Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry
of Defence
A note on the current situation on detainees,
including the numbers detained by US and UK forces, the processes
governing detention by UK forces, the release of Sunni detainees
by the Iraqi Government, and the prospects for passing responsibility
for detention of Iraqi civilians to local Iraqi control. (Q 161)
A note explaining the arrangements for the detention
of Iraqi civilians in MND(SE) and why this is still necessary.
UK DETENTION[1]
AND INTERNMENT
IN IRAQ
Any individual detained by UK forces
will have his case reviewed by the Divisional Internment Review
Committee (DIRC, see below) within 48 hours of initial detention
and a decision as to whether internment is necessary will be taken.
Individuals are only interned where the DIRC judges that they
pose an imperative threat to security.
UK internees are held in the purpose-built Divisional
Internment Facility (DIF) at Basra Air Station. As at the end
of July 2007, the UK held 86 individuals at the DIF, of which:
one has been convicted by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI)
and is awaiting transfer to the Iraqi Authorities; 10 are awaiting
trial in the CCCI; and 75 are security internees.
US INTERNMENT IN
IRAQ
At mid-August 2007, the US held around 20,000
internees in their in-theatre internment facilities in Iraq. Further
enquiries on US internment policy should be directed to the US
authorities.
THE LEGAL
BASIS FOR
INTERNMENT
The United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1546 (2004) and letters annexed, as continued by subsequent
resolutions, provides the legal authority under which Coalition
forces may intern individuals "where necessary for imperative
reasons of security". Such reasons of security include threats
to the security of the Iraqi people as well as to Coalition forces.
UK forces comply with all applicable international law obligations
when conducting detention operations and subsequent internment.
The overarching practice and procedures following
an arrest are enshrined in Iraqi law, namely, Coalition Provisional
Authority Memorandum No 3 (Revised).
CRIMINAL DETAINEES
AND THEIR
TRANSFER TO
IRAQI AUTHORITIES
The small number of criminal detainees held
by the UK are held in the DIF for and on behalf of the Iraqi authorities.
A Criminal Detainee will be released from the DIF if he is placed
on bail by the judge presiding over the case. This is often the
case where the trial is for a minor offence (these are offences
that attract a custodial sentence of three years or less) such
as unlawful possession of weapons or low-level theft. In those
circumstances, he will return home and be required to attend the
Basra Courts at a later date for trial.
Where there is a credible evidential case to
answer against an internee at the DIF, we look to transfer
him to the Iraqi criminal justice system. There is no legal bar
to the UK transferring individuals from the DIF to the Iraqi authorities
if they are convicted criminals or are held on remand on behalf
of the Iraqis, save where there is a real risk that that particular
individual may be subject to ill treatment such as torture or
arbitrary execution. If a Criminal Detainee has been charged with
a serious offence, such as murder or terrorism, then he can not
be bailed under Iraqi law. He will therefore remain in the DIF
until his trial date. If convicted at trial and given a custodial
sentence, he will be held in the DIF until appropriate arrangements
have been made to transfer him to Iraqi custody.
The UK takes its responsibilities towards its
internees very seriously. To that end, the UK has entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Iraq to secure
assurances that anyone transferred from UK to Iraqi custody will
be treated in accordance with basic international human rights
principles.
INTERNMENT REVIEW
PROCEDURES
The coalition's legal obligations regarding
internee review, and the review procedures we adopt to meet these
obligations, were outlined in the Department's supplementary memorandum
of 1 February 2007. There have been no changes to the obligations
or review procedures since that time.
SUNNI RELEASES
We are not currently aware of Iraqi plans to
pursue an agreement to release some of the individuals currently
held in Iraqi prisons. In some contexts, however, the reconciliation
process can be promoted through agreements to release prisoners,
where this represents part of a wider, agreed framework.
PASSING RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INTERNMENT
TO THE
IRAQI AUTHORITIES
Security internment by Coalition forces is permitted
under UNSCR 1723. There is no basis in Iraqi law to allow the
Iraqi authorities to undertake such security internment, and new
Iraqi legislation would be required if the Iraqis were to take
on this power. We have no plans to support such a move, and we
do not believe that the Government of Iraq wishes to take on powers
of security internment.
WHY INTERNMENT
IS STILL
NECESSARY
Internment remains necessary because there are
still individuals in Iraq whose aim is to undermine the establishment
of democratic rule through violence directed at MNF, the Iraqi
Security Forces and Iraqi civilians. Internment is used sparingly
and only when individuals present an imperative threat to security.
Additionally, we need to continue to hold those who have perpetrated
attacks against us in the past and who we believe remain a threat
to security. Further, internment is in the interest of the Iraqi
civilian population and is for their protection as well as our
own.
A note on how the Department assesses the performance
and effectiveness of the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR)
procurement process, including an assessment (with a breakdown
in figures) of how that process is performing now as compared
with two years ago, how it has improved over time, and what specific
improvements have been made to the UOR system. (Q 176)
The National Audit Office and the Public Accounts
Committee have acknowledged the effectiveness of the UOR process
at rapidly delivering to the front line the battle-winning capability
required by our Armed Forces.
The Department assesses the performance and
effectiveness of the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) procurement
process by conducting a performance effectiveness review. One
year after business case endorsement, the relevant Director of
Equipment Capability (DEC) raises a capability feedback form which
is sent to the equipment cell in the relevant operational theatre,
the Front Line Command (FLC), and PJHQ for input. Upon receiving
the completed form, the DEC adds its own comments and then feeds
this back into the central UOR database. These Capability Reviews
form the basis of consideration on bringing particular UOR equipments
into core.
As of August 2007, 91% of all equipment procured
under the UOR process was deemed either highly effective or effective
by troops in Theatre. Of the capability reviews that have been
completed and recorded for Op TELIC, 90% were assessed as highly
effective or effective. The remainder were deemed as either of
limited effectiveness or not used, due predominantly to the changing
nature of operations. Of the UORs reviewed for Op HERRICK, 86%
were deemed as highly effective, the rest being assessed as effective.
The manner in which the Capability Review data is stored means
that we are not presently able to produce a discrete snapshot
for two years ago. However, DSTL recently conducted an analysis
of UORs, which was briefed to the Equipment Capability Area's
Joint Capability Board in July 2007. This analysis was conducted
on UOR data from January 2005 to March 2007 which determined that
from the Endorsement Date to the Into Service Date 50% of UORs
are delivered within 6.5 months, 25% within 9.5 months and 15%
within 13.5 months (the majority of those within the 13.5 month
bracket are highly complex technical integration project UORs
eg Defensive Aid Suites onto aircraft). DSTL concluded that: there
are no differences in process performance between both operations;
that lower cost UORs are not processed more quickly and despite
the significant increase in UORs that have been delivered to both
theatres there has been no evident delay in the process. In total
the Department has now delivered in excess of 450 UORs to Op TELIC
and HERRICK.
Further recent improvements to the UOR process
include the introduction of a three weekly basis UOR working group
to review the progress on all extant UORs. In addition regular
video conferences between Theatre Equipment Cells, PJHQ and the
equipment capability staffs in main building are conducted. A
recent two star end to end business process review for UORs was
conducted involving all stakeholders and yielded a number of opportunities,
which are now being pursued, for further process performance improvements:
for example, improved guidance and training for business case-writers;
updated integration guidance for FLCs; and enhanced monitoring
of equipment performance in theatre. The SRO also conducts periodic
reviews of all longer standing UOR business cases. HQ LAND are
leading on work to assist the equipment capability area deliver
integrated UOR capability in a more effective manner, drawing
on IPT, industry and FLC experience in delivering complex UORs.
Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) have recently formed
a UOR cell to improve Board-level visibility of IPT performance
in delivering UORs, and to share best practice across the organisation.
The cell is currently leading a study on how the DE&S can
deliver UORs more effectively to enable increased high level scrutiny
of UOR delivery timelines thereby ensuring that delays are quickly
highlighted.
A note outlining how the Department evaluates
helicopter availability, including details of whether the UK is
using up its helicopters at a faster rate than envisaged when
they were purchased, what additional helicopter orders are planned,
and the pressures on helicopter crew. (Q 181-183)
The primary parameter by which the Department
evaluates rotary wing availability is through the delivery of
required flying hours.[2]
Annual flying rates for peacetime flying are set during the Departmental
planning round, based on the military outputs required. This includes
operational exercises, aircrew currency plus training. The outcome
is articulated in the Customer Supplier Agreements (CSAs) between
Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) and the Front Line Commands
(FLCs). Monthly flying rates for deployed operations are established
taking account of the operational requirement, the number of crews
available and on what is sustainable. A balance has to be struck
between meeting the immediate operational imperative and the longer-term
sustainability of that flying rate. Helicopter availability against
CSA and operational flying requirements is reviewed on a monthly
basis such that appropriate management action can be taken where
necessary.
Most helicopters have a maximum design life
based on flying hours that governs useful life of the aircraft,
or the rate at which the equipment is "used up".[3]
Fleets are therefore managed carefully to ensure that flying hours
are accumulated evenly so that the required number of helicopters
reach the declared Out of Service Date.
There are a number of factors considered due
to the higher utilisation of helicopters on operations:
— High flying hours on Deployed
Helicopters. When a new operation commences, helicopters will
usually require Theatre-specific modifications to be fitted before
they deploy. Only a proportion of the fleet are generally modified
to Theatre Entry Standard (TES). Flying rates in Theatre tend
to be higher than those on routine operations, so deployed helicopters
will accumulate flying hours at a higher rate than those not deployed.
Left unchecked over a prolonged period, this may cause
deployed helicopters to reach the end of their fatigue lives early.
The Department would, in such circumstances, seek funding for
additional helicopters to be modified to mitigate fleet management
pressures.[4]
— Environmental damage.
The conditions experienced in present Theatres can cause damage
(ie sand erosion etc) that would not arise in more benign operating
environments. This leads to an increase wear rate on key components
and an increase in the work required to restore helicopters during
Depth maintenance, but will rarely impact on the life of helicopters.
Our immediate focus is on work to sustain current operations (eg
replacement rotor blades, engines and windscreens).
— Accidental damage and Attrition.
Enemy action and the increased hazards encountered on Operations
can cause the attrition rate to be higher than normal. When the
size of the Departmental fleet is comparatively large relative
to the number of helicopters required on operations (eg Lynx),
such losses can be absorbed. Where the size of the Departmental
fleet is smaller (eg Chinook/Puma), it could be necessary to procure
replacement helicopters. If attrition rates were to rise significantly
then it could become a concern.
While all helicopters have residual flying hours,
we are however taking action, as announced by the Defence Secretary
in March 2007, to increase our battlefield helicopter fleet and
improve the flexibility we are able to offer operational commanders.
These measures include: the acquisition of six Merlin aircraft
(previously delivered to Denmark but never used operationally)
which will be available within a year; and the conversion of eight
existing Chinook Mark 3 helicopters to make them available for
deployment in two years. We also continue to refine future acquisition
plans to ensure we maximise the military capability we can get
from available funding and build a balanced helicopter fleet to
meet future requirements.
Work also continues to explore ways of further
exploiting all helicopter fleets to provide more operational flying
hours. An ongoing programme of logistics transformation is already
delivering a range of benefits. These arrangements (so called
Integrated Operational Support (IOS) programmes) are based on
long-term partnering with industry and already exist on Chinook
and Merlin. Similar arrangements for Sea King, Apache and Puma
are under development.
The level of helicopter activity demanded in-theatre
is established by the operational planning process.[5]
This is conducted by PJHQ and the Theatre Commander in full recognition
of the realities of crew and helicopter availability, the capacity
of the logistic infrastructure, and the impacts on long-term sustainability.
The continuing high demand on our helicopter capability is fully
recognised. As a high priority we are taking steps to improve
the number of flying hours we are able to offer Theatre Commanders.
We recognise that the high tempo of operations
and associated level of flying hours has led to increased pressures
on crew, for example in the number and frequency of tours that
some individuals have been asked to undertake. The achievement
of aircrew harmony however varies between platform types. The
welfare of our personnel is of the utmost importance and is closely
monitored. Deployed flying personnel are well trained for the
environments in which they operate, including for the frequently
hostile combat conditions encountered. When requirements dictate
the deployment of higher numbers of personnel, it is in the interest
of Flight Safety, but may be contrary to harmony guidelines. We
constantly review the number of deployed personnel in an attempt
to recover harmony guidelines
A note outlining the feasibility of installing
air conditioning in Warrior armoured vehicles and other vehicles
in theatre, and an assessment of the trade-off between the amount
of money which could be spent on installing air conditioning and
the cost of evacuating people because of heat related casualties.
(Q 184)
We now have an extensive programme to fit air
conditioning units to many of our current and future armoured
fighting vehicles and protected patrol vehicles. For example,
Challenger Main Battle Tanks, CVR(T), Bulldog, Mastiff and Vector
vehicles have environmental control units (ECU—air conditioning)
fitted.
Air conditioning is already provided for Warrior
drivers and as part of the extensive programme to fit air conditioning
units to vehicles, Warrior vehicle crew compartments will be provided
with ECU systems to afford cooler operating temperatures for the
occupants and vehicle systems. Prototype trials demonstrated the
feasibility of the system and a significant reduction in crew
compartment temperature was achieved. New Warrior ECU systems
have been delivered to Iraq, although technical difficulties have
been encountered. A modification kit is currently being delivered
in order to resolve the remaining technical issues. All Warrior
vehicles deployed to Afghanistan will be fitted with fully modified
ECUs and initial feedback from the user has been very positive.
Specialist Warrior variants already have ECUs fitted.
ECUs are currently being delivered and fitted
to a majority of our logistic vehicles including DROPs vehicles
and Heavy Equipment Transporters (the Close Support Tanker already
has a system fitted).
In addition to the extensive programme to fit
air conditioning to vehicles, we have examined other methods of
combating high temperatures and mitigating the effects of excessive
heat. Access to cold drinking water will be provided to soldiers
operating from Warrior vehicles and we are also investigating
the use of reflective blankets on the top of vehicles to reflect
solar heat. Pragmatic measures like keeping vehicles in shade
with hatches closed during the hottest time of day are also applied
when and where practical.
Any reduction in heat casualties as a result
of expenditure on the provision of air conditioning for vehicles
would not automatically lead to a commensurate reduction in the
cost of casualty evacuation. The requirement for a comprehensive
casualty evacuation (and AEROMED evacuation) system will be enduring,
for broader operational requirements.
An explanation of how the Department defines the
task of "over watch" for UK Armed Forces in MND(SE),
including details of whether effective over watch could it be
achieved from outside Iraq?
Overwatch is a term specific to UK forces within
Multi-National Division (South-East (MND(SE)) and is used to describe
the force posture for a given province. It is sub-divided into
three phases: Tactical, Operational and Strategic.
TACTICAL OVERWATCH
When a province is this phase, UK forces are
responsible for security. Initially, they are responsible for
the routine provision of security. Over time, routine and non-essential
Multi-National Force (MNF) activity progressively reduces, as
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) take increasing responsibility for
providing security as a means of moving towards security self-reliance.
OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH
In the Operational Overwatch phase, the province
has transferred to Iraqi control and the ISF have responsibility
for security. MNF provide a re-intervention capability, but the
requirement to intervene will be only in extremis and at
the request of the Iraqi authorities. The main effort for MND(SE)
during this phase is Security Sector Reform, through continued
mentoring and training of the ISF, in particular the Iraqi Army.
In addition, however, MND(SE) is also required to carry out a
number of designated Coalition tasks such as protection of supply
routes and points of entry.
The Operational Overwatch phase is the point
at which a province is first described publicly as being in a
state of "overwatch", hence Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar and
Maysan provinces are at the Operational Overwatch stage.
STRATEGIC OVERWATCH
Current coalition planning envisages a final
phase of Strategic overwatch during which the coalition's effort
will move to supporting the Iraqi Government and Security Forces
in facing strategic threats to their internal and external security.
A note outlining the criteria for assessing readiness
for transition to Provincial Iraqi Control
Since April 2006, each Iraqi province has been
subjected to comprehensive assessments of its readiness to be
handed over to Iraqi responsibility, with a working group considering
the readiness for handover and making recommendations accordingly
to the Iraqi PM and Coalition commanders.
For security responsibility to transfer from
the Multi-National Forces (MNF) to provincial Iraqi control (PIC),
however, individual provinces must satisfy four main criteria
of conditions:
— Threat assessment—the
security conditions and level of threat in the province;
— Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—their
ability to handle the security situation;
— Governance—the capacity
of the provincial authorities to manage and be responsible for
the security environment; and
— Multi-National Forces (MNF)
support—their ability to provide assistance to the ISF should
it be needed.
The transfer of responsibility will occur in
different provinces at different times according to when the conditions
are right to do so.
The process of deciding whether individual provinces
are ready for PIC is conducted jointly between MNF and the Iraqi
authorities. Each month, Divisional Commanders make an assessment
and recommendation against the conditions criteria jointly with
the relevant Provincial Governor. In terms of the UK's area of
responsibility in Multinational Division (South East), having
already handed over security responsibility to Iraqi control in
three of its four provinces, the UK Commander completes this process
for Basra, the province still to achieve PIC.
Divisional recommendations are sent to Baghdad
for review by the US Corps Commander who, in turn, forwards a
recommendation to the Iraqi/MNF Joint Committee for the Transfer
of Security Responsibility. If the Committee concludes that a
province is ready for PIC, then a recommendation is made to the
joint Iraqi/MNF Ministerial Committee for National Security where
the Iraqi Prime Minister has ultimate responsibility for the final
decision.
A note outlining the conditions by which the capacity
and readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces is assessed
The coalition strategy in Iraq is to help develop
a functioning state. Part of this process involves building and
strengthening the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—which consists
of the Army, Police Service and other security institutions—so
that they can take over responsibility for delivering security
for the Iraqi people.
This strategy has seen the Iraqis taking direct
control over their own security institutions. The Iraqi Police
has been under Iraqi control since 2004. The Iraqi Army has progressively
been transferred from Multinational Forces (MNF) to Iraqi control,
as each Division was trained and equipped and their capacity to
cope with the security requirement built. Their evolution takes
the route of:
— ISF units are formed while MNF
lead security operations;
— ISF units support MNF led security
operations;
— ISF lead security operations
with MNF support; and
— ISF capable of conducting independent
security operations.
This has seen the original 10 Divisions established
for the Army now having transferred to the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command.
A note outlining the formation of the Iraqi Army
14th Division, including details of when the Department anticipates
the 14th Division to deploy
The formation of the 14th Division Iraqi Army
(IA) is a Government of Iraq (GoI) initiative in recognition of
the 10th IA Division's considerable area of operation, which spans
the four south-eastern provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan
and Basra. It is being generated from the existing units of 10th
IA Division as well as elements of other units from within the
IA, all of which have been trained and equipped over the past
three years by the Multi-National Force (MNF). The intention is
for the new 14th IA Division to take over from 10th IA Division
in Basra.
As an Iraqi initiative, 14th IA Division aims
to build upon the experience gained by the 10th Division and is
now being formed, trained and equipped by the Iraqi Ground Force
Command (IGFC). 14th IA Division currently resides under the authority
of General Mohan (4* Iraqi Army), head of the Basra Operations
Command. The appointment of the General Officer Commanding (GOC)
and confirmation of Initial Operation Capability (IOC) is currently
planned for November 2007. It will be based in Basra. The UK intends
to act as mentor to the 14th IA Division.
10 September 2007
- "Detention" is defined as the period
during which a person is held by MNF following arrest, until he
is either transferred to the Iraqi judicial system, or released,
or a decision is made by MNF to hold him as an internee.
- "Internment" by MNF refers to
the longer-term holding of an individual where it is judged that
this is necessary for imperative reasons of security.
1 We adopt the following definitions, for clarity: Back
2
Other parameters used: operational serviceability, size of Forward
Fleet, number of helicopters "fit for purpose". Back
3
The structural integrity of airframes is monitored during service
and the life of the platform reviewed on the findings. Back
4
The most cost-effective way to do this is to equip helicopters
with just the fixed fittings for a capability, thus allowing the
more expensive avionics Line Replacement Units to be moved between
helicopters. Back
5
The Command Estimate is the process used. Back
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