House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Tenth Report

3 IN-COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO IDPS: DFID'S CO-ORDINATION ROLE

37. Inside Burma, DFID works with and alongside many partner organisations, sometimes as part of multilateral aid mechanisms such as the Three Diseases Fund.[66] A range of aid organisations work from inside Burma to assist IDPs, including bilateral and multilateral donors, national and international NGOs and UN agencies. Examining DFID's role in these efforts—and, crucially, its contribution to co-ordinating international aid efforts—is an important part of assessing its assistance to IDPs.

NGOs and aid organisations working in Burma

38. Currently there are 48 international NGOs with Memoranda of Understanding with the Burmese government.[67] For a brief window between November 2003 and September 2004, the space for humanitarian and development actors to operate in Burma opened up a little, due to the relatively co-operative approach of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. However, since his removal from power in October 2004, NGOs have had to carry out their support to IDPs and other vulnerable groups in an increasingly repressive climate.[68] Restrictions on their work were made explicit in the draft Guidelines for UN Agencies, International Organisations and NGO/INGOs, produced by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development in February 2006. Conditions include that state officials should accompany UN and international NGO (INGO) staff on all field trips and the enforcement of restrictions on employing Burmese staff.[69]

39. Few international organisations operating in-country have programmes explicitly targeted at IDPs. DFID perceived the reasons for this to lie partly in the sensitivity of the issue and partly in the fact that a large proportion of conflict-affected people in Burma have been displaced at some point, so it is often very difficult to distinguish IDPs from other vulnerable groups.[70] The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, the Burmese regime) technically prevents all NGOs and UN agencies working inside Burma from giving humanitarian aid to civilians in conflict areas.[71] However, in practice, NGOs—mainly local organisations—do have some limited access to conflict zones, and also have low-profile aid programmes in some SPDC-controlled areas, relocation sites and ceasefire areas in eastern and northern Burma.[72]

40. NGOs' work provides a crucial lifeline for people without access to healthcare, education, water, sanitation or livelihoods. For example, Merlin has just begun a primary healthcare intervention explicitly aimed at displaced populations in Chin State and Sagaing Division. Save the Children said that, although they do not currently record which citizens are displaced, they know that IDPs are present in "almost all the villages [they] are working in" in south-eastern Burma.[73] Their projects here include a DFID-funded child protection and anti-trafficking programme in Karen and Mon States.[74] Such projects are clearly of major importance in protecting children's rights in areas affected by displacement. Save the Children told us that they could "of course do more" if funds permitted."[75]

41. Several NGOs told us they made use of what they termed "plausible deniability" in terms of adhering to the SPDC's guidelines. Dr Thomas Lee of the University of California told us that "there are groups inside that quietly push the borders of where they are actually allowed to work quite effectively. Some organisations are more aggressive about that than others."[76] Linda Doull of Merlin said, "You can achieve much more at community level than perhaps is necessarily talked about [...] finding inventive ways to then work with existing structures."[77] Discussions we had in Thailand indicated that, whilst 10 years ago INGOs were only present in Rangoon and the north, the gradual pushing of boundaries set by the regime has resulted in an increased INGO presence across the country (although coverage is still far from even). In their submission, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) noted that in recent months, some INGOs have begun to gain direct access to conflict areas and that, as a result, "real opportunities exist to further expand in-country assistance."[78] It is clear to us that NGOs working from inside Burma can reach IDPs who would not otherwise receive assistance. Their work is crucial to providing basic social services such as education and health to vulnerable populations, and we believe that they deserve increased support from donors.

Co-ordination and communication

42. Throughout the inquiry, interlocutors have stressed to us the need for clear communication and robust co-ordination over the assistance provided to IDPs within Burma. Co-ordination is actively discouraged by the regime and NGOs work in a more isolated way than they do in other countries.[79] UN OCHA calls Burma "a complex humanitarian landscape."[80] Aid organisations working in-country have restricted access to SPDC-controlled, relocation and ceasefire zones, as well as some conflict areas, as discussed in the previous sub-section. Aid organisations working cross-border have access to contested border areas and neighbouring conflict zones, but less access to SPDC and ceasefire sites. Ideally, a situation would exist where two complementary approaches, in-country and cross-border, ensured even coverage in assistance to IDPs across Burma. But unfortunately this complementarity remains elusive at present. A key reason for this is the difficulty experienced by organisations in communicating—and hence co-ordinating—their work. Cross-border work is prohibited by the Burmese regime and is dangerous, and cannot be advertised. In-country work is more overt but NGOs inside Burma are very careful about describing their activities, due to concern that the Burmese authorities will learn of their projects and close them down.[81]

CO-ORDINATION

43. Several witnesses told us that confusion as to who was working where in Burma is problematic. They argued that an urgent mapping exercise is required to assess the needs of IDPs in Burma, where they are located and what the most appropriate mechanisms are for reaching them. They believed that DFID should play a leading role in this exercise.[82] The Burma Campaign UK stated, "Neither DFID nor the UN has made any commitment to undertake a comprehensive review to tackle what is one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world."[83] Christian Aid's written evidence states:

It is clear to us that DFID's office relocation from Bangkok to Rangoon is likely to impair its ability to fulfil its proper part in a co-ordination role, as we stated above (see paragraphs 35-36). We also believe that DFID is not currently fulfilling its responsibility as a lead donor to tackle the problems of co-ordination.

44. Witnesses believed that the UN was also failing adequately to fulfil its co-ordination role.[85] The Burma Campaign went so far as to argue that the that UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Burma, Charles Petrie, was polarising the divisions between those working in-country and cross-border rather than bringing them together.[86] UN OCHA's Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, Margareta Wahlström, who visited Burma in April 2007, defended the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator's record of reaching out to and engaging with aid organisations.[87] But she admitted that "better humanitarian information-sharing frameworks" for Burma were crucial and welcomed "efforts to develop and harmonise geographical area co-ordination mechanisms in order to [...] provide a more coherent and effective response to local needs."[88]

45. Several witnesses, including Gareth Thomas, felt that UN OCHA, rather than DFID, should lead on co-ordination of assistance to IDPs, as OCHA is the designated UN agency for humanitarian co-ordination, and is newly-established in Burma and therefore more likely to be neutral.[89] Margareta Wahlström indicated that OCHA was in the process of assuming this co-ordination role, saying they had "noted the need for a common analysis of the situation in Burma" and had "agreed to OCHA's provision of assistance" through the deployment of resources to the Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Rangoon.[90] We agree that the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), rather than any of the main bilateral donors, should take the principal role in co-ordinating aid assistance but believe that DFID should engage more wholeheartedly in helping to co-ordinate assistance to IDPs. We welcome the appointment of a UN OCHA Co-ordinator for Burma and believe that international NGOs should support his work. We recommend that DFID support UN OCHA to carry out an urgent mapping exercise of which IDPs are receiving assistance and where gaps exist between in-country and cross-border assistance.

COMMUNICATION

46. Several witnesses expressed concern that DFID does not share information about its assistance to IDPs sufficiently, even within confidential meetings.[91]This included communication with cross-border groups, who could help to develop complementary approaches to reach IDPs in border areas.

47. Linda Doull of Merlin believed that a distinct co-ordinating mechanism would also reassure aid organisations about discussing their work more safely: "I think if people are clear why information is being presented and to what aim [...] if there was a clear focus for particular discussions led by a stronger co-ordinating body, [...] then perhaps that might encourage people to say more."[92] Ray Hasan from Christian Aid told us that the UN and DFID currently faced a problem in gaining the trust of all groups. Mr Hasan said that DFID could play a significant role in organising private meetings of aid organisations assisting IDPs. He also thought DFID could help by being more open itself in these contexts.[93] He accepted that it would not be practical for DFID—or others—to share information in public forums, but believed that there were many opportunities to bring people together in closed environments.[94]

48. Gareth Thomas told us that DFID is "trying to step up not only the co-ordination but the communication more generally between those who work in Burma." However, he was "pretty hesitant" about more communication within Burma "because of the relationships of individuals, often very trusted people who have worked for a very long time together" and the need "to place the utmost priority on maintaining the security of the organisations we work through."[95] We believe that DFID should do more to share information about its assistance to IDPs, and more to encourage other organisations to do the same. We accept the importance of maintaining the security of the work being done, but believe it would be possible for DFID to enhance communication by organising more 'closed door' meetings with trusted partners.

The Three Diseases Fund

49. The Three Diseases Fund (3D Fund) has been developed by a group of donors—Australia, the EC, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK—to address HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria within Burma. The 3D Fund follows the withdrawal of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2005 because of restrictions placed on the UN and INGOs by the Burmese authorities. The Burmese regime agreed the proposal to establish the 3D Fund in June 2006 and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the United Nations Office for Projects and Services (UNOPS)—the Fund Manager—in October 2006. The Fund is not aimed specifically at IDPs but DFID pledged that, "As Three Diseases Funded projects are developed, DFID and our partner donors will work hard to ensure that IDPs suffering from tuberculosis, malaria or HIV/AIDS are able to benefit from international assistance."[96] DFID's commitment to the Fund totals £20 million over 5 years, or £4 million per year—nearly half of DFID's current annual budget for Burma of £8.8 million.

50. Witnesses acknowledged that DFID had played a leading role in developing the 3D Fund and welcomed it as a desperately needed effort to fight infectious diseases in Burma.[97] However, a major concern was articulated about the Fund in relation to its ability to reach IDPs. Witnesses doubted that the Fund would reach the most vulnerable people, many of them IDPs, in Burma's border areas.[98]Dr. Thomas Lee, who has worked for the last decade on Burma's borders, pointed out that Burma's malaria burden is highest on its four borders (see Map 2, page 26). A 2006 survey found that nearly half of all deaths in eastern Burma are due to malaria, and that adult malaria incidence in the region is nearly twice as high as the national average.[99]Christian Aid told us that on the Burma-China border, HIV prevalence is "at crisis point."[100] Whilst no independent mapping of services provided by INGOs working in Burma has been conducted—which adds further urgency to our recommendation in paragraph 45 that a review of assistance should be carried out—it is clear that these border zones, many of them conflict areas, are the very areas that NGOs are least likely to reach and hence where populations are most in need of assistance.[101]

51. Funding from the 3D Fund is unlikely to reach the border areas. Grant recipients are required to have a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the SPDC, but as the regime does not allow aid to reach many ethnic and conflict areas, it is unlikely to agree an MoU with local groups working in these areas. Cross-border groups will also not be permitted to sign an MoU.[102]

52. Several witnesses believed that the priority now is to create a complementary strategy to the 3D Fund that is capable of reaching the most vulnerable people, including IDPs. The Burma Campaign UK and Christian Solidarity Worldwide were concerned that, to their knowledge, none of the NGOs working on the ground were consulted on alternative mechanisms that could be used to reach people that the 3D Fund is going to miss.[103] Dr Thomas Lee told us that there is capacity to provide healthcare in the border areas, were funding opportunities available: "On all three borders there are substantial indigenous local health organisations that do have the infrastructure and the capacity to provide standard interventions for infectious disease."[104] Dr Lee described the woeful underfunding of essential healthcare services on the eastern border, with 80% of the costs for the malaria programme on which he works near the border used up by simply providing drugs and diagnostic tests, leaving hardly any funds for salaries, transportation and logistics.[105] Whilst we welcome the Three Diseases Fund, and believe that DFID deserves credit for helping to develop it, in its current form it will not reach sufficient numbers of IDPs or other vulnerable groups living in border and conflict areas. We recommend that DFID build on its leadership role in helping to develop the Fund by supporting the creation of a complementary mechanism that makes funding available to organisations providing healthcare in the border areas.

Developing a humanitarian dialogue with the regime

53. If in-country assistance to IDPs is to improve, it will be necessary to develop a humanitarian dialogue with the regime. A number of stakeholders that we spoke to during our visit to the Thai-Burma border told us that the Burmese authorities—especially at senior levels—were currently in denial about poverty. (There were some exceptions to this: for instance, the Minister of Education had shown some awareness of the poor education situation.) This made the kind of dialogue or shared analysis of poverty that DFID and other members of the international community would normally undertake with a government very difficult. In turn, this means that taking development and humanitarian programmes to any kind of scale is a real challenge for donors.

54. We wholeheartedly endorse the need to avoid showing support for the SPDC. However, we believe that undertaking limited, narrowly-focused discussions on poverty and humanitarian concerns with the regime could help develop a shared understanding of how best to assist IDPs. As Ashley South, a consultant specialising in displacement in Burma, told us:

"I think the idea of the SPDC engaging with the international community on discussions on democratisation in the broadest sense is not very realistic, but perhaps one or two specific issues could be identified, for example humanitarian dialogue, and [...] forced migration and displacement."[

106

Mr. South pointed out that there are examples of successful dialogue with the SPDC, notably regarding forced labour, as a result of which a trial victim complaints system for forced labour has been established between the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the regime.[107]

55. Dr. Zarni from the University of Oxford thought that DFID should "definitely take any opportunity to engage in policy discussion with the regime at all levels", but that the UK's "difficult historical relationship" made it problematic for DFID to take a leading role and that it would be more effective for DFID to support other actors, possibly the UN, to develop a humanitarian dialogue with the regime.[108] The UK Government needs to tread very carefully before beginning any kind of dialogue with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). However, we believe limited engagement on specific poverty and humanitarian issues should begin and that the most sensible approach would be for DFID to do this as part of a group of international actors, under the banner of the UN.

66 See Paragraphs 49-52. Back

67 Ev 138 [UN OCHA] Back

68 DFID Assistance for Burmese Refugees and Internally Displaced People, DFID, March 2007, p 15. Back

69 Ev 89 [Ashley South] Back

70 Ev 62 [DFID] Back

71 Ev 117 [Peace Way Foundation: Burma Issues] Back

72 Ev 62 [DFID] Back

73 Ev 123 [Save the Children (Burma)] Back

74 Ev 123 [Save the Children (Burma)] Back

75 Ev 123 [Save the Children (Burma)] Back

76 Q 75 [Dr Thomas Lee] Back

77 Q 123 [Linda Doull] Back