Select Committee on Public Accounts Eleventh Report


3  SBS's influence across government

16. The SBS was only ever responsible for a small part of the total government budget that provided support to small businesses and it had no formal authority over the actions of other government bodies. Since its creation in 2000 it has undergone a gradual transition from being a deliverer of services to influencing government to take appropriate actions to support small businesses.

17. In evidence, the SBS considered that a key factor in securing influence was to remain part of "the Whitehall village", rather than be outside it as a non-departmental public body. The SBS also felt that as an Executive Agency of the DTI, instead of being a unit within the Treasury or Cabinet Office, the SBS had the advantage of being within the Department responsible for creating the conditions for business success.[26] From April 2007 the SBS will lose its executive agency status and operate as a policy unit within the DTI's Enterprise and Business Group, responsible for influencing policy affecting small businesses.

18. The SBS has stated that its position within "the Whitehall village" has enabled it to sound the alarm bell over the complexity of small business support, leading to plans to streamline support;[27] to advocate the adoption of Dutch good practice to reduce regulatory burdens; and to persuade DEFRA to abandon plans to change regulations concerning the permitted angles of ramps used to load livestock into lorries that would have been costly for some small businesses.[28]

19. Surveys of departmental officials' views have shown an increasing respect for SBS expertise.[29] Two-thirds of SBS staff have worked in small businesses and a quarter of those had set up or run their own business.[30] A NAO survey found that the vast majority of government departments considered the SBS to be a reliable source of objective and critical information.

20. These examples are, however, counter-balanced by evidence of more limited influence. Although 90% of new regulations affecting small businesses were subject to a meaningful Small Firms Impact Test as part of the Regulatory Impact Assessment process in 2004, the SBS nonetheless fell short of its target of 100%.[31] The SBS did not judge the quality of the Test, and there was no formal process whereby the SBS identified which regulatory proposals were most likely to affect small businesses. Of greater concern, however, is that Departments considering new regulations consulted with the SBS at an appropriate time in only half the cases reviewed by the C&AG. The surveys which demonstrated respect for SBS expertise showed a declining regard for its ability to set the Government's agenda on small business issues.[32]

21. Organisations outside government have also expressed doubts about the extent of SBS influence. The CBI questioned whether the SBS had the power and attributes to ensure that the needs of small business were understood across government, or to implement initiatives so that they would benefit small businesses. The SBS disagreed but accepted that it does not always get its message across well to others, and has not been successful at showing where it has intervened to stop measures that could have been damaging to small business.[33]

22. The SBS is without a system with which to assess its success as an "influencer", although the very nature of the influencing role does not easily lend itself to performance measurement. At present, however, stakeholders inside and outside government have little insight into the wider value of the SBS. That deficiency has been compounded by the lack of good indicators on other issues that matter to business, such as the burden of regulation. The lack of good indicators not only makes it difficult to assess and communicate the SBS's achievements, but can also prevent lessons from being learned about the need for SBS interventions, and their effectiveness.





26   Q 11 Back

27   Q 3 Back

28   Qq 12, 52 Back

29   C&AG's Report, para 5.7 Back

30   Ev 5, Note to Q 23 Back

31   C&AG's Report, para 3.6 Back

32   Q 42 and C&AG's Report, para 5.7 Back

33   Q 42 Back


 
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