House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Tenth Report

2 DFID'S IN-COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO IDPS

16. DFID is one of only four donors with a staffed office in Burma.[22] The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Development, Gareth Thomas MP, told us that DFID has "the capacity as a result to know what works, who does what and where aid is best deployed" in Burma and that the Department has a "comparative advantage" in working in-country.[23] This chapter will assess the validity of this claim by looking at how effectively DFID reaches and assists IDPs within Burma.

The scale of need

17. Much of the debate about assisting Burmese IDPs focuses on populations displaced by the armed conflict in eastern Burma and other contested border areas. However, there are large numbers of displaced civilians throughout the country. State policies have led to massive dislocation and relocation of people in many areas, including the central dry zone, where seasonal food scarcity is most serious.[24] Estimating the total number of displaced people within Burma is very difficult but is likely to be around one million, and includes vulnerable communities that have experienced displacement for decades.[25] Part of the problem in accurately assessing the scale and location of need lies in the complexity of displacement. As Ashley South, a consultant specialising in displacement in Burma, states:

Tatmadaw

DFID assistance to IDPs is delivered both through its overall development programme for Burma (described in paragraphs 10-11), which it claims is "responsive to the needs of IDPs", and specific arrangements to fund community groups and provide emergency relief through the International Committee of the Red Cross (described in paragraph 12).[27]

18. The scale of the need that DFID and other donors are trying to address is extensive. A lack of reliable data complicates assessments of poverty. Burma is almost certainly seriously off-track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[28] The public health situation is particularly worrying. Infectious diseases are approaching epidemic levels: currently 71% of the population is at risk of malaria infection, the country has the third highest rate of HIV prevalence in South-East Asia and there are high rates of drug-resistant tuberculosis.[29] Public funding for health is the lowest in the world, at 0.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[30] 60% of households have had no education at all.[31] Food scarcity continues to affect both settled populations and IDPs.[32]

19. IDPs are likely to be amongst the most vulnerable. In its written evidence, DFID set out key challenges in reaching IDPs:

remoteness—IDPs are concentrated in mountainous areas with poor infrastructure;
security—armed conflict continues in eastern Burma;
state restrictions on access—especially to conflict areas;
humanitarian principles—the need to respect independence, impartiality and neutrality, in the face of both a brutal regime and armed opposition;
limited in-country capacity—Burmese personnel have often had little access to capacity-building;
co-ordination—complicated by the regime's unwillingness to assume this role and the difficulties for aid organisations in openly communicating their work; and
the need to balance development work with humanitarian and protection activities.[33]

We recognise the huge challenges facing donors in assisting IDPs within Burma and commend DFID for being one of only four donors to run a staffed development programme within the country.

Funding community-based organisations

20. In an attempt to overcome a number of these challenges facing external donors, DFID is providing £400,000 in 2007-08 for Burmese community-based organisations (CBOs) to assist IDPs. The Department says it also provides training to increase the groups' ability to deliver aid.[34] Given Burma's public health crisis, Dr Alan Smith, of the Thailand-based Centre for Local Development, considered health awareness training in local languages, capacity-building of local health workers and education about the need for safe water and sanitation to be particularly important for CBOs.[35]

21. Ethnic, religious and community groups often have relatively open access to government-controlled and ceasefire areas and can provide important development (and some limited protection) assistance to IDPs.[36] Such groups can assess IDPs' needs at first-hand and tailor their response accordingly.[37] Another key benefit to assistance provided by local grassroots organisations is their ability to go beyond emergency humanitarian assistance to undertake more sustainable development work with communities.

22. This might include: capacity-building; education; landmine awareness and mapping; health and sanitation promotion; and self-reliance programmes.[38] Ethnic women's organisations play a particular role in providing vocational skills and literacy training and specialised health education to women and children.[39] Providing funding to community-based organisations (CBOs), who often manage their own clinics, schools and projects, is a way for donors to assist IDPs without channelling funds through the military regime. Such groups can go beyond emergency assistance to carry out crucial sustainable development work at grassroots level. Ashley South, a consultant specialising in displacement in Burma, pointed out that CBOs are under-funded, especially in comparison to groups carrying out cross-border assistance to IDPs.[40] We recommend that DFID increase substantially the funding it gives to CBOs within Burma. Capacity-building and training of such groups is a crucial complementary strategy if funding is to be used effectively.

23. Some CBOs are directly linked to pro-democracy resistance organisations.[41] The regime seems to be more tolerant of social and community work done by faith-based groups. So donor funds, if not publicly acknowledged, can be channelled through religious groups to benefit IDPs. Funding CBOs provides donors with the means to support human rights and democracy work within Burma.

Exile groups

24. Another channel through which donors can assist IDPs within Burma is the range of Burmese political exile groups based in neighbouring countries. We met a number of these groups during our visit to Thailand, including the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN), the Women's League of Burma and the National Council of the Union of Burma. We heard that most groups work through the collection of information and advocacy, with some also carrying out covert political work and capacity-building (for instance, the training of professionals and journalists). SWAN told us that their network has a particular focus on documenting and assisting victims of sexual violence, to which Shan women, as an ethnic minority, are especially vulnerable. SWAN said that whilst they received support from other donors, they had tried in vain to meet and discuss funding opportunities with DFID. This must change.

25. Support to these groups has the dual benefit of promoting a transition to democracy and the establishment of a civil society within Burma.[42]One example is the exiled trade union movement. There are no free trade unions in Burma and the right to organise is severely restricted. Forced labour has been reported in Burma since the early 1960s and ethnic minorities and IDPs are particularly vulnerable to this abuse. A 2006 report by the Back Pack Health Worker Teams found that one-third of the IDPs surveyed in eastern Burma had experienced forced labour.[43] Maung Maung, General Secretary of the exiled Federation of Trade Unions-Burma (FTUB), described to us the covert training sessions his organisation runs within Burma to create awareness of trade unions, human rights and democracy.[44]

26. Mr. Maung said that the FTUB could, with extra financial support, extend these programmes.[45] Several pieces of written evidence recommended that DFID should begin funding the FTUB, as well as other exile groups including the Association for the Assistance of Political Prisoners, the Shan Women's Action Network, the Women's League of Burma and the Women's League of Chinland.[46] We recommend that DFID begin appropriate funding of exile groups who carry out crucial work both inside and outside Burma to support IDPs and other vulnerable groups. Support to such groups would have the simultaneous benefit of supporting and raising awareness about the plight of IDPs, and of building capacity for a future democratic transition. We believe that the exiled trade union movement and women's groups are particularly worthy of support.

International Committee of the Red Cross

27. As mentioned earlier, DFID has also provided emergency assistance to IDPs through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), totalling £0.5 million in 2006.[47] However, this was disrupted by the closure of two ICRC offices in Burma in March 2007. During our visit, Thierry Ribaux, Deputy Head of Burma's ICRC delegation, told us that a lack of independent access to sites or permission to work independently was now completely inhibiting the ICRC from carrying out its monitoring and protection work in eastern Burma. He said that the ICRC was standing by to withdraw completely if the situation deteriorated. In February 2006, Médecins Sans Frontières-France withdrew from Burma, stating that increased Government restrictions had made its operations in Mon and Karen States untenable.[48]

28. On 29 June 2007, the ICRC took the exceptional step of publicly denouncing the SPDC's "repeated abuses" of civilians—abuses that violate international humanitarian law—at a press conference. The ICRC commented specifically on the abuses inflicted by the army on communities living in conflict zones along the Thai-Burma border.[49] This is the most strident public criticism that the ICRC, which normally remains neutral, has made since it denounced the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[50] DFID and the FCO issued a joint statement in response to the ICRC's denouncement, condemning the Burmese regime's failure to co-operate with the ICRC.[51]

29. The ICRC does not identify a separate category of 'IDP'[52] but evidence we received emphasised the valuable role played by the ICRC in working in remote regions where displacement rates are high, such as Karen, Mon and Shan States, and Tenasserim Division, and its role in witnessing human rights violations.[53] In its written evidence, DFID pledged to "continue to lobby the Burmese Authorities hard fully to reopen access for [the ICRC] in eastern Burma."[54] The then FCO Minister of State, Rt Hon Ian McCartney MP, told us that he had held a recent meeting with the Head of the ICRC to discuss Burma, amongst other issues, and that he hoped to have a fuller meeting at the Human Rights Council later in 2007 on steps that could be taken to facilitate a re-opening of the ICRC's programme in Burma.[55] We are deeply concerned by the closure of two ICRC field offices in Burma in March 2007 and the damaging effect this will have on the international community's ability to document abuses perpetrated against IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Burma. We call on the UK Government to continue to make representations to the Burmese authorities on this issue at the highest level.

Overall levels of aid to Burma

30. We have made clear in this chapter the huge need for development and humanitarian assistance within Burma, and we have identified two particular areas of in-country support that we believe need increased funding from DFID. It is our strong belief that overall aid levels to Burma need to be significantly boosted. Burma is one of the world's least aided countries, receiving just US$2.40 of aid per head in 2004.[56] This is by far the lowest per capita aid level amongst the UN's list of Least Developed Countries.[57] Neighbouring countries close to Burma on the UN's Human Development Index receive 15-20 times as much in aid per head: Cambodia receives US$35 per head and Laos US$46.50.[58] If Burmese people were to get as much aid per head as people in Africa, DFID's Burma budget would have to increase from the current level of £8.8 million in 2007-08 to £80 million.[59]

31. DFID's budget of £8.8 million is substantially lower than the Department's funding of other countries with similarly poor human rights records. For instance, Burma receives around a quarter of the annual total given to Zimbabwe by DFID.[60] However, we appreciate the importance of avoiding channelling funding through Burma's regime, which, as we have said, bears much of the responsibility for poverty and displacement within the country.[61]

32. Funding of aid work in Burma is not a case of 'business as usual'. The risk of funding reaching an illegal and repressive military junta must be absolutely minimised. Political and humanitarian 'space' to carry out the process of poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance is highly constrained. Capacity amongst partner organisations to spend aid money effectively is low. The co-ordination of aid efforts is difficult and is currently done poorly. Overall, operating conditions for aid agencies in Burma remain very challenging. We respect DFID's determination to minimise the risk of any of its funds finding their way into the exchequer of a brutal and illegitimate regime. But as Gareth Thomas told us, "The aid that we spend in Burma is effective [...] there are ways of having a significant impact with one's aid through working with NGOs and UN organisations."[62] DFID has quadrupled its budget in Burma over the last six years, from £2.3 million in 2001-02 to £8.8 million in 2007-08. Whilst there is a need to address the significant constraints, we believe more aid could and should be spent in Burma by DFID. The current UK contribution of £8.8 million represents significant under-spending compared to countries with similar poverty levels and human rights records. DFID has quadrupled its aid budget for Burma in the last six years and we recommend that this trajectory should continue, with a further quadrupling by 2013. We also believe that the UK Government should encourage other countries to provide greater support for work within Burma. This would give Burma the opportunity to make at least some progress towards the Millennium Development Goals by the 2015 deadline.

DFID office relocation

33. DFID's Burma programme has until now been managed from DFID South-East Asia's office in Bangkok, where the programme manager and sectoral advisers are based. In addition, one poverty adviser and two members of administrative staff work from the Embassy in Rangoon. We were shocked to learn upon arriving in Thailand for our visit that DFID had decided completely to relocate the management of its Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon. The DFID South-East Asia office in Bangkok is scheduled to close and it is planned that the number of staff in Burma will increase from three to 10 by May 2008.

34. During our visit, the Head of DFID South-East Asia, Marshall Elliott, told us that DFID was setting an example and encouraging other donors, for instance the European Commission (EC), to increase their programmes in-country. Gareth Thomas believed that the office relocation would increase staff capacity to understand what works in-country. He also told us that Senior Civil Servant oversight of the programme will move to London, "closer to ministers and closer to the concerns of parliamentarians and [...] the debate [about] what we should or should not do in terms of our aid programme in Burma."[63]

35. A number of witnesses foresaw major problems in locating all Burma programme staff in Rangoon. Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK spoke positively of the decision to boost staff capacity, but was concerned that DFID staff would become very constrained by restrictions operated by the regime, such as insisting on accompanying staff and controlling their travel outside Rangoon. He told us: "[Rangoon] is a very tight, closed little environment [...] it is very isolated from what is going on in the world and what is happening in most of the country."[64] Other interlocutors were concerned that the office move would impair DFID's capacity to engage with activities on the Thai-Burma border (cross-border assistance and support to refugees) and to play a co-ordinating role.[65] We will return to this second set of concerns in Chapter 5 when we assess DFID's assistance to refugees on the Thai-Burma border.

36. Whilst we welcome the increase in staff capacity within Burma from three to 10 officials, we are concerned that if DFID fully relocates management of its Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon, it will impair DFID's ability to engage with activities on the Thai-Burma border and fulfil its proper part in a co-ordination role. We emphasise the importance of DFID working independently and we therefore recommend that DFID retain at least two senior, full-time members of staff within the British Embassy in Bangkok. This will help in providing an external perspective on displacement issues within Burma and in supporting refugees, cross-border assistance and non-governmental organisations based in Thailand.

22 The other donors with staff in Burma are: Australia (AusAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and South Korea's International Cooperation Agency (KOIKA). Back

23 Q 181 [Gareth Thomas MP] Back

24 Ev 145 [Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children] Back

25 Ev 75 [Christian Solidarity Worldwide] and Ev 77 [Ashley South] Back

26 Ev 81 [Ashley South] Back

27 Ev 58 [DFID] Back

28 Ev 61 [DFID] Back

29 Ev 118 [Peace Way Foundation: Burma Issues], UNFPA State of the World Population, 2006 and Q 57 [Dr Thomas Lee]. Back

30 Figures for 2003. UNDP, Human Development Report 2006. Back

31 Q 182 [Gareth Thomas MP] Back

32 Ev 118 [Peace Way Foundation: Burma Issues] Back

33 Ev 61- 63 [DFID] Back