House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Tenth Report

5 DFID'S ASSISTANCE TO BURMESE REFUGEES ON THE THAI-BURMA BORDER

77. This chapter will assess current modes and levels of assistance to Burmese refugees provided by DFID and partner organisations. The last two decades have seen a continuing flow of refugees across the Thai-Burma border. By the end of 2006, 151,300 refugees were officially registered in 10 camps (one Shan, four Karenni and five Karen) along the Thai-Burma border. There are also around 15,000 refugees over the Thai border but outside the camps,[163] as well as two million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand. We visited one of the largest camps, Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1 on the map, with a predominantly Karenni population), in May 2007.

The Thailand-Burma Border Consortium's assistance to refugees

THE RUNNING OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS

78. The Thailand-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) comprises 10 NGOs from eight countries, based in Bangkok and with field offices in Thailand near to the Burmese border. The Consortium has assisted Burmese refugees since they began to arrive across the border in 1984. It now provides food, shelter and other provisions such as clothing to all the refugee camps along the border. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) maintains ultimate authority over the refugee camps. Until recently, the RTG banned income-generation or employment for the refugees, and even now opportunities are only offered on a case-by-case basis, although there is evidence of unofficial employment. Refugees are therefore almost completely dependent on external services provided by TBBC, other NGOs and the UN.[164]

79. TBBC is part of an umbrella group of NGOs working on health, education, community services and protection as members of the Committee for the Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT). The total annual budget for the NGOs' work in the camps is US$30 million, of which TBBC's share is around half.[165] At Ban Mai Nai Soi Camp, we visited the Ban Tractor Health Clinic, which is run by International Rescue Committee and the Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand, members of CCSDPT. TBBC told us during our visit that there is a sophisticated co-ordination mechanism involving regular meetings to ensure complementarity between the CCSDPT members and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), who run protection and resettlement programmes for the camps. Ashley South, a consultant specialising in displacement in Burma, said that the CCSDPT is considered "a model of best practice in humanitarian governance."[166]

TBBC: DFID FUNDING AND ENGAGEMENT

80. DFID supports Burmese refugees with a £1.8 million grant (over 3 years) to TBBC, channelled via Christian Aid. Christian Aid told us that having a three-year—rather than an annual—funding agreement was a positive step because it adheres to the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative principles of predictable and accountable financing.[167] DFID funding to TBBC has increased annually over the past few years, from £535,000 in 2005 to £611,050 in 2006 to £672,155 in 2007. This represents about 4% of TBBC's total budget.

81. During our visit, we were concerned to hear that TBBC believed there to have been a "communication breakdown" with DFID. TBBC's Executive Director, Jack Dunford, said that DFID had shown little interest in activity in the refugee camps, prioritising instead work inside Burma. Mr Dunford could only recall four visits by DFID to the camps since DFID funding had begun around 12 years previously. He met the Head of DFID South-East Asia for the first time during our visit in May 2007, despite TBBC being one of DFID South East Asia's biggest grant recipients. TBBC's view was that all other donors did better, in terms of visits to camps and broader policy engagement. This is a matter of concern to us. The FCO appeared to be a far more recognisable presence on the border: the UK Ambassador to Bangkok said that there had been 20 visits to the border in the last four years alone, although the exact balance of FCO and DFID visits within this was unclear. Ray Hasan from Christian Aid said, "There has certainly been more activity from the Foreign Office than DFID with regard to visits to the border."[168]

82. This low level of DFID engagement led us to probe DFID's arrangement to fund TBBC indirectly. Ray Hasan of Christian Aid said that channelling DFID funding through his organisation saved TBBC, a small organisation which has 14-15 bilateral donors, valuable time.[169] No major donors fund TBBC directly; for instance, the European Commission funds through the Dutch agency ICCO and other NGO members of the consortium. Mr Hasan said that Christian Aid's arrangement with DFID is clear: the Department does not have staff resources situated on the border, but Christian Aid has always offered to support DFID in playing a stronger role in engaging first-hand in the camps' administration, should DFID approach them about wishing to do this.[170] We were concerned, however, that despite a substantial increase in funding and calling for these sums to be further increased by DFID, Christian Aid had failed to address robustly the cash-flow problems or capacity issues experienced by TBBC in the last financial year. It has also failed to offer any permanent staff presence in the region to support the need to address the strategic changes required in the way services are provided to refugees.[171] TBBC registered as a UK charity in 2005 which may make a direct funding arrangement between DFID and TBBC more straightforward. We were astonished to hear that DFID has visited the refugee camps it funds so infrequently. We believe that funding TBBC directly might improve communication and encourage stronger engagement on DFID's behalf. We therefore recommend that DFID reassess the continued value of funding TBBC indirectly via Christian Aid.

83. Gareth Thomas told us that "whether it is DFID staff or the political section [...] there are regular visits to the refugee camps and there is regular sharing of information."[172] Although we accept that the FCO has played a valuable role in visiting refugees, allowing DFID and the FCO to have an interchangeable presence at the camps is not the most effective way of overseeing the delivery of aid. We were struck by the lack of developmental analysis of the Ban Mai Nai Soi Camp and believe strong DFID engagement is needed to rectify this. For instance, nearly £5 million of food aid was delivered to the refugee camps between January and June alone in 2006.[173] Yet in Ban Mai Nai Soi camp, which has existed for nearly 20 years and has been in its current location for over a decade, a cash economy clearly exists with a variety of food and other shops in operation. We recommend that DFID carries out a developmental analysis of the camps; this is essential both to meet refugees' needs appropriately and to provide value for donors' funds.

84. Our concern about DFID's lack of engagement with the camps on the Thai-Burma border is heightened by the decision to relocate the management of DFID's Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon. Co-ordination between the FCO and DFID over refugees clearly needs improving. Guy Horton, a researcher who has spent a lot of time in the region, told us, "The Rangoon embassy cannot get access to the IDP areas and the refugees in Thailand may not appear its responsibility. The Bangkok embassy tends to see [...] the refugees as marginal to its major concerns."[174] Ray Hasan of Christian Aid said, "I am not entirely convinced that […] [the FCO and DFID] are talking to each other as effectively as they should be."[175] Gareth Thomas told us that the two Departments had agreed to draw up a Memorandum of Understanding to co-ordinate their different roles in relation to the refugee camps after DFID's office relocation.[176] We reiterate the concern we expressed earlier about DFID's office relocation from Bangkok to Rangoon and repeat our recommendation that at least two senior, full-time members of DFID staff should be retained within the British Embassy in Bangkok (see paragraph 36). This staff presence will be crucial to enhancing DFID engagement with the camps, carrying out a developmental analysis of the camps' administration, co-ordinating assistance to refugees with the FCO and supporting NGOs based in Thailand.

UN OCHA

85. During our visit, we met with the UN Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), whose Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, Margareta Wahlström, had visited Burma in April 2007.[177] OCHA told us that their priority was to build up a balanced picture of the humanitarian needs both at the border and in-country and then to co-ordinate the international effort. TBBC said that they were open to the idea that OCHA could become a useful co-ordinator of activity both at the border and in Burma. We reiterate that we welcome the appointment of a UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Co-ordinator for Burma. We anticipate that this step will help strengthen co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance to refugees at the Thai-Burma border.

Refugees' skills and employment

86. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) Ministry of Interior, through provincial and district authorities, is responsible for enforcing refugee policy and controlling the day-to-day running of the camps. RTG policy remains, officially, that refugees are not permitted to move outside the camps.[178] However, during our visit to the Ban Mai Nai Soi Camp we heard that in practice a significant number of refugees do travel locally in Thailand and find informal employment. A minority even work for extended periods outside the camps.[179]

87. Whilst the RTG has recently relaxed restrictions on education and skills (see paragraph 89), and has agreed to allow income-generation activities in principle, TBBC told us that in practice progress has been slow, especially regarding income-generation opportunities. Working outside the camps is very difficult. Benedict Rogers of Christian Solidarity Worldwide told us, "The Karenni camps in particular are suffering very severe restrictions at the moment and refugees who are found out of the camp are now being warned that they face the very real possibility of deportation."[180] The Karenni Refugee Committee has produced a list of refugees' requests for intervention from the UK Government, and at the top was help in obtaining a legal work pass.[181] Without official work permits, refugee workers do not qualify for Thai health entitlements or legal protection.[182] This heightens risks of abuse and ill-health, particularly within exploitative work environments in factories and the sex industry. An estimated 80% of the commercial sex worker population in northern Thailand is Burmese, with 40,000 Burmese girls and women entering Thailand's sex industry each year.[183]

88. UNHCR and the CCSDPT are advocating for official refugee employment opportunities with the Thai authorities. They have prepared a Comprehensive Plan for 2007-08 (following a 2005-06 Plan) that focuses on a longer-term approach to the refugee crisis, including people's freedom to move and work outside the camps and undertake secondary education.[184] Ray Hasan of Christian Aid said in relation to the preparation of these Plans, "It is those groups on the border that are doing that work with UNHCR and not the donor community, so we would certainly want DFID to get more involved in that."[185] We believe that opening up official employment opportunities for refugees in Thailand would be mutually beneficial to refugees and the Thai economy. We recommend that DFID and the FCO increase their engagement with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and NGOs in negotiations with the Royal Thai Government on expanding employment opportunities.

89. In late 2005, the RTG reversed its long-standing policies and allowed aid agencies working with refugees to expand education and vocational skills training, and income-generation schemes.[186] During our visit to the camp, we met refugees participating in vocational and non-formal education, including motorbike repair, mechanical, electrical and computer training, small-scale agriculture, spinning, weaving, cookery and crocheting. DFID was optimistic that these developments may result in refugees gaining legal access to parts of the Thai labour market, and eventually lead to some options for sustainable local integration.[187] Christian Aid also welcomed the RTG's increased flexibility on training and hoped that it will help decrease the current dependency on internationally co-ordinated assistance.[188] However, we were disappointed to witness the total gender imbalance in the various refugee vocational and training schemes, with women confined to crafts which are likely to have much less income earning potential. This is unacceptable. DFID should engage proactively with all organisations involved in training to ensure that this disparity is robustly addressed.

90. During our visit to the camp we heard that formal education opportunities were lacking, especially at tertiary level, and this was reiterated by witnesses. Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK told us that the thousands of children who grow up in the camps currently face very limited opportunities for further education.[189]The Karenni Student Development Group said that the restrictions on students leaving the camps prevented them from taking up learning opportunities in Thailand[190] and several witnesses emphasised that the RTG restricts teachers' and educators' access to the camps, constraining on-site learning.[191] We recommend that DFID and the FCO seek the agreement of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to increase formal education opportunities, especially at tertiary level. Restrictions on refugees' freedom to leave the camps, and for teachers and educators to enter the camps, are a key factor in limiting educational opportunities. DFID and the FCO should negotiate with the RTG for more flexibility in entering and leaving the camps, so that refugees' education and employment opportunities can be improved.

Resettlement and long-term strategies

91. As we heard during our visit, UNHCR and the RTG are overseeing a resettlement programme under which substantial numbers of Karen and Karenni refugees currently in camps will achieve the 'sustainable solution' of resettlement to third countries. However, we heard during our visit from a number of witnesses that DFID has not contributed to the policy debate with the RTG or engaged in any meaningful way with resettlement issues. It concerned us that DFID was not contributing to a developmental analysis of refugee resettlement. Hanne Mathieson, Head of the UNHCR Field Office in Thailand, told us that whilst resettlement had been slow to date—just 440 of Site 1's population of around 20,000 had been resettled in May 2007—a new wave of resettlements was coming up with the majority going to the USA and some to the UK, Australia and other countries. Ellen Sauerbrey, US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration was quoted in August 2006 as saying that "there will be no cap (for the resettlement of Karen refugees)."[192] Ashley South, a consultant specialising in displacement in Burma, told us that up to 40,000 people would be leaving the camps by the end of 2008. 10,000 refugees would depart in 2007. He believed that if maintained, this annual rate would mean all refugees currently in the camps would be resettled within a decade.[193]

92. Many of the Karen and Karenni refugees eligible for resettlement during 2006-07 were teachers, medical workers, administrators, and from other elite sectors of the refugee community.[194] A number of witnesses were concerned that resettlement of 'elite' refugees would leave a void in the running of the camps.[195] During our visit, TBBC told us they anticipated that the camps would lose 40% of their skilled workforce as the resettlement programme was rolled out. The then FCO Minister of State, Rt Hon Ian McCartney MP, told us that UK policy on resettlement "does not have criteria on educational standards or issues around that because we are acutely aware our standards are based on the vulnerability of the refugee concerned". He said that the UK had assessed three camps in April and May through the Home Office's Gateway Protection Programme and hoped for a first resettlement of 150 refugees later in 2007.[196] We recommend that the UK Government take steps to ensure that resettlement of refugees through the Home Office's Gateway Protection Programme does not create a sudden diminution in capacity amongst the camp populations and leave camps with gaps in their skilled workforce. The UK Government must also advocate on this issue in co-ordination with other governments, particularly the USA. DFID should actively engage with the Royal Thai Government in the policy debate on resettlement issues to contribute to a developmental analysis of refugees' needs.

93. Ashley South told us that large numbers of new refugees are still entering the camps and saw resettlement as a "pull factor" in this.[197] Christian Aid said that refugees who have left for third countries have simply been replaced by new arrivals from Burma.[198] This implies that the refugee camps along the border will be necessary for some considerable time to come, regardless of resettlement policies. Rurik Marsden, DFID's Poverty Adviser in Rangoon, told us that TBBC has been helping to develop a strategy for dealing with resettlement over the last few months.[199] This raised questions for us about whether it was appropriate for TBBC to be involved with refugee resettlement. What started as a temporary refugee influx on the Thai-Burma border has become a long-term humanitarian problem. The Thailand-Burma Border Consortium and the NGOs working under the Committee for the Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand umbrella deserve credit for the food, shelter and health services they provide within the camps. But we believe they cannot be—and cannot reasonably be expected to be—responsible for or involved in all refugee needs, especially training, employment, policy development and resettlement strategies.

94. We believe a strategic reassessment is required of the appropriate mechanism for dealing with the long-term interests of refugees. A clear delineation is needed between TBBC and other NGOs' work in providing food and basic services to refugees on the one hand, and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Royal Thai Government and third country governments' sustainable solutions for the refugee crisis, including employment and resettlement, on the other.

95. Engaging with the RTG on refugees' employment, education and resettlement, as set out in the last few sub-sections, will require inputs from the FCO, the Home Office and from DFID. We are concerned that the relocation of DFID staff from Bangkok to Rangoon will risk DFID being isolated from negotiations concerning refugees in Thailand. This adds further weight to the case we have made for retaining at least two senior, full-time DFID staff members within the Bangkok Embassy to provide support to refugee issues and NGOs based in Thailand.

Refugees on other borders

96. Our terms of reference for this inquiry focused on refugees on the Thai-Burma border. However, we also received evidence on the dire situation faced by refugees on Burma's other borders. There are more than 60,000 refugees in India, over 20,000 in Malaysia, several thousand in Bangladesh and an unknown number in China.

97. As we have stated, we heard that refugees on the Chinese, Indian and Bangladeshi borders are highly vulnerable.[200] The situation on the Indian border is of particular concern. As the Women's League of Chinland highlighted in their written evidence, the Government of India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and accordingly Burmese refugees—many of whom have fled from one of Burma's poorest states, Chin, across the Indian border—receive little assistance in terms of food, healthcare or education. It is difficult for donors to access many areas of the Indian border states. We recommend that the UK Government begin a dialogue with the Government of India about the status of and the assistance given to Burmese refugees in India and we reiterate our recommendation that DFID look at the options for starting to fund assistance to Burmese refugees over the border with India.

Other states' engagement with Burma

98. We are also concerned about India's investments within Burma. During our visit, we heard that India sells arms to Burma and invests in its natural resources—but that it never criticises the regime or seeks to engage with the SPDC about their terrible human rights record. We heard that China's public relationship with Burma was similarly uncritical, but that it was "asking some questions behind the scenes."[201] Benedict Rogers of Christian Solidarity Worldwide said that the UK's historical relationship—and the fact that India calls itself the world's largest democracy—indicated that the UK should negotiate with India to encourage it to engage responsibly with Burma.[202] Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK told us:

203

99. Rt Hon Ian McCartney MP told us that he had met with the Indian and Chinese Foreign Ministers in May 2007 and had, for the very first time, secured a common agreement with India and China, in which they "supported [...] our very firm statement of what needed to happen in Burma."[204] We recommend that the UK Government, at the highest levels, regularly raise the subject of India's engagement in Burma with the Government of India. India's uncritical relationship with the regime, and its appetite for arming and investing in the country, risks perpetuating Burma's illegal and brutal regime.

100. Burma also has an important bilateral relationship with Russia, whose atomic energy agency announced in May 2007 that it had agreed to build a nuclear research reactor for Burma.[205] We were extremely alarmed to hear that Russia has agreed to build a nuclear research reactor for Burma. We call on the UK Government, together with the international community, to bring pressure to bear on the Russian Government not to proceed with the reactor and to acknowledge the hardships the initiative would impose on the Burmese people.

163 Ev 59 [DFID] Back

164 Ev 136 [Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC)] Back

165 Figure given by TBBC in discussions during the Committee's visit to the Thai-Burma border. Back

166 Ev 84 [Ashley South] Back

167 Q 106 [Ray Hasan]. The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative was agreed in 2003 by a number of donor governments working towards achieving efficient and principled delivery of humanitarian aid. Back

168 Q 96 [Ray Hasan] Back

169 Q 109 [Ray Hasan] Back

170 Q 111 [Ray Hasan] Back

171 Qs 97-98 [Ray Hasan] Back

172 Q 194 [Gareth Thomas MP] Back

173 Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Programme Report for January to June 2006, p 35. Back

174 Ev 103 [Guy Horton] Back