predicted to fall even further by the end of 2006.[43] This has been largely driven by the withholding by Israel of PA tax and customs revenues. If these revenues are discounted there was a slight growth in GDP in the first half of 2006 mainly due to increased public sector hiring and the effects of increased public sector wages agreed in 2005.[44] Because of the increased number of PA employees and the increase in wages in 2005 the PA was already facing a severe fiscal crisis prior to the elections.[45]

31. UNRWA has noted a more worrying downturn in economic activity in the private sector, especially a drop in manufacturing.[46] During our visit the World Bank emphasised the significance of private sector development for the future viability of a Palestinian state. This is underscored by the decrease in job opportunities for Palestinians in Israel as a result of a decision by the Government of Israel, for security reasons, to reduce to zero the number of Palestinians employed in Israel by the end of 2007, as well as by the unsustainability of current levels of PA employment.[47] As we said in our report last session on private sector development, economic growth is central to reducing poverty.[48] However the private sector's capacity to deliver growth is determined by the environment in which it operates. The right investment climate and the right regulation will attract private sector development. At present the OPTs do not offer investors a reliable or predictable environment for their money.

32. On our visit to Bethlehem we met with Zahi Khouri, Chairman of the National Beverage Company. He pointed out that there was a high level of education and qualifications in the OPTs which provided potential to specialise in high-tech and services industries and that there were already a number of IT contracts in place with companies such as Volvo. Telecoms were highly developed in the OPTs compared with other Arab countries. He told us that Palestinians had a strong work ethic and that productivity levels in the OPTs were 40% higher than for other workers in the region. As an example of the business skills in the OPTs, he told us that, in official testing of Coca-Cola produced all over the world, his company in Ramallah had come out top. But this economic potential is not being fulfilled because of constraining factors. We met at the Jacir Palace Inter-Continental Hotel in Bethlehem. Its developers had hoped it would be a magnet for tourists which Bethlehem had hoped to attract for the millennium celebrations in 2000 and subsequently. But the emerging tourist trade to Bethlehem has been devastated through the impact of the intifada, a number of major Israeli military incursions into the town and by the increasing isolation of Bethlehem through the construction of the separation barrier (see Chapter 3). We were told that, despite the proximity of our visit to Christmas, room occupancy rates were as low as 2% but that closing down the hotel would be more expensive than operating at a loss.

33. At a lunch in Ramallah we met with a number of businessmen who recounted the difficulties they had in keeping their businesses operating. One had tried to import a replacement granulator for his chemical processing factory but had been refused a permit by the GoI, on security grounds, after paying $600,000 for the equipment. We were also told about the difficulties in transporting and gaining permits to trade goods between Gaza and the West Bank because of GoI regulations which gave priority to products from Israel, as well as ongoing restrictions in movement and the back-to-back system, which are discussed in detail in the following chapter.

34. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that the Palestinian economy has become increasingly dependent on low-skilled, labour-intensive activities—a trend which pre-dates the current crisis.[49] The World Bank similarly notes a progressive de-industrialisation of the economy as imports and exports move to the lower end of the technology ladder.[50] Consumption rather than exports has provided the main source of growth for a largely inward-oriented economy. The World Bank recommends that donors should shift their focus to the transfer of technology to Palestinian firms including new ideas, equipment, management practice and marketing strategies.[51]

35. The environment in the OPTs is not conducive to the growth of the private sector. On the contrary current measures imposed by the Government of Israel, on security grounds, provide significant disincentives for local and foreign investment in the OPTs. This is a worrying trend which threatens the viability of a future Palestinian state. Donors can play a role in encouraging the creation of an enabling investment climate but a reliable and predictable environment requires a peace settlement. Nevertheless more pro-active steps can be taken, even prior to the attainment of a peace settlement. The easing of occupation could dramatically improve the prospects for business development and this in turn could improve the prospects for a durable peace. There is particular potential to encourage the development of small business and the third sector. We recommended in our report on private sector development that DFID should develop a strategy for private sector development in conflict-prone and conflict-affected states. The OPTs are an obvious example of where this would be valuable.

TRADE

36. The reduction in the domestic production of the OPTs has led to decreased exports and increased dependence on external support. The World Bank reports that over the past six years imports of goods and services represented approximately 70% of GDP while exports of good and services represented between 15% and 20% of GDP.[52] The main trading partner for the OPTs is Israel, although it is difficult to measure accurately trade between the West Bank and Israel since there are no customs stations, unlike trade between Gaza and Israel. UNCTAD estimates that while Palestinian trade with Israel is a small part of total Israeli trade, trade with Israel is approximately 70% of total Palestinian trade. The OPTs maintain a large and growing trade deficit with Israel, greater than the total amount of development assistance which the OPTs receive.[53]

37. The EU has established an Association Agreement with Israel and an interim Association Agreement with the OPTs.[54] However, given the ongoing restrictions in movement and access faced by the OPTs, the latter agreement is not functioning.[55] In particular, and as discussed in the following chapter, movement in and out of Gaza has been severely restricted in the last year with the majority of crossings for goods operating at well below their capacity because of the security concerns of Israel.[56] Oxfam reports that transaction costs for Palestinians wishing to export products are up to 70% higher than for Israelis exporting the same product. This market benefit is also true of products produced by Israeli settlers in the West Bank who can get direct to markets in or through Israel without the disruptive road blocks and back-to-back transfers faced by Palestinians. In addition Palestinians face a range of regulations which Oxfam, for example, argues, do not appear to be linked to security. Similar restrictions are placed on imports, apart from those from Israel.[57] Oxfam also told us that "the Palestinians are obliged to rely on Israeli intermediaries to transport their goods and, therefore, do not pay purchase taxes and customs to the Palestinian Authority, which we have been told creates further losses to the economy of 3% of GDP a year."[58] In short, Palestinian trade is constrained and the benefits which they derive from it are limited. Current restrictions, including those on movement and access, make Palestinian trade uncompetitive and the interim Association Agreement with the EU inoperable. The viability of a future Palestinian economy will depend significantly on its trading opportunities. The EU must ensure that Palestinian products are not being unfairly treated by Israel and measures need to be put in place to make the Association Agreement effective.

38. In contrast Israel benefits from its own trade agreement with the EU which contains, as do all EU association agreements, a political dimension. This enables the EU to raise with Israel human rights and governance issues where they arise. DFID told us that the EU has done so in the past, and may do so again.[59] Evidence submitted by War on Want argues that there could be grounds for suspending the Agreement because of the undermining of human rights and democratic principles by Israel.[60] The European Parliament has also suggested that the Council investigate whether Israel's actions have breached the human rights requirement of the Association Agreement.[61] DFID told us it considers the Agreement to be a useful tool which enables dialogue to continue.[62] There is an incongruity in allowing Israel to continue to benefit from a type of agreement from which Israel prevents Palestinians from benefiting from. Continued dialogue with Israel is certainly necessary but the Association Agreement appears to give tacit assent to the restrictions on movement and access which Israel imposes on the Palestinians. The UK should urge the EU to use the Association Agreement with Israel as a lever for change and consider suspending the Agreement until there are further improvements in access arrangements.

39. Reports that products from Israeli settlements in the OPTs have been classed as 'made in Israel' and have thereby benefited from the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which was raised in the previous IDC's inquiry, were discussed with Alan Seatter of the European Commission. He explained that a new system of postcodes ensures that such products do not benefit from the Agreement. He subsequently submitted written material to confirm this.[63] The regulation requiring detailed postcodes for settlement products is a recent and welcome development. It is important that the EU is not indirectly supporting and giving benefit to unlawful settlements on Palestinian land. However, to be effective, information about the postcodes needs to be widely understood in the EU and member states should ensure that robust, cost-effective arrangements are put in place to monitor goods being imported from Israel. The UK Government should press for the EU to take practical action to achieve these things. It has also been reported that the Government of Israel is compensating Israeli manufacturers beyond the Green Line who export to the EU for the loss of their preference.[64] This matter should be fully investigated by the EU to determine whether such practices undermine the basis of the Agreement.

THE LABOUR MARKET

40. Employment in the OPTs grew in the first half of 2006, due mainly to an increase in the number of public sector employees, but this was countered by a downturn in manufacturing and construction jobs. The current fiscal crisis in the PA means that 160,000 public sector employees have not been paid salaries since March 2006. Given the high levels of dependence on such salaries, UNRWA estimates that about 25% of the population of the OPTs are affected.[65] OCHA reports that around 70% of the Gaza workforce is out of work or without pay.[66] Evidence suggests an unemployment rate of 40%.[67]

41. Without employment Palestinians cannot hope to meet their basic needs and poverty and hardship are therefore increasing. The consequences of the non-payment of PA salaries are substantial. UNICEF reports that:

"The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) found that households dependent on salaries from the public sector are resorting to negative coping strategies including postponing paying bills (83.5%), relying on past savings (26.3%), selling jewellery (29.6%) and reducing consumption of fresh meat (88.6%). Households are also becoming heavily indebted, with 65% reliant on informal borrowing in order to subsist. The reliance on negative coping strategies was most apparent in Gaza households. If this situation continues, the World Bank estimates that real GDP per capita will decline by 27% by December 2006 and personal income (real GDI) by 30%."[68]

HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION

42. Recent World Food Programme assessments indicate that 51% of Palestinians are now food insecure—unable to cover their families' daily requirements without external assistance.[69] This represents a 14% increase in the past year. OCHA also reports an increase in food security in the order of 13% in 2006.[70]

43. The World Food Programme reported recently that:

"the Gazan economy is collapsing and there is no trust for the future, no investment and no hope… There is now a one-month stock of food in densely populated Gaza which relies on external food shipments through border checkpoints which have been periodically closed by Israel. Infrastructure is also crippled while industries which have formed the backbone of the territory's economy, mainly farming and fishing are in sharp decline. There is no more grain in the four major silos of the four major mills, and even if we are providing food to some of the needy in Gaza, that is 15-16% of the population, the trade has completely collapsed. Since June no fishing is allowed at all and in fact you come to the fishing port and there is no more smell of fish. This puts out of work about 35,000 people who were living from the fishing industry."[71]

44. In 2004 the previous International Development Committee reported that rates of malnutrition in Gaza and parts of the West Bank were as bad as one would find in sub-Saharan Africa.[72] UNICEF has reported on the effects of the cut-back in health services in the West Bank and Gaza in 2006. Micronutrient deficiencies are the main health problem, with anaemia remaining a severe public health challenge: 37.9% of children under five and 31.1% of women of child-bearing age are anaemic. In addition, 22% of under-5s are vitamin A deficient and 20% show signs of iodine deficiency.[73] Infant mortality (25.2 per 1,000 live births) and under-5 mortality (29.1 per 1,000 live births) rates are not improving, making the achievement of Millennium Development Goal 4 difficult. The loss of income to poor families over an extended period, coupled with reduced health services, is likely to have long-term repercussions on nutrition and basic health indicators.

ACCESS TO WATER

45. The bombing of the Gaza power plant by Israel has severely restricted access to water in Gaza.[74] This has caused problems for the operation of hospitals and there has also been an increase in diarrhoea, particularly in children under three.[75] However, limited access to water for the Palestinians is not a new phenomenon. The previous International Development Committee noted the huge discrepancies between Palestinian and Israeli water consumption.[76] Greater discrepancies can be found in respect of Israeli settlements. UNICEF reports that Palestinians consume an average of 83 cubic metres of water per person per year, while Israelis consume 333 cubic metres and settlers 1,450.[77] OCHA reports that 25% of Palestinians in the OPTs do not have sufficient access to water.[78] In addition, David Craig of the World Bank and a number of other witnesses told us that settlements located on hill tops often drain their waste water into the valleys below where Palestinian villages are located, contaminating water supplies.[79] Water access arrangements continue to be a problem for agriculture. According to Oxfam only 7.3% of West Bank land is irrigated. The comparable figure of Israeli agricultural land is about 50%.[80],[81]

POVERTY

46. The downturn in economic activity, the squeezing of the private sector and the non-payment of PA salaries have all contributed to an increase in poverty and hardship in the OPTs. This is contrary to the internationally agreed goal of reducing poverty. According to Christian Aid, 20% of the population fell below the poverty line in 1998; by 2005 that had increased to 54%, and by 2006 to 64% across the OPTs and to 78% in Gaza.[82] Similar figures are reported by Save the Children and UNICEF.[83]

47. A report by UNRWA notes that since 2000, about two-thirds of all poor persons have had consumption levels below the deep consumption poverty line.[84] Average daily consumption of such individuals was about US $1.66 per day—below the accepted level of consumption which would meet the basic needs measure of US $2.10 per day.[85]

48. Using data for the first half of 2006, UNRWA reports that real per capita consumption levels fell by about 12%, with food consumption down by 8% and non-food consumption down by 13% relative to the second half of 2005. "This increased the number of deep poor from an average of 650,800 in the second half of 2005 to an average of 1,069,200 in the first half of 2006—a 64.3% increase."[86] OCHA reports that the poverty rate stands at 65.8% and continues to rise.[87]

49. Although the West Bank and Gaza were suffering from the impact of occupation well before 2000, developments since the outbreak of the intifada in that year took the socio-economic situation in the OPTs to crisis level. That crisis has intensified in 2006. In its current phase it is largely triggered by the withholding of PA revenues by the Government of Israel and the withdrawal of budgetary assistance by the major donors. These actions have made a bad situation worse. The PA is operating with a fraction of its normal budget and its contribution to household income has declined. The Government of Israel has been urged by the EU General Affairs Council to stop withholding the revenues, or to pay the revenues through the EU's own Temporary International Mechanism. There have been recent reports of an agreement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian President on the repayment of some of the withheld funds. This is a matter of the highest priority. Current measures taken by the Government of Israel and the international community are harming ordinary people. We recommend that the UK make specific representations to the Government of Israel to pay the remainder of the revenues due to the recognised institutions of the PA. If negotiations take place to channel the revenues through the Temporary International Mechanism or the Office of the President, it is important that these recognise that the revenues belong to the Palestinians, not the Government of Israel, and that any such discussions expedite, rather than delay, the revenues being put to use in the OPTs.

Humanitarian assistance

50. The UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has responsibility for monitoring the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people and for coordinating humanitarian-related activity for all UN agencies and donors. The Consolidated Appeals Process is the means by which resources are mobilised and then distributed through a programme for strategic planning, implementation and monitoring—the Common Humanitarian Action Plan.

51. In May 2006, faced with a worsening humanitarian situation and in response to the PA fiscal crisis, the UN took the unprecedented step of revising its appeal for humanitarian assistance from US$215 million to US$384 million. The head of OCHA in the OPTs, David Shearer, told us that in 2007 the appeal would be for around US$450 million. The increase will mainly be used for job creation, cash assistance and food aid. About 25% will be used for education, health and agricultural support. [88]

52. The high levels of humanitarian assistance being allocated to the West Bank and Gaza are not sustainable in the long run. David Shearer believed that donors were simply trying to stop the deterioration in living standards in the hope that there would soon be change in the political circumstances.[89] In its evidence, DFID points out that the UN system, and the provision of humanitarian assistance, should not become a replacement for the PA.[90] We agree with DFID that, while the UN can provide short-term humanitarian assistance, it cannot replace the services normally offered by the Palestinian Authority. Current high levels of humanitarian assistance may be necessary but they far exceed per capita levels provided in many poorer countries, for example in sub-Saharan Africa, and are not sustainable in the long term.

53. Aid, especially in conflict settings, has political implications. There is a widely-held view that aid is reinforcing the Israeli occupation,[91] but equally most agree that donors cannot simply withdraw.[92] There is no easy answer to this dilemma without agreement on final-status negotiations. In the interim donors must ensure that their aid is, as far as possible, non-distorting.[93]

The role of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)

54. UN Relief and Works Agency is mandated by the General Assembly of the UN to provide health, social services and education for Palestinians who became refugees in 1948 and who now live in the OPTs, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Over four million Palestinians are registered as refugees.[94] This can lead to apparent discrimination between refugees and non-refugees although in practice UNRWA provides support to both in many cases. UNRWA now also gives food aid and cash assistance to Palestinians who lost their jobs in Israel after the second intifada. Although UNRWA funds are part of the Consolidated Appeals Process, 96% of UNRWA's funding is at the discretion of individual donors and, according to DFID, this funding has lagged behind population growth and inflation.[95]

55. A recent report by UNRWA found that refugees are hardest hit by the current crisis—they are more likely to be unemployed, and make up the largest proportion of those living in deep poverty.[96] UNRWA launched an appeal on 12 December 2006 for $246 million in emergency funds. In response DFID announced a new package of assistance, worth £75 million over four years.[97] This represents an increase of about £20 million a year over current commitments.[98]

56. We visited the Balata refugee camp in the northern West Bank and spent some time in one of its schools. We were told that class sizes had been increasing steadily, as a result of UNRWA budget restraints and the closure of PA schools since PA teachers had gone on strike. There were now about 50 children in a class, which UNRWA officials considered too many. The school was fairly well-equipped although toilet facilities were basic and insufficient to cope with the increased numbers of children. While the Palestinian Authority has obligations to provide essential services, such as education, for non-refugee Palestinians, it cannot fulfil this role without a budget and so UNRWA has, in some cases, become the default provider of such services, especially in the current crisis. The increase in DFID funding serves as a means of helping ordinary Palestinians, who are not refugees, but for whom regular health and education services are not being provided in the current circumstances. It has been welcomed by UNRWA.

57. The UN Relief and Works Agency's capacity is stretched by the current crisis which has created an increased demand for its services. Even before the current crisis, UNRWA had requested more financial resources and increased management capacity to ensure a high standard of service delivery. We urge donors to bring greater predictability to UNRWA funding so that appropriate planning can take place to ensure proper provision of services for Palestinian refugees. DFID's additional funding over a four-year period is a welcome contribution and will also benefit non-refugees in the current crisis. If the UNRWA mandate is extended in 2008 it must be made clear to donors that the current level of funding is insufficient to provide high quality services for Palestinian refugees.

The responsibilities of the Government of Israel

58. In 2004 the previous International Development Committee argued that there had to be a sense of realism about what development assistance can achieve under conditions of occupation. This remains the case today. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention Israel, as the occupying power, bears legal responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian population.[99] This includes the provision of basic humanitarian services as well as safeguarding the security of the local population. Over the past ten years, according to OCHA the PA has fulfilled this role with the help of the international community. However the PA is currently unable to provide basic services.[100] The Government of Israel does not wholly accept that it is an occupying power, or that the Geneva Conventions apply to the Palestinian territories.[101] Instead they argue that the territories are disputed and that Israel is bound by customary international law and certain selected humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[102]

59. In September 2005 the GoI pulled out of Gaza by ordering the relocation of Israeli settlers. The disengagement was unilateral and consequently did not engender an increase in goodwill between Israel and the Palestinians. On the contrary, as we have noted, conflict between the IDF and Palestinians in Gaza has increased since the withdrawal. In many ways the current conditions in Gaza are much worse than under conventional occupation. Evidence submitted to us argues that, despite physical withdrawal, because the GoI still controls all movement in and out of the Gaza strip—by land, sea and air—the Israelis remain de facto occupiers.[103] As Discovery Analytical Resourcing said, "military disengagement and the dismantling of settlements alone, without enabling free access and open frontiers, constitutes neither a legal termination of occupation nor a practical proposition for economic development."[104] Recent incursions by the IDF into Gaza illustrate the fragility of any gains made from the withdrawal.

60. From the Palestinian point of view withdrawal from Gaza may be an important first step toward a two-state solution but Gaza is unviable without the West Bank and East Jerusalem. There has been no progress since the withdrawal on facilitating communication links between Gaza and the West Bank as set out in the Agreement on Movement and Access.[105] Many have described Gaza as an open prison. OCHA writes that "the Gazan population is undergoing a virtual siege by historical standards."[106] Gazans are unable to enter Israel and border crossings for goods in and out of Gaza have been restricted. Port and air access has been prohibited and there are reports that the airport in Gaza has been vandalized by Israeli soldiers.[107] Increased areas of Gaza are now designated buffer or no-go zones, further increasing population density.[108] However, while severe pressure has been placed on the Hamas-led PA to change its policies and accept Quartet principles, no comparable initiative has been taken with the Government of Israel to encourage it to put into practice agreements it has signed up to or to end clearly identified practices which are causing poverty and suffering in Gaza. We recommend that the UK urgently initiate a dialogue with the Government of Israel about those actions which are creating a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND THEIR PROPERTY

61. Withdrawal from Gaza does not absolve the Government of Israel from its moral obligation to alleviate, and certainly not to cause, suffering. In particular the Government of Israel, as well as the Palestinians, have obligations to protect civilians and their property.

62. Human Rights Watch has condemned the use of Palestinian civilians as human shields by both Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli Defence Force.[109] The condemnation came in the light of calls to Palestinians to defend houses targeted for destruction by making human shields. Human Rights Watch also called on the IDF to explain the military value of targeting homes which it has already ordered to be evacuated.

63. 2006 saw a marked increase in the number of Palestinian casualties of the ongoing conflict. According to UN OCHA, in the first five months of 2006, 117 Palestinians were killed including 21 children and 4 women and 844 Palestinians were injured by the Israeli Defence Force or settlers. The number of Israeli deaths has also increased in this period: three suicide bombings have killed 14 Israelis and internationals and injured 88.[110]

64. OCHA keeps monthly and weekly records of the number of deaths and injuries. Between 1 and 7 November, 68 Palestinians were killed and 182 injured in the OPTs, including 8 children and 6 women. One Israeli soldier was killed and two others injured. In the week of 8 to 14 November, 33 Palestinians were killed and 90 were injured in the OPTs, including 10 children and six women.[111] The conflict between Palestinians and Israel is resulting in a high civilian death toll. There was a marked increase in the number of Palestinian casualties in 2006. Greater pressure must be exerted on both sides to prioritise physical protection of civilians.

36 Q 257 [Mr Shearer] Back

37 Q 257 [Mr Shearer] Back

38 International Development Committee, Development Assistance and the OPTs, HC 230-I, Session 2003-04, p 12. Back

39 Q 233 [Mr Shearer] Back

40 ICRC, Household Economy Assessment: West Bank and Gaza, Autumn 2006, p 6. Back

41 International Development Committee, Occupied Palestinian Territories HC 230-I, Session 2003-04, Summary. Back

42 Q 108 [Christian Aid] Back

43 UNRWA, Prolonged Crisis in the OPT: recent socio-economic impacts, November 2006, and OCHA, Occupied Palestinian Territory 2006 Revision. Back

44 UNRWA, Prolonged Crisis. Back

45 Ev 74 [DFID] Back

46 UNRWA, Prolonged Crisis. Back

47 Q 81 [DFID] Back