The
role of donors
130. The previous International Development Committee's
report on the OPTs commented on the difficult and limited role
which international development assistance can play under conditions
of occupation. The case made then, which remains valid today,
is that while increasing levels of international assistance helps
to stave off humanitarian catastrophe, donors are effectively
subsidising Israel's occupation and relieving Israel of its duty
to maintain basic services for the occupied population.[200]
Most donors are acutely aware of this but are understandably unwilling
to disengage, believing that Israel would not in fact step in
and fill the gap left by donors.[201]
We agree
that under the current circumstances donors should not disengage
from the OPTs.
131. However, it is worrying that three years after
the previous International Development Committee reported the
same conclusions can be made. As DFID notes in its evidence, "decades
of occupation and conflict with Israel have severely constrained
Palestinian development."[202]
Looking back to the evidence they submitted in 2003, Christian
Aid told us:
"under tighter Israeli occupation, aid has become
a lifeline—but it is a lifeline that does not provide a
long-term solution….. No amount of aid will resolve the political
conflict over the Israeli occupation or bring about the peace
which Israelis and Palestinians so desperately need. The solution
to Palestinian poverty is an end to occupation and an agreement
which recognises the right of Israelis and Palestinians alike
to live in peace and security. The situation today is far worse,
so we need to repeat these comments again today with even greater
urgency."[203]
Indeed much of the evidence we received points towards
the need for an end to occupation—for a political solution,
as a precondition for development.[204]
The question of what can be done in the absence of a political
solution or how leverage can be exerted, is often avoided.
132. The DFID programme seeks to enhance the prospects
for peace, to make Palestinian institutions more effective and
accountable, and to deliver humanitarian and development assistance
more effectively.[205]
These are important objectives but the current situation makes
the first two in particular largely unachievable. We
agree that there is an urgent need for a political solution, and
an end to occupation, but consider that there are interim actions
which can and should be taken by the international community to
work towards one. For example DFID has contributed to the building
up of the Palestinian Authority and other institutions, and has
supported the Negotiations Support Unit, with a view to eventual
self-government. Such initiatives provide opportunities for increased
levels of independence and Palestinian-led development. These
are welcome initiatives. Unfortunately, as we have noted, the
current policy of not funding PA institutions threatens to undo
much of the progress which DFID has helped achieve and increases
the risk of collapse of the PA as anticipated by DFID in their
Country Assistance Plan of 2004.
133. The Quartet conditions and the withdrawal of
direct funding have placed the Hamas-led PA under severe pressure.
We heard different views as to whether the withholding of revenues
and the effect this had on public servants, as well as the services
they deliver, was likely to undermine Hamas or to entrench them.
The GoI has adopted similar measures by withholding tax revenues
and has also increased military pressure and 'closure'. It
has been reported that the Government of Israel has released $100
million of the withheld revenues to the Palestinian president.[206]
This
is a welcome development.
However there is no legitimacy to the withholding of any of the
revenues and the decision to release only a small part of these
will have limited effect on the crisis facing the Palestinian
economy. Pressure must be placed on the GoI by the UK and the
Quartet to release the full amount due as soon as possible.
134. We have said that we do not think that donors
should disengage from the OPTs under the current circumstances,
but this does not mean that donors should not place pressure on
Israel to abide by those international laws which govern military
occupation. Again, this was an issue which was raised by the
previous International Development Committee. The UK Government
response at the time was that it agreed that Israel should respect
the Geneva Conventions and that it raised specific breaches with
the Israeli Government at the highest levels.[207]
The Government also said it regularly urges the Israelis (and
the Palestinians) to do more to fulfil their Roadmap obligations.
The UK Government position then was that 'constructive engagement
with Israel is the best approach to exert influence on it to take
the steps called for by the EU and in the Roadmap.'[208]
135. The effect of this constructive engagement has
thus far been very limited. Many of the obstacles identified in
2004 continue to cause problems for the Palestinians and 2006
has seen a worsening socio-economic and humanitarian situation.
Christian Aid evidence states:
"Occupation is the main obstacle that Palestinians
face on a daily basis and that undermines the viability of a Palestinian
state. The apparatus that supports and perpetuates occupation—the
settlements, the separation barrier and the closures—prevent
Palestinians from going about their daily business and denies
them their rights and access to their cultural and historical
legacies."[209]
136. The way in which donors engage with Israel is
as important as development assistance to the OPTs. David Shearer
discussed with us the probability that the international community
was allowing a failed state to be constructed on Israel's borders
at the very moment it was trying to prevent such states emerging
elsewhere.[210] Our
report highlights the lack of progress in development since the
previous Committee's report on the OPTs in 2004. This lack of
progress sits uneasily with the large amount of donor funding
going into the OPTs and raises questions about donors' policy
towards Israel.
137. The existence
of the settlements and the requirement to protect and secure them
has created a complex system of separation under which Palestinians
must live. The current system of closure if taken to its logical
conclusion will make a future Palestinian state unviable. This
must not be allowed to happen. The future of the West Bank and
East Jerusalem settlements should be a matter of priority for
the international community. The constructive engagement approach
has not placed it sufficiently high on the agenda. The UK and
the international community need to reconsider their approach
towards the Government of Israel.
Looking forward: the current
ceasefire
138. One effect of the ceasefire between Israel and
the Palestinians has been to reduce significantly the number of
fatalities in Gaza resulting from IDF actions.[211]
The ceasefire has also opened up the possibility of talks between
the GoI and the Office of the President. Discussions between Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and President Abbas on 24 December 2006 offered
the promise of some revenues being released and future peace talks.
However these discussions took place amidst growing unrest between
supporters of Fatah and those of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza.
There have been accusations of outside interference by both factions.
What is clear is that if internal Palestinian violence continues,
or if any party feels it is being pushed out of office illegitimately,
the prospects for peace in the region could be seriously undermined.[212]
139. As the elected government, Hamas should be consulted
in any negotiations, but Hamas has not demonstrated willingness
to engage in talks under the current circumstances. The Office
of the President should be working alongside the Hamas-led government
to help them adjust to the realities of government and to create
a climate in which negotiations and engagement with the international
community are possible. Efforts in this regard have not yet yielded
results.[213]
140. The international community must also consider
whether isolation is the best way of effecting change. International
Crisis Group argues that, whilst international isolation may cause
the Hamas government to fall, the chaos and violence which would
result would undermine any benefits.[214]
There are many examples of conflicts where extreme positions have
only been modified after dialogue, initially rejected by one or
both sides, is eventually entered into. At
present there is a stand-off between a Palestinian government
that will not recognise Israel and the international community
which insists on this as a precondition for even exploratory dialogue
on humanitarian affairs, let alone formal peace talks. Ways must
be found to foster a dialogue—incentives should be offered
as well as penalties threatened or imposed if progress is to be
made on the peace settlement.
141. Even if, as many hope, a government of national
unity is formed in the OPTs, the international community will
probably continue to play a significant role in providing humanitarian
assistance to the territories for some time to come. The increase
in humanitarian assistance has come about as Israel has tightened
its closure policy with severe socio-economic consequences for
the Palestinian economy. But humanitarian assistance is not an
instrument for ending conflict, nor does it offer prospects for
poverty alleviation and long-term development. Humanitarian
assistance must be integrated with long-term development planning
which seeks to relieve developmental constraints. To this end
the UK must work with the Palestinian Authority and other relevant
bodies to consider how to rebuild Palestinian institutions and
how to restore lost livelihoods which have resulted from events
in 2006 and, importantly, how to re-establish confidence in the
democratic process out of which Hamas was elected.
142. The way Palestinian political parties conduct
themselves is vital to achieving this and there needs to be change
in the approaches of both Hamas and Fatah. Vital too is the extent
to which the international community demonstrates consistency
and even-handedness. The international community must show more
clearly that it respects the democratic decisions of the Palestinians,
just as much as that of any other people, to elect the government
of their choice. In other
situations, ways have been found of UK representatives talking
to those with whom we have profound and justifiable disagreements
because we talk to them in their capacity as elected representatives,
not in their capacity as representatives of a particular party
or faction. Finding ways of achieving this in this case need not
mean a dilution of the international community's insistence that
Israel has the unqualified right to recognition and security within
legitimate borders any more than our talking to the Government
of Israel means endorsing its continued occupation of East Jerusalem,
the West Bank and Gaza.
143. Although we are clear that
practical action needs to be taken now to relieve the immediate
crisis in the Occupied Territories, we are also clear that the
Palestinians have as equal a right to self-determination in a
viable and contiguous state as the Israelis have to peace and
security in their own internationally recognised state. Neither
the international community nor the Government of Israel should
underestimate the strength of commitment amongst Palestinians
to such a state. That message came out strongly during our visit.
144. Palestinian
resistance to occupation has taken many forms over the years.
Whilst rejecting violence as a means of achieving their aims we
support the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside
Israel. The commitment to a two-state solution is set out in UN
Resolutions and in the performance-based Roadmap drawn up in 2003.
The Roadmap was endorsed by the Quartet and the partners in the
Quartet should work more proactively to achieve it, through talks
between the parties involved and through measurable and internationally
monitored steps to achieve it.
200 International Development Committee, Occupied
Palestinian Territories, HC 230-1, (Session 2003-04), para
153. Back
201
Q 28 [DFID] Back
202
Ev 74 [DFID] Back
203
Ev 93 [Christian Aid] Back
204
See also Qs 260, 286 [Hilary Benn] Back
205
DFID, Country Assistance Plan. Back
206
Associated Press Report Israel unfreezes $100 m before summit,
19 January 2007. Back
207
Government response, HC 487, p 2. Back
208
Government response, HC 487, p 10. Back
209
Ev 97 [Christian Aid] Back
210
Q 258 [Mr Shearer] Back
211
OCHA Situation Report Gaza, December 2006. Back
212
International Crisis Group, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet:
Pulling back from the brink, June 2006. Back
213
Qs 283, 288, 291 [Hilary Benn] Back
214
International Crisis Group, Pulling back from the brink,
p 2. Back
