1 Progress on equipment projects
to improve Combat Identification
1. We questioned the Department on progress made
since our predecessors reported in 2002.[2]
There has been mixed progress in the range of equipment projects
that aim to improve Combat Identification. Some progress has been
made in respect of air and marine operations, and projects including
Successor Identification Friend or Foe (secure identification
of friendly aircraft and ships) and Link 16 (better situational
awareness of some ships and aircraft) are now in service.[3]
2. The Department told us that there had been progress
with the Bowman communications system.[4]
The Bowman system provided a secure voice and data communication
system for the Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. It also helped
to provide awareness of the whereabouts of people and equipment
in the battlefield. It was declared in service in March 2004 subject
to a number of provisos, but would not be fully operational until
2007. A project closely related to Bowman (Combat, DBL Infrastructure
and Platform BISA) comprised three sub-projects procured as a
single programme through the contractor providing Bowman. This
programme was designed to give inter-operability of United Kingdom
communication systems with those of our allies. It failed to meet
its target date to be in-service in December 2004 as the technology
was not sufficiently reliable.[5]
3. The Battlefield Target Identification System has
suffered significant delays. This is the main equipment project
to help forces identify friend from foe. It was been delayed for
five years as the Department attempted to find a solution that
would ensure inter-operability with allies.[6]
The Department considered that the need for inter-operability
was vital as it expected that greater numbers of operations in
the future to be conducted with allies.[7]
Developing inter-operable systems was a time consuming process,
and the Department acknowledged that the process of discussing
with allies which would be the best technological approach had
taken longer than it would have wished.[8]
In 2000, NATO agreed to adopt a solution to the Battlefield Target
Identification System that would allow inter-operability, and
in September 2001, the Department successfully trialled a solution
that complied with NATO standards.
4. In 2003, the Department realised that there was
a wider range of possible operating environments and technical
solutions. The United States and the United Kingdom with other
allies then agreed to pursue a joint assessment of the available
technologies. In December 2004, the Department revised the scope
of the Battlefield Target Identification System project. The United
Kingdom and other allies have been pursuing a four year programme
of including trials and exercises, the final element of which
was an exercise called URGENT QUEST on Salisbury Plain in September
and October 2005. The results are still being analysed but should
inform the decision on the Battlefield Target Identification System
to be adopted.[9]
5. The Department expected to make a decision on
the system in Summer 2006, some six years after the NATO agreement.[10]
It expected the system to be manufactured and in the field
in sufficient numbers by the end of the decade.[11]
The Department intended to wait until the technology was
sufficiently mature before deciding whether to continue to wait
for international agreement or to consider a UK only solution.[12]
The Department subsequently told us that it had further delayed
its decision on the Battlefield Target Identification System and
it has still reached no decision on the system.
6. Other projects that would contribute to better
Combat Identification have also suffered cancellation or delays.
The Airborne System for Target Recognition Identification and
Designation programme aimed to develop an air to ground target
identification system with three European partners. This project
should have enabled military personnel to identify possible targets
at much greater ranges than current equipment. However, funding
for the project was withdrawn in 2004, three years after it was
initially allocated. The need for the system still remains. Funding
has now been allocated to the Battlefield Target Identification
System to provide this capability.[13]
The Co-Operative Engagement Capability has also been deferred
and re-scoped following funding decisions in 2005. The project
should have enabled better detection, tracking and identification
of possible targets in the air.[14]
The Department told us it was taking longer to assess some technical
solutions to Combat Identification, as the nature of modern warfare
and the speed of operations had made it more imperative to find
a robust means of recognising friend from foe.[15]
7. The Department appointed a Senior Responsible
Owner in April 2004 to act as a champion for Combat Identification.
He is directly responsible to the Defence Management Board and
directs work in support of delivering improvements to Combat Identification.
He represents Combat Identification issues within the Department.
The Senior Responsible Owner does not have any overarching line
management or budgetary responsibility for Combat Identification.
The Department considered that he was sufficiently empowered to
lead, co-ordinate and focus relevant activities,[16]
and that it was not necessary for him to have a budget as there
was no one single equipment project for Combat Identification.
It noted there was a combination of equipment programmes, and
other inputs such as training and practices.[17]
8. To date, the Senior Responsible Owner's achievements
have been the production of more information, not the delivery
of improved Combat Identification or even of projects designed
to improve Combat Identification. For example, the Senior Responsible
Owner obtained funding to install equipment in an aircraft to
test the practical application of a potential target identification
system. He has also persuaded other areas of the Department of
the necessity and achievability of a database of Combat Identification
information.[18]
2 Q 17 Back
3
C&AG's Report, Appendix 4 Back
4
Q 17 Back
5
C&AG's Report, Appendix 4; Committe of Public Accounts, Fourteenth
Report of Session 2006-7, Ministry of Defence: Delivering digital
tactical communications through the Bowman CIP Programme,
HC 358 Back
6
C&AG's Report, para 18 Back
7
Q 38 Back
8
Q 45 Back
9
Q 105 Back
10
Q 8 Back
11
Q 44 Back
12
Q 16 Back
13
C&AG's Report, Appendix 4 Back
14
C&AG's Report, Appendix 4 Back
15
Q 18 Back
16
C&AG's Report, para 32 Back
17
C&AG's Report, para 33 Back
18
Q 96 Back
| 
