Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Christian Aid welcomes this opportunity
to give evidence to the International Development Committee on
DFID assistance to Burmese internally displaced people and refugees
on the Thai-Burma border.
1.2 Christian Aid has a long commitment of working
with the displaced people of Burma and in particular responding
to their humanitarian needs and strengthening their self-reliance.
Christian Aid has been working with refugees in Thailand for over
20 years. Through this experience we are able to assess the situation
in eastern Burma from the perspective of those most affected.
1.3 During this time we along with our partners
have been witness to the deteriorating situation in the country.
The situation in Burma and in particular eastern Burma continues
to worsen. 2006 saw an estimated 82,000 people were forced to
leave their homes,[26]
reflecting the State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC) disregard
for their responsibility to protect Burmese citizens from harm.
The greatest concentration of displacement was seenin eastern
Pegu Division and northern Karen State, where conflict is reported
to have displaced over 27,000 people
1.4 Decades of military rule and economic mismanagement
have resulted in widespread poverty and barely functioning health
and education systems. Currently only 3% of the government's budget
is spent on health as opposed to between 30-50%[27]
that goes to the armed forces. The World Health Organisation ranks
Burma 190th out of 191 countries in term of health care delivery.
We believe that all parts of the country are affected by the actions
of the regime but it is in the border areas where we have witnessed
the communities most disadvantaged by the actions of the regime.
1.5 Christian Aid supports a number of programmes
along the Thai-Burma border that provide assistance to both refugees.
Christian Aid is a member of the Thailand Burma Border Consortium
and channels support from DFID for their refugee programme.
1.6 Christian Aid believes it to be vital for
DFID to increase its assistance to providing support to meet the
needs of refugees based in the camps in Thailand in addition to
meeting the needs of the internally displaced through support
to a multi faceted approach to providing assistance. This should
recognise the importance of assistance being provided from inside
Burma as well as those working cross border.
1.8 It is important to recognise that civil
society space in Burma remains limited. There are opportunities
for targeted programmes but these are significantly restricted.
1.9 The National convention continues to move
excruciatingly slowly forward. But without meaningful participation
from many of the ethnic nationality groups and the exclusion of
the National League for Democracy it lacks legitimacy and it is
difficult to see how this will provide the opportunity to find
a genuine tripartite political solution between the government,
ethnic and democracy groups. Without this we believe that there
will be a continuation of the current trend of increased displacement
through conflict and human rights abuses, insecurity of livelihoods,
displacement through government sponsore development initiatives
and land confiscation.
INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PEOPLE (IDPS)
2.1 There are three main categories of displaced
persons in eastern Burma; those confined to relocation sites under
SPDC control, those in ceasefire areas and those hiding in conflict
(or free fire) areas. As of November 2006 it is estimated that
there are at least 500,000 internally displaced persons in eastern
Burma. This is made up of approximately 287,000 people in temporary
settlements in ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationality
groups, 95,000 hiding in those areas most affected by conflict
and a further 118,000 who have been moved to relocation sites
under the control of the SPDC. [28]
2.2 The two main causes of displacement are
conflict induced and development induced. Displacement through
conflict in eastern Burma is the result of the on-going civil
war and is well documented. However, in recent years forced displacement
has become increasingly associated with state sponsored development
projects. This includes infrastructure development and commercial
agriculture, which does little to alleviate poverty. This has
led to significant human rights violations and widespread land
confiscation.
2.3 Given this very difficult working environment
it is essential for priority to be given to the development of
robust coordination mechanisms between groups working cross border
and those operating inside Burma to provide humatarian assistance
to IDPs. There are significant challenges attached to this none
more so than building trust between different groups in order
to share information whilst maintaining confidentiality of work.
Given DFID's presence in both Thailand and Burma they are well
placed to play a much more proactive leadership role in developing
these opportunities which will ensure a stronger complimentarity
of approaches.
2.4 Christian Aid's experience is that there
is considerable information being provided by organisations working
cross border whilst there remains a reluctance to share information
of in-country operations.
2.5 Christian Aid welcomes some of the important
steps DFID has taken in reviewing its policies. This now needs
to be matched by greater transparency in sharing information of
their support to work from inside Burma.
2.6 To address these limitations we believe
that it is important to increase the provision of capacity support
for the institutional development of community based organisations
on both sides of the border, whilst at the same time prioritising
support through CBOs and national civil society groups. To ensure
this happens it is important that donors develop a greater flexibility
in their expectations of these organisations in meeting reporting
requirements. This often shifts too much of the attention of these
organisations away from implementing their programmes.
2.7 One significant ceasefire area in Eastern
Burma is the area under the administration of the ceasefire group
the New Mon State Party. Our experience and that of our partners
indicates that they receive negligible support from Organisations
based inside the country with many of the IDPs in Halochanee and
other resettlement sites still depend on assistance being provided
by humanitarian agencies based in Thailand. Again this reinforces
the importance of sharing information so that there is clarity
on what can be done.
2.8 Another key argument to prioritise support
for assistance to IDPs is that it will prevent those already displaced
from crossing over the border into Thailand as refugees. This
is desirable as it not only keeps people closer to their homes
but also reduces the cost of assistance. Therefore, there is a
strong cost effectiveness argument to providing assistance to
IDPs.
REFUGEES
3.1 DFID has provided support to the Thailand
Burma Border Consortium through Christian Aid for many years,
this has been important in meeting the ever increasing financial
needs of providing assistance to refugees to at least the minimum
recognised international standards.
3.2 The needs of refugees unfortunately continue
to grow. Even with the increase in resettlement the numbers remain
unchanged, those leaving for thrid countries have simply been
replaced by new arrivals fleeing conflict and systematic rights
abuses in Burma. In addition, costs continue to rise and it remains
an annaual challenge simply to maintain current rations. Therefore,
although it is important to acknowledge the current DFID contribution
it is important that DFID recognises that in fact its contribution
in real terms continues to fall.
3.3 In 2005 DFID for the first time made a three
year commitment to support TBBC's refugee programme. This was
in line with the debate around good humanitarian donorship and
was certainly welcomed. In addition, DFID agreed to a 10% increase
for each year. This represented a total commitment of £1.8
million for three years.
3.4 In spite of this increase in funding DFID's
commitment as a percentage of TBBC's overall budget has in fact
fallen. An analysis of TBBC's account shows that DFID's funding
in 2000 represented 4.6% of TBBC's overall budget; this now stands
at 4.1% in 2006. [29]
3.5 It is important for DFID to increase significantly
its financial support to TBBC. This is in light of the increasing
costs of managing the current refugee caseload. In fact Christian
Aid would advocate for DFID to follow the strategy that has been
undertaken by the Swedish government of providing a fixed percentage
of TBBC's overall budget. It is increasingly difficult for the
member organisations of TBBC to continue to lobby one or two governments
to continue to increase their commitments whilst the commitment
of others decreases or remains stagnant in real terms.
3.6 Whilst Christian Aid would strongly advocate
for DFID to increase its support to TBBC we would more broadly
urge them to increase their overall assistance to refugees in
Thailand and consider supporting other important initiatives.
3.7 Current Royal Thai Government (RTG) policy
states that refugees must be confined to camps and therefore have
no real income generating or employment opportunities. More recently
there has been genuine progress within the RTG to review this
policy and they are now considering the establishment of income
generating programmes on a case by case basis. This is extremely
welcome and it is hoped that this will decrease the current dependency
on internatiionally coordinated assistance.
3.8 Christian Aid urges DFID to increase its
support to expand skills training and income generating programmes.
This is a crucial development and it is important that DFID recognises
the need to increase its support to organisations working in developing
these initiatives.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 DFID needs to take a more proactive role
in developing robust coordinating mechanisms between cross border
and in-country approaches to providing assistance to IDPs.
4.2 To do this DFID must be more transparent
in sharing information of its programme in supporting in-country
approaches. This will help in substantiating claims of the reach
of its work and provide a more conducive coordinating environment
to enable complementarity of programming.
4.3 We urge DFID to increase its financial support
to both refugee and IDP programmes managed in Thailand. There
is untapped potential to increase the impact of cross border work
and the main constraints remain financial. It is important that
DFID commits to increasing suport to cross border programmes.
4.4 We support DFID's policy of working to increase
assistance to IDPs from withing the country. In doing this we
urge DFID to investigate ways of providing assistance to the IDP
camps in the Mon ceasefire areas.
4.5 DFID should continue to investigate ways
of sufforting civil society groups both inside Burma and along
the border. If this is to succeed DFID needs to review its reporting
requirements which are currently too rigid and therefore reduces
the potential of this strategy.
4.6 DFID has a responsibility to maintain a
high level of funding to support the current TBBC refugee programme.
In spite of some recent improvements the UK government's support
to Burmese refugees falls significantly behind many other governments.
4.7 DFID should also prioritise support to skills
training and income generating programmes for refugees. This is
a long term strategy that if successful will in time reduce dependency
on international assistance.
April 2007
26 Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2006 Survey,
Thailand Burma Border Consortium, pg 20. Back
27
Failing the People of Burma: December 2006, The Burma Campaign
UK, pg 5. Back
28
Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2006 Survey, Thailand
Burma Border Consortium, pg 3. Back
29
Programme Report: July to December 2006, The Thailand Burma Bcrder
Consortium. Back
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