House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Tenth Report

4 CROSS-BORDER ASSISTANCE TO IDPS

56. Whilst human rights abuses and high poverty levels exist across Burma, the situation along the eastern border with Thailand is of particular concern. Karen State, eastern Tenasserim Division, southern Mon State, southern and eastern Karenni State and southern Shan State are all witnessing conflict-induced displacement of populations. The Burma Army began a new offensive in Karen State in 2006, the worst in a decade. This is continuing into 2007.[109] Border states are also subject to state 'development' activities such as infrastructure construction and natural resource extraction, which may also displace local populations.[110]

57. Because NGOs and community groups within Burma have only very limited access to conflict zones, a number of Thailand-based organisations bring emergency relief supplies and humanitarian support over the border to IDPs in eastern Burma. In March 2007, DFID reversed its policy position and lifted the restriction on its funds being used for cross-border assistance from Thailand.[111]

58. As we discuss below, cross-border work is very sensitive.[112] Crossing the Burma border from Thailand is prohibited by the Burmese regime and if the Burmese Army catches cross-border workers they run the very high risk of being imprisoned or killed.[113] Much of the written evidence we received on cross-border assistance was submitted to us in confidence which we will respect.

Cross-border assistance to IDPs

59. Substantial numbers of civilians within conflict areas in the states along Burma's eastern border cannot be reached by aid agencies working within Burma. Several relief organisations travel into areas within these states to deliver emergency assistance—cash, food, healthcare and some limited education services—to IDPs.[114] A number of these groups go beyond provision of humanitarian relief to record and document human rights abuses, carry out advocacy work and help build capacity of opposition groups.[115] These teams consist of indigenous Karen, and less often Karenni or Shan people, sometimes with assistance and training from international aid workers.[116]

60. The Burmese authorities believe cross-border assistance legitimises insurgency. Thailand does not officially condone cross-border assistance (although in practice the Thai authorities generally "turn a blind eye" to it).[117] During our visit to the border, agencies working cross-border told us their work was justified by international law, citing the Geneva Conventions, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the principle affirmed in the Responsibility to Protect framework that, where sovereign authorities are unable or unwilling to respond to humanitarian needs, "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."[118] As Dr Alan Smith of the Thailand-based Centre for Local Development pointed out, whilst it is certainly not a neutral mode of delivering assistance, cross-border work is the only way to reach certain groups inside Burma.[119]

61. The assistance is provided by organisations who often have long-standing relationships, mutual trust and common languages with IDP communities.[120] Cross-border assistance can be cost-efficient when relief provisions are purchased in Thailand and currencies are exchanged at market rates rather than Burma's inflated rates.[121] Due to donors' concerns about impartiality and distributing aid in a war zone, most groups use rigorous monitoring and evaluation techniques, including photographic and video documentation, and simultaneously collect health and human development data that otherwise would be very difficult to record.[122]Cross-border aid also offers the benefit of flexibility: Thailand-based community-based organisations (CBOs) have the freedom of working outside the Burmese military bureaucracy and it is easier to hire and train staff.[123] Aid recipients also benefit from flexibility: they are often given cash, rather than food or medical provisions and can then spend the money according to their needs.

62. As the Back Pack Health Worker Teams (BPHWT), Mae Tao Clinic and the Burma Medical Association highlighted, all of whom work on or across the border, their work is laden with risk, as most medical and relief supplies have to be transported on foot through the jungle.[124] The BPHWT told us when we met them during our visit that there are currently 76 backpack teams of three to five medics and support staff working cross-border. These 300 workers risk their lives to provide healthcare to IDPs; indeed, seven BPHWT staff have been killed during cross-border trips over the last decade and two members of staff are currently in prison within Burma. The Free Burma Rangers, another group carrying out cross-border relief work with IDPs, reported three deaths during the last year alone. The most recent victim had been tortured and murdered. Cross-border aid may not be considered to be a neutral form of assistance and it is highly dangerous. However it is the only way to reach IDPs in several of Burma's conflict-affected states and we believe that it can provide a cost-efficient and flexible way of delivering emergency relief where no other options exist, but it must be continually and robustly reviewed. Such funding must not detract from the key humanitarian objective of ending conflict.

DFID's policy change

63. DFID announced in a Written Ministerial Statement on 5 March 2007 that it was removing the restriction on the use of its funds for assistance to refugees on the Thai-Burma border, so that they can be used for either cross-border or refugee assistance, as need and funding dictates. The Department acknowledged "the importance and value of cross-border aid, especially in supporting many of the 100,000 internally-displaced people living in conflict areas in eastern Burma."[125] This followed an internal review, published in September 2006, of DFID's assistance to Burmese IDPs and refugees. The policy change was not accompanied by an increase in funds for cross-border work.

64. Benedict Rogers of Christian Solidarity Worldwide told us that because DFID's change in policy was not accompanied by extra funding, "there has been no meaningful change on the ground."[126] Mark Farmaner from the Burma Campaign UK concurred with this, saying that the lack of new funding meant that the outcome of the policy change was "effectively a cosmetic one."[127]

65. Gareth Thomas acknowledged that DFID may need to follow up its policy change with financial resources for cross-border work, "particularly in the context of [DFID's] rising aid budget".[128] However, he said that this would depend on an indication from OCHA that more cross-border aid is needed.[129] The Minister was cautious about how successful cross-border aid can be in reaching large numbers of IDPs in Burma. He told us that, based on DFID's calculations, "Even the most wildly optimistic scenario suggests that 4.5% of the Burmese community could be reached cross-border."[130]

A comparative advantage?

66. The Minister emphasised the need to balance UK commitments with what the international community was already providing: he said there is already "a range of donors providing aid cross-border" whilst "there is a very small number of donors based in country and who therefore have knowledge of what works in country" and that therefore he would "suggest to the Committee that we have a comparative advantage in working in country."[131] Whilst Mr Thomas agreed that this "comparative advantage" did not rule out funding for cross-border work, the paper that DFID produced to accompany its policy change in March 2007 expressed other reservations about funding cross-border assistance:

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The DFID Paper also identifies as a key risk of funding cross-border work "increased suspicion and suppression of existing DFID projects by the Burmese authorities."[133] This was refuted by the Burma Campaign UK, who argued that:

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67. DFID's view that its funds "will add little extra value" to cross-border assistance is divergent from what some other witnesses told us. Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK estimated that 150,000 extra IDPs could be reached if financial assistance was increased.[135] Both groups administering cross-border assistance and other stakeholders told us that funding for cross-border assistance is too low[136] and many supported the case for DFID to begin funding aid delivered in this way.[137]

68. Mark Farmaner said that DFID's assertion that it had a comparative advantage in working in-country would only hold up if there was effective donor co-ordination, a "division of labour [...] where other governments were showing that aid was reaching parts of particularly eastern Burma." But, he said, "This has not happened to any degree at all."[138]

69. Some countries, including the USA which is the biggest donor in the region, focus their direct bilateral aid effort on cross-border assistance.[139] Norway and the EC fund both in-country and cross-border aid. A number of witnesses said that DFID should also fund both forms of assistance.[140] Burma is a complex problem that cannot be dealt with through a one-sided approach; it requires a co-ordinated effort from within the country and across its borders to address the scale of poverty and displacement.[141] As Ray Hasan of Christian Aid put it, "Either/or is not an option; it has to be both."[142] VSO strongly believed that choosing only to support in-country assistance risked reinforcing the Burmese regime's mistreatment of ethnic minorities living near the Thai border:

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70. We believe that DFID's policy change to allow its funds to be spent cross-border, but with no extra funds currently committed, has exacerbated the existing problems in engaging productively with agencies carrying out cross-border work and has unsurprisingly been perceived by them as an empty gesture. As we have stated previously, there is an urgent need for DFID, working closely with the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to establish comprehensively the needs of IDPs who can only be reached by cross-border work, particularly in relation to the control of infectious diseases. DFID must not hide behind its argument that is has a 'comparative advantage' in working in-country. At the same time UN OCHA must also address the failure of a significant number of bilateral donors to properly fund in-country work, which has hindered an effective, comprehensive approach. Cross-border assistance to Burmese IDPs could be extended if more financial resources were available. We recommend that DFID contribute to providing effective relief to IDPs in eastern Burma and that it should commit funds for cross-border assistance as part of an overall rise in aid to Burma. We believe that, as a high priority, DFID should maximise relief to IDPs in eastern Burma.

Reaching the most vulnerable IDPs

71. Several witnesses emphasised that certain IDP groups were particularly vulnerable and in need of support. The majority of Thailand-based cross-border groups work in Karen, Mon and Karenni states. Security concerns and local capacity constraints mean that substantially less work is undertaken in Shan State.[144]Christian Solidarity Worldwide believed that DFID should help to ensure that assistance to IDPs is directed towards Shan IDPs, as well as other ethnic groups.[145]

72. Women IDPs were identified as another very vulnerable group, particularly with regard to sexual and reproductive health (SRH). Maternal mortality rates are startlingly high: a 2002-03 survey of households in eastern Burma found that 27% of adult female deaths were pregnancy-related.[146] Reasons for this high rate include lack of access to contraception, emergency obstetric care, safe abortion services and post-abortion care.[147] An unpublished 2002 Back Pack Health Worker Teams (BPHWT) survey found that 94% of deliveries in eastern Burma took place in the home or jungle.[148] Limited medical facilities do exist in IDP-populated areas and the BPHWT provide mobile health assistance to women, but these services are constrained by resources and women must often travel long distances in order to benefit from them.[149]

73. The Karen Women's Organisation told us that girls' education was another priority for cross-border assistance.[150] VSO described the education services offered to IDPs by ethnic women's groups as very worthy of support. It said the benefits of cross-border assistance to teachers were particularly significant.[151] In some IDP areas, temporary schools have been established but support in the form of teachers' stipends, internships for Burmese teachers to train across the Thai border, books and materials is needed.[152] We believe that, in addition to funding cross-border work, DFID should help to ensure that assistance is focused on the most vulnerable IDPs, including Shan populations and women. Women's sexual and reproductive health needs to be prioritised. Cross-border health assistance and clinics in IDP areas both require extra financial resources. We recommend that education, especially for girls, should be another priority for DFID and that it should fund cross-border assistance to teachers and schools in IDP areas.

74. A number of witnesses told us that the Burma Army uses rape as a weapon of war on a widespread and systematic basis.[153] The Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN), whom we met during our visit to the Thai-Burma border, told us that Shan women were often victimised because they were an ethnic minority, and that girls as young as six were raped. SWAN works on and across the Thai border to document rape and other human rights abuses and to provide health and education services. As discussed below, SWAN said that whilst they received support from other donors, they had tried in vain to meet and discuss funding opportunities with DFID.[154] Other civil society groups said the same.[155] Rape is used as a weapon of war by the Burmese Army and we call on the UK Government to make high-level representations about this atrocity to the Burmese regime. We reiterate our recommendation (see paragraph 26) that DFID should fund women's groups working on and across the border who document rape and other human rights abuses, and provide women's health and education services. The Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) is one group particularly worthy of support.

75. Displacement is by no means limited to Burma's eastern border states. IDPs in Chin State, along the Indian and Bangladeshi borders, live in extreme poverty.[156] The Women's League of Chinland conveyed the desperate situation within Chin State:

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76. Cross-border assistance carried out from Bangladesh, India and China is far more limited than that from Thailand, and consists of small-scale relief and human rights documentation.[158] Benedict Rogers of Christian Solidarity Worldwide said that, whilst access is sometimes more restricted, "All three of these borders are even more vulnerable and forgotten than the Thai border", and that DFID should "investigate the possibilities" of funding work here.[159] Mr Rogers noted the valuable work done by the Women's League of Chinland on the India-Burma border.[160] Dr Thomas Lee, who has worked on Burma's borders for a decade, believed that DFID should fund cross-border assistance on the Chinese and Indian borders.[161] DFID has begun to fund healthcare work across the Chinese border.[162] We recommend that DFID scale up its funding of cross-border assistance over the Chinese border. The Department should also look at the options for starting to fund assistance over the Indian border. Support to the Chin backpack health worker programme, operating over the Indian border, would be one step towards assisting the many IDPs facing dire poverty in Chin state.