Memorandum submitted by the Burma Campaign
UK
SUMMARY
UK AID IS
NOT REACHING
MANY OF
THE MOST
VULNERABLE PEOPLE
1. In many border areas of east and northern
Burma, where poverty is most severe, aid can only reach people
by cross-border mechanisms. DFID refuses to fund such aid. The
argument made by DFID for not funding cross-border aid is that
it has a comparative advantage working from inside Burma, and
that cross-border aid is already well funded. This argument is
based on a false premise that there has to be an either or. This
is not the case. DFID can, and should, fund both. The populations
in the conflict zones are among the most vulnerable in Burma,
with some of the highest levels of disease and mortality. More
cross-border assistance will save lives.
— DFID must provide funding for cross-border
aid as the only mechanism available to reach some of the most
vulnerable people in Burma. There needs to be a comprehensive
study and needs assessment of the situation of IDPs in Burma,
and aid delivered according to need on the basis of that assessment.
NO SUPPORT
FOR DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
2. As the dictatorship in Burma is at the
root of humanitarian problems and underdevelopment, it is impossible
to tackle these problems without also addressing their causes,
yet DFID is failing to adequately commit to this. DFID does not
provide any resources to projects promoting democracy, despite
spending millions of pounds on projects promoting democracy in
other countries where oppression and human rights abuses are not
so severe. The limited capacity-building projects DFID currently
engages in, that it now describes as pro-democracy, are not the
same as projects that are specifically targeted at improving the
human rights situation in Burma, and encouraging democratic reform
in the country.
— DFID must provide funding for projects
promoting human rights and democracy in Burma. This funding should
be for projects inside Burma, and through exile Burma organisations
that work in Burma and internationally.
NOT ENOUGH
AID
3. Given that health, education, and other
key indicators are as severe as in many of the poorest African
countries, DFID's budget for Burma—£8 million per year—is
woefully under-funded. Neighbouring Vietnam receives £50
million a year. If Burmese people were to get as much aid per
head as people in Africa, DFID's Burma budget would have to increase
from £8 million in 2007 to £80 million.
— Aid to Burma should be at least doubled
for 2008-09, and a review conducted of appropriate funding levels
for future years.
ABOUT THE
BURMA CAMPAIGN
UK
4. The Burma Campaign UK campaigns for human
rights and development in Burma. We work for the freedom of all
the peoples of Burma regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or
age. We provide analysis to the media and government, and we lobby
and campaign to improve government and commercial policy on Burma.
We provide training and advice to Burmese organisations all over
the world.
CROSS-BORDER
AID
5. The humanitarian crisis in Eastern Burma
is one of the worst in the world. In the past year, 82,000 people
have been forced from their homes by conflict and human rights
abuses. [4]Poverty
is equivalent to the poorest conflict-hit countries of Africa.
A recent report found health threats such as HIV/AIDS, TB and
Malaria are most marked in Burma's border areas. [5]In
conflict zones in eastern Burma malaria accounted for 45% of adult
and child deaths in 2003-04. [6]Yet
virtually no UK aid reaches this area, most of which can only
be reached by aid workers crossing over the border from Thailand.
There are also areas in northern Burma which can only be reached
by cross-border aid from neighbouring countries. DFID refuses
to fund any cross-border projects.
6. There are estimated to be more than 500,000
IDPs in eastern Burma. More than 90,000 are in conflict areas
where most can only be reached by cross border aid.
7. The Burma Campaign UK warmly welcomes
the decision of DFID to lift restrictions on the Thai-Burma Border
Consortium (TBBC) regarding the use of DFID grants for cross-border
aid. However, no extra funding has been allocated to TBBC, and
as TBBC struggles most years to fund its work in refugee camps
in Burma, in practice the decision will mean that little or no
extra aid will reach IDPs in Burma.
8. The argument made by DFID for not funding
cross-border aid is that it has a comparative advantage working
from inside Burma, and that cross-border aid is already well funded.
This argument is based on a false premise that there has to be
an either or. This is not the case. DFID can, and should, fund
both. The populations in the conflict zones of eastern Burma are
among the most vulnerable in the country, with some of the highest
levels of disease and mortality. More cross-border assistance
will save lives.
9. DFID's own March 2007 review of its support
to Burmese refugees and IDPs appears to contradict its own concluding
argument that it has a comparative advantage, that they are relatively
well funded, [7]and
that it will add "little extra value." [8]
10. For example, page 15 of the review describes
how education projects for IDPs in conflict areas are "massively
under-funded." The high levels of disease and mortality as
described above are evidence that there are tens of thousands
who are not receiving the aid they require, and that thousands
of people are dying every year as a result. It is extraordinary
that DFID argues that it would provide "little extra value"
by providing funding for aid programmes that could save thousands
of lives every year.
11. The comparative advantage argument fails
to convince on more than one level. DFID is not faced with a choice
of doing one or the other, which is the impression it is trying
to give. DFID has argued that providing cross-border aid could
result in the regime expelling DFID from Burma, but there is no
evidence or precedent to support this argument. The UK has been
at the forefront of international criticism of the regime ruling
Burma, and has in the past pushed for stronger EU sanctions, has
sponsored and lobbied hard for resolutions on Burma at the United
Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Commission, has issued
many condemnatory statements of the regime, and most recently
co-sponsored a resolution at the United Nations Security Council
that produced a near hysterical response from the regime, including
condemnations of the UK from regime officials and in state-run
newspapers. None of this has resulted in any restrictions on DFID
operations inside Burma. In this context providing funding for
cross-border aid is unlikely in the extreme to have any negative
consequences for DFID operations.
12. The comparative advantage argument also
fails to convince as it implies an organised division of labour
in terms of delivering aid to IDPs, and that DFID is filling a
gap that others are not. DFID's own March 2007 paper on IDPs states
that this is not the case: "There is almost no overall analysis
of the humanitarian situation or comprehensive statement of needs.
There is no clear process for relating needs to fund allocations
by donors".6[9]
How can DFID argue an effective comparative advantage when it
admits in its own paper that there has been no proper needs assessment
for prioritising aid to reach the most vulnerable, and that there
is no clear process for fund allocation by donors? There are tens
of thousands of IDPs in eastern Burma who can only be reached
by cross-border aid and are among the most vulnerable in the country.
Thousands of people die because aid does not reach them. Surely
helping them should be a priority?
13. The issue of lack of donor co-ordination
that DFID describes in its IDP paper is a very serious one, and
the Burma Campaign UK has repeatedly called for a proper review
of the needs of IDPs in Burma, where they are, what their needs
are, and what mechanisms will be needed to reach them. While DFID
has pledged to work to improve co-ordination, neither DFID nor
the UN has made any commitment to undertake comprehensive review
to tackle what is one of the most serious humanitarian crises
in the world. Given DFID's own statement on the lack of any proper
assessment or co-ordination regarding IDPs, The Burma Campaign
UK finds it extraordinary and bizarre that in the same paper DFID
should state that: "In relation to IDP issues, and humanitarian
protection more generally, effective leadership within the UN
system has been provided by the office of the UN Resident Co-ordinator."
The Burma Campaign UK believes that the UN Resident Coordinator
has clearly failed to take the necessary measures to tackle this
crisis, both in terms of assessing needs and ensuring delivery
of assistance where needed, and addressing the root causes of
the IDP crisis, namely, in large part, the regimes deliberate
targeting of civilian ethnic minorities, which the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights has described as being in breach of
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. In view of the failure on
the part of the United Nations to perform its role effectively,
DFID should step in to ensure that a comprehensive study is undertaken.
14. Another argument against cross-border
aid used by DFID, that it has to chose how to spend its limited
resources, only stands if one accepts that its current budget
for Burma is a reasonable one. It clearly is not. DFID allocation
of aid to Burma is a fraction of what it should be. (This is covered
in more detail in the next section.)
15. Aid can be delivered if financial resources
are provided. Furthermore, costs are relatively small. In 2005
the 70 backpack teams from the Backpack Healthworker Team provided
healthcare to about 140,000 displaced people in Burma. Each team
of two to five healthcare workers covers a population of approximately
2,000 people. There are 15 field-in-charges and 15 second-in-charges
that supervise and monitor the activities. One backpack team working
for six months costs just 50,000 baht (£720). [10]
REFUGEES IN
THAILAND
16. In a very welcome move, DFID has begun
to increase its funding for the TBBC, from £535,500 in 2005,
to £611,050 in 2006 and £672,155 in 2007. However, given
that DFID funds just 4% of the TBBC budget, [11]the
regular and high profile references to support given to TBBC could
be seen as out of proportion to the levels of funding given. In
addition, TBBC is mainly responsible for providing food and shelter
in the camps, not health, education and other services. Health
and education services in the camps are extremely limited, and
more resources are also needed in this area.
WILL THE
3 DISEASES FUND
REACH THE
MOST VULNERABLE?
17. On 10 August 2006 DFID announced it
was giving £4 million a year, half of its total Burma budget,
to the new 3 Diseases Fund for Burma, overseen by UNOPS. DFID
has played a key role in establishing the 3D Fund, as it is known.
The fund was created after the Global Fund was forced to withdraw
from Burma because of restrictions placed on it by the regime.
It is hoped the new fund will save a million lives in Burma, providing
the regime allows it to operate effectively. However, it appears
that many people in Burma in areas where malaria and HIV/AIDS
are most prevalent will not benefit from this fund. For although
DFID has stated that the 3D fund is committed to working on basis
of need, in fact the 3D fund is not able to operate on this basis.
The 3D fund has stipulated that grantees will have to have a memorandum
of understanding (MoU) with the regime.
18. As the regime does not allow aid to
reach many ethnic and conflict areas, and organisations delivering
cross-border aid do not have MoUs, the effect of this approach
will be that areas in eastern Burma, where malaria rates are consistently
more than 10% of the population at any time, and can be as high
as 22% in some areas, resulting in 45% of deaths caused by malaria,
will receive no 3D assistance. Such omissions also seem likely
to apply in much of Kachin State, which has some of the highest
rates of malaria and HIV/AIDS. These areas could be reached by
cross-border aid or direct funding to local NGOs.
19. This example again exposes the lack
of a comprehensive approach towards aid delivery in Burma. The
international community appears to have made no serious attempt
to set up an alternative fund or mechanism to ensure aid reaches
those parts of Burma that the 3D Fund won't.
20. The approach of the United Nations in
delivering 3D aid is symptomatic of a broader problem with the
United Nation's approach to delivering aid in Burma. Around the
world the United Nations is renowned for its ability to negotiate
with all sides in areas of political and military conflict in
order to secure the delivery of aid. It is bizarre that when it
comes to Burma few, if any, such efforts seem to be being made.
The UN Resident Co-ordinator, and UN Envoy Ibrahim Gambari, have
failed to reach out to all the key players in Burma, particularly
from different ethnic nationalities, and instead attempt to work
only with the SPDC, which has consistently blocked free access
for humanitarian aid. In a letter referring to the role of the
UN Resident Co-ordinator in any possible negotiations with the
regime, the National League for Democracy has stated: "Our
experience is that those who have served in this country for some
time in any capacity have become conditioned to move within the
framework of thought and action set up by the SPDC." Recent
visits by senior United Nations Officials to the sham National
Convention, seen as an apparent endorsement by many, reinforced
the impression that the UN has a preference for working with the
SPDC rather than all the key players in Burma. Aid should not
be held hostage to such politics, and DFID and the British government
should use their influence with the United Nations to ensure it
works with all players in Burma to ensure aid reaches those people
most in need, not just those that can be reached with the permission
of the SPDC.
NO SUPPORT
FOR DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
21. Burma receives an estimated total of
$150 million in humanitarian aid each year[12],
but Burma Campaign UK estimates that less than $10 million dollars
a year is spent on projects promoting human rights and democracy
in Burma.
22. In addition, the European Commission
has more than halved funding for projects promoting human rights
and democracy in Burma since 2004; from €522,000 (£353,392)
in 2004 to just €200,000 (£134,411) in 2006. [13]This
is despite human rights and democracy being listed first in the
list of areas to receive funding in the EU Common Position on
Burma. A new five year draft aid strategy plan for Burma produced
by the European Union that has been seen by Burma Campaign UK
sidelines support for democracy and human rights to an unspecified
separate fund, rather than putting them at the heart of its policy.
23. DFID's stated commitments and objectives
regarding pro-democracy activities in relation to Burma do suggest
concern, on paper at least, that Burma's underlying problems be
addressed and not just the symptoms. However, the reality leaves
much to be desired.
24. Whilst DFID's evolving efforts to ensure
that a pro-democracy element cross-cuts all of its other objectives
in Burma is welcome, it is nowhere near sufficient. Despite pledges
to actively seek out opportunities to support programmes that
would assist Burma's transition (to a democratic society) and
specifically to "consider supporting programmes focused on
this objective"[14]
DFID openly admits it "does not fund any projects solely
focused on promoting democracy"[15]
in Burma. Given this fact it is the Burma Campaign UK's view that
DFID is failing to sufficiently meet its commitment "to contribute
to prospects for a successful transition"[16]
in Burma and by doing so short-changing the people of Burma.
25. In its recent review of policy towards
IDPs and refugees, DFID describes how humanitarian operations
can facilitate protection activities relating to improving human
rights, such as reporting of abuses to advocacy organisations,
resulting in a reduction of instances of forced labour, yet it
fails to fund those advocacy organisations that play this essential
role. [17]
THE EXILE
MYTH
26. Some organisations and individuals have
tried to justify lack of funding to exile Burmese organisations
by saying they are out of touch or that the money is better spent
inside Burma. The facts completely contradict this argument. So-called
exile groups based in neighbouring countries and other countries
may use these countries as a base, but many are operating inside
the country through underground networks and risking their lives
to cross into Burma. Much of what we know about the situation
in Burma—the humanitarian crisis in eastern Burma, use of
forced labour, use of rape as a weapon of war, torture in Burma's
jails—comes not from the United Nations, aid agencies or
diplomats, but instead from these so-called exile organisations
that struggle for funding every day.
PRO-DEMOCRACY
PROGRAMMES
27. A broad sweep of a selection of pro-democracy
projects conducted by exiled Burmese organisations is detailed
below. Many more deserving projects both inside and outside Burma
cannot be named publicly. All of the following deserve more than
passing consideration for support from DFID.
EXAMPLES:
AAPP
28. Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners (Burma) was formed to document and disseminate information
on the real situation of political prisoners in Burma and to provide
assistance to the families of prisoners.
Democratic Voice of Burma
29. DVB covers a wide range of issues—empowerment
of independent media, capacity building amongst the public as
well as young journalists, civic education (Human Rights, Workers
Rights, Gender Equality etc.), free flow of information and knowledge
etc. Management and accountability of funds is transparent and
effectiveness can easily be measured by the evaluation of programmes
conducted. Radio and TV broadcasts into Burma.
Federation of Trade Unions, Burma (FTUB)
30. The FTUB is a trade union congress with
member unions. FTUB works inside Burma to educate, organize, and
strengthen Burmese workers and other pro-democracy groups to assert
their rights and push the regime towards substantive tripartite
negotiations with the National League for Democracy and the leaders
of Burma's ethnic peoples. FTUB conducts outreach and coalition
building with sympathetic organizations in the region and around
the world, continuing to support the movement for democracy in
Burma. It also provides education programs on democracy, human
rights, and trade union principles in villages and towns throughout
the country. The FTUB also seeks to organise democratic trade
unions in ethnic areas and publish teaching materials, in a variety
of languages, for the concepts of democracy and trade union rights.
Karen Youth Organization (KYO)
31. The Karen Youth Organization's main
priority is to help young Karen develop their potential to work
in and on behalf of the Karen community.
Members of Parliament Union (Burma)
32. The Members of Parliament Union (Burma)
is responsible for electing the prime minister of the National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. As an institution,
its main focus is to raise international awareness on Burma and
to garner the support of democratic political institutions.
National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma
33. The National Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma is a group of National League for Democracy
MPs who work with all the democracy and the disenfranchised ethnic
forces as well as with other exile and student groups to help
bring about democratic change in Burma.
National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB)
34. The National Council of the Union of
Burma (NCUB) is a network of pro-democracy and ethnic resistance
groups that aim to support the struggle of the democratic movement
inside the country with the assistance of the international community.
Coordination of a Foreign Affairs Training Programme.
Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN)
35. The Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN)
is a network of Shan women active in Thailand and along the Thai-Burma
border, seeking to address the needs of Shan women.
Women's League of Burma
36. The Women's League of Burma unites various
women's organisations to enhance cooperation, mutual understanding
and trust among the women of Burma.
TOO LITTLE
AID
37. The £8 million a year budget for
Burma is not proportionate to the needs of the country. Neighbouring
Vietnam receives £50 million a year. [18]Given
that health, education, and other key indicators are as bad as
in many of the poorest African countries, DFID's budget for Burma
is woefully under-funded. If Burmese people were to get as much
aid per head as people in Africa, DFID's Burma budget would need
to increase from £8 million in 2007 to £80 million.
The Burma Campaign UK is calling for an immediate doubling of
DFID aid to Burma, and a review of funding levels for future years.
38. DFID's budget for Burma for 2007-08
has been frozen at £8 million, effectively a reduction once
inflation and increased costs are taken into account. Half of
DFID's Burma budget will be spent on one single project, the 3
Diseases Fund for Burma, leaving just £4 million to address
the many other challenges facing the country. [19]
39. A recent report—Chronic Emergency,
Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma, reveals levels of
poverty and disease in Eastern Burma equivalent to that of conflict
hit African countries. Reports from the United Nations and other
organisations show increasing numbers of people living below the
poverty line, and a decline in health and education standards
that again are comparable to many African countries. Yet Africans
get ten times DFID aid per head than people in Burma. Zimbabwe,
which like Burma is a country where assistance cannot be channelled
through the government, per head, receives 18 times what Burma
receives.
REGIONAL AND
AFRICAN COUNTRIES
WHERE DFID ALLOCATES
ANNUAL BUDGETS
| Country | Population[20]
| DFID aid £ [21]
| Aid per head |
| | |
|
| Burma | 49.5m | 8m
| 16p |
| Cambodia | 13.5m | 12.8m
| 94p |
| Timor Leste | 800,000 | 2.08m
| £2.60 |
| Indonesia | 217m | 30.34m
| 13p (22p inc Tsunami) |
| Vietnam | 82m | 50m
| 60p |
| Zimbabwe | 12.9m | 38m[22]
| £2.94 |
| Africa | 752m[23]
| 1bn[24]
| £1.32 (will increase to£1.66 in 2007-08)
|
HEALTH EXPENDITURE
PER CAPITA—PURCHASING
POWER PARITY
(PPP) REGIONAL AND
AFRICAN COUNTRIES22[25]
| Burma: | $30 |
| Cambodia | $192 |
| Vietnam | $148 |
| Timor Leste | $195 |
| Indonesia | $110 |
| Rwanda | $48 |
| Nigerian | $43 |
| Mali | $33 |
| Zambia | $51 |
| Mozambique | $50 |
| Zimbabwe | $152 |
40. Despite the growing humanitarian crisis, levels of
aid have not been increased commensurately, and this needs to
be reviewed. Given the extreme and growing restrictions on the
delivery of aid in Burma, it is unlikely that budgets equivalent
to that of Africa would be able to be spent at this time. However,
there are clearly opportunities for increasing humanitarian aid,
both inside Burma, and via cross-border aid. There are also significant
opportunities for funding projects promoting human rights in Burma.
Where direct funding of projects inside Burma is very difficult,
there are extensive opportunities to conduct this work through
cross-border projects, and through other exiled Burmese organisations.
41. There are concerns that an increase of aid to Burma
could result in the regime stealing aid, or using it for propaganda
or other purposes. The Burma Campaign UK calls for aid to be delivered
in line with the recommendations outlined in Pro-Aid, Pro-Sanctions,
Pro-Engagement, published by the Burma Campaign UK in July
2006.
4
Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma 2006 survey, Thailand Burma
Border Consortium page 2. Back
5
Responding to AIDS, Tuberculosis, malaria, and emerging infectious
diseases in Burma: Dilemma's of policy and practice, Page 6, Breyar
et al, PLOS October 2006. Back
6
Responding to AIDS, Tuberculosis, malaria, and emerging infectious
diseases in Burma: Dilemma's of policy and practice, Page 4, Breyar
et al, PLOS October 2006. Back
7
Paper on DFID Assistance for Burmese Refugees and Internally Displaced
People, Page 22 DFID, March 2007. Back
8
Paper on DFID Assistance for Burmese Refugees and Internally Displaced
People, Page 23 DFID, March 2007. Back
9
Paper on DFID Assistance for Burmese Refugees and Internally Displaced
People, Page 19 DFID, March 2007. Back
10
Backpack Health Worker Team. Back
11
Based on figures from TBBC annual accounts. Back
12
Page 4, Myanmar-New Threats To Humanitarian Aid, International
Crisis Group, December 2006. Back
13
European Commission answer to parliamentary Question by Glenys
Kinnock MEP, 27/9/2006. Back
14
DFID Country plan, Oct 2004, page 12. Back
15
Written parliamentary answer Gareth Thomas, DFID Parliamentary
Under-Secretary on 19 January 2006-theyworkforyou.com Back
16
DFID Country Plan. Back
17
Paper on DFID Assistance for Burmese Refugees and Internally Displaced
People, Pages 18.19 DFID, March 2007. Back
18
Hansard PQ answer 26 June 2006. Back
19
Media Release, British Embassy, Rangoon, 10 August 2006. Back
20
UNDP HDR 2005, 2003 figures. Back
21
Hansard PQ answer 26 June 2006 Back
22
2005-06 figures http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/zimbabwe.asp Back
23
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-03/2006-03-07-voa80.cfm Back
24
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/default.asp?ID=0 Back
25
UNDP HDR 2005 2002 figures. Back
| 
