Examination of Witnesses (Questions 148-159)
MR ASHLEY
SOUTH AND
MR MAUNG
ZARNI
12 JUNE 2007
Chairman: Thank you for your indulgence
for the break in the evidence session and thank you to both of
you for coming in and offering to help us with our inquiry into
the situation in Burma. I know that you have both got experience
of operating in and around Burma in different contexts. We were
given a cutting from The Independent, Mr Zarni, of your
article of 5 June which I have no doubt you will explain a little
more in your evidence, but I was going to pick up one particular
comment if I might where you refer to the pro-West opposition
and I wonder whether that is helpful in the sense that the opposition
was democratically elected by the people of Burma albeit a long
time ago and it is perceived, I would have thought, inside and
outside as the only legitimate expression of Burmese opinion that
has ever been tested, so it seems to me to put the specific adjective
"pro-West" in a slightly pejorative way is not entirely
helpful. I am not going to ask you a question now, I would just
say in the course of your evidence I think we would be keen to
know—if you do not actually regard the people who were elected
at the only recent elections we have had in Burma as legitimate
representatives, who could you possibly regard as legitimate representatives.
However, I am going to ask Marsha Singh if he would like to start.
Q149 Mr Singh: It is a question for
Mr Zarni and maybe Mr South would also like to comment on this.
It is this issue that you raise in your article about the importance
of dialogue and the futility of sanctions. I understand where
you are coming from but what options does the international community
have to show its disapproval of particular regimes like this if
it does not use sanctions? Would you then argue that we should
not have imposed sanctions on South Africa because of apartheid
because it hit ordinary South Africans? I am struggling a little
bit with that concept. Then a further question arises, how open
is this regime to dialogue and would either of you or both of
you advocate that what the British Government should be doing
now is opening the dialogue with the Burmese Government under
whatever circumstances prevail or would the British Government
in doing that be out of step with the rest of the international
community?
Mr Zarni: Firstly to respond very
briefly to the Chairman's comment, I have lived for half of my
life now in the West and I am based in Oxford and I did not in
any way intend the term "pro-West" to be pejorative.
It is just a fact that the opposition draws material moral and
ideological support from the West as opposed to China or India
or Russia, and so in that sense it is a matter of fact, and I
state that, in that it is supported by the West and it is sympathetic
to Western democratic ideals. I am sitting here within the British
Parliament and I did not use the term "pro-West" in
a pejorative way at all. I just want to make that clear and put
it on the record. On the question of sanctions and the valuable
role they played in bringing down the apartheid regime in South
Africa, I was one of the people that coined this "Burma as
South Africa" phrase primarily to appeal to the old anti-apartheid
veterans because they were scattered all over the Western countries.
What differentiates Burma categorically from South Africa is that
all the ASEAN[6]
countries do not support the sanctions on Burma whereas in fact
South Africa's case became a symbolic struggle not just confined
to the borders of South Africa but spread to the entire African
Continent—white versus black, so when you have a regime
that is supported by two giant neighbours—China and India—as
well as by the rest of Asia it is very, very difficult to apply
this model. We have tried it. I was with the sanctions campaign
for 12 years. Then we looked at it objectively. What we failed
to anticipate was the rise of both China and India. The sanctions
campaign was hatched in the early 1990s. Back than none of us
thought that China's rise would be this rapid and this consequential
nor did we think that India, New Delhi, would radically reverse
its policy of supporting Aung San Suu Kyi and our opposition and
cosy up to the regime out of its own national interests and strategic
needs. These are structural factors meaning that neither China
nor India will shift under any circumstances policies that are
designed to pursue their national interests, and so in that sense
the home country, the people of Burma get caught in the larger
geo-political struggle. This fact needs to be kept in mind constantly
as we explore what will be most effective in terms of helping
the Burmese people. Thirdly and lastly, how open is the regime
for dialogue? I would say not open at all. They do not need the
West, they have China, they have Russia, and they have India.
As we saw in January 2007, it has been amply demonstrated that
the regime in Burma can count on both Russian and Chinese support
at the UN Security Council so the pressure of sanctions is not
going to work. On top of that they are enjoying a natural resource
blessing and they are sitting on massive new finds of natural
gas and resources in a region that is consuming energy at such
an alarmingly fast rate in terms of environmental degradation.
China, India, Thailand—everyone—is involved in bidding
for the natural gas and oil from Burma. Burma's natural gas and
oil are a blessing for the generals and a curse for the Burmese
people. So they do not need the West. The West has little or no
leverage with the regime. We should start reviewing what can be
done realistically. Finally on that question, if we are
looking at policy or strategy options the problem with the Asian
approach of constructive engagement as well as the Western approach
in the name of sanctions and isolation, which is supported by
all of us in opposition, is that they are both focused on elite
politics. Democratisation involves societal transformation and
there is nothing—let me emphasise this—which is designed
to support either the economic power of the people or the societal
and cultural power of the people. I think the policy debate has
to be shifted from the top leadership-focused, be it on Aung San
Suu Kyi or the Karen National Union or the Shan State Army or
on the regime itself. Let me say categorically—and I know
this is a public hearing, I do not think the regime is serving
the national interests of the country or even the interests of
the Army as an institution. It is only a handful of top generals
that are benefiting from the current political and economic arrangement,
and there is a common plight that both the rank and file soldiers
and young officers and the Burmese people share; they share the
collective poverty and misery. Since you were talking in the earlier
session about IDPs being the issue, the greater number of internally
displaced people is within the government-controlled area. If
you compare 150,000 or 250,000 refugees and add another 500,000
for IDPs who are hiding in the jungle somewhere in conflict zones,
one type of IDPs is conflict-related and the root cause of the
IDPs is conflict. Here the policy and the strategy need to take
into account the need to de-escalate the conflict. Then secondly,
and equally importantly, another type of IDP problem is caused
by deep and growing poverty. The current policy from the pro-democracy
opposition's side to isolate and cripple the regime financially
is a) not working and b) contributing further to the rise of IDPs
inside the country who are following employment. They are scattered
all over the country. We do not have an exact figure on these
IDPs within the military-ruled Burma. We are talking about 5 per
cent of the country's territory where the conflict remains active
versus the rest of the country under military rule.
Q150 Chairman: I think we get the point.
We are somewhat constrained on time and I would like to hear Mr
South's comments as well.
Mr South: I do not have very much
to add to what Zarni has said regarding sanctions. It does seem
pretty clear to me that sanctions in the case of Burma is really
a symbolic issue. After 15 years it seems pretty clear that the
sanctions regime has not achieved its objectives for some of the
reasons which Zarni mentioned. Personally I think that sanctions
do send a moral message from the international community which
is perhaps the most important element. One other reason which
Zarni did not mention was the fact that the current hardline military
regime in Burma are much more comfortable with international isolation
than they are with engagement. Many of these people made their
military careers during socialist military rule between 1962 and
1988 and these are people who are used to isolation, they are
used to the bunker mentality, and so they are quite happy with
the situation of being isolated by the international community,
and it does seem that the Government is more unhappy and more
uncomfortable when they are engaged on issues, so I would suggest
that, yes, dialogue with the military government is very important.
Also for the reasons that Zarni said, I think it is unlikely to
be achieved by increased international pressure in terms of sanctions
regimes but I think that there are opportunities perhaps to work
with particularly India and China, and perhaps Russia also, the
ones who vetoed the resolution at the UN Security Council, perhaps
to have some behind-the-scenes discussions with the Burmese military
Government, that these countries could encourage their client,
the SPDC, to engage with the international community on some specific
issues. I think the idea of the SPDC engaging with the international
community on discussions on democratisation in the broadest sense
is not very realistic, but perhaps one or two specific issues
could be identified, for example humanitarian dialogue, and I
think that the whole issue of forced migration and displacement,
which we are talking about today, is quite a good example of a
subject that obviously reflects the desperate situation of many
people within Burma, and it is an area where perhaps other regional
powers can be encouraged to put more pressure on the Burmese military
government to engage with the international community and discuss.
There are a couple of examples of successful dialogue with the
Burmese military government, but not many. I guess forced labour
would be one. It is on again/off again but the relationship with
the ILO has some examples of how it has been possible, at least
to a limited extent, for the international community to engage
on a very sensitive subject with the Burmese military government,
although obviously it is problematic also. The point I wanted
to make really, again to back up what Zarni just said (although
we do not agree on many things!), concern the exclusive emphasis
on a elite level change on most discourse regarding Burma. I think
that this really is to have a rather simplistic view of how democratisation
might take place in the country. I think democratisation is a
process and we need to be thinking more about how we can encourage
democracy from below from a community level by empowerment and
I think many of the projects which DFID supports, both cross-border
from Thailand but also in terms of community-based organisations
which DFID supports inside the country, are very good examples
of empowerment of local organisations that are perhaps in a more
incremental and not very dramatic fashion nevertheless working
for sustained political transition in Burma, and I think that
is something that needs to be acknowledged.
Q151 John Battle: Our visit to the
border focused on IDPs at the border. I want to really focus on
the issue of IDPs in government-controlled and ceasefire zones,
not where there is conflict or where there is no government control.
I want to ask who do you think is best-placed to provide assistance
to those IDPs? It is really following on Ashley's point. Can people
get in there to help? Can there be a dialogue with the Government
to help with those IDPs? Will they accept the concept of IDPs?
And how could DFID be engaged in that?
Mr Zarni: Ashley would be better
qualified to comment.
Mr South: This is in specifically
government-controlled areas?
Q152 John Battle: Yes, government-controlled
and ceasefire zones.
Mr South: The groups that are
providing assistance to IDPs cross-border from Thailand, by and
large, have access to areas of on-going armed conflict, places
where acute vulnerabilities exist, as I think we have already
discussed. They have some access to government relocation sites
and ceasefire areas, but not very much, whereas groups helping
IDPs from inside the country have some limited access to areas
of on-going armed conflict but mostly have access to government-controlled
and ceasefire zones. These are local organisations operating in
a very low-profile manner in the same way as the cross-border
groups are local organisations, that are supported by international
agencies which cannot themselves get access to war zones. Inside,
though, there are community-based organisations many of which
are religious faith-based organisations, partly because the suppression
of civil society in Burma means that religious organisations enjoy
a degree of autonomy which other civil society actors do not.
These local organisations do have access often to internally displaced
people in government-controlled and ceasefire areas. I would suggest
it is complementary; cross-border groups have access to conflict
areas and the groups working inside to government-controlled and
ceasefire areas.
Q153 John Battle: Is there a public
discourse whereby there is an agreed assessment of the needs of
the people? Is there agreement on how many internally displaced
people there are in ceasefire and government-controlled areas?
Will the Government share those figures with people? Could you
give me a number? The next point really is should DFID be engaged
in working to try and tackle that as an area of need?
Mr South: I think the community-based
organisations to which I was referring have over the last two
to five years greatly increased their capacity to analyse the
needs of displaced people in these areas. Over the last couple
of years we are now beginning to see numbers coming out which
broadly tally with the numbers which the cross-border based groups
are producing, although obviously there is not that much overlap
so it is difficult to make too much in the way of comparison.
The capacity of the groups working inside the country for analysis
are more limited because they have received less support and also
they have not been doing it for so long, so it is still a bit
disproportionate but I think those groups are increasingly able
to identify needs and come up with numbers also. DFID have played
a very important role in supporting these groups and I think Britain
has played a crucial role in supporting these groups.
Mr Zarni: Let me follow up on
that very briefly. There have been surveys and research done on
the subject of IDPs inside the country with specific regards to
food security because the IDPs inside are primarily driven by
economic needs. This falls categorically under this rubric of
"developmental need". The issue of developmental assistance,
and humanitarian assistance cannot be defined very clearly. Secondly,
I think it would not be strategic to address this issue only as
a humanitarian/charitable issue. This has to do with economic
empowerment and this is the area the Government of Burma would
not object too strongly to especially because this Government
is inept in managing the economy. And we have been in this type
of dire economic situation for the past 45 years. It has been
more than clear that the top leadership will not be able to develop
the economy, and the top leadership also does not appear to be
that concerned about the economic well-being of ordinary citizens.
So I think what I would emphasise here is if we are looking at
IDPs inside Burma, this is an issue that is linked to the lack
of economic development, so whatever DFID is doing it is not going
to be enough. However, there is a private sector especially because
Burma is an agrarian society primarily, and there are NGOs working
in the agricultural sector. I can give you one example of International
Development Enterprises and they have been addressing the issue
of rural poverty by providing food pumps for irrigation and there
are similar organisations. There is social space and economic
space: it is just that the military Government is paranoid about
political space.
Chairman: We have had evidence
from other organisations on that.
Q154 Ann McKechin: We have talked
a lot today about the need for co-ordination. I wonder if you
could comment on whether you think OCHA's appointment of a humanitarian
co-ordinator for Burma is going to assist the co-ordination of
help to the IDPs and in identifying groups in areas other than
eastern Burma who currently are receiving very little aid?
Mr South: Yes, I think that it
probably is quite an important and positive development. The only
real thing I would want to add is I think it is quite important
to acknowledge that the actual groups that are assisting but also
providing some protection for IDPs in eastern Burma in particular
are local Karen, Mon, and Shan organisations. The international
agencies do not have access to these areas so everybody is working
by proxy. In many cases the local organisations are actually a
couple of steps ahead of the international organisations. The
Karen networks inside the country, particularly over the last
five years, let us say, have developed pretty extensive contacts
with the Karen networks which are working cross-border and obviously
in a public session one could not say much more than that. That
kind of co-ordination is already going on at community level.
I think there is a danger that by internationalising it this could
actually disempower very able organisations that are doing the
work.
Q155 Ann McKechin: So we perhaps
over-emphasise the need for a multilateral donor to co-ordinate
as opposed to community groups co-ordinating on the ground?
Mr South: It is important to have
international donor co-ordination as well but it needs to be done
sensitively and I think OCHA are probably the best placed to do
this because to a certain extent they are perceived as being more
neutral. I think most of the Thailand-based organisations are
understood to be quite clearly aligned with certain conflict actors
and it would be quite difficult for them to take on a co-ordinating
position which was perceived by everyone as being neutral. Perhaps
the same could be said for organisations working inside the country,
so OCHA as a newly established office might be the best way to
move forward on that.
Q156 Ann McKechin: So it may have
some advantage as opposed to DFID doing the co-ordination?
Mr South: Yes, I heard the comments
earlier and I did not quite understand why it was that DFID was
being asked to take on this major co-ordination role when DFID
is just one of a number of players in the situation. One more
thing which I think is important, I do believe that DFID are supporting
some very innovative and important programmes inside Burma which
do have a strong pro-democracy angle, although that is obviously
played down in order not to alienate the Government, and I understand
that DFID might perhaps not want to take on too high a profile
a role in something like co-ordination of assistance to IDPs because
it could possibly undermine their position in terms of some of
the quite sensitive programmes that they are undertaking inside
the country.
Q157 John Bercow: I would like to
come to a specific question about cross-border aid in a moment
but I would just like to be absolutely clear, and for the Committee
to be clear about the credentials of both witnesses, who we warmly
welcome to our proceedings. Mr South, I know you are described
for our benefit as an "independent consultant", and
I am sure that is absolutely right, although I think you have
experience in the past of working for TBBC. For the avoidance
of doubt, would it be correct to say that you either have worked
or do work for DFID, you have been paid by DFID and the UNDP?
Mr South: Yes, I have worked on
Burma for 15 years. I have visited the country about 100 times.
The majority of those visits were cross-border trips from Thailand.
I have also visited across the China border and inside the country.
I have on two occasions worked for the Thai Burmese Border Consortium,
once in the 1990s and once in 2002, I actually ran the TBBC cross-border
aid programme for a year. I have produced reports for Human Rights
Watch, I have done consultancy work for the UN, the World Food
Programme and also for DFID.
Q158 John Bercow: So you have worked
for DFID?
Mr South: Yes.
Q159 John Bercow: I am extremely
grateful to you and thank you. Dr Zarni, just so again I can be
clear, your academic repute is widely known. I just want to be
quite clear because although you have undertaken quite a journey
in relation to Burma matters, it would be correct to say, would
it not, that you do not yourself have any experience of development
policy as such?
Mr Zarni: I am currently specialising
in development issues around Burma and I have a three-year fellowship
where I am writing a book on the economic development of Burma.
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