Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-55)
MS MARIEKE
WIERDA, MR
NICK GRONO
AND MR
BARNEY AFAKO
4 JULY 2007
Q40 Mr Davies: That is my second
scenario, but that does involve retreat by the ICC.
Mr Afako: No, it does not involve
retreat by the ICC because I think that the Rome Statute, properly
conceived, is actually a much more subtle document. I think that
the current emphasis on the arrest warrants per se has
prevented a much closer examination of what justice and the fight
against impunity actually entails. The judges will have to come
to a conclusion as to whether Uganda's exercise of criminal jurisdiction
satisfies international standards and that is not just a standard
on the basis of penalties, but the entire criminal justice process.
Indeed, the context of that process is not irrelevant and I do
not believe that the Court will ignore the fact that this peace
process, which has been embarked on, is taking place in a conflict
resolution setting and, if it delivers the peace dividends that
we all hope for, that will be a factor in determining what action
the Court will take. The point really is that it is a more nuanced
approach that we expect.
Q41 Mr Davies: It is certainly a
more nuanced approach, but I put it to you again that the penalty
of that, the price of that is to blunt the credibility of the
ICC which is based on the assumption of some form of international
justice on a single standard throughout the world for a particular
type of crime, and that will go and be replaced by the idea that
the ICC may initially issue indictments which in practice will
be different in different contexts depending on the political
pressures involved and depending on the negotiating and bargaining
strengths of those who have been indicted and depending on the
judicial and legal systems in the country in which the atrocities
or the alleged atrocities took place. That is a very different
picture from the one of a single standard of justice delivered
by an objective international court.
Ms Wierda: Just to speak to that,
I come from an organisation that strongly supports the International
Criminal Court and the system it represents, but I think we would
say that the innovation of this Court really is its ability to
take into account genuine efforts at accountability on the national
level and that it is indeed able to adapt to some extent. Now,
we would take the view, much as the Government, that the role
of the arrest warrants until now has been quite crucial and that
the ICC maintains a very useful source of pressure, one that it
would be far too early to remove. Apart from that, if Uganda comes
into the situation where its inability to exercise jurisdiction
changed, which was the ground on which it originally asked the
ICC to intervene, if there is a factual change in circumstances
to its ability to exercise jurisdiction, then we would believe
that it is within the spirit of complementarity to allow them
to attempt to do so.
Q42 Mr Davies: I think you ignore
a very important point. As you rightly say, up until now the ICC
indictments have been a very potent weapon in this, they have
had some force, they have had some effect and the reason is because
the ICC up until now has been credible. If, as a result of this,
what you do is you compromise the ICC's principles and develop
the scenario set out by your colleague, next time around when
there is an atrocity, the ICC warrants will not be so credible
because next time around they will say, "This is not absolutely
terrifying—it does not mean that I'm going to spend the
rest of my life in jail. This just means that we will be made
to enter a negotiation and it depends upon my bargaining power
what kind of legal process we shall ultimately end up with".
Ms Wierda: I should have clarified
that we believe that the ICC judges are the ones that are, after
all, making these decisions. We do not believe that they will
be applying political principles in their decision-making. They
will look at legal principles, they will apply legal standards,
they will evaluate the processes that are taking place in Uganda
and match them with those international legal standards, so we
do not believe that that undermines the ICC's credibility. Obviously
it creates certain difficulties in terms of timing in these discussions
because we do not believe that the time to make an admissibility
challenge would be now or even on the basis of the document, so
it does not resolve the difficulty, but I believe their ability
to decide in accordance with those international standards is
not an attack on their credibility.
Q43 Chairman: Can I ask you a question
about the Government of Uganda. In the past, the Government of
Uganda's approach, and you heard my question to our two Ministers,
has been somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, they have said,
"It's a little bit of a problem, we can deal with it",
the talks have happened and then they have escalated the pursuit.
Are you confident that the Government of Uganda is engaging in
this process in a different spirit from the past and it is also
under the same kind of international pressure to act in good faith
to try and secure a settlement through these talks and not resort
to any kind of actions that would bring them to a premature end?
Mr Afako: It would probably be
foolish to attempt to speak for the Government of Uganda.
Q44 Chairman: I am not asking you
to do that.
Mr Afako: What can be said is
that this is the first time that you have had a set of talks mediated
by a third country between the Government and the LRA. The Juba
talks are very highly observed, as has been noted here this morning,
and all of that puts pressure on the Government to keep faith.
That does not mean that you rule out attempts to take shortcuts
with the process, but it makes that much less likely. So in that
regard the African observers, the role of former President Chissano
and the participation of many other international development
partners in the Juba Initiative Fund are all very important pressure
points. Of course the communities, the populations in the affected
areas, especially in northern Uganda, are fairly solidly behind
any negotiated settlement for the reasons that were already discussed
earlier to do with the settlement of the humanitarian situation
in that part of the country.
Mr Grono: I think you have seen
that the Government of Uganda is taking seriously this peace process
and it has advanced further than any we have seen. I think though
that the real challenge is when we get to the crux of the issue
that Mr Davies was talking about, which is that you will get to
a stage where a decision has to be made on what is the settlement
that is going to be arrived at, particularly in terms of dealing
with those indicted leaders. I think that will be the challenging
part of this process where you will see the true motivations of
the parties being examined. The Government presumably wants to
preference a peace process, it wants an end to the conflict that
is devastating the north, the LRA perhaps too, but the question
that will have to be settled is: if you have the International
Criminal Court warrants in place, what kind of punishment would
satisfy the requirements of the ICC statute? I may not be putting
this very clearly, but I think what you are going to find is that
the parties to a conflict will often be prepared to excuse each
other of past atrocities, so you will get to a stage where the
Government of Uganda and perhaps the LRA are prepared to say,
"We will accept a certain degree of accountability that might
not meet international standards", and the ICC will then
have to decide and judge whether that meets their standards, and
there are a number of provisions in the Act which allow for a
balancing of that which we can go into, but I do think we have
got a way to go before we can face that issue.
Ms Wierda: I think it is useful
to maintain pressure on the Government of Uganda, but an indicator
of its seriousness, if you will, will also be its own willingness
to submit to scrutiny or accountability for its role in the conflict
in some shape or form.
Q45 Hugh Bayley: What kind of penalty
imposed by the courts of Uganda would satisfy the people in northern
Uganda that justice was being done in respect of the four indicted
leaders and what kind of penalty would satisfy the International
Criminal Court that justice had been done?
Mr Afako: That is a difficult
call to make. In relation to the population of northern Uganda,
one of the things that you will find in the agreement is the commitment
to consult widely on various aspects of the agreement. That is
important because people say different things depending on the
point of the conflict, depending on whether they are in camps
and desperate to get back home; if they get back home, they might
take a different view on these matters. The starting point under
the law of Uganda is that these sorts of crimes ordinarily attract
the death penalty, so the first thing to be said is: we will move
away from that approach. Where the pendulum will hang is not certain
at this stage and it would be premature to guess because a lot
of these consultations have not taken place. With respect to the
ICC, one of the principles of the Rome Statute is actually deference
to national penal approaches, and that is Article 80. That is
significant because you will know that some states find life imprisonment
inhuman and degrading and, therefore, would not apply it in their
own jurisdictions, whereas under the Rome Statute that is perhaps
acceptable. So there is some margin of appreciation, there is
some latitude that states enjoy on the issue of punishment and
I think that balance would have to be struck somewhere, and once
it is struck, then, in making its judgment, the Court will take
into account all sorts of other factors and not merely focus on
the punishment.
Ms Wierda: It is sometimes said
that the Rome Statute is silent on the issue of punishment because
it refers to effective investigation and/or prosecution, but of
course we must presume that the Court is interested in penalties,
although of course there is a lack of practice now. I would just
point to developments in Colombia under the peace and justice
law which are somewhat analogous with what is happening in Uganda.
There, the Government has proposed penalties of five to eight
years for its paramilitaries and for involvement in very serious
international offences. It is quite possible that at some point
we will be able to gauge how the Court might react to that, but
it is too early to say as we are lacking practice in this area.
Q46 John Battle: I would like to
ask a general question about what, in your view, is the responsibility
of the international community for ensuring that the conflict
ends? Should they just leave it to the legal processes and step
back or should they be more engaged and do you think the donors
are doing enough to give practical financial support to the peace
talks?
Mr Afako: I would say regarding
the international community that, because the talks have now started
and the parties have agreed the framework for settling or attempting
to settle the conflict peacefully, at this stage the effort should
be to keep pressure up on both parties to keep the process going
and to come to the earliest possible resolution of that matter
and then go on to implementation. Of course there are issues within
northern Uganda to do with the humanitarian situation, the return
of civilians and so forth, and that needs to be well resourced
and I think there is no lack of political will in that direction.
In terms of practical support, yes, at home in Uganda, but also
in the neighbouring countries that have been affected by the conflict,
we need to make sure that once the insurgency is over, then people
can return home. The legal aspect has been a bit of a paralysis
because people do not know how to engage with the International
Criminal Court because the Court is not meant to be political
and states do not want to appear to be political. Indeed, the
Juba Initiative Fund created a lot of angst amongst donors, I
think, before they finally agreed to engage. I recall that when
the Government of southern Sudan made its overtures to the LRA,
a lot of the legal opinion, emerging even from some of the states
now supportive, was that it was against international law to talk
to a group that had members who were indicted, so to speak, by
the ICC, and it took calm discussion of the objects of international
law and the promotion of peace and so forth to come to this point
where there is now support. However, I think we are going in the
right direction and I think that states are beginning to find
space even within a tricky, legal environment to operate and be
supportive.
Ms Wierda: I think also the issues
that are addressed in the recent document, the agreement on principles,
are really very complex. They call for an establishment of a range
of mechanisms potentially; it is not just going to be about the
International Criminal Court and engaging there. We think this
range of mechanisms and indeed the consultation leading up to
those mechanisms will all need support, and that there will be
a very important role for the United Kingdom there.
Mr Grono: It is critically important.
These parties do not trust each other at all; they have been in
conflict for more than 20 years. There is a real issue about whether
or not they are both genuinely committed to a peaceful outcome.
Now, the talks have been going on for a year, there has not been
a significant assembly by the LRA at the assembly points, and
the UPDF has not always behaved as it should have, and I think
it is critically important that the international community maintain
pressure on both sides. Britain has a role to play in maintaining,
and using, its strong bilateral relationship with Uganda and maintaining
pressure on the Government of Uganda to participate in good faith
and to make it clear that, if the Government of Uganda does not
support peaceful outcome, then it will be of concern. Likewise,
pressure has to be maintained on the LRA. We can do things like
look at the funding sources for the LRA, perhaps a UN expert panel
can be looking at those issues, and some planning around what
will happen if the peace process falls apart. You have to have
disincentives for those considering pulling out of the process,
and I think it is a critically important role for this Government
to play.
Q47 Hugh Bayley: Is the international
community giving the ICC sufficient support in relation to these
four indictees and in relation to the other cases that are before
the Court and, if not, what more should it be doing?
Mr Afako: I think the Court might
feel that it has not been as strongly supported as it would have
hoped. The reason for this is that the international community
is grappling with a genuine dilemma and it is not straightforward
to effect these arrests. If that had been the case, we would not
be having this discussion—these people would be facing trial
by now and the people of northern Uganda would have returned to
their homes. The reality of the matter is that for 20 long years
the LRA and the Government have been battling away within Uganda
and the south of Sudan, and you are very familiar with the impacts
of that. It is an untenable situation and I think the international
community recognises that and that is where the tension arises.
Should the international community now turn away from the process
in Juba, for argument's sake, and begin to press for a military
solution? Is there the political will to marshal what it would
take, which has not been marshalled for the last 20 years? There
is a difficulty, there is a real dilemma posed by the humanitarian
impacts of the LRA's activities and I think that is what has given
cause to pause and to give the process in Juba an opportunity
to work something out. It is a more convoluted type of approach
because it is a complex issue. What the international community
can do is to keep faith with that process and trust the judgment
of the ICC on the outcome and not, so to speak, talk out of turn,
but let the judges decide this matter and allow the Government
of Uganda its sovereign latitude to engage directly with the Court
on this issue and we can sit back and wait for the judgment of
the Court.
Ms Wierda: The Court itself has
been quite clear that it sees these dilemmas of peace and justice
as dilemmas that it can approach, advancing on parallel track
to any negotiation that is ongoing. The only thing that we would
say, I think, about that is that its track also has to proceed
and not be entirely contingent on, or interrupted by, the negotiation
track. From that point of view, I think the Court not just in
Uganda but across the board at the moment is concerned with state
co-operation and what it can expect in these situations. I think
it would be important for the international community at large
to keep thinking of concrete ways and mechanisms to put in place
adequate state co-operation so that the Court's gestures do not
appear completely empty.
Mr Grono: Your question was a
little broader than Uganda, but I think Uganda is a difficult
situation and the level of support is perhaps appropriate at this
stage. I think it is much clearer when you get to a case like
Sudan where you have arrest warrants issued, a clear statement
on behalf of the Government of Sudan that they are not going to
hand over the indicted individuals and it is a much easier case
for the international community to respond appropriately, which
we have not seen yet. The Prosecutor has come out and said that
the international community should rally behind the Court. I think
that is a much more important test case for cooperation at this
stage and I trust again that the British Government will be in
the forefront of efforts to support the process there.
Q48 Hugh Bayley: To go back to northern
Uganda specifically, when we were in northern Uganda we had a
conversation with, I think it was, the Permanent Secretary of
the Interior Ministry, whichever ministry is in charge of the
police, about whether logistical help was needed to effect arrests.
I came away with the conclusion that it was not logistically possible,
that the failure to arrest the indictees was not because of logistical
difficulties, but because of practical difficulties of identifying
where they were and having a sufficient force of arms to capture
them. Is it the case that the Government of Uganda has asked the
international community for technical assistance of some kind
to effect arrests and is there evidence that the governments of
neighbouring countries have been willing to co-operate in an international
community arrest process because, if that is not the case, then
looking for some negotiated solution could just be the only way
out?
Chairman: As a supplementary to that,
you have said that the LRA need to know what the consequences
are of the talks failing. We have international engagement in
the DRC, we have international engagement with bells on in Sudan,
and obviously the international community is supporting Uganda,
so in that context is part of the point that, "If these talks
break down, do not be so confident that you would not actually
be seized, arrested and dealt with"?
Mr Grono: That is certainly the
message that we would like to see out there. Of course it is complex
because, for a start, the LRA leadership is located in Congo,
so, as far as the Ugandan military forces go, there is a real
issue there and we would be extremely concerned if they sought
to cross over into Congo, particularly with the history of Uganda
and Congo. There have been talks with the Congolese authorities
and with MONUC, the UN mission in Congo. I think MONUC is unwilling
to take a lead role right now because it does not see it as part
of its peace-keeping role, but I think that is something that
we should explore and we have certainly called for MONUC to provide
support if the peace process falls apart. We also have a UN mission
in southern Sudan which also is displaying a degree of reluctance
to get involved in this because they say their mission is peace-keeping
in south Sudan. The ICC at some stage signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Government of Sudan pursuant to which the Government
was supposed to provide some support, but it has, I think, since
resiled from that agreement following the indictments against
the Sudanese minister and the Janjaweed leader, so there is a
very strong role for greater co-operation and I think some of
the planning and thinking should be proceeding apace on that.
There are talks, I do not know how far they have gone, but it
is certainly the position that the British Government has played
a facilitative role in encouraging talks on those issues. As far
as the UPDF goes too, our reporting has said that we have seen
a significant improvement in their capabilities over the last
few years with assistance from other governments. I suspect that
part of the reason you see the LRA in Congo right now is because
of the greater abilities of the UPDF, but that does not go very
far if they are not even in Uganda.
Q49 Hugh Bayley: Should we expect
the AU[10]
to put in place an arrest strategy when you have people sought
by the International Criminal Court who have been moving between
three countries? It would be a military operation, would it not,
let us be perfectly blunt about it, and it would be quite a challenging
military operation? If the international community wants to leave
the impression that a failure to do a deal on peace will lead
to military intervention which will arrest the leaders of the
LRA, then who should be responsible for constructing that military
plan?
Mr Grono: It is one of the great
dilemmas of the ICC of course, that it has no power to execute
its own warrants. So the problem that we see in Uganda, in Sudan,
we will see, I am sure, in the Central African Republic and, if
others are indicted, in Congo is this lack of ability to execute
warrants. The AU may well have a role, but I think the AU would
have more of a role in convening the respective governments to
co-ordinate their efforts. We have to be careful about throwing
too much responsibility on this fledging African Union. We are
also asking it to lead the peace-keeping force in one of the world's
most difficult conflicts in Darfur and we have asked it to lead
a peace-keeping force in Somalia, so you have got two of the world's
most difficult conflicts and it is too easy too often to say,
"Well, the AU is the body with responsibility". So if
you are talking about some kind of military intervention force,
I think that would pose some difficult challenges, but certainly
it could play a lead role in helping the Governments of Congo
and Uganda and Sudan and South Sudan and talking about co-operating
with their own military forces, in the event that the peace processes
fall apart, to effectively respond.
Mr Afako: I was going to say that
for many people military options are not attractive and it is
the case that you are not going to have a policing operation in
effecting arrests and that it is going to be a military operation.
We must always bear in mind that the LRA is not a volunteer force,
but there are a lot of forcibly conscripted people there and many
of them very young and we, therefore, must pause long before we
inflict battle on them in the name of effecting arrests. If the
international community has to protect civilians, then it has
to do what it has to do, but in a context where there is dialogue
and there is the possibility of exploring a peaceful outcome,
then it would seem that it is morally dubious to inflict battle
on children.
Q50 Ann McKechin: I had the opportunity
to meet with the Amnesty Commission a few years ago and, whilst
certainly we would not doubt their commitment to the job in hand,
to say that their resources were scarce would be, I think, a real
understatement. I wonder to what extent you would agree that there
are limitations currently to the Amnesty Commission fulfilling
its present role in the reintegration of combatants. I was told
that they only have a six-month running mandate and I wonder whether
or not that is going to be extended for granting amnesties. And
do you consider that there are any possibilities for expanding
its function to take on a wider reconciliation programme and for
negotiations to be successful at Juba?
Mr Afako: On the resource issue,
I think the World Bank has supported the Amnesty Commission in
the last two years and they have carried out some resettlement,
so they have paid out the backlog of resettlement packages for
a number of people up to, I think, 10,000. So the machinery is
up and running and it just needs to be topped up as and when you
have numbers ready to be resettled. It is a simple package, as
you know. It is merely meant to introduce people back to the community.
The longer-term reintegration issues are perhaps not for the Amnesty
Commission itself, but it would be for the Government to devise
a strategy for that, so I am not worried about the capacity to
carry out DDR[11]
for the LRA or indeed the ADF,[12]
which is still in western Uganda and Congo. As to the brief on
reconciliation, that has come up quite heavily in the talks in
Juba and parties are now exploring what the most appropriate mechanisms
would be for that. Some of it could be done by the Amnesty Commission,
but I suspect that they will be looking to see other bodies taking
a more active role in promoting community as well as national
reconciliation.
Ms Wierda: I think a range of
mechanisms would be appropriate also in the sense that often,
I think, in post-conflict societies what happens is that reintegration
benefits or packages for ex-combatants can raise tensions in the
communities and can make victims feel ignored. I think again a
range of mechanisms, including reparations, could help to balance
some of those tensions and provide more community-oriented results.
Q51 Ann McKechin: And they should
be working in tandem presumably rather than as the Amnesty Commission
on its own as at the present time?
Ms Wierda: Yes, one would need
a comprehensive strategy to deal with the range, including also
of course the local level and traditional structures.
Q52 Sir Robert Smith: In your evidence,
Mr Grono, you said that, as part of a peace deal, there is a need
for a very comprehensive redevelopment in the north, given the
devastation it has gone through. What are the witnesses' views
of the Government of Uganda's plans for peace, recovery and development
in northern Uganda?
Mr Grono: I am no expert on the
plans that the Government has, but I do know that we have been
doing some research into the needs that will be there in the north
if there is a peace process and certainly my understanding is
that there are two primary concerns. One is the resettlement and
reintegration process, but another very closely related issue
which has not received much attention so far is the land issue.
You have a younger generation of people who have lived off the
land in camps returning to their land and it is often very, very
unclear as to who owns the land, and the boundaries of the land.
If you add on to that the issue of returnees, I think you will
have a very volatile mix in a lot of the north together with a
lot of suspicion and mistrust sometimes of the intentions of those
in the south regarding land in the north. I trust that one of
the key objectives of any development effort will be dealing with
a lot of the tensions that will arise throughout this process.
Ms Wierda: I think there has not
been a lack of plans on behalf of the Government, but with the
PDRP I think we as an organisation are quite concerned that it
keeps moving to implementation, and we would also echo the concerns
voiced earlier this morning about consultation and about ownership
and participation at the grassroots levels. We think that other
areas that are in urgent need of attention are the situation of
youth and children more generally, opportunities both in terms
of education and in terms of vocational training, and also I think
civil society and human rights organisations and such will need
continued and urgent support to provide the counterweight to the
Government in implementing the PDRP and various other strategies.
Mr Afako: I am not very pessimistic
about the outlook. I think that once the guns fall silent, you
will find that the communities are very resilient indeed. We have
had a lot of people displaced out of Uganda to neighbouring countries,
to West Nile, for example, and most of the population was in Congo
and Sudan and when they came back, there were no elaborate programmes
for long-term reintegration and resettlement and it has picked
up, so you will find that the communities are willing to go back
and to rebuild their lives. I think we need to look at some of
the more subtle impacts of the conflict, and the whole area of
the psychosocial and psychological impact on young people and
so forth needs to be addressed.
Q53 Sir Robert Smith: But on the
land issue, do you see that—
Mr Afako: I do not see it being
that volatile. Across Uganda, where there is population pressure,
you will have problems of land and you particularly have problems
of land where you have outside communities coming into the area
and we have that in western Uganda at the moment. I have heard
and read a lot about potential difficulties with land, but I think
if you have a functioning dispute resolution system, local courts
and a functioning formal judiciary, I think these problems will
be contained because there is a strong insistence in northern
Uganda that it should not go back into chaos.
Q54 Chairman: Do you think people
will mostly go back to their traditional land? We have had some
suggestions that perhaps some of the returnees and others may
be looking for more urban resettlements, but there is not necessarily
more work in the towns. Do you think that will be a problem or
will people tend to revert to their more traditional rural lives?
Mr Afako: I think to some extent
the opportunities will determine where people end up. A lot of
communities across Uganda are subsistence, agricultural communities;
they need the land, that is their livelihood. If there are jobs
to be had in the towns, they will gravitate towards the towns,
the unemployed youth and so forth. So you have that kind of problem,
which is not unique to the north, but what we suggest should not
happen is the kind of enforced middle way, settlements in the
north between returning to communities and the current situation.
I think people should be encouraged to go back to communities
or remain where they are, which is their entitlement as long as
they do not trespass on anybody's rights.
Ms Wierda: I think the point on
access to justice is a vital one. I think that is another area
in which there would be need for quick improvement of how people
can access systems to regulate their disputes.
Q55 Hugh Bayley: Let us assume that
the peace process brings the conflict to an end. What needs to
be done to ensure that the views and aspirations of northern Ugandans
are properly represented within the Government in Kampala so that
this feeling of exclusion and resentment against the south is
no longer a feature of Ugandan politics?
Mr Afako: Part of the reason for
the apparent polarisation in Uganda is the failure of the Government
to end the conflict there. If you look at the situation in West
Nile, which is now reasonably peaceful, you will not as often
have the discourse of the north/south divide there and it is because
people are going back home and they are doing politics in the
good, old-fashioned way, so it will be for the electorate in the
north to decide which government it wants to support. In the past,
it has voted with the conflict in mind. That voting pattern might
well change once the conflict is over and then political parties
will have to pitch on issues of policy and delivery with the communities.
The nature of the north/south divide will be interrogated and
the parties in Juba have agreed to a process of analysis of the
conflict which will bring out some of these issues. The Government
contests that there is a north/south issue and is quite happy
to have this whole business examined and publicly debated. I think
that debate will be interesting and it will certainly have political
implications in terms of how voters choose.
Ms Wierda: We too see, I think,
room for debate on national reconciliation. We would not like
to see that whole debate squeezed into the Juba process because
we think it is really a wider issue and that not all people who
have a stake in that debate are able to participate very directly
in Juba. We are encouraged by the suggestion to have this consultation
now as part of the Juba process, but even that is very limited.
In the aftermath of Juba I think that, through this process of
historical analysis and through wider debates, Uganda can perhaps
start to address this issue of a national reconciliation.
Chairman: Can I thank you very much indeed.
Obviously the situation in many ways has improved from when we
visited in February last year, people are returning to their land,
it is more secure and the levels of violence have dropped, but
there is not a final solution and there is that uncertainty that
things could degenerate. I think we all have to hope that the
process will continue in a positive direction and normality will
be restored and that ultimately the peace process will reach a
conclusion which will give people real confidence to get back
to normality and away from the camps. It has certainly been very
helpful from our point of view to have your up-to-date views both
on what you think is happening and the tensions around the ICC
and the role of the Government of Uganda and the international
community on which in some small way, this Committee hopes, it
has helped to keep the spotlight. I think, from what you have
said and from what the Ministers have said, clearly if the parties
are aware that the eyes of the world are on them, it does appear
to have a degree of concentrating minds to try and achieve results
and, if we take our eyes away, then the danger increases. Thank
you very much indeed; it has been extremely valuable to us.
10 African Union (AU). Back
11
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Back
12
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Back
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