Memorandum from Dr Michael Williams
INTRODUCTION
1. Since 1989 the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has attempted to transform itself from a reactive,
defensive organization centred on the protection of Western Europe
to a proactive risk manager that addresses security concerns that
affect Europe and North America, but emanate far from the transatlantic
region. But Allies have been slow to adapt to the post-Cold War
security environment. While NATO's role as a collective security
guarantee for countries threatened by other states remains widely
accepted, there is no clear agreement on the nature and lethality
of non-state threats or how to tackle them. Security chiefs would
all acknowledge that organised criminals, terrorists, drug lords
and extreme ideologues catalyse insecurity, but there is no consensus
on the role of expeditionary military forces in tackling them.
The Alliance is torn between continued expansion, (principally
to lock developing, post-conflict and former Soviet Union countries
into liberal democratic models and managing pol-mil relations
on Europe's fringes) or transforming into an expeditionary force
that address problems that emanate from abroad. Kosovo was the
last campaign in which traditionally equipped forces opposed NATO
using traditional tactics. And despite a subdued population, minimal
insurgency and a massive military overmatch, it has taken nearly
a decade (and the sustained deployment of some 20,000 troops)
to deliver a secure environemnt in a territory the size of Yorkshire.
2. In Afghanistan, several times the size
and a massive logistical, linguistic and political challenge,
there continues to be a lack of consensus within the Alliance,
not only over how to use military forces to manage security issues,
but which ones are important enough for European publics to accept
casualties for. This is particularly true since the Taliban were
removed from government and the so-called reconstruction phase
began. The result is an inefficient campaign conducted by caveated
contingents, starved of resources and driven by divisions over
intent. Europe stands with America in seeking collective security.
But there is no unifying narrative strong enough to convince European
capitals to share the collective risk. Once engaged in a mission,
this uncertainty is expressed through varying political commitment
and widely divergent investment in capability. This further marginalises
Europe as a partner in American foreign and defence policy and
may finally result in a severe decoupling between allies. The
future of NATO is far from certain and much depends on the outcome
of the mission in Afghanistan—a mission which illustrates
all of these issues in startling detail. Britain must consider
which path best suits UK interests—if NATO is to be used
to further stablize Europe, can the Alliance concurrently facilitate
British interests through expeditionary missions.
WHAT IS
NATO?
3. At the core of the Alliance's current
difficulties is a lack of consensus about what NATO is supposed
to do. The allies all agree that NATO is political-military alliance
made up of democratic states that share common values. Beyond
this, however, disagreement if rife. During the Cold War the rationale
of the Alliance was simple—to deter a Soviet invasion of
Western Europe and if invaded, to repel the Soviets. The threat
was easily identified. The Soviets believed in a hostile and competitive
ideology that advocated a global workers' revolution and the Kremlin
possessed the wherewithal to attack Europe and North America using
both conventional and unconventional means. Although the Allies
agreed that the USSR was a threat, there was still disagreement
about how to handle the threat. Hence American furore at West
German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik or German outrage
over American plans to put more missiles into Germany. Today the
Alliance would very much like to squabble over such details—at
least no one was really asking if NATO was relevant and the threat
was easy to identify even if how to defeat it was a matter of
debate.
4. Instead of the Soviet monolith the Allies
now face a diverse number of security risks. Weapons proliferation,
rogue states, failing states, global pandemics, international
terrorist networks, people trafficking, crime syndicates, climate
change and energy shortages are now pressing security issues.
It is very true that many of these issues existed before the present
day, but they were subsumed within the global Cold War. Furthermore,
Western society has evolved over the past two decades to be come
increasingly obsessed with the idea of risk. The situation is
particularly acute in America, but it is not a uniquely American
preoccupation. Therefore, even though people in the West are now
safer than they ever have been in the last 100 years, they feel
more at risk. This is why although statistics tell us that we
have a better chance of dying from falling off a ladder than we
do in a terrorist attack, the US and its allies are currently
engaged in a Global War on Terror, rather than a Global War on
Ladders. [119]The
problem for NATO is deciding which challenges to manage. That
many of them emanate from beyond NATO's borders complicates the
matter even further. It is because of this changing rationality
that conceptualizes security in terms managing risks, rather than
a means-ends approach to deterring threats that NATO has sought
to become a more proactive organization. At the moment, however,
the metamorphosis is incomplete, in part because of the continued
expansion of the Alliance.
5. The demise of the Soviet Union not only
enabled the West to address a variety of new security risks, it
also left a vacuum in East-Central Europe. NATO filled this vacuum,
expanding to include countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic
and Hungary. In doing so NATO insured that these countries would
have a firm supporting structure to guide their transition from
closed dictatorships to open democracies and that their militaries
would be subordinate to civilian rule. In many ways, this was
a core function of NATO during the Cold War when the Alliance
helped ensure peaceful transitions to democratic governments in
countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece. Just as NATO was
a stabilizing factor in Southern Europe, the strategy of eastward
expansion has also worked. Expansion continues now to the point
that new NATO members include Macedonia and Bulgaria, with the
possibility of membership being extended to countries such as
Albania and Croatia. The problem that this presents is that these
new countries make it more difficult to achieve consensus, which
makes it harder to use NATO as an expeditionary force. Therefore,
whilst the stabilizing factor of expansion benefits British interests,
it also limits any ambitions that the Alliance can be used in
an expeditionary capacity. Furthermore, even when new members
are willing to act abroad in an expeditionary campaign, they lack
the resources to do so. Even states such as Poland or the Czech
Republic, which are trying to transform their forces, for the
time being, offer little support to Alliance capability.
WHO IS
NATO?
6. Once the Allies answer the question of
what NATO's purpose is, they can then more easily address the
issues of NATO's area of responsibility. Here there are essentially
two possibilities. If the Alliance is deemed to be a collective
defence organization, oriented on managing security relations
among European states and defending the territory of Europe in
a reactive way, then NATO will remain a European centred organization.
If the Alliance agrees that managing security risks should start
where the risks emanate from, then there is no choice but for
the Alliance to be global in nature. [120]The
latter is the most logical choice for Britain. The United States
has made it clear that US policy vis-a"-vis Europe
is not about Europe per se, but about how Europe and America
can work together. The extension of this logic is that Washington
wants NATO to be a global organization that provides for transatlantic
security and defence by engaging problems around the world. The
US drive to secure closer relations with Japan, Australia and
New Zealand supports this goal. The involvement of all three countries
in current US and European operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
illustrates the possibility of increased transatlantic cooperation
with key players in the Asia pacific region.
7. Some European states have, up until now
at least, been worried about making NATO a global organization.
Of particular concern is that the involvement of states such as
Japan and Australia would tilt the balance of power within the
Alliance towards Washington. While this concern is understandable,
no one is advocating that Asian pacific counties join NATO—they
would instead be special partners (such as Sweden currently is).
Furthermore, while many of these countries are very pro-US, they
have still sought to be clear when divisions exist between their
policy positions and Washington. Canberra, for example, has clearly
stated that it will not be goaded into supporting hostile rhetoric
from Washington aimed at China as China is Australia's second
largest trading partner. The reality is that it would be better
for the Alliance to integrate certain Asia-pacific countries into
NATO partnership structures than to exclude them, thus forcing
the US to perhaps go more in the direction of ad hoc coalitions
to get the necessary support to effect policy. By partnering with
these countries, NATO's capability deficit is also somewhat reduced.
8. NATO today is de facto a four
tier alliance.
(a) Tier I: This group includes countries
such as the UK, US, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark that acknowledge
the role that expeditionary missions need to play in transatlantic
security policy. These countries have prepared themselves for
such missions and willingly deploy in hazardous areas. Interestingly
enough, this group includes non-NATO allies, such as Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and Sweden.
(b) Tier II: Members of tier II are the major
countries of "Old Europe" such as Germany, France, Spain,
Italy among others. There countries Strategic Defence Reviews
continually emphasis less and less defence spending. They are
reluctant to deploy abroad, and when they do deploy they tend
to do so in a highly risk averse manner that makes their contribution
more cosmetic more than anything else. The one possible exception
if France. Paris has invested quite heavily in defence (compared
to other European countries) and the French maintain an open mind
with regard to expeditionary missions. The major dilemma has traditionally
been opposition to US-led initiatives. Perhaps, the new Sarkozy
government will adjust course to be more engaged in an Alliance
expeditionary capacity.
(c) Tier III: This group consists of new
member countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary
that understand the need for expeditionary missions and want to
support them. They have willingly engaged in such missions and
have started military transformation so that they can participate
in expeditionary campaigns. At the moment, however, they militaries
are not able to provide all of the required capabilities to engage
in such missions and require heavy subsidies (financial and equipment)
from the West (ie Washington) to deploy abroad.
(d) Tier IV: Members of this group include
states such as Macedonia and Bulgaria. They are not able to deploy
substantial contributions abroad and bring very little to the
table in terms of capabilities when they are deployed abroad.
They lack the funds or ability to sufficiently support expeditionary
activities within the alliance framework. The militaries are small
and have difficulty operating alongside Western European forces
on a number of levels, not the least important of which is a lack
of English speaking troops.
(e) The Next Round of Expansion—This
round will include countries such as Albania and Croatia. The
Alliance seriously needs to address what these countries will
bring to NATO and what effect they will have on Alliance ambitions
to be a global actor. All indications seem to point to these states
as consumers of Alliance security, but not providers of it.
WHAT CAN
A MULTISPEED
ALLIANCE DELIVER?
9. The question of "who is NATO"
has already been partially addressed. A more global NATO does
not necessary mean new allies, but just new partners. The more
substantive bit of this question is "who does what within
NATO?" The situation in Afghanistan is effectively a coalition
of the willing within NATO. Certain states believe that kinetic
military operations are necessary to bring security to Southern
Afghanistan. As such Britain, the United States, the Netherlands,
and Canada (Denmark will be coming on board soon) find themselves
doing all the fighting while the rest of the allies participate
in "reconstruction" activities that many NGOs repeatedly
emphasize they could undertake.
10. The issue of capabilities is not new.
Throughout the Cold War Washington droned on about the necessity
of Europe having a better ability to defend itself. Today the
complaint is the same—Europe needs more airlift, more armour,
more money into research and development—but there is now
an added element. Capability really boils down to political will.
If the Soviets marched over the Fulda Gap there is little doubt
Bonn would have responded. Today, despite the former German defence
minister proclaiming the defence of Germany starts in the Hindu
Kush, Berlin is not willing to push the case that Germany must
be involved in Southern Afghanistan.
11. This problem thus makes it important
for the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies, that the
Alliance incorporates new partners (or in the extreme, allies)
with serious capability and will to act. Should the Alliance become
increasingly unwilling to act, or willing to act in rhetoric only,
then the logical conclusion is that the United States would seek
to establish coalitions of the willing to support US policy. One
must ask why exactly the US should work through NATO if the majority
of the allies bring little to the table, but complicate the decision
making process immensely. This question must also be considered
by Britain—do the benefits of NATO (legitimacy?) outweigh
the drawbacks? A disastrous experience in Iraq does not discredited
the idea of coalitions of the willing—indeed coalitions
of the willing have more often than not been successful. The Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) stretching from the Mediterranean Sea
to the Pacific Ocean (and beyond in theory) is one such working
example as is the Peace Support Operations Training Centre in
Bosnia. If will and capability are not existent, the Alliance
will not endure as a working organization in the long-term. It
may remain as a political husk, since its complete demise would
be too disturbing to the idea of the West, but it would cease
to be a working forum for debate and formulation of transatlantic
defence policy.
THE AFGHAN
DILEMMA
12. All of these issues are easily identified
in NATO's current mission in Afghanistan. What exactly is NATO
doing in Afghanistan? There is the official rhetoric about assisting
the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in providing peace and security
and extending the reach of the GoA. But if you ask ten NATO allies,
you will most likely get ten different answers. Since practically
each ally has a different rationale for being in Afghanistan,
they conceptualize the problems differently and prescribe different
solutions. This has resulted in a disjointed Western (and international)
approach to the country. This disjointedness has meant that the
security situation has only improved marginally in some parts
of the country and in secure areas it has meant inadequate levels
of reconstruction and development.
13. It may be because the allies have different
rationales for being in Afghanistan that they assign caveats (or
not) to their presence in the country. The German emphasis on
reconstruction and development means that there should be no need
for the Bundeswehr to fight in Helmand. On the other hand, while
Washington and London might agree that reconstruction is a key
aspect of success, they argue that security is a prerequisite
for reconstruction and development, and as such, advocate kinetic
military operations. At the heart of the capability and will issue
is once again the question of "why is NATO in Afghanistan"
which then leads ultimately to "what is NATO for?" The
capacity and will issue cannot be resolved without answering this
question.
14. The biggest challenge facing the Alliance
at the moment, however, is not conceptual, but practical. NATO's
role in Afghanistan has always been a tough one and the Alliance
has been on the verge of failure a couple times. NATO has attempted
to do Afghanistan on the cheap and as such it has suffered. The
fact that General Richards believes that if the Taliban had chosen
to use manoeuvre warfare in summer 2006 instead of digging in
against NATO forces, he could have lost the battle, is very revealing.
[121]The
Alliance has overcome some difficulties, finally bolstering forces
in the south of the country (which now include a theatre reserve
requested by General Richards in 2006), but the lack of a joined
up approach, coupled with a lack of assistance from the rest of
the international community does not bode well for the future
of the mission.
15. In the immediate term NATO must defined
what success in Afghanistan looks like. To do this, the Alliance
must work out why it is Afghanistan and what the ultimate mission
is. From this point NATO can then establish what "success"
(or at the very least failure) looks like. The Alliance should
be careful to not ascribe too much to success—it should
be a realistic and achievable standard. Although NATO troops will
be in Afghanistan for a long time to come, with success defined,
the Alliance could then draw up a plan that would allow it play
an increasingly smaller role over the next decade, handing over
responsibility to the Afghan government and other international
organizations and non-governmental organizations that are better
placed to help the country develop in the long-term.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
AND OPTIONS
16. In the face of the aforementioned factors
NATO has two potential courses of action.
(a) Internal Assimilation—the Alliance
focuses on being an engine of "peaceful expectation of change"
in Europe. NATO will help to integrate new members into the community
of democracies and it will help to train and update the militaries
of former Warsaw Pact countries. If the Alliance continues to
expand, however, the most likely outcome is that expeditionary
missions either fall by the wayside or are assumed by a "coalition
of the willing".
(b) Expeditionary Capacity—In this
scenario the Alliance tackles the demons of operating abroad.
There needs to be serious discussion about what members contribute
to NATO and how the Alliance engages in expeditionary missions
such as those in Afghanistan. Under this model the Alliance cannot
expand indefinitely and future expansion must be contingent upon
shared values and capability. Adding Australia or Japan to the
Alliance would make much more sense than adding Croatia from this
point of view.
(c) It is possible that expansion and expeditionary
missions are not diametrically opposed. Over the long term, adding
members such as Poland and Hungary that are willing to act and
just need to develop a capability will hopefully mean more boots
on the ground (which pay for themselves). In the short to medium
term, however, expansion to include allies that mainly consume
resources, rather than provides them, means that the Alliance
will have difficult time. Each ally has a vote in what the Alliance
should or should not do, regardless of what they contribute to
Alliance capabilities.
17. NATO faces a number of daunting challenges
and its future is far from certain. It may be tempting to see
the Alliance as a dated organization, but to do so is to overlook
that very real fact that NATO is the physical manifestation of
the West. The shared values of NATO member states are very real
and they are the bedrock of the Alliance. It is because of these
values that NATO will most likely succeed in Afghanistan. The
Alliance may come through bloodied, bruised and perhaps not as
effective as it could have been, but it should come through. Unlike
the coalition of the willing in Iraq, which has steadily lost
members over the years, NATO remains committed to Afghanistan.
To fail in Afghanistan would call into question the idea of the
West and the commonality of Western values. Although there is
much speculation that America and Europe no longer share common
values, this is nonsense. Both sides of the Atlantic believe in
free-market economics, democracy and human rights. Europe and
America do disagree on how to best promote these values and how
to normatize them into international frameworks, but these differences
are not what make the Alliance weak, they are what makes it strong.
A callous and over zealous American administration has made the
situation worse, but balance is slowly being restored to Washington
politics. If policy-makers in Europe and Washington are smart,
they will recognize that disagreeing over how to promote democracy
and human rights at least means that you are starting from the
same page—that democracy and human rights are good things.
The same can not be said of Europe or America's relationships
with many other countries.
Dr. Michael Williams is the Head of the Transatlantic
Programme at the Royal United Services Institute. He also directs
the RUSI project on Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Williams is
the editor of Power in World Politics (Routledge 2007)
and the author of From Kosovo to Khandahar: The Evolution of
an Alliance (Routledge 2008).
Head, Transatlantic Programme, RUSI
11 June 2007
119 According to the US Centers for Disease Control
the average American has a one in 88,000 chance of dying in a
terrorist attack, compared to a one in 10,010 chance of dying
from a fall. See: Benjamin Friedman, Think Again: Homeland Security,
Foreign Policy (July/August 2005) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3079&src2=PJA05 Back
120
Global in nature does not necessarily mean new allies from outside
Europe, but that the Alliance acts outside Europe as is the current
trend. The possibility that global NATO means members from outside
Europe, such as Australia or Japan, is another issue the alliance
will have to confront in the medium term as it continues to work
more and more closely with these states. Back
121
RUSI Interview with General David Richards, RUSI Journal 152
(2), April 2007. pp. 24-32. Back
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