CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The modernisation of the West Coast Main
Line completed to 2006 has delivered increased passenger numbers
and reduced journey times.
Network Rail and the Strategic Rail Authority have worked effectively
together to turn round the programme inherited from Railtrack.
2. The original aims were, however, overly
ambitious and work has taken longer and cost more than originally
envisaged. Learning from the West Coast
Main Line experience, in approving proposals for rail enhancements
and monitoring their delivery, the Department should:
a) assess whether milestones and delivery
dates are achievable and realistic;
b) assess how far Network Rail has identified
factors that could result in failure to deliver the project to
time, cost or quality; has put in place mitigating controls; and
has allocated responsibility for monitoring the risks within its
organisation;
c) identify in advance the project's impact on
the relevant train operating companies' ability to deliver commitments
under franchise agreements; and
d) agree a franchise management strategy to give
early warning of emerging difficulties in delivering franchise
commitments including those which may arise from project delays.
The Office of Rail Regulation should:
a) satisfy itself that Network Rail has appropriate
project management in place and that all costs have been identified
and quantified;
b) commission gateway reviews at key stages during
the project's implementation and check that the train operating
companies, the Department and other stakeholders are satisfied
that the project is progressing as expected; and
c) satisfy itself that the specific risks associated
with the use of innovative technological advances have been identified,
including the possibility of delay to delivery or failure of the
technology, and that appropriate contingency arrangements are
in place.
3. The total cost of modernising the West
Coast Main Line is estimated to be more than £6 billion in
excess of the estimates made in 1998.
Network Rail has improved control of the costs but work since
2004 is still likely to have cost £300 million more than
the Rail Regulator had anticipated. Network Rail could improve
control over costs, for example by:
a) benchmarking across projects, and for
the network as a whole, unit costs for track renewals and work
on signalling and structures to enable it to better challenge
contractors' prices;
b) making informed forecasts of when signalling
equipment is likely to become out of date, drawing on experience
to estimate likely maintenance requirements, and negotiating access
to spares to prolong the life of the equipment; and
c) testing price and quality by awarding contracts
for project management on the basis of competitive bids, and by
defining and benchmarking project management costs across all
its projects.
4. Network Rail is seeking to reduce the time
taken to carry out repair and replacement work. The
enquiry into the train derailment on 23 February 2007 may cast
further light on this issue. Meanwhile, to minimise the impact
on passenger services of booking track access for engineering
and maintenance work, Network Rail should develop, set and report
on a target to increase year-on-year the proportion of booked
train access time used effectively and minimise unused track possessions.
5. The current compensation scheme for loss
of track access is unclear and may lead to higher levels of compensation
being paid to Train Operating Companies than necessary.
The Office of Rail Regulation should work with Network Rail and
the rail industry to develop a single simplified regime for compensating
Train Operating Companies for track access lost to engineering
work, whether for enhancement or renewal or repair, which better
reflects the costs and losses actually borne.
6. Prolonged access to the track for maintenance
and renewal disrupts services for passengers. Network
Rail should minimise disruption to passenger journeys from evening
and weekend maintenance work by:
a) adopting as standard practice its planned
phased introduction of Sunday lunchtime handback of track and
reporting progress towards that goal;
b) reducing, in conjunction with the Train Operating
Companies and the Department, the number of delays caused by the
late handover of track by train operators for maintenance and
engineering work; and
c) consulting with passenger groups on the timing
of engineering work and providing clear information well in advance
of planned works at stations and via websites of the impact of
engineering works on journey time, frequency of service and the
availability of through services, so that passengers can make
alternative travel arrangements if they so wish.
7. Some parts of the route are already at
or near capacity and by 2015-20, the line may not have enough
capacity to meet demand, while other routes are also overcrowded
with passengers often having no seats.
To help ease overcrowding on the most popular services the Department
and the Rail Regulator should:
a) review passenger loading figures, and
feedback from Passenger Focus,[3]
with Network Rail and the Train Operating Companies to identify
which trains are frequently overcrowded;
b) take more seriously the stress and inconvenience
caused by persistent overcrowding, avoiding any suggestion that
passengers should resign themselves to it; and
c) plan how capacity on these services can be
increased, for example by making changes to train layout, frequency
of service, or through investment in longer trains and platforms
and signalling improvements to enable greater use of existing
tracks.
8. Current fare pricing structures can be
complex, and inaccessible, particularly to those rail users who
may not have internet access.
The Department should:
a) use its franchise monitoring and letting
arrangements to encourage train operators to make fare pricing
structures more transparent; and
b) work with train operators and Passenger Focus
to monitor fare arrangements and the advice given by train operators
and their staff to passengers to enable passengers to benefit
from the cheapest fare option.
9. The Chairman of Network Rail was rewarded
over £1 million in salary and bonuses in 2005-2006.
Whilst Network Rail inherited many of the problems generated by
Railtrack's over-optimistic West Coast upgrade programme, the
continuing areas of weakness identified above need to be fully
addressed if commensurate value is to be gained from Network Rail's
contribution to the programme.
3 Passenger Focus is an independent public body set
up by the Government to protect the interests of Britain's rail
passengers. Back
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