Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
13 MARCH 2006
Q20 Mr Mitchell: The more nations
involved, the more difficult it is to get a common system.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Absolutely,
and that is why tactics, techniques and procedures, procedures
being the absolute key here, are an integral part of combat ID.
Q21 Mr Mitchell: How far is the root
of the problem the Americans? In the 1940s and 1939-45, the American
style was to throw big numbers at a problem and go in boots and
all with massive power, which has not always been the British
approach. I should imagine that in that kind of situation our
troops are more at risk from the Americans than theirs are from
ours.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: I would
not agree with that particular statement, for two reasons. First
of all, the Americans, as I have mentioned, are taking this extremely
seriously at the moment.
Q22 Mr Mitchell: So they should be;
they are killing more.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: We have
made a lot of progress with them in getting to where we have got
to today, particularly around the situation we shall hopefully
find ourselves in this year, in being able to make progress directly
in trying to prevent any more of these incidents happening.
Q23 Mr Mitchell: Are they secretive
about systems?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: No, not
as far as I am aware.
Q24 Mr Mitchell: There seems to be
a pattern now that we are ordering more within Europe, presumably
at greater expense, but of course the way we are paying for good
relations with Europe is to waste more money there. We are going
to be buying more military equipment from Europe and less from
the US. Is that going to cause more of a problem with identification?
Mr Jeffrey: I am not sure that
we are necessarily buying more from Europe. Our procurement, as
the Committee will know in a different context, is now very much
undertaken under the Defence Industrial Strategy that was published
at the end of last year and it looks as though we shall have a
mixed picture. We shall have some equipment which is purchased
from UK-based firms, we shall have some which is based in European
consortia and some from the United States. I do not know whether
it is necessarily the case that the balance of equipment purchased
is shifting in quite the way you suggest.
Q25 Mr Mitchell: The Chairman commented
on the delays in inquiries. I wonder how far that is deliberate,
in the sense that this is something which is very destructive
of morale and certainly caused a lot of shock and horror to me
and various others at the time at home and disillusionment with
the purposes of the war. How far are inquiries being delayed so
that the thing can fade away and be forgotten?
Mr Jeffrey: In preparing myself
for this hearing I have seen nothing whatsoever to suggest that
that has been a factor. There have been several factors.
Q26 Mr Mitchell: So it is not a deliberate
policy.
Mr Jeffrey: No; certainly not.
Q27 Mr Mitchell: It says in the Report
that there has only been real progress on one front. Why is that?
Which is it?
Mr Jeffrey: I am not sure that
we should necessarily accept that there has only been progress
on one front. There has been progress on equipment, there has
been progress in policy and doctrine, there has been progress
in training and there has been progress, albeit slower than we
should wish, in working with our partners to develop more effective
joint systems. We should gently contest the conclusion that there
has only been progress on one front.
Q28 Mr Mitchell: The Report also
says that the department should consider carefully the likely
costs and benefits of proceeding with UK-specific solutions. Would
they be any use in fact ?
Mr Jeffrey: It goes back to the
earlier exchanges. It would be possible for us to proceed completely
independently of our allies but we do not believe it would make
very much sense because of the inter-connected nature of the engagements
that we are deployed on at the moment. That is not to say that
when it comes to it and we have a good understanding with our
allies we shall not acquire our own capability. However, to go
completely alone and not wait for the outcome of the discussions,
in which the Air Vice Marshal is pretty closely involved would,
in my judgment, be a mistake.
Q29 Mr Bacon: Air Vice Marshal, you
mentioned that you disagreed with Mr Mitchell's statement about
the number of people being killed. Could you say how many members
of the British Armed Forces have been killed by Americans?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Sorry;
in which context?
Q30 Mr Bacon: In Iraq.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: During
the combat phase of TELIC there were three.
Q31 Mr Bacon: And how many Americans
have been killed by British forces?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: None,
as far as I am aware.
Q32 Mr Bacon: So Mr Mitchell was
right when he said Americans were killing more British than the
other way around.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: In that
sense the statistics would indicate yes.
Q33 Mr Bacon: That is what I thought.
Could I ask you to turn to page nine? In paragraph 18 it refers
to the battlefield target identification system and it is listed
above as well as one of the six projects. Could you say why the
battlefield target system has been so badly delayed?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Can I
just make it clear that one is talking about the Battlefield Target
Identification System, which is the overall way in which we see
identification in the battle space, and one is talking about the
Battlefield Target Identification Device. The device they are
talking about in paragraph 18 is a particular piece of kit; the
system is the overall way which is referred to in the table above.
The actual technologies that we have been looking at to supply
the BTIS requirement is part of what we have been talking about
so far. There are several technologies ranging from optical to
radar and what we have been trying to establish is which is going
to be effective, reliable and robust in the battlefield area.
Q34 Mr Bacon: When was the NATO standardisation
agreement issued?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: In 2003,
if I remember correctly.
Q35 Mr Bacon: I thought it was in
June 2000.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Yes;
sorry, 2000. I beg you pardon.
Q36 Mr Bacon: It is nearly six years
ago, is it not?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: It is.
Q37 Mr Bacon: How long did it take
to fight World War II? It is a serious question. How long did
it take to fight World War II?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Around
about the same time.
Q38 Mr Bacon: Yes, it did. I was
not there at the time, but as far as I remember it took from 1939
to 1945. Getting this right is taking almost as long as it took
to fight the entire World War II. It is nowhere near acceptable,
is it?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: The key
here is to try to make sure that we are closely interoperable
with our allies because that is the key to how we are going to
fight future operations. That interoperability is absolutely vital,
if we can make it in the timescale that we can afford. In other
words, when the technology becomes mature enough, which should
be in the coming year, we shall then be in a position to decide
whether the prize of interoperability is still worth waiting for
in its fundamental sense or whether we should then need to consider
going alone because the technology would be available to protect
British troops.
Q39 Mr Bacon: Could you just repeat
that last bit, "... or whether we should need to consider
going alone because ..."?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Because
the technology is then reliable enough. Using the standards you
have mentioned as being the bedrock of that, we have confidence
that it is then in a good enough position for us to move forward
because it is going to be reliable, robust enough and will work
in the international environment in which we find ourselves.
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