Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
13 MARCH 2006
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon, welcome
to the Committee of Public Accounts where today we are considering
the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report on Combat Identification.
I welcome back Bill Jeffrey; welcome also to Air Vice Marshal
Stephen Dalton who is the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) of Combat
Identification. I should say that this Committee has taken a particular
interest in this matter and I have taken a particular interest
in this matter. We first issued a Report in 2002 and we made a
number of recommendations. I think our Report has had an impact
and there has been progress Mr Jeffrey on which I congratulate
you. We should put this into context that, although any death
from friendly fire is appalling, of course the numbers were relatively
low in the Iraq war compared with any other war, so clearly progress
had been made, is being made and I put that into context. I should
also say that we are joined in this Committee by the Geneva Centre
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, so a number of people
sitting in the public gallery, particularly a number of colleagues
from south eastern Europe, and we are very grateful to them for
joining us today. Perhaps I can begin then by asking you to look
at figure four on page seven which is the amount of time it has
taken to investigate these fratricides. When we look at page seven
we can see that the elapsed time between incident and board of
inquiry report was 14 months, 28 months, 14 months, 8 months.
Why did it take so long to investigate these fratricides?
Mr Jeffrey: May I say first that
I appreciate very much your introductory remarks because, as you
know, I am still quite a newcomer to the MoD. Although this is
not an area that any of us feels we have got quite right yet,
my sense is that we are making some progress, although every single
death that underlies these cases is in itself a tragedy. On the
question of the time it takes for boards of inquiry to do their
business, I agree with the underlying sentiment of what you say
that in these four cases it has taken a great deal longer than
one would certainly want. Each of them raises somewhat different
issues. What has often caused the most significant delay has been
the requirement to investigate whether there is any criminal issue
before the board of inquiry could get started on its business.
In other cases it has been a requirement to synchronise what we
are doing and match it with investigations that our American colleagues
in particular have been undertaking. In others, we have required
technical advice from companies which manufacture the equipment.
These are the explanations: I am not offering them as excuses.
Q2 Chairman: You will admit that
some of these figures show that it is a long time, do they not?
Mr Jeffrey: It is indeed.
Q3 Chairman: So you are going to
try to do better. If you look at the previous page, fatalities
during the combat phase of Operation TELIC, it makes the point
about the extraordinarily low number of people killed by enemy
action, which is just a truly extraordinary figure really for
a war. What were the causes of the 21 out of 33 fatalities in
the operation that were not the result of enemy action or fratricide?
What were the causes?
Mr Jeffrey: The principal causes
were: two flying accidents, which between them accounted for 14
fatalities—eight and six; one case involved the illness
of the officer who died; three occurred as a result of road traffic
accidents; two are described as "killed on active service",
one during an explosive ordnance disposal operation, one during
an explosion; and one case is still sub judice, so it is
not possible to attribute it to any of these categories.
Q4 Chairman: Any death is unfortunate.
Would it be an unfair question to put to you that perhaps you
are not doing enough to protect our troops, given what you have
just told us about the aircraft crashes in particular? Is that
an unfair question or is it just inevitable in the fog of war
that this sort of thing is going to happen and there is nothing
more you can do to protect our troops?
Mr Jeffrey: I do not intend to
make a practice of coming to this Committee and saying there is
nothing more we can do, because there always is. I am sure that
what one might call the health and safety aspect of this, as opposed
to the measures that we are trying to take on combat identification
to reduce fratricide, is equally important. What I should do is
draw attention to the fact that two thirds of these fatalities
were attributable to two highly regrettable but nonetheless isolated
accidents in the air.
Q5 Chairman: Let us get to the heart
of this now, which is the Americans, as always when we are talking
about combat. Please look at paragraph 18 on page nine. I took
a particular personal interest in this subject and I wrote letters
to the Secretary for State at the time and these may be on your
file, I do not know. If you look at paragraph 18 it says "It
is important that the Battlefield Target Identification System
is inter-operable with allies, particularly the United States."
well that is obvious "Ensuring the inter-operability has
led to slow progress". That has always been the problem when
I have studied this previously; dealing with the Americans has
been a problem, particularly in NATO. "While NATO issued
a Standardisation Agreement in June 2000 and the Department successfully
trialled a compliant solution (Battlefield Target Identification
Device) in September 2001, the project was deferred in 2003 when
allies and partners agreed to a United States proposal to assess
technologies other than those defined in the NATO Standard Agreement".
In other words, we are back to the old NATO thing: two steps forward,
one step back and all the rest of it. If the Americans fail to
reach a decision on this, are we back to square one? This is absolutely
crucial, is it not?
Mr Jeffrey: We are not back to
square one; it is true to say, as you do, that we did successfully
trial the system which is compliant with NATO standards. We then,
round about 2002-03, realised that there was a wider range of
operating environments in which it might need to be deployed and
a wider range of candidate technologies, if I might put it that
way. At that point the Americans proposed and we agreed, with
others, that there should be a joint assessment of the available
technologies. It is certainly the case that when one goes international
things sometimes take longer. On the other hand, in this environment
in which we are now operating, there does not seem to us to be
much alternative to going international; so much depends on coalition
operations and so much depends on having compatible technology.
Q6 Chairman: Air Vice Marshal Dalton
could you comment on this because you are obviously an expert
on this? Tell us a bit about the Americans and your dealings with
them and how interested they are in this whole area and how much
progress we can make. It was said to me when I was taking an interest
in this at the time of the war, that there was no technology and
the best I could hope for was that one of our tanks driving in
the desert had a Union Jack on the top of it so the Americans
did not blow it out of the desert. Is that a bit unfair?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: I believe
that is a little unfair. I think we shall discover that the Americans,
as with many of our allies, take this as seriously as we do. The
issue of course is trying to make sure that we have the right
balance between the technology and the right level of risk, in
other words that it works and does not lead to people not having
faith in it and that it works across all the platforms and environments.
We and the Americans, the French, the Germans and the Swedes are
all involved in this to try to find a technology which is reliable
and that will complement the whole question of tactics and training
and procedures as well as our situational awareness. They are
taking it very seriously.
Q7 Chairman: That is fine, but it
does not really say a great deal. When is this going to happen?
Assuming there is another war and our tanks go into action and
there are American helicopters and planes flying about above them,
will there be some piece of kit on the tank which will prevent
the Americans blowing our tanks out of the desert?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: The current
rate of progress means that, hopefully by the summer this year,
we shall have an understanding as to which particular technologies
of the ones we have tested, culminating in that major test in
September/October last year, are now at a stage that we can all
put our weight and money behind moving ahead and trying to develop.
Q8 Chairman: Okay, we shall have
an understanding this summer.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Yes.
Q9 Chairman: We shall now put our
weight and our money behind this. Putting our weight and our money
behind this and us all agreeing, how many years will it be before
we have a system by which American planes can recognise our tanks,
for instance?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: I cannot
answer that question directly.
Q10 Chairman: Give us an idea. Will
it be five years, 10, 15?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: It could
be very few years, but I cannot answer that question directly
because I do not know what the other nations themselves will decide.
It is for them to make their minds up. What I can say is that
our decision process has been based very much on getting an understanding
as to the likelihood of the way the United States in particular
are going to go so that we can back the horse that we think is
going to be the most helpful.
Q11 Chairman: Is there a not a particular
piece of technology out there? How far advanced is this? Is there
some piece of kit, which we know is manufactured by a certain
American company for instance, that we can all rally behind and
which is affordable? Is there no piece of kit? Where are we? Are
we still in the business of talking? Where are we exactly? You
must be able to tell me whether, in five months, five years or
10 years, it is likely that we can get this piece of kit, because
we have been talking about it for a long time. When you have all
this technology available, particularly to the Americans, it is
extraordinary that they cannot produce this one piece of technology.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: The whole
aim of the advanced concept technology demonstrator, which we
are just coming towards the end of, was to identify those technologies
which were ready to go forward and that then could be adjudged
in terms of their affordability across the piece. That is what
we are aiming for in the work we are doing now in analysing the
results of the programme we have been involved in, such that we
can now make decisions on which way to go.
Q12 Chairman: So there is no particular
piece of technology out there at the moment?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: There
are several bits of technology out there at the moment. The question
is which is the most effective, reliable and in a battlefield
situation going to work.
Q13 Chairman: Other Members can continue
on this if they want; I think I have made my point. Can you please
look now at paragraph 27 on page 11? You produced, very usefully,
60,000 combat identification aide-memoire cards, did you
not? They were taken out to Iraq, not a single one of them was
given to any of our troops, they were left on the dockside and
then were shipped back to England. What was the point of that?
Where is the value for money in producing 60,000 aide-memoire
cards which stay on the dockside?
Mr Jeffrey: The short answer is
that there is no point in that and it was a highly regrettable
passage of events. What I understand is that it did reflect more
general difficulties in Iraq at the time with supplies and asset
tracking that this Committee is aware of, which we have addressed
in the meantime.
Q14 Chairman: So you want to apologise
for that do you?
Mr Jeffrey: I do so readily. It
was an error at the time. What I can say is, first of all, that
it could not happen now because the aide-memoire cards
are issued to troops prior to their deployment rather than afterwards.
We have made improvements in the tracking of all sorts of consignments
in the meantime and we feel we are in a significantly stronger
position for the deployment in Afghanistan.
Q15 Chairman: Air Vice Marshal, you
are the Senior Responsible Owner in this field and, as recommendation
three on page five tells us, what we are talking about "...
will stretch and test the operation of the Senior Responsible
Owner concept". How can you take this process forward when
you do not have any direct line management or budget? In other
words, would it be unfair to say to you Air Vice Marshal that
in this field you have no staff, no budget, no management therefore
how seriously can we take your role?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: The principle
here is that my staff directly are involved in how the information
on which combat identification is based is passed around the battle
space. So from the point of view of having a direct line and direct
point of influence and a responsibility, it makes eminent sense
for me to have that responsibility. The way that the department
works, in terms of the whole financial planning piece and of course
the priority setting and also in terms of who is responsible,
is very much based on who is going to benefit from the activity
going on within the SRO construct. As the information manager
for the battle space, then it makes sense for me to be responsible
for it and I do have enough authority to make things happen.
Q16 Chairman: You can make things
happen in this field? You have the staff, the budget, the people
and the authority to do it?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Yes.[1]
I can always refer back to the Defence Management Board if I feel
there is any issue which is not being addressed seriously enough
to move things forward.
Q17 Mr Mitchell: It does seem appalling
that progress in this matter has been so slow. I am a newcomer
to the Committee, but since the last report, the last inquiry,
not much seems to have happened. This seems very odd, because
the nature of modern warfare is going to be totally different
to the kind of warfare we were used to in the days of great power
warfare. Now it is going to be big states, fast moving invasions,
chaotic situations, probably allies working with them and because
things are moving so fast this is going to be a situation in which,
unless we do take some clear action, there is going to be more
of this friendly-fire killing. We are preparing our way for a
disaster, are we not?
Mr Jeffrey: I entirely accept
the implication of what the Chairman was saying earlier that our
discussions with allies have taken longer than any of us would
have wished, but I should take issue a little with Mr Mitchell's
general assertion that not much has been done since the last report.
If one looks at the NAO's Report, it does set out a fair amount
of progress: to get some equipment systems in, including the Bowman
radio system, which is greatly improving the situational awareness;
to learn the lessons of the first Iraq engagement and drive through
changes there which are in appendix three of the Report; to publish
doctrine on this subject—and we are the only country to
have done so; to improve training, which paragraph 24 of the Report
brings out; and to improve the collection of information which
the previous Committee requested us to do. I should argue that
although one is never as far along the track as one would want
to be, we have made quite a bit of progress on this.
Q18 Mr Mitchell: How would you argue
the case I have just put up that it is going to be more a problem
in the nature of modern warfare?
Mr Jeffrey: The Air Vice Marshal
may have something to say about this as the military man, but
I should dispute that. Certainly, what is clearly an aspect of
modern warfare is the engagement of coalitions of a number of
countries and it is obvious that there are more risks of this
sort inherent in that. I do not know whether the Air Vice Marshal
would want to add to that?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Two things,
if I may? The first one is that with modern warfare and the speed
of operations it becomes that much more imperative to try to find
the most reliable and robust way of recognising your own before
you start recognising the enemy. That is why some of the technology
we have been looking at has taken longer to examine: to make sure
we understand what it is and how it works better than perhaps
others. That is a point which is true. The other aspect of it
is that there of course will be many more non-enemy and non-friendly
people in the battle space in the future and therefore we need
to be sure that we are doing enough to recognise that we shall
only be able to recognise our own through some form of pure identification
systems per se. It is the situational awareness, knowing
the likeliest position of the enemy in particular, but also of
any non-combatants in there, which is also important for us to
do.
Q19 Mr Mitchell: How happy are you
with the situation in Afghanistan? Incredible terrain, broken,
numerous different forces, war lords all over the place, different
missions, some patrolling the capital, others destroying poppy
crops and pursuing the Taliban, the Americans pursuing whoever
they are pursuing wherever it is. This is going to be a natural
place for this kind of accident, is it not? What can you tell
us about how the situation has been improved so that it does not
produce more tragedies in Afghanistan?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Of course
the bottom line is that we can never guarantee that there will
not be any further incident of fratricide. It is a fact of warfare
that from time to time, because of all the conditions, especially
the human conditions which are factors, it is difficult to put
down and pin down the precise way in which you can solve this,
but the human factors will become more of the issue. The second
thing is that we have done an awful lot more in making sure this
time that before the deployment we have a lot more cross-discussions
with the various nations involved out there in defining the areas
of responsibility to try to make sure that the interfaces, which
are often the areas where these things go wrong, are better defined.
1 Note by witness: The Senior Responsible Owner
for Combat Identification does not have a specific budget. The
role is explained in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the NAO Report, Progress
in Combat Identification. See also Question 46. Back
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