Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-176)
MR ASHLEY
SOUTH AND
MR MAUNG
ZARNI
12 JUNE 2007
Q160 John Bercow: You have not done
that work in Burma?
Mr Zarni: I was myself for 17
years in exile and I lived there for 25 years and worked in the
tourism sector as a tour guide and previously I was a teacher,
so I do not know what you mean by that.
Q161 John Bercow: I was seeking to
establish what the historical record was because my understanding—and
I think it is important to have this elucidated—was that
you were originally a strong advocate of robust action against
the Government, notably in the form of sanctions. There was a
point in your career at which you were very frustrated by what
you thought was the relatively ineffectual nature of multilateral
policy and you were sympathetic to armed struggle. You did at
one important point in your career I think—but if I am wrong
I am sure you will correct me—go to see the Khin Nyunt (and
I do not know whether you want to talk on the record about your
discussions with military intelligence or not) but just for the
record it is absolutely right, I think, as we have been told,
that you founded the Free Burma Coalition. You did of course at
one point announce a significant change in policy on the part
of the Coalition and my understanding is that at the time your
announcement of a change of policy did not command the support
of the staff to such an extent that almost all of the supporters
of the Free Burma Coalition left and decided to form another organisation.
Is that correct?
Mr Zarni: That is not correct,
sir. Just to clarify the points that you mentioned. One is that
the Free Burma Coalition was a voluntary network of people and
we had a few paid staff members, including myself. The policy
shift was primarily decided by the Burmese—former members
of the KNU[7]
as well as former ABS DF[8]
members and myself—and the majority of the people that opposed
our policy shift were American activists, the people who had never
lived in the country and did not understand the junta the way
we did—just about every Burmese in Burma including Aung
San Suu Kyi is associated with the military by family connections,
and so we felt at the time that although we, the opposition, had
pursued this policy of sanctions and isolation—and we all
worked very hard, and we were foot-soldiers supporting Aung San
Suu Kyi and her pro-sanctions policies, and we still love her
and we support her morally—we felt that our strategy had
failed the country and failed the people, the same way the successive
military governments in Burma have failed our country and our
people. The mission of our Coalition, sir, was not to wed ourselves
to a particular strategy but to assess that strategy against what
is happening on the ground and what new developments were occurring
in the region that impact directly on the lives of our countrymen,
for instance, the rise of China and the rise of India.
Q162 John Bercow: I am extremely grateful
that you have clarified your position and it is all on the record
and can be analysed—
Mr Zarni: On the issue about meeting
Khin Nyunt because you mentioned that I went there, there was
a small number of Burmese who were educated in the West and some
of us were once armed. I was not, I was in the US, but some of
my colleagues were part of armed student resistance in the jungle.
When we reached the conclusion that dialogue between Aung San
Suu Kyi and the top leadership was not possible—it was dead
on arrival—we were approached and we responded positively
to the more progressive elements within the junta and out of that
channel of communications came one visit.
Q163 John Bercow: I understand entirely
the thesis that you are advancing and I am extremely heartened
to hear you say that you still love Aung San Suu Kyi but people
might be forgiven for thinking otherwise with the reference to
"Kipling's Burma girl awaits her turn, a prostitute nation,
she was bound to become..." Oxford, United Kingdom, 28 June
2006. I will not embarrass you, Dr Zarni, by reading out the poem
in any detail or length. I know it is not your role in life to
try and become a Poet Laureate and it is probably as well! Can
I just be clear because there is a lack of clarity, with the greatest
of respect, at any rate in my mind, on the basis of previous exchanges
we have had, not least in Wilton Park last year, what your position
is on the subject of the conduct of the regime. You said earlier—and
this is important—you thought that the regime was not really
helping the country, just a small number of people at the top.
Mr South made the interesting point a few moments ago that he
thought there had been a little bit of progress on the question
of child labour.
Mr South: Child labour/forced
labour.
Q164 John Bercow: Forced labour—sure—can
I be clear as far as both of you are concerned but I am mainly
addressing my question to Dr Zarni, that you accept that rape
as a weapon of war, compulsory relocation, forced labour, the
use of child soldiers, the use of human minesweepers, religious
persecution, the incarceration of political prisoners and the
bestial destruction of villages in eastern Burma on almost a daily
basis have all long been part of the policy of the Government
of Burma and of the State Peace and Development Council, including
at the time when you chose to meet Khin Nyunt, who you described
I think a few moments ago as a relative moderate. At the time
you were having a meeting with that "relative moderate"
those bestial abuses of human rights were being perpetrated and
you were aware of the fact. Is that right?
Mr Zarni: You have said a lot
of things but let me just—
Q165 John Bercow: It is a pretty
simple challenge.
Mr Zarni: I was not just sympathetic
to the armed struggle; I was assigned as the team leader of a
small group of five Burmese dissidents to look for arms by no
other than General Bo Mya, head of the Karen National Union and
of the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) in June 2003.
I had travelled extensively in the conflict zone with the Karen
National Liberation Army, not just visits along the Thai-Burmese
border and refugee camps. I ate with the soldiers, I talked with
them for hours, and I made a number of visits, and I was so outraged
by what I heard from them first-hand stories about atrocities
that were committed by the Burmese soldiers—(and I belonged
to the majority ethnic group then)—at the time there was
also a brutal attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage at
Deyapin. This is a major conflict zone and the KNU was also committing
atrocities as well, I learned from these soldiers. That is when
I began advocating the way to find the de-escalation of this conflict.
We—Burma—have been a post-colonial mess. In 1948 we
regained independence and there were 20,000 sub-machine guns in
the hands of the people who disagreed on what type of Burma they
wanted to build. There were also different ethnic pocket armies
in the country as well as the Burmese Communists, and so this
is a long-running conflict of 60 years. Sir, if today "regime
change" was the best solution I would support regime change,
but based on what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan I would
categorically oppose regime change because there is no single
silver bullet. We have got to understand the historical, structural
and institutional complexities of this issue[9].
Q166 John Bercow: Thank you very much
indeed. Can I just ask Mr South—of course Mr South will
say what he wants, but if I can get in my question and then he
can perhaps wrap it around that and then I will shut up and colleagues
can pursue their lines of questioning—on the question of
co-ordination between those working in-country and those working
cross-border and the need to try to ensure that the work is complementary,
can you develop a little further if necessary what was touched
upon earlier about the role of UN OCHA. And can I just ask you
on the strength of your very extensive experience, which I readily
acknowledge, do you accept that some at least and some quite significant
numbers of the most vulnerable and marginalised people can effectively
be reached only by cross-border assistance?
Mr South: I will certainly answer
your question. If I could just begin by perhaps chipping in to
complement what Zarni said, on the long list of very systematic
human rights abuses that have been perpetrated by the Burma Army
I can say, yes, certainly I recognise all of those as being very
much the practice of the Burmese military in areas of armed conflict.
Whether it constitutes government policy, I suppose, is rather
a technical issue in terms of what is policy but certainly this
is how the Burma Army behaves. I do think it is important that
many of these practices are also characteristic of the armed opposition
groups as well and I think there is a danger of painting the other
parties to the armed conflict as being completely blameless—it
takes two to make war—and I think that is something that
often gets overlooked. More importantly really is I do think it
is fairly easy to document the horrific abuses that occur in Burma.
Any suggestion that the reports of human rights abuses are fabricated
by opposition groups is clearly untrue, and there are certainly
a lot of bad things happening in Burma and you do not have to
make this stuff up, but it is relatively easy conceptually to
document what is happening and much more difficult to come up
with solutions. So I think this is what we should be thinking
about, how can we begin to address some of those issues. In terms
of co-ordination, really I would want to restate what I said earlier
regarding the importance of prioritising the local organisations
that are already active in these areas. I do not know if I necessarily
want to add much more than that. On your final question, yes,
certainly, I think as per my submission, there are large numbers
of displaced people in Burma, some of whom are clearly internally
displaced people according to the UN's guiding principles, others
are perhaps economic migrants and there is a grey area as to quite
what the differences are between displaced people and economic
migrants. There are very large numbers of extremely vulnerable
people inside Burma that have access to very limited protection
and assistance. Many of these people are IDPs, but I think it
is probably true to say that the most acute vulnerabilities are
experienced by those in the conflict zones, primarily along the
Thailand border but in some other areas as well, and that these
people, by and large, can only be accessed by cross-border assistance;
I would not disagree with that. The only thing I would want to
add is that I think whilst no doubt all organisations can benefit
from greater assistance, particularly in the area of capacity-building
that, by and large, groups inside the country receive less support,
certainly proportionately to the number of people who are displaced
in areas which they have access to than cross-border groups, so
in terms of the value-added argument which was discussed in the
earlier session I think that this is probably the area that does
need to be prioritised, working inside the country. But very importantly
border areas can only, in some places at least, be accessed from
Thailand, I would agree.
Q167 Sir Robert Smith: You have talked
about increasing support for community groups in Burma. Do you
have any particular idea of which groups require that support?
Mr South: I think that might come
into the area where I would request perhaps to follow up in confidence
or in writing. I do not know if it is something that would be
great to discuss because obviously these groups are vulnerable
to a lot of different pressures inside the country. The majority
would be faith-based networks—Christian but also non-Christian
organisations, particularly among the non-Karen groups, I know
that most of the focus of advocacy has been on the Karen communities—and
again I think it is important to recognise that 30 per cent of
the Karen population perhaps are Christians and there are very
important networks among other faiths within the Karenni community
that could benefit from greater support. Yes, these would largely
be local community-based organisations.
Q168 Sir Robert Smith: If DFID did
do more open funding of such groups would that put at risk its
other programmes in Burma or lead to more disapproval?
Mr South: I think it would have
to be handled with great sensitivity obviously. This is something
that I tried to refer to earlier. One of the issues about working
in Burma is that often it is necessary to not call a spade a spade.
Quite a lot of the projects that support displaced people inside
the country are not necessarily discussed as such and so a certain
amount of creativity is necessary in order to be able to provide
assistance to these groups, but I do not think it necessarily
would undermine other projects if it is done sensitively.
Mr Zarni: May I follow up on that
very briefly. Since you are looking at the possibility of supporting
inside or in-country initiatives and community groups, I think
there needs to be an understanding that although there are far
fewer registered local NGOs that would fit the Western criteria
of "civil society" organisations, this is a society
that has functioned through informal networks that do not feel
the need to go to central government and get themselves registered.
This is a society that has survived hundreds of years of absolute
monarchy and 125 years of British Colonialism followed by 60 years
of civil war. Still there is a resilient society o the ground
and I would really encourage us not to characterise them (the
people of Burma) as merely aid recipients. These are people who
are struggling to survive—and thrive in some cases—under
extremely difficult circumstances: so if there is any support
that is provided by DFID and HM Government here it has to be in
the spirit of supporting the struggle of ordinary Burmese people
to survive this current system. Secondly, if you look at the scope
and the quantity of support that is given to the Burmese people
and compare that with the amount of aid for Nepal or Cambodia—I
have got one-year data/statistics from 2005-06—in Burma
there are 41 international NGOs for a population of 50 million
with a budget, excluding the Global Fund and now the Three Diseases
Fund, of $30 million. That is 41 NGOs for a population of 50 million
and a total in-country budget of $30 million. If you compare that
with Cambodia with, 115 NGOs, for a population of 15 million—that
is three times less than Burma's population—for a budget
of $110 million annually. Lastly Nepal 275 NGOs, a population
of 25 million—which is half of Burma's population—and
a total budget of $175 million. There is both a need for an increase
in the quantity of the aid that is going in and the need to expand
the scope of aid. If you compare that with the IDPs on the Thai-Burmese
border side you have got 150,000 refugees registered with the
Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) and other organisations
commanding $60 million versus, say, 95 per cent of the Burmese
people who are not refugees—98 per cent of the Burmese population
inside the country—there needs to be some kind of perspective
here if we are to formulate any type of strategic policy.
Chairman: Dr Zarni, these
are helpful comparative figures. They are actually in the ball-park
of what we are struggling with in terms of what is the right thing
to do. Clearly all the international NGOs and agencies find delivering
aid effectively in places like Nepal and Cambodia easier, and
part of our inquiry is about trying to say are we making the difficulties
more than they are and, if we are, how can we get through. I think
that is helpful. Can I ask John to come in here.
Q169 Mr Battle: Thank you, Dr Zarni,
for those remarks because some of us have worked for years on
development and trying to move DFID and NGOs and other agencies
away from being ambulances picking up injured people and burying
the dead to actually tackling the causes of poverty and trying
to work on preventive action in advance of that. I was interested
in Ashley's evidence that it is not just conflict that causes
the problem, there is economic displacement. As shown by my experience
with the rainforest in Brazil, so you have then got to ask about
agri-business and places where they have got meat-processing factories,
and are clearing the forests and clearing the people out in order
to build up industries. So that issue of economic displacement
and government policies about infrastructure construction, roads,
natural resource extraction, all those questions, should DFID
not engage with those questions? How should DFID engage there,
looking at the root causes as well as the sticking plaster—and
I do not mean sticking plaster abusively; it has got to be done.
Mr Zarni: I think DFID should
definitely take any opportunity to engage in policy discussion
with the regime at all levels. I would say categorically the senior
leadership of the Burmese regime does not seem to be interested
in any type of policy discussions because they are in the most
comfortable position. We think that they are the most heinous
regime on earth—and to a degree they are—but from
their perspective they are the best government Burma has had since
independence. They are sitting on $800 million of foreign exchange
reserve. At least this is how they perceive themselves. The Burmese
Foreign Office since independence has spent more than 50 per cent
of its energy and resources worrying about China, and China is
now their best friend. For the Burmese regime this is an enormous
accomplishment unrivalled in the history of post-independence
Burma. It is very, very difficult for DFID or any other entity,
perhaps with the exception of someone like Mr Gambari who has
been given access to the highest level of leadership, including
Senior General General Than Shwe, so maybe these policy discussions
should be conducted by someone such as Mr Gambari[10]
and then DFID can play a support role. Because the United Kingdom
has had a difficult historical relationship with our country I
am not sure that DFID is best-placed to have the policy conversations
with the junta. That is why I think it should be very much focused
on the ground at community level and doing concrete, practical
things rather than trying to catch the policy discussions in the
clouds.
Mr South: I would certainly agree
with you, but I think the great majority of advocacy regarding
IDPs in Burma does focus on the eastern border areas and armed
conflict-induced displacement, and I think, as we have perhaps
agreed, those IDPs in the eastern border areas do face the most
acute vulnerabilities—but they are probably not the largest
groups of displaced people in terms of the numbers. Much more
widespread throughout the country is the phenomenon of people
moving because of infrastructure development projects, particularly
land confiscation which seems to be becoming more and more prominent
in many different areas, and more generally livelihoods insecurity,
and I think this is an aspect of population movement that really
does need to be addressed more specifically. I agree with Zarni
that local community-based approaches are often appropriate, but
I do think it is necessary to engage with the Government on policy
dialogue as well. Quite a lot of my recent research has been on
land rights in Burma and land confiscation. It seems to me that
this perhaps might be one of the areas which the international
community could highlight for any possible engagement with the
military government. It is perhaps just that little bit less political
than armed conflict when you are talking about land rights and
of course it also goes to the heart of many issues regarding the
relationship between state and society. It is one possibility,
I think, and certainly it is an area that needs more focus.
Q170 Mr Singh: I want to talk about
the refugee camps and resettlement for a moment. In your view,
how do you think the Royal Thai Government views the refugee situation?
What is its view of the camps? I read recently that they have
been clamping down even more than before. We saw a camp and I
suspect that was one of the better ones. Why is the resettlement
process out of the camps so slow? I think about 400 from Site
1 have been resettled from a population of about 20,000. Is this
deliberate Thai Government policy or is it bureaucracy or is it
that the international community are not accepting people quickly
enough? What are the reasons? What is the real situation here?
Mr South: I think historically,
as this Committee is probably aware, the Thai security establishment
has supported anti-government groups in Burma for centuries and
certainly during the modern period the Thai authorities have been
a major sponsor of anti-government insurgency in the country.
I think it is in that context that the refugee camps were established
in Thailand in the early to mid-1980s really as R&R bases
for the insurgent groups in Burma, as well as places of refuge
for victims of the civil war. Clearly as those armed organisations
lost ground inside Burma the humanitarian aspect of the camps
became more important as large numbers of people became displaced,
as we have discussed. Some time in the 1990s—and you can
date it to different years—I think that Thai policy shifted
towards much more constructive engagement with the military government
in Rangoon and the refugees became increasingly an irritant in
the relationship with Rangoon. I understand that in the last year
approximately the Royal Thai Government has increased the opportunities
for livelihoods schemes and education projects in the refugee
camps, which obviously is to be welcomed. I understand that this
has been presented as a sign that the Thai Government is now much
more willing to accept the presence of the refugees and maybe
try and find a long-term enduring solution. Personally I am not
so sure that I agree with that reading. It seems to me that the
Thai Government has basically accepted the resettlement of refugees
which previously was never on the agenda—it is only in the
last couple of years that there has been any discussion really
on anything other than very, very small numbers of refugees moving
out. Previously it was some of the urban-based activists who took
part in the 1988 uprising and subsequent events who had access
to asylum in third countries. The border-based refugee population
was pretty much being kept in limbo. That policy has now changed,
as you said, and Western countries are now beginning to accept
increasingly large numbers of refugees—and I will come on
to the numbers in a minute. So it seems to me that for the Royal
Thai Government they can now see light at the end of the tunnel
and maybe in a decade there will be no more refugee camps in Thailand
and they will get rid of this problem. I think, although this
maybe was not your question, it is worth considering what the
implications are for the armed conflict in Burma if the civilian
support base of the opposition groups is relocated to the United
States and other countries. It will have a very serious impact
on the armed conflict. I know that senior KNU officials have been
told to expect 40,000 people leaving the camps by the end of next
year and I understand that it will be about 10,000 this year.
In terms of the numbers those are ball-park figures because I
am not really up to speed on this. I think it is fairly large
numbers of people who are expected to be resettled. If it was
10,000 or 15,000 refugees a year within a decade that would be
all the refugees. My understanding also is that those people who
are being accepted for resettlement are from elite communities
within the camps, so it is the teachers, the medics, the administrators.
So as more and more refugees are resettled I think we are going
to get a huge crisis of capacity in the camps which will undermine
many of the efforts of TBBC and other organisations to support
local initiatives. I understand also that large numbers of new
refugees are entering the camps and there is clearly a pull factor
here for people to get themselves on to camp registers and get
themselves to the West, and of course this is part of the reason
why previously the Thai authorities resisted any resettlement
because of their experience with the Indo-Chinese refugee caseload
when the solution of resettling Vietnamese and Laos refugees to
the United States caused a huge influx of new refugees. I think
we will see the beginnings of this happening along the border.
Mr Zarni: Since you are looking
ahead at the implications of the Thai policy on the Burmese refugee
situation, I strongly doubt that the refugees now will remain
trapped in the current situation for another two decades, primarily
because the economic strategy that the region or regional governments
as an ASEAN block is pursuing is making it impossible for anyone
to remain as refugees. They have to transform themselves into
migrant workers and labourers. Besides any possibility or potential
for launching any type of pro-democracy activities or opposition
activities using Thailand as a base is threatened now that there
is the Mekhong region development scheme. It is partly this development
scheme that is investing heavily in hydroelectric and Asian highway
projects. China is heavily involved, India has a huge interest
in this, and so I think, unfortunately, now this refugee issue
will be swept away under this wave of economic development. If
Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is rising I think that these
people are the most vulnerable people, and one of the best ways
to help them is (because there is little likelihood of these refugees
returning to their home communities inside the country feeling
safe there) third country resettlement or helping them equip themselves
with economic skills so that when push comes to shove they will
not be more vulnerable and at greater risk than they already are
now.
Q171 Mr Singh: It seems it me that
there is a role for donors to be helping to equip people for life
in third countries. Should this be something on DFID's agenda
or other donors' agendas?
Mr Zarni: I would definitely think
so, sir. In terms of DFID helping these people, either IDPs inside
the country or IDPs along the Thai-Burmese border area, one thing
that needs to be very clear because when we talk about extending
the scope of DFID's activities inside the country or increasing
the amount that is going in, people moralise too much in the sense
that although there is a legitimate question that should be raised—"Will
the aid legitimise the regime? Or will the aid dollars prop up
the regime?"—the regime does not need to be propped
up by the aid money. They are sitting on a massive natural
gas and oil field that could be pumped for the next 150 years.
They do not need DFID's money to stay strong economically and
they are as entrenched as ever. Also in terms of legitimacy, this
regime does not have moral legitimacy or credibility in the eyes
of either the domestic population or the international community.
That is why I think the key issue really is to let DFID's policy
initiatives be driven by what the real—and not the perceived
needs—are of the ordinary citizens. We are really talking
about the people of Burma, we are not simply talking about either
the opposition or the junta or the armed ethnic minorities. I
think if we let the needs of ordinary citizens drive the British
policy that should lead us to some kind of exit out of this conflict
of 60 years. Otherwise we will get into this situation where different
strategies are attached different moral weights' and some of us
who advocate for strategic engagement with society get vilified
for saying that you need to touch the regime with a long pole
because it is there. We just need to engage the country in a way
that does not strengthen the regime's hand, but strengthens the
society and the economic power of the people through development.
Q172 Sir Robert Smith: Just very
quickly, maybe for Mr South, there was a lot of concern when we
were out there about the lack of DFID's direct engagement with
the TBBC and the wider community involved in the refugee camps
and the lack of visits. Do you think there is a role for DFID
to be more involved in relating to the camps and therefore also
in advocacy for the needs of the camps with the Thai authorities?
Mr South: I suppose it would not
hurt but it seems to me that the camps already attract a very
high proportion of donor attention and in terms of added value,
to use that expression again, I would have thought DFID might
be better putting their focus elsewhere. I do not think it would
be detrimental for DFID to advocate more on behalf of the refugees
but the refugees already have quite a strong advocacy behind them
so I am not sure that it would really add a great deal.
Q173 Chairman: Just a final point,
you have made it clear that some form of engagement with the regime
is necessary if aid is to be delivered. Mr Zarni, you have made
the point that the regime has its own resources and the money
would not necessarily be diverted but you have also said the regime
does not really care about isolation or need friends because it
has got China, India and Russia. However, the United Nations does
have a mandate in Burma and, as has been pointed out, this is
a regime that has perpetrated every conceivable abuse invented
and a few that have not been thought of, and in that context it
is very difficult to ask any agency to engage with a government
which in any way would imply that anything they are doing is legitimate.
So how can the UN be effective in Burma and what is it that the
UN could and should be doing given that it stands for human rights
progress and development. We cannot walk away from this so what
is the UN's proper role?
Mr South: As I have said already,
I think one important element should be greater support to community-based
organisations and I think there has been some change over the
last two or three years and there is now more support for civil
society, both cross-border and inside the country, so I think
that is one thing which the UN can do and does do. As I understand
it, and this is a bit outside of my area, this is a dilemma which
the UN faces in many places around the world, how to engage with
often very brutal national governments which are often the most
serious perpetrators of human rights abuses against their own
populations, and I guess it is an element of the humanitarian
dilemma. The only real thing from my own area which I could add
is that I do think it is probably quite important to identify
specific areas for engagement and that might be one way of not
wholeheartedly supporting the legitimacy of the Government by
trying to identify specific technical issues which should be addressed,
such as land rights for example, but I think it is a really good
but very difficult question which does apply not only to Burma
but is important to working with repressive governments.
Mr Zarni: My brief follow-up would
be to not view the regime as a monolith. There are people who
are part of government ministries and bureaucracies who are there
because they need to feed their families, they need to send their
kids to school and get medicine for their ageing parents, and
they are not sympathetic to the regime but they have to do their
job, especially in ministries that have Western-trained bureaucrats,
technocrats and researchers such as agriculture, public health,
forestry, fisheries, education—(vocational and teacher education)—all
kinds of technical issues, all of the livelihoods issues that
are dealt with through ministerial channels. Sir, we have to understand
the nature of the state if we want to address the issue. This
is a state that is obsessed with its own institutional and personal
survival. This is a national security state. This is not a developmental
state.
Q174 Chairman: Sure—
Mr Zarni: May I finish. The weakest
aspects of the current militarised and military state are precisely
where these technocratic and technical ministries are and because
the regime is not devoting resources nor is it equipped to deal
with these issues—about public health and education, the
agricultural sector, mining, and what not—the regime is
most vulnerable in terms of external exposure as well as community-based
self-help initiatives. They cannot address the issue of poverty.
People are trying to address the issue with the help of outside
business organisations, the private sector, NGOs; the regime cannot
stop these. This is where we need to hit in terms of pushing for
a channel of change and transition. If the price is that a piece
of legitimacy will go to the generals it is a price worth paying.
Q175 John Bercow: It is an interesting
point Dr Zarni, if I could just come in on this, because there
seems to be a rather neurotic attitude here. On the one hand you
said a moment ago, and I quote, that the regime is "obsessed
with its own survival". On the other hand, you said in terms
very dismissively earlier in your evidence that the regime simply
did not care about the views of the international community and
actually rather liked isolation and was not remotely interested
in the views of the wider world. That of course is not quite true,
is it, and it is an example, if you will forgive me for saying
so, of your tendency to argue by assertion rather than by evidence
and to distort by over-emphasis the points that you are seeking
to make because in fact the regime is rather concerned at various
times about external scrutiny. If it is not concerned, why does
it go to such lengths to exclude the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights and if it is not at all concerned and blithely
dismissive of the international community, why did it get worked
up to the extent that it did to frustrate the United Nations Security
Council Resolution? To say they are not concerned is nonsense
on stilts, is it not? So far they have managed to get away without
decisive United Nations Security Council action. I put it to you
that the fact that thus far a concerted UN intervention and a
substantial sanctions regime have not been implemented do not
themselves constitute good reasons not to continue to make the
attempt?
Mr Zarni: I have just returned
from the Asia Security Summit where I posed this question to the
Singaporean Prime Minister at the opening dinner asking him what
is ASEAN's position on Burma? Is there a consensus? Is it falling
apart? (And I think the UK was well-represented there.) The Singaporean
Prime Minister's response was that this is a regime that has turned
its back even on ASEAN which has bent over backwards trying to
bring them into the more civilised fold. They moved the capital
from Rangoon to Nay Pyi Taw, the new up-country capital and, in
his words, "they do not want to be involved, they do not
want us to involve them in these international forums or regional
forums. We have tried our best to cajole them, to help them out,
they are simply impervious". And they can afford to be impervious
to outside pressure because they are supported by two veto-wielding
UN Security Council permanent members—China and Russia,
plus India—who are all neighbours. I arrived back from Vietane,
Laos this morning at six o'clock via Singapore. Here is a Communist
state and I travelled across the Mekong Delta, which is one of
the poorest regions in Vietnam, and these were two authoritarian,
Communist-run states, but these societies are opening up and their
opening up is led by development, not by the opposition, not by
the West, but the needs of society there to pursue economic development.
Because we have created this highly polarised, highly moralised
situation, we cannot have a proper policy dialogue or exchange
without you throwing at me words like "neurotic" or
me "asserting my position", and this is the situation.
We need to recognise that we share—
Q176 John Bercow: The Government
of Burma is rather neurotic.
Mr Zarni: Sorry, then I misunderstood;
definitely they are neurotic. They are concerned about the internal
instability not Western intervention at this point. If they allow
NGOs to operate in poverty alleviation it is still driven by a
national security concern not by concern for the economic deprivation
of the people.
Chairman: Can I draw this to a close,
it is one of the longest evidence sessions we have had, but it
has been very stimulating and very informative. If I may say so,
I think your evidence has been helpful and very important. It
is a very difficult and complicated situation and probably it
is one that cannot be resolved by aid alone and to the extent
that you challenged that seems to me a very helpful and relevant
part of the evidence. It also seems that what you are telling
us is that there is an awful lot that can be done at a local community
level and if we can find ways to make DFID and other agencies
co-ordinate that more effectively perhaps it would be possible
to ease the plight of the Burmese people whilst taking the politics
out of it by not allowing them to influence it as much as they
do. That is for us to consider. We have more evidence to take
and more thoughts to put together before we come up with a report.
Thank you very much indeed for coming in.
7 Karen National Union. Back
8
All Burma Students' Democratic Front. Back
9
Ev 90 Back
10
UN Under Secretary General Back
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