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The Bowman family of digital radios, and the associated Combat Infrastructure Platform (CIP), are key to the plans of the Ministry of Defence (the Department), to transform military communications and enable the Armed Forces to operate more effectively and at a quicker pace. The pressing need to replace the ageing Clansman radios used since the 1970s with reliable, secure voice communications has made Bowman one of the Army's top priorities.
By enabling transmission of large quantities of electronic data Bowman is intended to provide information on the position of UK forces, and forms the underlying network to carry CIP. CIP is intended to replace and automate many existing manual processes for command and control on the battlefield. It is also key to plans for "Network Enabled Capability"; joining up military communications and electronic systems in a "network of networks". The ability to see the position of UK forces, on screens in vehicles and headquarters, should amongst other benefits, help to avoid "friendly fire" incidents.
The programme involves conversion of up to 15,700 land vehicles, 141 naval vessels, and 60 helicopters, with training for some 75,000 service personnel. Contracts worth £2.4 billion were placed with General Dynamics UK, in 2001 for Bowman and in 2002 for CIP.
The secure radio capability provided by Bowman has only recently begun to enter service, some ten years later than originally intended, resulting in the armed forces having to operate with insecure, out-dated analogue radios for far longer than they should have done. Though Bowman was declared in service in March 2004 and useful new capabilities have since been delivered, conversion of vehicles and units has been slow, and troops do not find the equipment flexible and intuitive to use.
Substantial technical challenges remain to be overcome before all the required capabilities are in place. Bowman CIP was accepted into service in March 2004 with 27 major provisos that reduce the operational capability of the system. An increase in funding of £121 million has been required to enable this phase to be completed. Furthermore, several important capabilities have also been removed from the system to enable the remainder to be delivered in 2007-2008; deletions include key requirements such as the ability to communicate data directly with allies' systems, which, again, should have helped reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents.
Bowman CIP is a complex and technically demanding programme and the Department seriously under-estimated the challenges involved in both delivering it and sustaining it in service. The failure to adequately survey the state of the army's vehicle fleet led to difficulties in conversion, which further increased the delays in bringing the system into service. Support costs such as provision of spares and training requirements were also severely under-estimated. In some areas, most notably the radio provided for the dismounted infantry, the equipment delivered failed to meet the requirements of the users even though it met the requirement in the contract. Management failings did not help. The Department failed to appoint from the outset a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) with the responsibility, funding and authority to deliver the programme.
On the basis of a Report from the Comptroller and Auditor General[1] the Committee took evidence from the Accounting Officer and supporting witnesses on four main issues: the overall control and management of the Bowman CIP procurement programme; the realism of the initial business case; the adequacy of planning estimates of through life costs; and the prospects for Bowman CIP delivering the full operational requirement.
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