Appendix 2: Note prepared by the House
of Commons Library
I understand that in the light of the announcement
in Budget 2007 of a further extension of the FAS,[24]
you would like further information on the following questions:
1. The difference between benefits provided
under PPF and what is now being proposed under the extended FAS.
2. An explanation of what £8bn figure
referred to in the Budget amounts to and the difference between
the figures presented in cash terms or net current value terms.
3. What it would cost to provide PPF level
of benefits to those now eligible for FAS.
4. What it would cost to index-link payments
under the extended FAS.
5. What it would cost to cover those who
lost out when a solvent employer walked away from a scheme.
Scope of the FAS
To qualify for the FAS an occupational pension scheme
must not be a money purchase scheme and must have commenced wind
up between 1st January 1997 and 5th April 2005. Except in certain
limited circumstances, the employer relating to the scheme must
also experience an insolvency event (dealt with in more detail
below).[25]
Initially, eligibility for the FAS was restricted to those within
three years of retirement age on 14 May 2004. In 2006, this was
extended to those within fifteen years of retirement age on that
date, with the amount of assistance depending on how far a person
was from normal retirement age, up to a maximum of 80%, subject
to a £12,000 cap.[26]
In Budget 2007, the Chancellor announced a further extension of
the FAS, so that all members of affected pension schemes would
get:
80 per cent of the core pension rights
accrued in their scheme. The cap on maximum assistance will be
increased to £26,000 and the de minimus rule that excludes
those whose FAS payment would be £10 or less a week will
be removed.[27]
The FAS continues to be criticised as insufficiently
generous. One of the reasons for this is that it provides 80%
of "core pension rights," whereas the Ombudsman asked
the Government to consider the replacement of the entirety of
the pension which affected individuals would have received - non-core,
as well as core benefits. [28]
Ros Altmann argues that the 80% of core pension that the FAS provides
"is not 80% of expected pension - it is worth around 60%."[29]
"Core benefits" are, broadly speaking, the monthly payments
individuals would have received from their pension on retirement.
"Non-core benefits" include the option to take a proportion
of the pension as a lump sum, survivor's benefits, and ill-health
benefits (i.e. the ability to draw a full pension early on ill-health
grounds).[30]
The Department has estimated that implementing the Ombudsman's
proposals would cost between £13 billion and £17 billion
over 60 years in cash terms.[31]
How the costs are presented
Originally, the Government provided £400 million
in cash terms (£243 million in net present value terms) for
the FAS over 20 years.[32]
The extension of the scheme announced in May 2006, to those within
fifteen years of pension age on 14 May 2004, increased the commitment
to £2.3 billion in cash terms (£830 million in net present
value terms). The further extension announced in Budget 2007,
increased the commitment to £8 billion in cash terms (£1.9
billion in net present value terms).[33]
The figures given in the breakdown DWP has provided
for the Committee show the cost of the extended FAS announced
in the 2007 Budget in cash over 55 years from £2007/08.[34]
The annual amounts for all years to 2062/63 sum to £8 billion.
DWP explains that:
Net present value is used to compare costs
that occur in different time periods. It is a separate concept
to inflation and is based on the principle of 'time preference',
i.e. that people prefer to receive goods and services now rather
than later. NPV costs discount cash costs by 2.5% per year to
convert cash costs into real costs (to take account of inflation)
and, in addition, by 3.5% a year in years 0-29, and by 3% a year
in years 30 onwards to convert real costs into NPV costs (to take
into account time preference.[35]
The effect of applying these figures to the cost
of the extended FAS is to get a net present value of just under
£2 billion. The main reason for such a big difference between
the cash and net present value figures is the 55 years over which
the scheme is costed. As an example, £100 in 2007/08 would
have a purchasing power of around £25 by 2062 if inflation
had been 2.5% on average a year. Applying a discount rate (the
opportunity cost of capital) adds to the disparity.
Mr Justice Bean, in his decision on the application
for judicial review of the Ombudsman's report on occupational
pensions, said he considered the difference between the cash costs
and net current value costs to be important as "a matter
of presentation", although "not in truth a difference
of substance." A more telling point, he said was that:
neither figure takes account of the tax
that would be payable by the recipients of pensions if full payments
are restored, nor the benefits that have to be paid to those who
have lost all or most of their occupational pensions on winding-up.[36]
The Department has said that the increased
tax revenue and reduced income-related benefit expenditure which
would arise is "difficult to estimate precisely, over such
a long period."[37]
Differences between Pension Protection Fund (PPF)
and FAS
It should be noted that, like the FAS, the PPF does
not compensate members for the full amount of their expected pension.
However, it is more generous than the FAS. The main differences
between the two schemes are, in broad terms, as follows:
- PPF replaces 100% of the pension in payment to
those of at least normal pension age for the scheme on the assessment
date, and 90% of the expected core pension for those below normal
pension age.[38]
FAS will top up pension payment to 80% of expected core pension.[39]
- For people below normal pension age, the 90%
compensation provided under PPF is subject to a cap of £26,935.70
at age 65.[40]
The amount of the cap is increased annually in line with earnings.
FAS payments are subject to a cap of £26,000.[41]
- Under both schemes, survivors are entitled to
roughly half of what the scheme member would have been entitled
to.[42]
Survivors' benefits are therefore less generous in FAS than the
PPF.
- In the PPF, that part of compensation relating
to pensionable service on or after 6 April 1997 is increased in
line with the RPI, capped at 2.5%.[43]
FAS payments are not index-linked "because many of the schemes
involved were not index linked in the first place."[44]
- Eligibility for the PPF starts from normal pension
age for the scheme.[45]
Eligibility for the FAS starts at age 65, (except where a person
is terminally ill).[46]
- Trustees can make pension payments at PPF levels
(90% and 100%) during the assessment period.[47]
The FAS scheme manager has the discretion to provide those eligible
for FAS with "interim" payments, up to only 80% of the
expected pension.[48]
- PPF provides an option to draw up to 25% of the
value of their compensation as a tax free lump sum.[49]
There is no such option in the FAS.[50]
Additional costs of providing PPF level benefits
to those eligible for the FAS
DWP estimates that the additional cost of providing
people eligible for the extended FAS with PPF level benefits is
£2.7 billion in cash terms (£640 million in net present
value terms.) This assumes that people get PPF level of benefits
(90% or 100%), the cap is set at PPF levels, and indexation is
provided on benefits after 1997 (1% indexation across the board
has been assumed). [51]
It should be noted that this is the estimated cost of bringing
FAS benefits up to PPF levels, rather than of bringing FAS into
line with PPF in all respects.
Additional costs of indexing payments under the
extended FAS
DWP was asked to provide an estimate of the additional
cost of applying the same indexing rules to payments under the
extended FAS as apply to the PPF. Instead, it has provided an
estimate of indexing the full accrued pension. It explains that
this is because the PPF provides indexation on the part of the
pension that derives from pensionable service on or after 6 April
1997. Because individuals in FAS schemes are unlikely to have
accrued much of their pension after 1997, providing indexation
on those rights would provide them with little additional benefit.[52]
For this reason, DWP says that:
We have instead estimated the costs of
providing indexation in the individual's full accrued pension.
We have assumed that the pension in payment would be increased
each year in line with RPI capped at 2.5%. The additional cash
cost, on top of the current FAS would be £3.5 billion (£530
million in NPV terms).[53]
Solvent employers
In order to qualify for the FAS the employer must
usually have experienced an 'insolvency event' by 31 August 2007.[54]
The date by which an insolvency event must have been experienced
has recently been extended. The Pensions Reform Minister, James
Purnell, said this was because he had received representations
from trustees of a small number of pension schemes who were in
negotiation with employers in relation to insolvency and would
like further time to complete the process. He said he would consider
whether a further extension beyond 31 August was required.[55]
The definition of "employer insolvency" for FAS purposes
is designed to be "sufficiently general
to capture
schemes where the sponsoring employer no longer exists and also
where insolvency may have occurred some time after scheme wind-up
had started." The definition was extended by amending regulations
which came into force in December 2006.[56]
These allow the FAS to:
consider schemes where the employer has
been subject to overseas insolvency proceedings, and further,
they give a discretionary power to include schemes where the employer
is unlikely to continue as a going concern but for whatever reason
has not formally undergone a qualifying insolvency event.[57]
In debate in the House of Lords, Lord Hunt of King's
Heath said that the amendments:
demonstrate our desire to define insolvency
as widely as possible in order to bring schemes and their members
into the FAS. They do not affect our oft-stated belief that ongoing
solvent employers remain responsible for making good their pension
promises to members.[58]
DWP was asked to estimate the cost of extending the
FAS to people whose pension funds wound up before April 2005,
where the sponsoring employer had not experienced an insolvency
event. DWP says that there is limited data on the number and circumstances
of schemes that have wound up under-funded with a solvent employer.
It also argues that some will have suffered small losses (if any
at all), for example where the wind up is due to the merger of
schemes and members are transferred to a different scheme providing
the same benefits. DWP has, however, provided an estimate of the
cost of including a specific number of schemes where the debt
has been compromised in order to avoid insolvency of the employer.[59]
The context within which this would happen is set out below.
Where a decision is taken to wind up a pension fund,
a valuation is made of the pension fund's assets and liabilities.
Where the fund is found to be in deficit, any shortfall is treated
as a debt due from the sponsoring employer to the trustees of
the scheme under section 75 Pensions Act 1995.[60]
Prior to June 2003, the valuation of the fund was done on a Minimum
Funding Requirement (MFR) basis and non-pensioner members were
required to be put in a position where they would receive the
Cash Equivalent Transfer Values (CETV) that would normally be
paid in the case of someone who left the company. DWP's 2003 Pensions
White Paper commented that these CETVs were too low to provide
people with the pensions they expected at retirement:
Companies that choose to wind up their
schemes pass their investment risk on to non-pensioner members,
as they transfer their money into money purchase arrangements.
Moreover, because the actuarial assumptions underpinning the CETV
calculation have become out of date, CETV levels are now providing
less protection than was originally envisaged.[61]
For this reason, the Government introduced a requirement
through Pensions Act 2004 to ensure that there were sufficient
funds to meet the full costs of the rights accrued by scheme members.
Since June 2003, any deficit is determined by valuing the benefits
pension scheme members would get on a basis that they are bought
out in full via immediate annuities (for pensioners) or deferred
annuities (for non-pensioners).[62]
In some cases the employer is not in a position to
meet its debt to the pension scheme. The courts have held that
it can be permissible for the trustees, exercising their fiduciary
duties, to agree a lower amount - or "compromise" the
employer's debt to the scheme, if this is to the benefit of pension
scheme members. In the case of the Bradstock Group Pension
Scheme, for example, the scheme was in substantial
deficit and the employers had no realistic prospect of being able
to pay the instalments necessary to bring the funding up to the
required level by the prescribed date. Unless the debt could be
compromised, the employers would be forced into liquidation. The
court held it was permissible to compromise a debt for the benefit
of scheme members.[63]
DWP says it is aware of 15 schemes where the employer
has compromised the debt on the pension scheme in order to avoid
an insolvency event. It estimates that these schemes have around
8,000 members in total and that the cost of including them in
the extended FAS would be £460 million in cash terms (£100
million in net present value terms).[64]
Trustees should only agree to compromise a debt in the interests
of scheme members. In the cases to which DWP refers, the decision
would have been taken well before the recent extensions of the
FAS. It is possible that had they been aware at the time of what
would be available for pension scheme members under the FAS, they
might have made a different decision. They might for example,
have decided that it would be in the interests of scheme members
for the employer to be forced into insolvency, bringing them within
the scope of the FAS.
24 HM Treasury, Building Britain's long-term future:
Prosperity and Fairness for Families, Budget 2007, para 5.65;http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/73B/6B/bud07_chapter5_320.pdf
(retrieved 27 March 2007). See also, HC Deb, 28 March 2007, c113WS Back
25
DWP, The FAS, An in-depth guide for trustees and professionals,
April 2007,http://www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/penret/penreform/fas/fas-p2-apr-07.pdf Back
26
FAS Regulations 2005/1986, Schedule 2, para 3(3) and 4 Back
27
HM Treasury, Building Britain's long-term future: Prosperity and
Fairness for Families, Budget 2007, para 5.65 Back
28
DWP, 'Response to the Report by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, Trusting
in the pensions promise', June 2006 Back
29 Press
release, 'More political spin - how mean-spirited can the Government
be?', 21 March 2007. Her statements are based on detailed calculations
of what individuals would get under FAS compared to the situation
if their pension scheme had not wound up Back
30 DWP,
'Response to the Report by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, Trusting
in the pensions promise', June 2006, Annex, page 40 Back
31
DWP, Response to the Report by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, 'Trusting
in the Pensions Promise', June 2006 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2006/pensions/response-ombudsman.pdf Back
32
HC Deb, 14 May 2004, c32WS; SC Deb, 6 December 2006, c4 Back
33 HC
Deb, 28 March 2007, c113WS Back
34 Paragraph
3, DWP letter to committee Back
35
DWP, Response to the Report by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, 'Trusting
in the Pensions Promise', June 2006, p 44 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2006/pensions/response-ombudsman.pdf Back
36
R v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ex parte Bradley
and Others [2007] EWHC 242 (Admin), para 91 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2007/242.html Back
37
DWP, Response to the Report by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, 'Trusting
in the Pensions Promise', June 2006, Annex, para 23, http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2006/pensions/response-ombudsman.pdf Back
38
Pensions Act 2004, Sch 7, para (4), PPF, Introductory Guide to
the Pension Protection Fund, p5 Back
39
FAS Regulations 2005/1986, Sch 2, para 3(3) and 4 Back
40
Pensions Act 2004, Sch 7, para 27; Explanatory Memorandum to Pension
Protection Fund, (Pension Compensation Cap) Order 2007, SI 2007
No. 989, para 4.8 Back
41
MGP 07/1230 Back
42
Pensions Act 2004, Sch 7, para 4; FAS Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1986),
Sch 2, para 5 Back
43
Pensions Act 2004, Sch 7, para 28 Back
44
HC Deb, 28 February 2005, c628 Back
45
Pensions Act 2004, Sch 7, para 11 (1) and 15 (1).There is an option
to apply for PPF payments from age 50, but the amount is actuarially
reduced. Applications to PPF can be made from age 50, although
payments will be actuarially reduced Back
46
FAS Regulations (SI 2005/1986), reg 17 (2) Back
47
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/index/assessment-period.htm Back
48
FAS Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1986), Sch 2, para 10; Proposed
Government amendment to Pensions Bill 2006, NC38 Back
49
Pensions Act 2004, Sch 7, para 11(1) and 15 (1) Back
50
DWP, The FAS - an indepth guide for trustees and pension professionals,
p 3 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/penret/penreform/fas/information.asp Back
51
Letter from DWP to Clerk of the Committee, dated 10 April 2007,
para 12-13 Back
52
Ibid, para 9 Back
53
Ibid, para 10 Back
54
HC Deb, 27 February 2007, c84WS Back
55
HC Deb, 27 February 2007, c84WS Back
56
FAS (Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2006 SI 3370 Back
57
Explanatory Memorandum to FAS (Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations
2006 SI 3370http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/em2006/uksiem_20063370_en.pdf Back
58
HL Deb, 7 December 2006, c1326 Back
59
Ibid, para 14-16 Back
60
Section 75, Pensions Act 1995 Back
61
DWP, Simplicity, security and choice: Working and saving for retirement.
Action on occupational pensions, para 11Cm 5835, June 2003 Back
62
Pensions Act 2004, Occupational Pension Schemes (Winding Up and
Deficiency on Winding Up etc) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (SI
2004/403) Back
63
Tolley's Pensions Law, para H4.18 Back
64
Letter from DWP to Clerk of the Committee, dated 10 April 2007,
para 14-16 Back
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