Memorandum from the Redress Trust
INTRODUCTION
1. The Redress Trust (REDRESS) is an international
non-governmental organisation with a mandate to ensure respect
for the principle that survivors of torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment and punishment, and their family members,
have access to adequate and effective remedies and reparation
for their suffering.
2. We are concerned about detention and
internment by UK forces in Iraq. We respectfully invite the Committee
to use the oral evidence session on "Operations in Iraq"
on 24 July as an opportunity to raise a number of concerns regarding
the treatment of detainees in UK detention facilities that emerged
during the court martial R v Payne & Others.
3. We believe that the Minister for the
Armed Forces needs to deal with these issues regarding detention
and internment in Iraq, and we feel it would be useful for the
Committee to investigate whether the concerns of various members
of the militarily expressed during the court martial have now
been addressed. It would also be an opportunity for the Committee
to ask the Minister whether he agrees with former Attorney General
Lord Goldsmith QC that there should be an inquiry in to how the
army came to authorise particular conditioning techniques.[6]
4. These concerns are based mainly on evidence
from some key dates in the court martial transcript, and not a
full reading of the whole record. In the limited time available
it is not possible to deal with everything arising from the transcript
which is a lengthy document. We respectfully suggest that the
Committee could possibly make further use of the transcript to
raise more questions.
DETENTION AT
THE BATTLE
GROUP LEVEL
5. One of the developments which led to
abuse in Iraq during the Occupation was a shift in policy from
transferring detainees to a central facility for holding and questioning
within a matter of hours to one allowing Battle Groups to detain
and question their own detainees for a number of days. The period
between capture and delivery to a central detention facility was
a known "danger point" where abuse could occur.[7]
Indeed much of the previous abuse, including the tragic death
of Baha Mousa, took place at the Battle Group level.
6. Given this, and noting the Memorandum
from the Ministry of Defence sent to the Committee,[8]
we welcome the move of internees to the more permanent Divisional
Internment Facility (DIF) at Basra Air Station. This move may
have already taken place. However, if not, we feel it important
for the Minister to assure the Committee that the new facility
will be operational before the temporary facility at Shaibah Logistic
Base is closed (otherwise the current internees there might be
dispersed back to Battle Group or some other "lower"
level), and that in any event the length of time in custody at
the Battle Group level will not increase.
7. A further issue arising in the court
martial was American reluctance to take in internees at British
run facilities (at which the Americans nevertheless strongly influenced
policy) during the night, and as a result detainees had to be
held over night at the Battle Group level and for longer than
had been recommended.[9]
The Committee should seek assurances that this is not the case
with regard to the temporary facility at Shaibah Logistics Base
and that it will not occur or is not occurring at the new dedicated
DIF at Basra Air Station.
8. Given the history of poor procedures
and treatment at the Battle Group level the Committee should inquire
into the current procedures for holding and questioning detainees
at the Battle Group level. Issues that should be raised include
the procedures for documenting the treatment of detainees, whether
a dedicated[10]
guard detail and rota is in place to ensure accountability,[11]
and the training given to regimental medical staff regarding the
reporting of possible detainee abuse.[12]
"CONDITIONING"
9. The court martial heard evidence that
it was standard procedure of the Intelligence Corps to use conditioning
techniques[13]
that the Government gave assurances in 1972 to the House of Commons
would no longer be used.[14]
We feel it is important that the Committee ask the Minister to
investigate the implementation of the 1972 ban and how these techniques
came to be used in Iraq despite the ban, and despite the 1978
ruling of the European Court of Human Rights that the techniques
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.[15]
In our view this is a fundamental issue of Ministerial responsibility
given the history of the ban.[16]
10. The court martial also showed gaps in
doctrine on the subject of prisoner of war and civilian detainee
and internee handling.[17]
It has been somewhat addressed by new advice contained in four
Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs)[18]
on the subject. However, the extent to which this has been implemented
in practice remains unclear. The Committee should pursue the extent
to which the new doctrine is actually used in practice.
TRAINING
11. One of the main issues with regard to
conditioning was a lack of Tactical Questioners with up-to-date
training. The Committee should seek to find out whether adequate
Tactical Questioners and interrogators are now deployable. Further,
the Committee should question the Minister as to what conditioning
techniques are still used in Iraq, which ones are still taught,
and whether in refresher courses it is taught that some previously
used techniques are illegal.[19]
Safeguards
12. JDP 10-1 now advises that medical officers
are not to state "that a subject meets a specific mental
or physical standard for interrogation,"[20]
for ethical reasons. We are concerned that the medical examination
prior to questioning may have been removed. We invite the Committee
to seek clarification from the Minister of the precise role of
medical staff before, during and after questioning.
SUMMARISED QUESTIONS
— What is the expected time frame that
units are to place detainees in the custody of the Divisional
Temporary Detention Facility and/or the Divisional Internment
Facility?
— To what extent are detainees
held by Units (Battle Groups)?
— Will this change with or during
the move to the Divisional Internment Facility?
— Is the Divisional Temporary
Detention Facility and will the Divisional Internment Facility
be run by the UK or the US, and to what extent?
— Will it take in detainee/internees
24 hours a day?
— What procedures are in place
to ensure that Human Rights Act is applied at these facilities?
— Since the Ministry of Defence
conceded in the Al Skeini that the Human Right Act applies
to UK detention facilities in Iraq during, and of course the House
of Lords judgement itself, have any procedures or conditions of
detention changed, and if so, how?
— Has the document JDN 3/05 Tactical
Questioning, Debriefing and Interrogation or other documents
been modified to reflect the applicability of the Human Rights
Act to detention facilities abroad?
— Has the Ministry of Defence
any plans to make the internal reviews and investigations into
detainee abuse available to the Committee for scrutiny?
— Are procedures now in place
to ensure that important procedures and orders are not lost when
Units are replaced?
— To what extent do detainees
go though a medical examination before undergoing questioning?
18 July 2007
6 "We need to understand why anybody thought,
if they did-and somebody obviously did-that these were permissible
techniques to be used. I think that is something which needs to
be inquired into." Lord Goldsmith giving oral evidence to
the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 26 June 2007, Q196, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/uc394-iii/uc39402.htm Back
7
R v Payne Court Martial transcript, 8 December 2006 pg
63-64. Back
8
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/209/7011108.htm Back
9
Transcript, 8 December 2006, pg 43. Back
10
Transcript, 11 December 2006, pg 78-79, and Back
11
Transcript, 22 November 2006, pg 18, also 13 December 2006 pg
33-34. Back
12
Transcript, 11 December 2006, pg 12-16. Back
13
Transcript, 8 December 2006, pg 12. Back
14
Hansard, col 744, 2 March 1972, referring to the Parker
Committee report. Back
15
Ireland v United Kingdom, 1976 Year Book on the European
Convention on Human Rights 512, 748, 788-94. Back
16
Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider
authorised procedures for the interrogation of person suspected
of terrorism. (Parker Report) March 1972 Cmd 4901 majority report
§ 37. Back
17
Transcript, 13 December 2006 pg 130, see also pg 96 on lack of
policy regarding involvement with US questioners. Back
18
JDP 10-1 2006, JDP 10-1.1 2006, JDP 10-1.2 2006 and JDP 10-1.3
2006, available at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/DoctrineOperationsandDiplomacyPublications/JDP/ Back
19
It has been stated that "wall standing" and the "Ski
Sit" positions are not stress positions but are used in conditioning,
see transcript 14 December 2006 pp 41-42 and 67. Clearly the length
of time in any one position is determinative of the stress it
causes. Back
20
JDP 10-1, page 5D-3 (70 in the PDF document) Back
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