Conclusions and recommendations
1. The Department has failed to develop viable
Combat Identification solutions to counter the risks of friendly
fire incidents, despite their devastating effects, and despite
the recommendations made by the Committee of Public Accounts in
both 1992 and 2002.
Some improvements have been made, for example for air and naval
operations, but the Department needs to address the outstanding
areas without further delay.
2. Over half of the equipment programmes for
Combat Identification have been delayed, deferred or re-scoped
during the last four years. A Battlefield
Target Identification System will not be available until early
in the next decade. Equipments such as the Blue Force Tracker
and Bowman communications system may improve situational awareness
in the meantime, but the inevitable time-lag in analysing and
collating information from these systems will restrict their potential
for positive target identification. The Department therefore needs
to develop a timetabled plan for introducing a credible target
identification system.
3. Progress in procuring the Battlefield Target
Identification System has been held up for six years awaiting
allies' decisions. The Committee recommended
in 2002 that the Department develop methods of co-operation with
allies on Combat Identification, but preliminary decisions are
yet to be made. The Department needs to reach agreement with allies
on procuring a system, or introduce, as an interim, a more limited
national programme, focusing on key risk areas such as ground
to ground combat.
4. The Department's Senior Responsible Owner
on Combat Identification has no budgetary or line management responsibility.
The Department should identify what impact
the Senior Responsible Owner has been able to make since the role
was established in 2002, and determine whether giving greater
management authority would increase the effectiveness of the role.
5. During Operation TELIC the Department produced
60,000 Aide Memoire cards to raise awareness of Combat Identification,
but failed to distribute them to front-line troops.
The Department regretted this failure, which it attributed to
more general difficulties with supplies in Iraq. Cards are now
given to personnel before deployment. The Department should determine
how successful they have been in raising awareness among the troops
concerned.
6. As the Committee recommended in 2002, the
Department has developed a database on the fratricide incidents,
but it does not collate data on the fratricide rates of our allies
or on non-combatant casualties. The Department
should update the database regularly and expand it to include
data on allied fratricide rates and non-combatant casualties.
The Committee also recommended in 2002 that the information gathered
in the database be analysed and disseminated appropriately within
the United Kingdom and to allies. The Department should share
the database with our allies to promote greater joint interest
in finding effective solutions.
7. It took between eight and 28 months to
conclude the Boards of Inquiry investigations into the four friendly
fire incidents during Operation TELIC, and in one case it was
a further 27 months before the findings were made publicly available.
There will inevitably be variations in the time taken to complete
investigations due to differing levels of complexity and the possibility
of criminal prosecutions. But once complete, the Department should
make every effort to publish the findings of Boards of Inquiry
within one month of the investigation being concluded.
8. It took the Department over six months
to inform the Committee that it could not provide information
on allied fratricide rates and non-combatant casualties requested
at the hearing. The Department should
in future provide promised information no later than four weeks
after the hearing. Where more time is required, the Department
should agree an appropriate timetable for delivery within a week
of the hearing.
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