Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. We
do not in any way condone the firing of qassam rockets from Gaza
into Israel. Such actions need to stop. The question of a proportionate
response nevertheless arises. The Israeli Defence Force's response
has killed and injured many more people than the actions of the
Palestinian militants. Many civilians, including women and children,
have been killed in Gaza. We accept that in situations of conflict
there will be mistakes and even excesses but proportionate response
must be an integral part of any state's security policy. The actions
of neither the Palestinian militants nor the IDF in and around
Gaza enhance the prospects for a peaceful settlement. (Paragraph
10)
2. We believe that
the international community is right to place pressure on Hamas
to change those policies which militate against a peace process.
However this would best be achieved through dialogue and engagement
rather than isolation. The danger of the current approach is that
it might push Hamas into a corner which encourages violence rather
than negotiation. The international community must also ensure
it is not bolstering one faction against the other and thereby
increasing the risk of internal strife. (Paragraph 17)
3. We agree with the
British Prime Minister that until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is solved there will be no peace in the region. 2006 has been
a year of crisis for the OPTs; much of the progress made in the
past has been eroded. We hope the Prime Minister's comments will
revive interest in a peaceful settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict which has continued for several decades. (Paragraph
21)
Economic growth and private sector development
4. The
environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is not conducive
to the growth of the private sector. On the contrary current measures
imposed by the Government of Israel, on security grounds, provide
significant disincentives for local and foreign investment in
the OPTs. This is a worrying trend which threatens the viability
of a future Palestinian state. Donors can play a role in encouraging
the creation of an enabling investment climate but a reliable
and predictable environment requires a peace settlement. Nevertheless
more pro-active steps can be taken, even prior to the attainment
of a peace settlement. The easing of occupation could dramatically
improve the prospects for business development and this in turn
could improve the prospects for a durable peace. There is particular
potential to encourage the development of small business and the
third sector. We recommended in our report on private sector development
that DFID should develop a strategy for private sector development
in conflict-prone and conflict-affected states. The OPTs are an
obvious example of where this would be valuable. (Paragraph 35)
Trade
5. Current
restrictions, including those on movement and access, make Palestinian
trade uncompetitive and the interim Association Agreement with
the EU inoperable. The viability of a future Palestinian economy
will depend significantly on its trading opportunities. The EU
must ensure that Palestinian products are not being unfairly treated
by Israel and measures need to be put in place to make the Association
Agreement effective. (Paragraph 37)
6. There is an incongruity
in allowing Israel to continue to benefit from a type of agreement
from which Israel prevents Palestinians benefiting. Continued
dialogue with Israel is certainly necessary but the Association
Agreement appears to give tacit assent to the restrictions on
movement and access which Israel imposes on the Palestinians.
The UK should urge the EU to use the Association Agreement with
Israel as a lever for change and to consider suspending the Agreement
until there are further improvements in access arrangements.
(Paragraph 38)
7. The regulation
requiring detailed postcodes for settlement products is a recent
and welcome development. It is important that the EU is not indirectly
supporting and giving benefit to unlawful settlements on Palestinian
land. However, to be effective, information about the postcodes
needs to be widely understood in the EU and member states should
ensure that robust, cost-effective arrangements are put in place
to monitor goods being imported from Israel. The UK Government
should press for the EU to take practical action to achieve these
things. (Paragraph 39)
8. It has been reported
that the Government of Israel is compensating Israeli manufacturers
beyond the Green Line who export to the EU for the loss of their
preference. This matter should be fully investigated by the EU
to determine whether such practices undermine the basis of the
Agreement. (Paragraph 39)
Poverty
9. Although
the West Bank and Gaza were suffering from the impact of occupation
well before 2000, developments since the outbreak of the intifada
in that year took the socio-economic situation in the OPTs to
crisis level. That crisis has intensified in 2006. In its current
phase it is largely triggered by the withholding of Palestinian
Authority revenues by the Government of Israel and the withdrawal
of budgetary assistance by the major donors. These actions have
made a bad situation worse. The PA is operating with a fraction
of its normal budget and its contribution to household income
has declined. The Government of Israel has been urged by the EU
General Affairs Council to stop withholding the revenues, or to
pay the revenues through the EU's own Temporary International
Mechanism. There have been recent reports of an agreement between
the Government of Israel and the Palestinian President on the
repayment of some of the withheld funds. This is a matter of
the highest priority. Current measures taken by the GoI and the
international community are harming ordinary people. We recommend
that the UK Government make specific representations to the Government
of Israel to pay the remainder of the revenues due to the recognised
institutions of the PA. If negotiations take place to channel
the revenues through the Temporary International Mechanism or
the Office of the President, it is important that these recognize
that the revenues belong to the Palestinians, not the Government
of Israel, and that any such discussions expedite, rather than
delay, the revenues being put to use in the OPTs. (Paragraph
49)
Humanitarian assistance
10. We
agree with DFID that, while the UN can provide short-term humanitarian
assistance, it cannot replace the services normally offered by
the Palestinian Authority. Current high levels of humanitarian
assistance may be necessary but they far exceed per capita levels
provided in many poorer countries, for example in sub-Saharan
Africa, and are not sustainable in the long term. (Paragraph
52)
The role of the UN Relief and Works Agency
11. The
UN Relief and Works Agency's capacity is stretched by the current
crisis which has created an increased demand for its services.
Even before the current crisis, UNRWA had requested more financial
resources and increased management capacity to ensure a high standard
of service delivery. We urge donors to bring greater predictability
to UNRWA funding so that appropriate planning can take place to
ensure proper provision of services for Palestinian refugees.
DFID's additional funding over a four-year period is a welcome
contribution and will also benefit non-refugees in the current
crisis. If the UNRWA mandate is extended in 2008 it must be made
clear to donors that the current level of funding is insufficient
to provide high quality services for Palestinian refugees. (Paragraph
57)
The responsibilities of the Government of Israel
12. While
severe pressure has been placed on the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority
to change its policies and accept Quartet principles, no comparable
initiative has been taken with the Government of Israel to encourage
it to put into practice agreements it has signed up to or to end
clearly identified practices which are causing poverty and suffering
in Gaza. We recommend that the UK Government urgently initiate
a dialogue with the Government of Israel about those actions which
are creating a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. (Paragraph 60)
13. The conflict between
Palestinians and Israel is resulting in a high civilian death
toll. There has been a marked increase in the number of Palestinian
casualties in 2006. Greater pressure must be exerted on both sides
to prioritise physical protection of civilians. (Paragraph 64)
The infrastructure of occupation
14. The
proposed E1 settlement will severely impact on Palestinian territorial
contiguity. The current explosive nature of the relationship between
Israel and the Palestinians, and the significance which Palestinians
attach to the city of Jerusalem, should be sufficient incentive
to shelve plans for E1. We recommend that the UK Government initiate
talks with the Government of Israel about the unacceptable nature
and likely impact of E1 and identify what measures could be applied
by the international community if Israel persists with the implementation
of its E1 plan. (Paragraph 71)
15. Israel is entitled
to defends its citizens. Attacks against civilians violate international
humanitarian law. However any such defence must be proportionate
to the threat. The system of separate roads and road blocks is
discriminatory and much of the need for such infrastructure arises
from the presence of settlements. Palestinians are being treated
as second-class citizens in their own country. The checkpoints
are slow and the access roads are poor. The operation of the checkpoints
is haphazard and arbitrary. Where humanitarian needs exist, these
must, as a matter of priority, be met without delay. We are extremely
disappointed that no progress has been made in this area since
the previous International Development Committee's report in 2004.
(Paragraph 78)
The separation barrier
16. Israel
has the right to construct a barrier inside its own territories
or along the Green Line. However, the barrier, as it is currently
constructed and according to its projected route, destroys the
viability of a Palestinian state. It divides Palestinian communities
and families and it separates Palestinian farmers from their land.
The barrier has been declared contrary to international law by
the International Court of Justice. The UK Government shares the
view that the building of the wall on Palestinian land is illegal.
Building up the Palestinian economy and business environment is
not possible under these conditions. The Government of Israel
bears primary responsibility for ensuring public order and humanitarian
conditions in the Palestinian territories. We accept that Israel's
security concerns are legitimate, but it should not unlawfully
seize Palestinian land or place unnecessary obstacles in the way
of Palestinian economic development. The rulings against the separation
barrier are clear—the barrier must be removed from Palestinian
land and the UK Government should make renewed representations
to the GoI about this and consider what further responses would
be appropriate from the international community should Israel
continue to ignore these rulings. (Paragraph 87)
The Agreement on Movement and Access
17. We
accept that the security situation deteriorated significantly
in 2006 and we acknowledge the legitimate security concerns of
Israel. Decisions by the Government of Israel not to put into
practice procedures acceded to in the Agreement on Movement and
Access are, however, causing severe damage to the Palestinian
economy and in particular to Gaza. Disengagement from Gaza has
no chance of success under these conditions. Putting into practice
measures agreed to in the Agreement on Movement and Access would
provide a significant boost to the Palestinian economy. This is
an area in which progress can be made prior to the achievement
of a political solution. We recommend that the UK Government accelerate
its efforts to prevent the Agreement from failing. (Paragraph
94)
18. Assurances and
procedures put in place by the EU Border Assistance Mission, in
co-operation with Palestinian border police and customs officers,
on the Rafah crossing should enable the crossing to be opened
as envisaged under the Agreement on Movement and Access. The decision
not to do so leads us to question the extent to which Israel
is motivated by legitimate security considerations. (Paragraph
95)
19. The back-to-back
system is outdated, slow, unpredictable and costly. What we observed
at the Awarta checkpoint in the middle of the West Bank leads
us to question the contribution it makes to enhancing security,
while it is quite clear that it is one of the measures strangling
the Palestinian economy. (Paragraph 96)
20. We believe there
is a fundamental relationship between Palestinian economic viability
and Israeli security. The benefits from the achievement of both
would be mutual. The efforts of the US Security Coordinator to
improve the security of the Karni crossing are a step in the right
direction. The effective operation of Karni would help to ensure
a predictable and efficient passage of goods between Israel and
Gaza. Without this the Palestinian economy cannot grow. A viable
Palestinian economy would serve the interests of Palestinians
and Israelis and both have responsibilities to ensure the safe,
predictable and secure passage of goods and people as set out
in the Agreement on Movement and Access. Making the Agreement
work should be a priority for both parties and for the international
community. (Paragraph 100)
The Temporary International Mechanism
21. It
is clear that there have been delays in getting Window I of the
Temporary International Mechanism fully operational. We understand
the need for caution in the procurement of supplies of drugs and
accept that the European Commission would have faced the same
problems as the World Bank if it had administered Window I. However
these problems could have been anticipated and alternatives considered
to ensure the continued supply of medicines. We believe that the
TIM's objective of ensuring that essential services continue has
not thus far been met in relation to the supply of essential drugs.
(Paragraph 107)
22. Window II was
a timely response to the bombing of the Gaza power plant. It is
working well in difficult circumstances and fulfilling its objectives.
(Paragraph 108)
23. Window
III is making a useful, if limited, contribution to health care
workers, social hardship cases, low income cases and pensioners.
It is not a substitute for, or equal in value to, salaries or
normal welfare arrangements. In the current circumstances, it
is helping to meet the basic needs of some groups of people. There
are many public sector workers who do not receive anything through
the TIM and who are worse off as a result of the fiscal crisis
facing the PA. The strikes throughout the civil service demonstrate
their dissatisfaction. (Paragraph
112)
24. We
recommend greater donor co-ordination to facilitate the work of
the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU
COPPS) which we believe can play an important role in developing
policing skills and a non-factional approach to promoting law
and order. We are also pleased that discussions are taking place
between the EU and the Office of the President about the possibility
of the security services being paid an allowance through the TIM.
In highly inflammatory situations it is important that the civil
police feel they are in a position to carry out their duties effectively
and do not abuse their position because of economic hardship.
However any decision to fund the civil police, or the security
forces of the Office of the President, will need to take account
of the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah security forces and potential
misdirection of funds to international terrorism.
(Paragraph 115)
25. A
way must be found to repay the remaining revenues withheld by
the Government of Israel. The TIM offers one possible mechanism.
(Paragraph 116)
26. The
European Commission recognises that the TIM is, and can only be,
an inadequate response to the present financial crisis in the
OPTs. We agree that it is a means of helping the poorest and alleviating
the suffering of the Palestinian people in the short run. The
problems we have identified, including the delays in getting Window
I off the ground, as well as the limited number of civil servants
who receive payments, will need to be addressed when the TIM is
extended. In the absence of a solution to the current fiscal crisis
we support the continuation of the TIM. However we insist that
it must be temporary and if it persists beyond the current year
there is a very real risk that the Palestinian Authority may be
fatally undermined. This
would set back not only the realisation of Palestinian rights
to govern themselves in the West Bank and Gaza but also the prospects
for peace. (Paragraph 117)
The health sector
27. The
UK Government and other donors in the international community
have indicated that if a Palestinian Authority, led by or including
Hamas, agreed to accept the Quartet principles, normal funding
mechanisms would be resumed. We hope the Government of Israel
would take a similar view. In the meantime, however, we believe
there are humanitarian reasons to exempt the health sector from
the financial boycott of the Palestinian Authority, especially
given the difficulties which restrictions on movement and access
continue to cause for this sector. We recommend that the UK Government
investigate the possibility of achieving such an exemption. Using
existing health provision structures would be more effective and
efficient than the creation of alternative funding mechanisms
such as the Temporary International Mechanism.
(Paragraph 129)
Development assistance under conditions of occupation
28. We
agree that under the current circumstances donors should not disengage
from the OPTs. (Paragraph
130)
29. We
agree that there is an urgent need for a political solution, and
an end to occupation, but consider that there are interim actions
which can and should be taken by the international community to
work towards one. For example DFID has contributed to the building
up of the Palestinian Authority and other institutions, and has
supported the Negotiations Support Unit, with a view to eventual
self-government. Such initiatives provide opportunities for increased
levels of independence and Palestinian-led development. These
are welcome initiatives. Unfortunately, as we have noted, the
current policy of not funding PA institutions threatens to undo
much of the progress which DFID has helped achieve and increases
the risk of collapse of the PA as anticipated by DFID in its Country
Assistance Plan of 2004. (Paragraph
132)
30. It
has been reported that the Government of Israel has released $100
million of the withheld revenues to the Palestinian President.
This is
a welcome development. However there is no legitimacy to the withholding
of any of the revenues and the decision to release only a small
part of these will have limited effect on the crisis facing the
Palestinian economy. Pressure must be placed on the GoI by the
UK and the Quartet to release the full amount due as soon as possible.
(Paragraph 133)
31. The
existence of the settlements and the requirement to protect and
secure them has created a complex system of separation under which
Palestinians must live. The current system of closure if taken
to its logical conclusion will make a future Palestinian state
unviable. This must not be allowed to happen. The future of the
West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements should be a matter of
priority for the international community. The constructive engagement
approach has not placed it sufficiently high on the agenda. The
UK and the international community need to reconsider their approach
towards the Government of Israel.
(Paragraph 137)
Looking forward: the current ceasefire
32. At
present there is a stand-off between a Palestinian government
that will not recognise Israel and the international community
which insists on this as a precondition for even exploratory dialogue
on humanitarian affairs, let alone formal peace talks. Ways must
be found to foster a dialogue—incentives should be offered
as well as penalties threatened or imposed if progress is to be
made on the peace settlement.
(Paragraph 140)
33. Humanitarian
assistance must be integrated with long-term development planning
which seeks to relieve developmental constraints. To this end
the UK must work with the Palestinian Authority and other relevant
bodies to consider how to rebuild Palestinian institutions and
how to restore lost livelihoods which have resulted from events
in 2006 and, importantly, how to re-establish confidence in the
democratic process out of which Hamas was elected.
(Paragraph 141)
34. In
other situations, ways have been found of UK representatives talking
to those with whom we have profound and justifiable disagreements
because we talk to them in their capacity as elected representatives,
not in their capacity as representatives of a particular party
or faction. Finding ways of achieving this in this case need not
mean a dilution of the international community's insistence that
Israel has the unqualified right to recognition and security within
legitimate borders any more than our talking to the Government
of Israel means endorsing its continued occupation of East Jerusalem,
the West Bank and Gaza. (Paragraph 142)
35. Although
we are clear that practical action needs to be taken now to relieve
the immediate crisis in the Occupied Territories, we are also
clear that the Palestinians have as equal a right to self-determination
in a viable and contiguous state as the Israelis have to peace
and security in their own internationally recognised state. Neither
the international community nor the Government of Israel should
underestimate the strength of commitment amongst Palestinians
to such a state. That message came out strongly during our visit.
(Paragraph 143)
36. Palestinian
resistance to occupation has taken many forms over the years.
Whilst rejecting violence as a means of achieving their aims we
support the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside
Israel. The commitment to a two-state solution is set out in UN
Resolutions and in the performance-based Roadmap drawn up in 2003.
The Roadmap was endorsed by the Quartet and the partners in the
Quartet should work more proactively to achieve it, through talks
between the parties involved and through measurable and internationally
monitored steps to achieve it. (Paragraph 144)
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