Memorandum submitted by Department for
International Development
CONTENTS
1. Summary.
2. The particular needs of IDPs in Burma
and refugees in Thailand.
3. How different ethnic groups are affected
by displacement.
4. The likely trends in the region in terms
of displacement, and development and humanitarian needs.
5. The challenges faced in delivering aid
and assistance to these groups.
6. How donors can assist IDPs in Burma and
refugees in Thailand most effectively.
7. The advantages and disadvantages of cross-border
assistance compared to other ways of assisting IDPs in Burma.
8. The impact of DFID's policies towards
Burma's IDPs and refugees.
SUMMARY
1. Over the last 50 years, conflict and
human rights abuses have led to large-scale population displacement
inside Burma and of Burmese refugees to neighbouring countries.
In addition to these most visible sections of the displaced population,
large numbers of civilians have fled their homes as a result of
inappropriate Government policies and infrastructure developments,
as a result of natural resource extraction, and because of widespread
livelihoods insecurity in Burma.
2. The humanitarian situation is of serious
concern across the country. Burma is facing a generalised HIV
epidemic. More than seven out of ten people live in areas where
they are at risk from malaria. 97,000 new tuberculosis cases are
detected each year. Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is found
in 4% of new patients and 15.5% of previously treated patients.
It is estimated that half of Burmese children do not complete
primary school, with significantly higher numbers dropping out
in remote and conflict affected areas. In 1997, one in four people
in Burma were living below the minimum subsistence level, with
the poorest of the poor living mostly in rural areas. Burma's
education and public health systems are chronically under-funded.
According to a recent assessment by the United Nations Development
Programme over one third of the population is below the basic
poverty line ($0.34/day at market exchange rate), and 10% is living
in extreme poverty (unable to meet basic food needs—$0.25/day
at market exchange rate).
3. DFID has developed programmes which are
starting to address this poverty. For example, in HIV/AIDS, DFID-funded
projects or interventions have helped to achieve:
— 48 million condoms distributed in
2005 (four times the total in 2000).
— 160,000 people received voluntary
and confidential testing in 2005 (only 800 did so in year 2002).
— 1.1 million clean needles distributed
in 2005 (four times the total in 2003).
— The inclusion of injecting drug users,
HIV positive people, and commercial sex workers in a participatory
process to develop the Government's own HIV national strategy.
— The HIV national strategy identified
the need to work with injecting drug users, commercial sex workers
and men who have sex with men—official recognition of their
existence and their vulnerability to HIV.
4. DFID has very recently changed its policy
towards IDPs and refugees. In response to criticism that serious
consideration was not being given to the legitimacy of cross-border
support, we carried out a review to look again at both cross-border
and in-country means of supporting IDPs. As a result of our policy
we have a balanced allocation of our resources which reflects
the placement of other donors' funds and our own comparative advantage
in building relationships inside Burma.
5. DFID has increased the ability of community-based
groups inside Burma to deliver emergency relief, health and education
programmes and a limited protection role for IDPs. Governments
tend not to support these organisations because few donors have
a presence inside Burma, or they lack the capacity to engage in
the regular and detailed engagement inside eastern Burma which
is needed. DFID has developed a relationship with community based
organisations working inside Burma and last year channelled support
to IDPs through them—at the same time providing training
to increase their ability to deliver aid. As a result, this year
the groups will be able to provide support to a greater number
of IDPs.
6. DFID has increased the breadth of the
support we provide to IDPs and other conflict-affected people.
We have increased the amount of aid available to community-based
groups inside Burma (£400,000 in 2007-08) to deliver their
emergency relief, health and education programmes. We have also
removed a restriction on the use of our funds provided for assistance
to refugees (£1.8 million over three years) so that they
can be used for either cross-border or refugee assistance, as
their relative needs and funding dictates. This will mean the
continued provision of food, shelter and a range of other necessities
to refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border and of emergency relief
to a sub-set of the most vulnerable IDPs in hiding in the areas
of on-going armed conflict across the border. The protection work
carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross is
a further important component to this coverage, and we will continue
to lobby the Burmese Authorities hard fully to reopen access for
them in eastern Burma. Finally, we continue to ensure that the
development programmes DFID funds are responsive to the needs
of IDPs. As Three Diseases Funded projects are developed, DFID
and our partner donors will work hard to ensure that IDPs suffering
from tuberculosis, malaria or HIV/AIDS are able to benefit from
international assistance.
7. DFID is helping to ensure greater coordination
of international assistance to IDPs. We have been a strong advocate
for a process led by the United Nations, including funding a position
with explicit aid-coordination objectives in the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator's Office in Rangoon. We have tried to ensure that
the organisations we fund contribute to the coordination process
organised by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. And we have, with the European Commission, led an ongoing
process to increase the information-sharing, coordination and
complementarity amongst donors. As a result of these initiatives
we intend that donors and NGOs will be better able to assess displaced
people's needs, and to coordinate their interventions and donor
funding to ensure that assistance reaches as many of those needs
as possible.
THE PARTICULAR
NEEDS OF
IDPS IN
BURMA AND
REFUGEES IN
THAILAND
Internally Displaced People
8. Whilst "IDP" can serve as a
useful descriptor, it conceals a much more complex situation.
Perhaps 100,000 people have been forcibly displaced in eastern
Burma since 2004; yet according to the most authoritative figures
(from the Thailand Burma Border Consortium) there were a total
of 500,000 IDPs in eastern Burma in late-2006, in a variety of
different situations—including 287,000 people in ceasefire
areas, 95,000 in areas directly affected by armed conflict, and
118,000 people in Government-controlled relocation sites. Even
these figures do not include the large numbers of people who have
achieved sustainable solutions to their plight, especially those
living on the margins of urban areas. A recent report by the Back
Pack Health Workers Team found that of 2000 IDP households they
surveyed, 10% had suffered forced displacement and one third had
been subjected at some time to forced labour. Human rights abuses,
extreme poverty and a way of life without a sustainable solution
are extremely common and should be calculated in the millions.
9. According to the Back Pack Health Workers
Team's recent survey (Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights
in Eastern Burma (September 2006)), mortality rates among IDPs
in eastern Burma are the highest in Asia. Infant mortality was
found to be 9.1% and child mortality for under-fives was reported
as 22.1%. The biggest killer is malaria, which infects 12% of
the population. Of the 2000 households surveyed, one third had
been subjected at some time to forced labour, and 10% had suffered
forced displacement; a quarter of respondents had had food confiscated
or destroyed by the Burma Army. Families forced to flee their
homelands were reportedly 2.4 times more likely to have a child
die, while those who had had their food destroyed were 50% more
likely to suffer a death in the household.
10. In response to displacement pressures,
IDPs may adopt one or more of the following strategies: i) hide
in—or close to—zones of on-going armed conflict and
forced relocation, often remaining mobile for years; ii) move
to a relocation site if one is provided; iii) move to relatively
more secure villages, towns or peri-urban areas, including "behind
the front lines" in war zones, in ceasefire zones, and in
Government-controlled locations; iv) seek refuge in a neighbouring
country. Often, IDPs are living inter-mixed with communities who
are not—or have not recently been—displaced. The broader
humanitarian situation across the country also remains of serious
concern.
11. IDPs fleeing armed conflict are vulnerable
to a range of well-documented violations, including forced labour,
looting and the destruction of property, rape, torture and murder.
In addition, large numbers of civilians have fled their homes
as a result of the expansion of Burma Army bases, natural resource
extraction or large-scale development projects (including gas
pipeline and dam construction) or inappropriate Government livelihoods
policies. These IDPs are vulnerable to land confiscation and destruction
of livelihoods, and also face a range of problems during migration,
when women and children especially are vulnerable to human trafficking
and other abuses.
12. The most acute needs of IDPs are: i)
protection from human rights abuses; ii) food and livelihoods
security; iii) access to health services, (especially for women
and children, and the elderly); iv) access to education; v) access
to land, and to labour markets; vi) appropriate land and identity
documentation (especially for IDPs in relocation sites, and relatively
secure villages and peri-urban areas).
REFUGEES
13. As of the end of December 2006, 151,300
refugees were officially resident in 10 camps (one Shan, four
Karenni and five Karen) along the Thai-Burma border, and a further
15,000 live in or near the camps and are unregistered. An additional
20,000 people are located in nine New Mon State Party, Shan State
Army and Karen National Union-controlled settlements just across
the border. These include Mon refugees who were forcibly repatriated
in 1996, following a ceasefire between the Government and the
New Mon State Party.
14. Previously, refugees in Thailand could
leave their village-like camps quite easily, to forage for supplementary
food and building materials, in Thailand and adjacent rebel-held
areas of Burma. However, over the last decade, as the amount of
insurgent-controlled territory in Burma has declined, the camps
have become much larger in size, and more tightly controlled by
the Thai authorities. Today, the refugees are largely dependent
on international humanitarian aid.
15. With the exception of the 20,000 or
so people living in IDP/"refugee" camps across the border,
the basic needs of the refugees are being met by the international
NGOs on the Thai-Burma border. But these NGOs are officially prevented
from supporting newly arrived—and thus non-registered—refugees,
the number of whom may increase, as opportunities for third country
resettlement increase. Refugees also often find it very difficult
to access economic and social opportunities.
16. Sexual abuse and rape, in the context
of domestic abuse, and perpetrated by Thai soldiers and villagers,
remain primary protection concerns in the refugee camps.
HOW DIFFERENT
ETHNIC GROUPS
ARE AFFECTED
BY DISPLACEMENT
17. Different ethic groups are affected
by different forms of displacement. Displacement in and from Burma
is not only caused by armed conflict in the east of the country.
While the most acutely vulnerable IDPs do live in those few areas
of Burma still affected by significant levels of armed conflict,
patterns of forced migration are more complex and widespread—the
product of decades of mis-governance by the militarized state.
Three inter-linked types of forced migration in Burma can be identified,
and tend to affect the following ethnic groups:
— Displacement caused by armed conflict:
either as a direct consequence of fighting and counter-insurgency
operations (The Burma Army's "Four Cuts" campaign),
or because armed conflict has directly undermined human and food
security. Displacement of this sort is often linked to severe
human rights abuses. It most affects Karen people across Karen
State and in eastern Tenasserim Division, Mon people in southern
Mon State, Karenni people in southern and eastern Karenni State,
Shan people in southern Shan State, and Chin people in parts of
Chin State[1]
and Chin and Naga Sagaing Division[2].
Armed conflict-induced displacement also affects Rakhine people
in some isolated parts of Arakan State[3].
— Displacement caused by military occupation
and/or "development" activities: due to land confiscation
by the Burma Army or other armed groups, including in the context
of natural resource extraction (eg logging and mining); displacement
due to small- and large-scale infrastructure construction (eg
roads, bridges, airports); also forced migration as a product
of forced labour and other abuses. This form of displacement is
related to the use of force, but does not occur in the context
of outright armed conflict. Although no quantitative data is available,
all of the ethnic minorities (Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan) living
in the border states and divisions are affected by militarisation-
and/or "development"-induced displacement and Kachin
people in Kachin States, as well as a number of urban areas. In
Northern Rakhine State there are 725,000 Rohinga Sunni Muslims
in a stateless-like situation. Of these, 234,000 took refuge in
Bangladesh in 1991-92 and have subsequently returned to Burma.
One by-product of opium eradication in Wa ceasefire areas has
been the forcible relocation of between 50-125,000 Wa villagers
since 1999, from opium growing areas in northern Wa, to the United
Wa State Army's Southern Command area on the Thailand border.
Thousands of local Shan, Lahu and Akha villagers were forcibly
displaced by the new arrivals.
— Displacement caused by loss of livelihood:
this is the primary form of internal and external migration in
and from Burma. The main causes are Government policies and practices
which impact disproportionately against the poor (such as the
requirement that farmers follow an ill-advised and strictly pre-determined
crop cycle), limited availability of productive land, and poor
access to markets, resulting in food insecurity; lack of education
and health services. Livelihoods vulnerability-induced displacement
occurs across the country, including of Bamar people in the central
dry zone, and especially in and from remote townships.
THE LIKELY
TRENDS IN
THE REGION
IN TERMS
OF DISPLACEMENT,
AND DEVELOPMENT
AND HUMANITARIAN
NEEDS
18. Since the 2004 (provisional) Karen National
Union ceasefire, large numbers of IDPs in central and southern
Karen areas have begun to return from hiding places in the jungle
(and from relocation sites, and some refugee camps in Thailand),
to build more permanent houses and grow crops. Especially in central
Karen State, many IDPs have moved from ceasefire zones into relatively
more secure villages and peri-urban areas, influenced by both
the Government and armed groups.
19. While the provisional truce seems to
be holding in most of southern and central Karen State and Tenasserim
Division, since late 2005 the Burma Army has launched attacks
against Karen National Union positions and Karen villages in northern
Karen areas, where insurgent commanders have always opposed the
ceasefire. Between February-September 2006, some 15-20,000 people
were displaced in Toungoo and northern Nyaunglebin Districts,
and parts of Papun District. In addition, since April, dozens
of villages have been forcibly relocated to new settlements in
areas more firmly under Government control.
20. These disturbing developments notwithstanding,
since the provisional Karen National Union ceasefire, the situation
in other Karen areas has begun to stabilise. In parts of Tenasserim
Division, and across much of central and southern Karen State,
there has been little fighting for two years.
21. As a result, both seasonal and permanent
migration is on the increase in Burma. The type of periphery-centre
population movement described here often increases following the
agreement of ceasefires. During periods of armed conflict, travel
in rural areas is usually difficult and dangerous, and control
over civilian populations is a priority for combatants on all
sides. Following the cessation of hostilities, civilians often
exploit the new movement opportunities brought about by relative
peace.
22. Chin State and Sagaing Division, however,
are likely to see renewed conflict and displacement, as the Burma
and Indian Armies cooperate to "flush out" insurgent
groups operating along their common borders.
23. Overall we are not likely to see a significant
change in the numbers of IDPs in Burma. The total numbers of IDPs
in Eastern Burma, as defined by TBBC, decreased slightly over
the past three years.
TABLE SHOWING TBBC POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR
IDPS IN EASTERN BURMA
|
IDPs in Hiding |
IDPs in RelocationSites |
IDPs in Ceasefire Areas |
Total IDPs |
| 2004 |
84,000 |
77,000 |
365,000 |
526,000 |
| 2005 |
92,000 |
108,000 |
340,000 |
540,000 |
| 2006 |
95,000 |
118,000 |
287,000 |
500,000 |
Refugees
24. Since late 2005, the Royal Thai Government has reversed
long-standing policies, to allow international organisations to
work with refugee communities to expand education (including vocational)
services, and income generation schemes. These welcome developments
may result in refugees gaining legal access to parts of the Thai
labor market, and possibly some form of official identification
card. These may eventually lead to some options for sustainable
local integration.
25. Following various delays, the next few months will
see substantial numbers of Karen and Karenni refugees achieving
the "sustainable solution" of resettlement to third
countries. Many of those registered for re-settlement are teachers,
medics, administrators, and others from elite sectors of the refugee
community. Although probably no more than 15,000 will depart by
the end of next year, Ellen Sauerbrey, US Assistant Secretary
of State for Population, Refugees and Migration was quoted at
the end of August as saying that "there will be no cap (for
the resettlement of Karen refugees)" to the United States.
Development and humanitarian needs
26. There is little reliable verifiable data on poverty
and vulnerability in Burma. However, there is undoubtedly widespread
poverty and vulnerability throughout Burma and especially in remote
and conflict-affected areas. And this situation is likely to continue.
Burma is almost certainly not on track to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. In 1997, one in four people in Burma were living
below the minimum subsistence level, with the poorest of the poor
living mostly in rural areas. A 1997 Government survey found that
70% of household expenditure was on food, an indicator of the
vulnerability of poor people in the country. Burma's education
and public health systems remain chronically under-funded. The
country is facing a generalised HIV Epidemic. More than seven
out of 10 people live in areas where they are at risk from malaria.
97,000 new tuberculosis cases are detected each year. Multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis is found in 4% of new patients and 15.5%
of previously treated patients. It is estimated that half of Burmese
children do not complete primary school, with significantly higher
numbers dropping out in remote and conflict affected areas.
27. The absence of reliable comprehensive data makes
it extremely difficult to draw solid judgements about vulnerability
in Burma. However it seems likely that poverty may be particularly
severe in the remaining areas of Eastern Burma affected by armed
conflict; in Chin and Rakhine States and possibly in parts of
the central dry zone; and in high-risk groups scattered around
the country (such as people in hiding in conflict zones (100,000
people), people living with HIV (300,000 to 600,000 people), injecting
drug users (over 60,000 people), commercial sex workers (over
40,000 people), migrant workers, and orphans and street children)
who face high levels of vulnerability to a complex range of risk
factors (including HIV infection, malaria, forced labour, and
police/other brutality). Scaling up efforts to reach all of these
groups remains a huge challenge for the international community.
28. DFID has developed programmes which are starting
to address this poverty. For example, in HIV/AIDS, DFID-funded
projects or interventions have helped to achieve:
— 48 million condoms distributed in 2005 (four times
the total in 2000).
— 160,000 people received voluntary and confidential
testing in 2005 (only 800 did so in year 2002).
— 1.1 million clean needles distributed in 2005
(four times the total in 2003).
— The inclusion of injecting drug users, HIV positive
people, and commercial sex workers in a participatory process
to develop the Government's own HIV national strategy.
— The HIV national strategy identified the need
to work with injecting drug users, commercial sex workers and
men who have sex with men—official recognition of their
existence and their vulnerability to HIV.
THE CHALLENGES
FACED IN
DELIVERING AID
AND ASSISTANCE
TO THESE
GROUPS AND
THE ADVANTAGES
AND DISADVANTAGES
OF CROSS-BORDER
ASSISTANCE COMPARED
TO OTHER
WAYS OF
ASSISTING IDPS
IN BURMA
Remoteness
29. These groups of people are living in some of the
most remote areas of Burma, usually mountainous and heavily forested
and with extremely poor transport and communications infrastructure.
All of these factors make frequent engagement and communication
with IDPs difficult.
Security
30. Armed conflict continues in eastern Burma as rebel
groups sustain their independence struggle against the Burmese
Army. This is especially heavy in Karen State, Karenni State and
Southern Shan State. But sporadic fighting and banditry also occurs
in Mon State, Tenasserim Division and Eastern Bago Division. Many
of the areas are land-mined by both sides; and there are quite
frequent reports of serious human rights abuses by the Burmese
Army. These factors make it extremely difficult to travel to the
areas in which the most vulnerable IDPs are currently based.
Restrictions on Access
31. The Burmese Authorities have placed restrictions
on access to many of the conflict-affected areas. At times, some
international organisations have been able to get access—for
example, the International committee of the Red Cross, and Medecins
Sans Frontiers (Switzerland)—but this is patchy, sporadic
and difficult to achieve from within Burma. It is easier for Burmese
NGOs to gain access, through their own networks, to some of these
areas.
32. From Thailand, the Karen National Union controls
access to the areas it holds, with the Karen National Liberation
Army providing security for cross-border groups. Their access
into Burma remains illegal, as the Royal Thai Government does
not condone crossing the border into Burma.
33. Because of the dependence of the cross-border teams
on the Karen and other armed groups for security, these groups
are essentially limited in their access to areas in which rebel
armed groups can escort them. For example, cross-border groups
associated with the Karen National Union are not able to access
IDP communities in areas controlled by other Karen ceasefire groups—for
example the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).
34. Groups working cross-border from Thailand vary in
capacity and scope of programmes. In general they have access
to a sub-set of the most needy IDPs in hiding in the zones of
on-going armed conflict (approximately 70% of the resources from
the main cross-border provider benefit these groups) and to some
IDPs in "mixed administration areas" (approximately
20% of resources), with more limited levels reaching relocation
sites and ceasefire areas. They also provide aid to other vulnerable
groups in conflict zones, who may not be IDPs as such. This mostly
takes the form of short-term emergency relief (food and medicines),
plus a little education and community development. Cross-border
groups engage in a range of human rights documentation and advocacy
activities, but can do little to protect IDPs in the war zones.
35. Local civil society networks "inside" Burma
have extensive access to people displaced into or within Government-controlled
areas, and also to many people in relocation sites and ceasefire
areas. They have much less access to IDPs in zones of on-going
armed conflict, although some aid is provided to IDPs in "mixed
administration areas" and to those in hiding on an opportunistic
basis. Assistance takes the form of community rehabilitation and
development activities, plus some emergency relief. Ethnic nationality
civil society networks also undertake some important, low-profile
protection activities—although they are unable to take part
in public advocacy.
Humanitarian Principles
36. Those delivering aid to IDPs in Burma face the need
to strike a compromise between the need to provide emergency humanitarian
support with respect for the principles of humanitarian assistance:
independence, impartiality and neutrality.
37. Independence: international NGOs working inside Burma
face pressure to confirm to a set of Guidelines for UN Agencies,
International Organisations and NGO/international NGOs, produced
by the Burmese Authorities in February 2006. Some of the guidelines
are not being applied—for example, the Burmese Authorities
are not attempting to restrict the UN and international NGOs to
choosing new Burmese staff from the Authorities' list of approved
candidates. But other guidelines are being implemented in a piece-meal
manner—for example, State-Divisional and Township Coordinating
Committees are sometimes pushing for a supervisory role over development
projects—and these have the potential to compromise the
independence of NGOs in Burma. The International Committee of
the Red Cross has a very clear mandate which demands its independence.
They currently face difficulties in obtaining access because,
consistent with this mandate, they refuse to travel with a Government
or Government-Organised NGO escort. Community-based groups inside
Burma, because they operate through widely distributed faith-based
networks are also able to maintain an independence. Cross-border
groups are much less able to do so—there is a mutual reliance
with the armed groups who escort them into conflict areas.
38. Impartiality: there is no evidence to suggest that
in-country or cross-border groups are anything other than impartial
in the targeting and provision of aid according to need in the
areas that they can access. The great majority of assistance seems
to reach its intended beneficiaries.
39. Neutrality: Cross-border groups are closely associated
with the armed opposition on which they rely for security and
logistical arrangements. Indeed, most cross-border personnel are
members (or affiliates) of insurgent organisations. As a result,
cross-border groups are not neutral in the conflict (they adopt
various positions of solidarity with oppressed villagers, and
support for opposition forces). The community-based groups operating
inside the country utilise religious networks, which are neutral.
Limited Capacity
40. Of the mechanisms for delivering support, international
organisations have the greatest capacity—highly-skilled
staff with experience of conflict and displacement internationally
from which to draw. Groups working cross-border have been able
to draw on international support and experience for capacity-building
support over the past few years—for example to strengthen
their planning and monitoring systems. The groups working inside
the country have had much less opportunity for capacity-building
and because of the sensitivity of their work often maintain a
low profile and so have limited access to international interlocutors.
So whist they have strong networks and some organisational capacity,
these groups often have limited experience of working on humanitarian/development
issues and limited financial management and reporting mechanisms.
Coordination
41. There is currently no systematic means to analyse
the humanitarian situation and set out a comprehensive statement
of needs. The other challenges described above make reliable data
collection extremely difficult, and no single organisation has
the comprehensive access which would facilitate it. The Burmese
Authorities are not in a position to lead or coordinate interventions
or donor funding as other governments would; and no other organization
has been filling that role.
42. This situation is made worse by the fact that local
NGOs inside Burma, even through they want to increase coordination,
are very careful about to whom they will describe their activities—for
fear that the Burmese Authorities will learn of the projects and
close them down. This also means that organisations working "inside"
Burma cannot afford to be as bold in their advocacy roles as those
in Thailand and overseas—as a result, a lack of funding
is a major problem for groups supporting IDPs from inside Burma.
Humanitarian/protection/development balance
43. In a constrained working environment such as Burma,
it is easier for international organisations to focus on service
delivery and relief activities, than on more politically-challenging
issues, such as protection. Therefore, one of the greatest challenges
facing international organisations in Burma is how to achieve
a balance between emergency relief, more sustainable assistance,
and protection issues—the organisations providing assistance
to IDPs each tend to be more effective at different aspects of
this balance.
HOW DONORS
CAN ASSIST
IDPS IN
BURMA AND
REFUGEES IN
THAILAND MOST
EFFECTIVELY
44. The aim of the international community must be to
ensure that (i) emergency assistance reaches all those who are
in the greatest need; (ii) that protection is provided from human
rights abuses; and (iii) that longer-term development assistance
is provided to all those who live in unsustainable situations
as a result of conflict.
45. To those ends donors have a choice of mechanisms
to support. They could look to support refugees in Thailand through
the international organisations working on the Thai-Burma border—including
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the International
Rescue Committee and the Thailand Burma Border Consortium.
CASE STUDY: Thailand Burma Border Consortium: Support to
refugees in Thailand
— The objective of the TBBC refugee work is to ensure
access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter, cooking fuel
and non-food items for displaced persons. As a result of their
programmes, amongst the 166,000 refugees they support, crude mortality
rates have declined from 4.9 per 1,000 people in 2000 to 3.9 in
2001; under-five mortality has decreased from 9.2 in 2000 to 5.3
in 2005; and the percentage of children under five with wasting
malnutrition has remained below 5%.
46. Donors can support the provision of emergency assistance
to a sub-set of the most vulnerable IDPs in hiding in the areas
of on-going armed conflict from across the border.
CASE STUDY: Cross-border emergency assistance to IDPs
— In 2005, the main cross-border programme provided
cash assistance to around 80,000 villagers, in 15 townships. Their
work included a substantial proportion of those "IDPs in
hiding" in the conflict zones who choose to make themselves
available to armed opposition groups, plus about 25,000 people
in "mixed administration" areas (and some Government-controlled
relocation sites).
— The ethnic armed groups alert cross border assessment
teams when they are aware of a conflict-related food crisis. The
turn-around time between the initial incident, needs assessment,
and transfer and distribution of funds is between one to four
months. Distribution trips are accompanied by units of soldiers
from the ethnic armed groups. These armed guards receive no direct
benefit beyond provision of food supplies for the duration of
the trip and the political advantage of being associated with
the relief effort.
— Cash distributions enable IDPs to purchase three
months' rice—although people sometimes choose to buy medicines
or other essential supplies with the money (the average distribution
in 2005 was $13.50 per person). This short-term humanitarian aid
is intended to supplement villagers' existing rice-sharing and
other coping mechanisms, offering them a chance to reconstruct
their communities once the immediate crisis has passed.
— Due to the problems associated with distributing
aid in a war zone in partnership with a party to the conflict,
over the past decade the programme has developed sophisticated
and systematic needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation, and
information collection and dissemination systems. The programme
is impartial, partly independent, but not neutral.
47. Donors can fund protection work by international
organisations inside Burma, such as that by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
CASE STUDY: International Committee of the Red Cross: Protection
of IDPs in Burma
— A major part of the work of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Burma is to deliver assistance
to, and promote the protection of, the civilian population in
conflict areas in eastern Burma. The ICRC does not identify a
separate category of "IDP", arguing that humanitarian
law and principles should not distinguish between IDPs and other
conflict-affected civilians.
— The ICRC has a presence in or near conflict areas
in Karen, Mon and Shan States, and Tenasserim Division and has
maintained contacts with the Burmese Authorities as well as with
armed opposition movements. These provided ICRC the opportunity
in its capacity as a neutral humanitarian intermediary to "assess
the security and living conditions of the civilian population
in areas affected by conflict and, where necessary, extended assistance
to vulnerable civilians"—it aimed to deliver "protection
by presence".
— In remote and sensitive areas in Southern Shan
State and Karen State ICRC provided immunisation services, the
training of auxiliary midwifes and basic health care workers.
In remote and sensitive areas of Karen, Southern and Eastern Shan
and Mon states, as well as Bago and Tanintharyi divisions, ICRC
rehabilitated more than 20 rural health structures and schools,
and carried out in these areas nine projects aiming at improving
access to safe water to the benefit of about 40,000 people.
— Although relations with Burma Army commanders
on the ground generally remain good, the ICRC has recently experienced
significantly reduced access to most parts of eastern Burma. As
a result, in March 07 they closed two of their field-offices.
At least one ICRC sub-delegation has managed to continue to monitor
events in more sensitive conflict-affected areas via contacts
with local networks.
48. Or donors can use in-country community-based groups
to deliver emergency relief, as well as some health and education
programmes, and a limited protection role.
CASE STUDY: Community based emergency relief, health and
education programmes
— A variety of civil society networks exist among
ethnic nationality communities "inside" Burma. These
include Christian and Buddhist organisations, and many traditional
village associations, as well as more formally-established local
NGOs. These local networks can often access conflict-affected
parts of Burma that are beyond the reach of international organisations.
— A systematic approach has been adopted by several
CBOs and local NGOs, which have established low-profile aid programs
in number of Government-controlled areas, relocation sites and
ceasefire areas in eastern and northern Burma (including "mixed
administration areas"). Some of these local organisations
also work in some zones of on-going armed conflict, where access
varies, depending on the current situation.
— The support that these organisations provide includes—provision
of funds to enable children to attend school, teacher training,
vocational training, mosquito net distribution, construction of
latrines, health awareness training, training on hand-pump construction,
and school construction. They also provide limited emergency relief
(rice or money to purchase it and medical supplies, including
mobile outreach teams) to Karen IDPs in areas of active conflict.
One such network used DFID funds to reach almost 12,000 direct
recipients in 2006 and 190,000 indirect recipients.
49. Very few international organisations operating inside
Burma have programmes specifically targeted at IDPs. In part,
this is due to the sensitivity of the issue, especially in the
current political and humanitarian environment; in part, it reflects
the fact that a very large number of conflict-affected people
in Burma have been displaced at some point, so it is often very
difficult to distinguish IDPs from other vulnerable people. Donors
can therefore also try to ensure that their development programmes
are responsive to the needs of IDPs and other conflict-affected
people. For example, International Development Enterprise's sale
of foot-pumps to poor farmers and the United Nations Development
Programme's Human Development Initiative.
CASE STUDY: International Development Enterprises: Foot-pumps
for poor farmers
— IDE is aiming to raise incomes and improve the
food security and well-being of poor and vulnerable rural households
across Burma. They do this by introducing and marketing innovative
and affordable small-plot irrigation technology solutions that
significantly boost household productivity and incomes—the
most successful product has been the foot-pump. They engage the
private sector to locally produce and disseminate these to achieve
large-scale access and impact among poor, rural households.
— U Thaung Nyunt is a young father living in southern
central Burma. Last year he left his family to travel hundreds
of miles to look for work on the Burma-China border. This year
he won't have to. His wife bought a foot pump and his family now
earns enough from their small plot for him to stay at home. He
said "before I wasn't sure how we were going to make it as
daily life was getting harder for us. Now I have confidence in
the future. I even dare to dream of seeing my children finish
their schooling".
— Seventy percent of foot pump-buyers earn less
than US$1 per day. The foot pumps help to increase the area of
vegetables they can irrigate, on average doubling their income.
IDE's foot pumps reach IDPs as well as other conflict-affected
people in Karen and Mon states.
CASE STUDY: United Nations Development Programme: Human
Development Initiative
— Daw Htwe Kyi is a 37-year old single parent living
in the Delta region of Burma. After her husband divorced her,
she and her five year old son had to live on her earnings as a
casual labourer of around half a dollar a day. Sometimes in the
agricultural off-season when there was no work, she used to sell
her labour in advance at half price to buy rice to eat.
— Two years ago Daw Htwe Kyi joined a savings group
for poor women established with the support of UNDP's Human Development
initiative. The group meets once a week and all members save a
quarter of a US dollar. Members can borrow small amounts at a
reasonable rate of interest, either to meet immediate needs or
pay for small investments.
— Daw Htwe Kyi has taken four loans—the smallest
of two dollars and the largest 10 dollars. She used the money
to buy a pig and six chickens and to pay for pig food. Her investments
have done well. She has paid back her loans and because of the
extra money that she earns from raising pigs and chickens she
gets the full value of her labour during agricultural seasons—she
no longer needs to sell it in advance. The experience of being
a member o the group has also given her, and other poor women,
more confidence to speak up about important village issues.
— Daw Htwe Kyi says, "in the beginning I was
a little hesitant to be a member." But she adds that the
group "has completely changed my life and also the lives
of many other members in our group. All of us now do not sell
our labour in advance or borrow money from money lenders. We have
donated some money for school repair and will continue help in
the development of the village, When we started the group we were
shy to speak. None of us feels shy anymore."
— UNDP's Human Development Initiative is working
in several areas in Mon, Karen and Shan state controlled by the
Burmese Authorities but where armed ethnic groups are also active
and there are IDPs.
50. None of these means alone can deliver sufficient
support to displaced people. They are complementary in the types
and locations of the IDPs or refugees they support. As a result,
the international community needs to ensure that the full range
of mechanisms is supported. No individual donor is likely to be
able to engage sufficiently effectively to support them all, so
it will be important for donors to take account of the programmes
of other donors in order to ensure greatest overall coverage.
It is likely also that donors will have a comparative advantage
in supporting one mechanism over another—and this should
also be taken into account within the context of overall international
effort. A mechanism for systematic comprehensive donor coordination
does not exist, so a key responsibility of donors will be to contribute
to the sharing of information between donors and implementers
working inside Burma and cross-border—on levels of need,
access, funding and projects.
THE IMPACT
OF DFID'S
POLICIES TOWARDS
BURMA'S
IDPS AND
REFUGEES
51. DFID has very recently changed its policy towards
IDPs and refugees. In response to criticism that serious consideration
was not being given to the legitimacy of cross-border support,
we carried out a review to look again at both cross-border and
in-country means of supporting IDPs. As a result of our policy
we have a balanced allocation of our resources which reflects
the placement of other donors' funds and our own comparative advantage
in building relationships inside Burma.
52. DFID has increased the ability of community-based
groups inside Burma to deliver emergency relief, health and education
programmes and a limited protection role for IDPs. Governments
tend not to support these organisations because few donors have
a presence inside Burma, and therefore lack the necessary capacity
for the regular and detailed engagement inside Burma. Over the
last three years DFID has developed relationships with community
based networks inside Burma and last year provided support to
IDPs through them, at the same time providing training to increase
their ability to deliver aid. As a result, this year the networks
will be better placed to provide support to a greater number of
IDPs.
53. DFID has increased the breadth of the support we
provide to IDPs and other conflict-affected people. We have increased
the amount of aid available to community-based groups inside Burma
(£400,000 in 2007-08) to deliver their emergency relief,
health and education programmes and a limited protection role
for IDPs in eastern Burma. We have also removed a restriction
on the use of our funds provided for assistance to refugees (£1.8
million over three years) so that they can be used for either
cross-border or refugee assistance, as their relative needs and
funding dictates. This will mean the continued provision of food,
shelter and a range of other necessities to refugee camps on the
Thai-Burma border and of emergency relief to a sub-set of the
most vulnerable IDPs in hiding in the areas of on-going armed
conflict across the border. The protection work carried out by
the International Committee of the Red Cross is a further important
component to this coverage, and we will continue to lobby the
Burmese Authorities hard fully to reopen access for them in eastern
Burma. Finally, we continue to ensure that the development programmes
DFID funds are responsive to the needs of IDPs—this includes
not just International Development Enterprises' foot-pumps and
the UN Development Programme's Human Development Project (described
in earlier case-studies) but also Save the Children's provision
of early childhood education, WHO's vaccine-preventable disease
surveillance and other projects. As Three Diseases Funded projects
are developed, DFID and our partner donors will work hard to ensure
that IDPs suffering from tuberculosis, malaria or HIV/AIDS are
able to benefit from international assistance.
54. DFID is helping to ensure greater coordination of
international assistance to IDPs. We have been a strong advocate
for a process led by the United Nations, including funding a position
with explicit aid-coordination objectives in the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator's Office in Rangoon. We have tried to ensure that
the organisations we fund contribute to the coordination process
organised by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. And we have, with the European Commission, led an ongoing
process to increase the information-sharing, coordination and
complementarity amongst donors. As a result of these initiatives
we intend that donors and NGOs will be better able to assess displaced
people's needs, and to coordinate their interventions and donor
funding to ensure that assistance reaches as many of those needs
as possible.
Annex A
DFID'S PROGRAMME INSIDE BURMA
DFID has a £8 million annual programme in Burma (up
from £2.3 in 2001-02). In addition to the support we provide
for IDPs inside Burma and for refugees on the Thai/Burma border,
DFID is working on four key objectives:
(a) Reducing the burden of communicable diseases
Burma is facing a very serious public health situation. Between
170,000 and 610,000 are HIV positive with a prevalence rate as
high as 1 in 3 in high risk groups. Malaria is a major cause of
illness and death. 70% of the population is at risk. TB is the
second leading cause of death with approximately 75,000 new cases
reported in 2004. Our response includes a £20m commitment
(over 5 years) through The Three Diseases Fund. The Fund should
help to save a million lives over five years. Its broader success
will be judged by its transparency and accountability and its
ability to achieve increased access to vulnerable groups.
(b) Improving access to basic education
Like Burma's health system, the education system is deeply
under-funded. It is believed that around three-quarters of the
costs of education are met by communities—limiting the ability
of the poor to access in education. Official figures report a
primary completion rate of 73.4% in 2005 (up from 48.5% in 2000).
It seems likely that the actual figure is closer to 50%. In addition
the education system is largely based on rote learning—failing
to develop children's creativity and critical thinking. Our response
includes support for Save the Children to improve access to Early
Childhood Care and Development (£2.7 million over 3 years)
and to UNICEF's basic education programme (to be jointly funded
by the EC, Denmark and Norway—£3.3 million over 3 years).
Both programmes combine a focus on access for the poor and ethnic
minority children (who often drop out of Burmese language formal-education
quickly if they do not speak Burmese at home) with work on improving
quality of education and a more child centred approach.
(c) Support for sustainable livelihoods
Around 70% of the Burmese population (35 million out of approximately
50 million) is dependent on agriculture. Of these 15 million do
not own land and are dependent on securing seasonal agricultural
work. At least 30% of the population lives on less than $1 per
day. 10% of the population (or 5 million) people do not have enough
to eat. Our response includes support for the UNDP Human Development
Initiative (£4 million over 4 years) which is introducing
community development methodologies, increasing incomes and reducing
vulnerability of poor rural households across Burma. We also support
work by international NGOs like Action Aid and International Development
Enterprise Myanmar.
(d) Support to a process of transition to a democratic
society
Burma's social fabric has been devastated by 60 years of
civil war and 45 of one-party or military rule. There are serious
concerns about human rights abuses and political prisoners. The
country is richly diverse. But this diversity is been managed
with repression and violence, rather than negotiation, compromise
and accommodation. Social capital is weak with limited trust between
groups. There is a culture of autocratic leadership and relationships
based on dominance and subservience—both amongst the authorities
and in broader society. There is little space for public debate
and the free media has been repressed. Militarisation has stunted
the capacity of the civil service and of civil society. Corruption
is endemic. As its contribution to HMG's broader efforts to bring
democracy to Burma, DFID is focusing on building the foundations
needed for democracy to grow and sustain. As well as work on community
participation and empowerment as part of our support for health,
education and livelihoods we are also funding activities supporting
a range of projects directly intended to build Burmese civil society.
For example we are funding a network of ethnic groups who are
active in conflict areas and holding public training on good governance
(£219k, 1yr); and supporting the growth of ethnic civil society
organisations (£500k, 3yrs). We recently approved a new £3
million programme (over three-years) which will build local capacity
for increased citizen participation in lower-order political decision
making processes affecting their welfare, livelihoods and governance.
1
The Chin National Front insurgent group estimates that, since
1988, 40-50,000 people have been displaced by armed conflict in
Chin State, many of whom have since fled to Mizoram State, India.
There are small numbers of Type 1 IDPs in thinly-populated areas
of Chin State, near the borders with India and Bangladesh, where
Rohingya, Arakanese and Chin armed groups are active. Back
2
Naga armed groups operate on both sides of the India-Burma border.
Increased counter-insurgent cooperation between the Burma and
India armies since 2003 has displaced unknown numbers of people. Back
3
Unverifiable local sources estimate that approximately 80,000
IDPs are living in temporary settlements in the jungles and mountainous
areas of Arakan State, as a result of low-level armed conflict
between Arakanese insurgents and the Burma Army, with associated
human rights abuses (including rape and murder). Also, relocated
Burman and Rakhine communities live in 49 "new villages"
in Northern Rakine State, to which they were forcibly relocated
by the Government, as part of a scheme to re-model the demographics
of northern Arakan. Relocated families were provided with "start-up
kits", including small parcels of land, shelter and farming
tools, and some means of livelihood support (eg trishaws or tractors).
In many instances, the initial capital investments never materialised,
or were insufficient to allow families to engage in productive
activities. Back
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