House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report

3 The infrastructure of occupation

65. Over 420,000 Israeli settlers live in the OPTs in about 160 settlements and 100 outposts.[112] The location of settlements in the West Bank can be seen in Map 1. All settlements established on land which is occupied are in breach of international law. Under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is under an obligation as the occupying power not to transfer its citizens to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.[113] The Roadmap is clear that Israel should freeze all settlement activity including the natural growth of existing settlements, and dismantle all outposts built since former Prime Minister Sharon's election in March 2001.[114] The UK Government's view is that settlement building is contrary to international law and is an obstacle to peace.[115]

66. The Hague Regulations prohibit the occupying power from making permanent changes to the occupied area apart from in relation to narrowly defined military needs or unless the occupied population benefits from such changes.[116] A recent report by the Israeli NGO Peace Now notes that the property rights of Palestinians have been systematically violated in the course of settlement building. Using data from the Israeli Civil Administration the report found that Palestinians privately own nearly 40% of the land on which settlements have been built. The report also found that over 50% of land deemed 'state land' by Israel has been declared as such through controversial means and mostly for the benefit of settlements.[117] In addition, the allegation that Israel or Israeli Government agencies have appropriated privately-owned land without fair compensation is extremely serious. The allegation is frequently made on the Palestinian side. It was refuted by representatives of the GoI to whom we spoke. We are not in a position to review all the evidence and to reach a judgement, but we believe that the international community should commission a report by outside jurists and other experts, so that authoritative light can be shed on the matter.

67. In respect of outposts, evidence from Discovery Analytical Resourcing states that:

"In March 2005, the head of the criminal department at the Israeli Attorney General's Office, Talia Sasson, published a report on unauthorised settlements citing 'blatant violation of the law by certain national authorities, public authorities, regional councils … and settlers', revealing that:

the unauthorized outposts phenomenon is a continuation of the settlement enterprise in the territories;
the Israeli government was involved in planning and financing illegal outposts;
the Civil Administration was involved in allocating private Palestinian land on which outposts were unlawfully established; and,
over many years officials at the Ministries of Defence and Housing, the World Zionist Organisation and the Israeli army were implicated in the establishment of over 100 outposts."[118]

On our visit we were told by the GoI that one illegal outpost had recently been removed.

68. Despite rulings against the settlements and outposts they continue to grow both in number and size, through what is called "natural growth". UN Security Council Resolution 465 (of 1 March 1980) called on Israel "to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem."[119] However most Israeli settlements in the OPTs have been built since this Resolution was passed, with the greatest expansion having taken place in the past decade.[120]In September 2006 the GoI authorised the construction of 690 settlement housing units.[121] A new settlement was approved in the West Bank on 26 December 2006 for the families who were moved out of the Gaza strip.[122] These recent decisions are in direct contravention of the commitment made in the Roadmap to freeze all settlement activity.

THE PROPOSED E1 SETTLEMENT

69. The biggest settlement inside the West Bank, Maale Adumim, lies to the east of Jerusalem. While West Bank Palestinians cannot travel through Jerusalem to get between the northern and southern West Bank, they can currently travel through a passage between the eastern side of Jerusalem and Maale Adumim. The proposed Israeli E1 project is designed to connect Jerusalem to Maale Adumim and other settlements east of Jerusalem. The effect of E1 will be to cut off the passage between the north and the south and to further restrict links between Jerusalem and the West Bank.

70. The breaking up of the West Bank into a fragmentation of communities with severe communication difficulties between them seems to us to be entirely incompatible with a two-state solution. Proceeding with E1 would make Israeli claims to favour a two-state solution unsustainable and bring into question how a viable West Bank economy could function.

71. An official from the Israeli Ministry of Defence acknowledged to us that the proposed E1 settlement would cause serious movement problems for Palestinians. The project is currently on hold although a huge police station is being built on the site. The proposed E1 settlement will severely impact on Palestinian territorial contiguity. The current explosive nature of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, and the significance which Palestinians attach to the city of Jerusalem, should be sufficient incentive to shelve plans for E1. We recommend that the UK initiate talks with the Government of Israel about the unacceptable nature and likely impact of E1 and identify what measures could be applied by the international community if Israel persists with the implementation of its E1 plan.

Restricted roads and closure

72. The presence of settlements and outposts in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has led the GoI to create a support infrastructure for these, the effect of which is to severely limit Palestinian movement and consequently economic viability. This infrastructure includes a network of restricted roads which connect the settlements with Israel and which are accessible only to Israelis or Palestinians with permits. According to the Israeli NGO B'Tselem, the road system is based on the assumption that all Palestinians pose security risks for Israel and that it is therefore justifiable to restrict their movement.[123] The GoI defends its policy as necessary for the protection of Israeli citizens living in the West Bank after the increase in violence since the start of the second intifada. The purpose of the system is to allow Israelis to travel freely between and within settlements. For Palestinians the effect is to divide their communities from one another making economic and social interaction extremely difficult. In addition the system of bypass roads has required the expropriation of Palestinian land to build settlement roads. The territorial fragmentation of the West Bank is shown in Map 2.

73. Restrictions in movement caused by the separate roads system are compounded by road blocks, border crossings, mounds, trenches, flying checkpoints, and a separate system of underground passes for Palestinians, to which OCHA gives the collective name 'closure'. OCHA regularly monitors and reports on the number of obstacles to movement. At the time of our visit we were told there were 528 checkpoints and other closure points. One result was that OCHA found it almost impossible to get into Hebron. Journeys were taking much longer than usual—for example a one and half hour journey from Hebron to Ramallah now took three hours.

74. On our visit we stopped at many of the checkpoints in the northern West Bank. We saw some of the difficulties Palestinians face in trying to get from one part of the West Bank to another. At Huwarra checkpoint we saw taxis stopping at one side to let passengers off so they could pass through the checkpoint and then resume their journey in another taxi on the other side of the checkpoint. The roads were too narrow to cope with the large number of taxis waiting to either drop off or pick up passengers. The checkpoint on the outskirts of Nablus was chaotic with long queues. It made it extremely difficult for those living in the outlying villages to get into Nablus to use health services or for education purposes. Nablus is effectively encircled by five Israeli settlements and a series of restricted bypass roads and checkpoints through which all Palestinians have to pass.

75. At the Za'atara checkpoint, also in the Nablus region, an age restriction has been placed on all males who are allowed to pass through. No males between 16 and 25 are allowed through and sometimes this age limit is raised to 35. We were told this could prevent between 26,000 and 100,000 young men travelling south from Nablus for work, education, health or for social reasons. The Head of OCHA told us that the particular restrictions applied at a given checkpoint are often dependent on the attitude of the IDF soldier in charge at that time.[124]

76. Movement in and out of the West Bank is also controlled by a system of permits and passes. For example Palestinians who live in the West Bank but work in Jerusalem require a permit to travel to work each day. Quaker Peace and Social Witness told us:

"getting permits from the Israeli authorities is highly problematic. It is not a transparent process; people are denied permits on security grounds but they have no means of appealing against decisions or knowing what the reasons behind them are. Also, there are costs involved in trying to get permits; permits are short term and they have to be renewed and they can be withdrawn at any time; permits can also be overruled by any kind of closure that is declared at any time. So you may have a permit to enter Jerusalem, go to a checkpoint and not be able to go through anyway because some other kind of rule has applied."[125]

77. We heard two separate accounts of arbitrary delays at checkpoints which resulted in unacceptable medical consequences. David Shearer of OCHA told us of a delay which resulted in a week old baby dying,[126] and on our visit we learned of a boy of ten with cancer who had to go to a hospital appointment alone because his mother was not allowed through a checkpoint to accompany him. Camden Abu Dis Friendship Association also submitted background papers describing patients being prevented from getting through checkpoints.[127] In response to the previous International Development Committee's comments on closure, the Government said that it had pressed the GoI to ensure that commitments made to the UN humanitarian envoy in 2002 were upheld. The Government also acknowledged that theoretical agreements not to cause unnecessary delays at checkpoints were not in practice implemented.[128]

78. Israel is entitled to defends its citizens. Attacks against civilians violate international humanitarian law. However any such defence must be proportionate to the threat. The system of separate roads and road blocks is discriminatory and much of the need for such infrastructure arises from the presence of settlements. Palestinians are being treated as second-class citizens in their own country. The checkpoints are slow and the access roads are poor. The operation of the checkpoints is haphazard and arbitrary. Where humanitarian needs exist, these must, as a matter of priority, be met without delay. We are extremely disappointed that no progress has been made in this area since the previous International Development Committee's report in 2004.

The separation barrier

79. In 2002 the GoI decided to construct a separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank with the declared objective of preventing Palestinian suicide bombers and terrorists from entering Israel. The intention is to create a barrier which is 703 kilometres long.[129] This will be more than twice the length of the Green Line (315 km) which is the 1949 Armistice Line between Israel and Jordan, as it weaves in and out of Palestinian communities and Israeli settlements.[130] So far 406 kilometres (58%) has been constructed. In most places the barrier is a fence. In some, mainly urban and built-up areas, it is a concrete wall. Bethlehem, for example, is more or less surrounded on three sides by a concrete wall with access to the city from the north controlled by a checkpoint. Within Bethlehem a wall is being constructed along the route to and around Rachel's Tomb. These closures have cut off the main route between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and drastically reduced the number of tourists visiting the city.[131]

80. The separation barrier divides East Jerusalem from the West Bank leaving 220,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites on the Israeli side of the barrier.[132] If the barrier is completed along the proposed route, 60,500 West Bank Palestinians will live in the area between the barrier and the Green Line or in closed areas.[133] OCHA told us that, when complete, 12 villages and 31,400 Palestinians will be both completely encircled by the barrier and on the western side of it.

81. The effect of the barrier is to divide Palestinian communities and families from each other. Its route also prevents or severely inhibits the ability of Palestinian farmers to access their land. Quaker Peace and Social Witness submitted many first-hand accounts of the difficulties farmers face in this respect, the violence directed at some farmers by settlers, and the implications of these actions for agricultural production in the West Bank. They note:

"The barrier now separates the village of Jayyous from about 70% of their agricultural land. The 900 hectares of land trapped behind the barrier produce almost 90% of the agricultural income earned by the village. According to Jayyous mayor Fayez Salim the land that has been separated from the village contains 15,000 olive trees, nearly 50,000 citrus trees, and 120 greenhouses. Six of the seven wells that supply water to the agricultural land lie behind the barrier. The mayor suggests that the majority of families in the village are directly affected by the construction of the barrier with an associated loss of income."[134]

82. The Deir al Hatab Women's Association whom we met gave us graphic accounts of how they were prevented from accessing their land and were faced with threats or actual violence from settlers when they tried to do so. Evidence submitted by the International Solidarity Movement also provides eyewitness accounts of the effects of the wall. They note that, "there is evidence of a well organised and developed agricultural industry in the past, which is now derelict and unviable due to the apartheid wall and checkpoints restricting every part of the agricultural process."[135]

83. Both the World Bank and OCHA have reported on the implications of closure for the olive harvest in the West Bank and Gaza. Over half the Palestinian population participate in the olive harvest which in good years can contribute 15-19% of agricultural output.[136] This is an important contribution to the economy as agriculture accounts for nearly 25% of GDP. The World Bank identified a number of constraints which the olive oil sector faces; in particular current movement restrictions and closures have significantly increased the cost of production.[137] Limited access to fields and markets, as well as the destruction and uprooting of trees by settlers, led the Israeli Defence Minister to instruct the IDF to protect Palestinian farmers during the 2006 olive harvesting season.[138]

84. On our visit we were told by the GoI that the barrier was successful in preventing suicide bombers from entering Israel, but we were also told by Palestinian commentators that the barrier was ineffective in this regard because determined terrorists could find ways to get through the barrier. We accept that the barrier acts to some extent as a deterrent to terrorists, but it is also making life extremely difficult for ordinary Palestinians. The question of at what cost Israeli security should be achieved must give appropriate weight to the fact that the barrier deprives Palestinians of their land and has a devastating impact on their ability to lead normal lives.

85. The previous International Development Committee commented on the route of the barrier which departs significantly from the Green Line in many places. They understood why the Israelis might wish to build a barrier but believed that this should not be built on Palestinian land.[139] The UK Government's response was that the construction of the barrier on occupied land was unlawful and was harming the prospects for a peaceful settlement.[140] We agree.

86. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that "the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law."[141] Subsequently the UN General Assembly called on Israel to comply with the legal obligations identified in the ICJ ruling. The Israeli Supreme Court has also "declared invalid a number of orders under which land was seized to construct the separation barrier."[142] While the Government of Israel and the Israeli Supreme Court have on occasion re-examined and altered the route of the barrier, and maintain that it is a temporary structure, it has also acknowledged that there are political implications arising from the barrier. Tzipi Livni, now Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, is reported to have said that the fence will impact on the future border of Israel implying that, despite its declared temporary status, the wall may in fact establish Israel's future borders.[143]

87. Israel has the right to construct a barrier inside its own territories or along the Green Line. However, the barrier, as it is currently constructed and according to its projected route, destroys the viability of a Palestinian state. It divides Palestinian communities and families and it separates Palestinian farmers from their land. The barrier has been declared contrary to international law by the International Court of Justice. The UK Government shares the view that the building of the wall on Palestinian land is illegal. Building up the Palestinian economy and business environment is not possible under these conditions. The Government of Israel bears primary responsibility for ensuring public order and humanitarian conditions in the Palestinian territories. We accept that Israel's security concerns are legitimate, but it should not unlawfully seize Palestinian land or place unnecessary obstacles in the way of Palestinian economic development. The rulings against the separation barrier are clear—the barrier must be removed from Palestinian land and the UK Government should make renewed representations to the GoI about this and consider what further responses would be appropriate from the international community should Israel continue to ignore these rulings.

The Agreement on Movement and Access

88. Restrictions on movement and access continue to be the main impediments to Palestinian development.[144] The Israeli disengagement plan for the Gaza strip created concerns about the economic conditions in Gaza unless accompanying measures for increased movement of goods and people were implemented. The Quartet identified six conditions for Gaza's success after disengagement, four of which relate to the movement of goods and people.[145] The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), signed on 15 November 2005, was designed to "promote peaceful economic development and to improve the humanitarian situation on the ground,"[146] and reflects these conditions.[147] It seeks to open crossings between Gaza and Israel, and Gaza and Egypt, and to facilitate movement within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Gaza. It also aims to make progress on an airport and improved port facilities in Gaza.[148] Map 3 shows all the crossing points into Gaza.

89. A six-month assessment by the World Bank of movement, access and trade in the West Bank and Gaza since the AMA came into operation found that restrictions remained severe and that several earlier improvements had been reversed.[149] The update noted that:

"Today all cargo flows between Israel and Gaza must be channelled through the Karni crossing point. From a low base of only 43 export trucks per day in the six months prior to the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, actual daily export numbers through mid-June 2006 have fallen to less than 25 trucks a day. GOI has cited security concerns as the cause of the frequent closures. Without challenging this assertion, much of Karni's inadequacy derives from poor management when it is open--- cells and scanners are not used efficiently, operating hours are inconsistent and unpredictable and export volumes are low when the facility is operating. Israel has worked to keep the crossing open for the importation of foods and medicines for the Gazan population which has been essential in avoiding a humanitarian crisis. However, this is not sufficient for any type of economic recovery. With the ability to guarantee delivery dates a vital part of securing export markets, speed and reliability are mandatory, particularly for agricultural products. As things stand, today's regime represents an overwhelming obstacle to investment and growth in Gaza."[150]

90. Evidence we received from NGOs presents conflicting data on the extent to which the various crossings are open.[151] Overwhelmingly, however, the picture is one of reduced openings in terms of the number of days, or hours, or the amount of goods allowed through. A one-year assessment of the AMA by UN OCHA indicates that:

"One year after the signing of the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) on 15 November 2005 between the Government of Israel (GoI) and Palestinian Authority (PA) the ability of Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip to access either the West Bank or the outside world remains extremely limited and the flow of commercial trade is negligible. Movement within the West Bank is also more restricted. There has been no peaceful economic development as envisaged by the AMA but rather a deterioration in the humanitarian situation and an increase in violence overall. The increased closure of Gaza's crossing points has contributed to the worsening of the economic situation over the last 12 months."[152]

91. In short the AMA is failing. Initial increases in the opening of border crossings in and out of Gaza were cut back dramatically in June. There has been no progress on linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. Movement within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and Jerusalem has become more difficult. Specifically the Rafah crossing into Egypt has not opened as planned, convoys have not been allowed to transport goods between Gaza and the West Bank, the number of physical obstacles has increased, less than 4% of the Gazan harvest was exported, and Karni crossing, the most significant one for Gaza's trade, has operated at well below the proposed level of 400 trucks per day.[153] The losses from Karni's closure during the 2005 harvest season are estimated at $600,000 per day.[154]

THE RAFAH CROSSING

92. As part of the AMA an arrangement was made with the EU to allow EU observers—the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)—to monitor the Rafah crossing which links Gaza to Egypt. However, after the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, Corporal Shalit, in June 2006 on the Israel/Gaza/Egypt border by Palestinians using a tunnel near the crossing, Rafah was closed by the Israelis. The border is now only open for two days a week for specific purposes—for example during our visit Rafah was opened after the Beit Hanoun incident to allow casualties to be taken to hospitals in Egypt.

93. We were told by EUBAM that the security concerns of Israel could be met by procedures which allowed suspects to be held for up to six hours and by the use of 32 video cameras. Individuals using Rafah travel in special buses so their progress through the crossing can be easily monitored. EUBAM reports that, to date, there have been no breaches of security through the Rafah crossing. There does not seem to us to be a legitimate reason for keeping the opening of the Rafah to such restricted periods.

94. We accept that the security situation deteriorated significantly in 2006 and we acknowledge the legitimate security concerns of Israel. Decisions by the Government of Israel not to put into practice procedures acceded to in the Agreement on Movement and Access are, however, causing severe damage to the Palestinian economy and in particular to Gaza. Disengagement from Gaza has no chance of success under these conditions. Putting into practice measures agreed to in the Agreement on Movement and Access would provide a significant boost to the Palestinian economy. This is an area in which progress can be made prior to the achievement of a political solution. We recommend that the UK Government accelerate its efforts to prevent the Agreement from failing.

95. Assurances and procedures put in place by the EU Border Assistance Mission, in co-operation with Palestinian border police and customs officers, on the Rafah crossing should enable the crossing to be opened as envisaged under the Agreement on Movement and Access. The decision not to do so leads us to question the extent to which Israel is motivated by legitimate security considerations.

THE BACK-TO-BACK SYSTEM

96. The system for transporting goods in and out of the Palestinian Territories relies on the back-to-back system which the previous International Development Committee's report described.[155] This requires goods to be unloaded from one truck and loaded on to another at various checkpoints normally located at border crossings—between Gaza and Israel as well as between the West Bank and Israel. However, one back-to-back checkpoint we visited, Awarta, is located in the middle of the West Bank, where there can be little justification for suggesting it contributes to Israeli security. It effectively slows down commerce within the West Bank. The IDF is charged with supervising this checkpoint and monitoring the transfer of goods. On the day we visited there was no evidence of the IDF carrying out inspections, even though goods were being transferred from one truck to another. We were told by the IDF that they were carrying out spot-checks that day rather than systematically examining each vehicle. The conclusions the previous International Development Committee made in 2004 remain relevant. The back-to-back system is outdated, slow, unpredictable and costly. What we observed at the Awarta checkpoint in the middle of the West Bank leads us to question the contribution it makes to enhancing security, while it is quite clear that it is one of the measures strangling the Palestinian economy.

97. As we were unable to visit Gaza, we did not see the back-to-back system in operation there. The US Security Coordinator, General Dayton, explained to us his efforts to update the equipment being used on the Karni crossing which would significantly speed up the process. The Secretary of State for International Development visited the Karni crossing: his view was that it would be beneficial if Karni could be opened as intended.[156]

THE GAZA GREENHOUSE PROJECT.

98. On our visit we were told about a Palestinian greenhouse project in Gaza which made use of 4,000 square kilometres of greenhouses left by the departing settlers, after Israeli disengagement in September 2005, to grow fruit and vegetables for export. We were told that it was the largest greenhouse project of its kind in the world which attracted investment from Palestinians and foreign investors, including James Wolfensohn, former President of the World Bank and the Quartet's special envoy for the Gaza disengagement. It was intended to generate 120 tons of produce per day in season[157] with potential revenue of many millions of dollars. The project had employed about 4,000 workers.[158]

99. Despite the AMA being in place, tightening of the crossing openings, coinciding with the peak harvest time in March and April, meant that only 4% of the greenhouse project produce could be exported in 2006. The rest was dumped or given away in local markets. The workers were laid off without compensation, contributing further to the already very high levels of unemployment in Gaza. The Gaza greenhouse project demonstrates the fragility of the Palestinian economy under the current restrictions on movement and access.

100. We believe there is a fundamental relationship between Palestinian economic viability and Israeli security. The benefits from the achievement of both would be mutual. The efforts of the US Security Coordinator to improve the security of the Karni crossing are a step in the right direction. The effective operation of Karni would help to ensure a predictable and efficient passage of goods between Israel and Gaza. Without this the Palestinian economy cannot grow. A viable Palestinian economy would serve the interests of Palestinians and Israelis and both have responsibilities to ensure the safe, predictable and secure passage of goods and people as set out in the Agreement on Movement and Access. Making the Agreement work should be a priority for both parties and for the international community.

112 Ev 84 [DFID]; Q 243 [Mr Shearer]. Outposts are unauthorized 'temporary' structures which have been erected close to existing settlements. See, The Sasson Report Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, www.pmo.gov.il. Back

113 Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 and considers it belongs to the state of Israel. This is not recognized by the international community. Back

114 The Roadmap, 'a performance-based roadmap to a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,' was agreed in 2003 between the GoI and the PLO and approved by the Quartet. Back

115 www.fco.gov.uk. Back

116 The Hague Regulations are discussed at www.btselem.org. Back

117 Peace Now, Breaking the Law in the West Bank: One violation leads to another, October 2006. Back

118 Ev 128 [Discovery Analytical Resourcing] Back

119 UNSCR 465 was adopted under Chapter 6 which means it is a non-binding resolution. Back

120 Amnesty International, www.Amnesty.org. Back

121 Ev 93 [Christian Aid] Back

122 Israel Approves West Bank Settlement, www.bbc.co.uk, 26 December 2006. Back

123 B'Tselem, Forbidden Roads: Israel's Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank, August 2004. Back