Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
INTRODUCTION
1. This memorandum is provided by the Ministry
of Defence as written evidence for the House of Commons Defence
Committee Inquiry: The Future of NATO and European Defence. It
outlines the Government's policy towards NATO and European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP), both in general terms and under the
headings of activity, capabilities, partnerships, institutional
reform and resources, and also seeks to answer questions asked
by the Committee in its letter of 14 May (in italics in the text).
OVERALL POLICY
TOWARDS NATO AND
THE EU
2. The Government's vision is of international
organisations individually and in partnership being configured,
resourced and having the resolve to provide an effective response
to current and future security challenges.
(What are the key challenges affecting NATO and
how can/should the Alliance change to reflect the new political
and strategic realities?)
3. We see NATO as the ultimate guarantor
of Europe's security and the means for achieving its collective
defence. As such, it should be able to respond both politically
and militarily to the global risks that Allies face, taking a
more expeditionary role to respond to the challenges of the twenty
first century.
4. The key strategic challenges which NATO
must deal with are international terrorism, the proliferation
of WMD and their means of delivery, and the instability caused
by failed or failing states. Such complex and inter-related threats
put a premium on close co-operation and co-ordination between
international organisations, and underpin the importance of the
transformation of NATO's capabilities and relationships.
5. NATO's Comprehensive Political Guidance
(CPG), published at the Riga summit in November 2006 (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm),
provides political direction and a 10-15 year framework for NATO's
continuing transformation. It recognises that the nature of potential
Article 5 operations is continuing to evolve: a large-scale, conventional
military threat to the Euro-Atlantic area is unlikely in the foreseeable
future; whereas threats to Allies that originate further afield,
possibly using asymmetric means, are rising. Against this background,
NATO must retain the ability to carry out the full range of missions,
from high to low intensity; placing special focus on the most
likely operations, but maintaining the ability to conduct the
most demanding. In order to do so, NATO needs the capability to
launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and a range
of smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response
on Alliance territory, at its periphery and at strategic distance.
This places an imperative on Allies' ability to develop and acquire
flexible, rapidly deployable, expeditionary capabilities.
6. Our aim is for the EU to be an effective
strategic player in its own right, able to complement NATO's efforts
but also able to conduct crisis management operations when NATO
is not involved. The EU is unique among regional organisations
in being able to apply a full suite of security instruments: military,
police, judicial, developmental, economic, political and diplomatic.
It should be able to employ military forces that are interoperable
with NATO, drawing as necessary on the "Berlin Plus"
arrangements that allow it to make use of NATO assets and capabilities.
It has proved itself in a number of operations.
ACTIVITY
7. We expect NATO and the EU to conduct
well-planned, well-resourced operations, appropriate to their
roles and capabilities and on the basis of equitable contributions
from Allies and member states that make a positive impact on international
security.
(To what extent should there be a division of
labour between NATO and ESDP?)
8. NATO has a far greater military capability
than ESDP. But the range of security instruments that the EU can
deploy allows it to add value in different ways. There are thus
some types of operation in which one or other of the two has a
clear advantage: NATO for more intensive military operations,
the EU where the emphasis is on civilian capability. But there
are equally a range of peace support operations which could be
undertaken by either organisation, or where there is a role for
both. In these cases the choice of whether NATO or the EU should
lead should be made on a case by case basis, according to the
intended objectives and the nations that intend to participate.
(What are the key lessons of NATO's operational
deployments for the future of the Alliance?)
9. NATO's experience of conducting operations
at distance, particularly in Afghanistan, has become a significant
driver for change in the Alliance, and underlines the importance
of Allies acquiring flexible, rapidly deployable and sustainable
expeditionary capabilities. But NATO's experience in Afghanistan
and the Balkans has also shown that success cannot be achieved
by military means alone: the international community needs to
work in a concerted way across many fields—security, reconstruction
and development, law and order, and good governance. Whilst NATO
does not need to develop civilian capabilities in its own right,
it does need a capability to deal with complex political and other
interactions inherent in today's crisis management operations
management, and to improve its ability to work with other institutions
like the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the World Bank and other international
and non-government organisations. It should apply this Comprehensive
Approach at all stages of an operation, from initial planning
to execution. Indeed, it is clear that international institutions
collectively need to improve their capacity to work together to
deliver comprehensive responses to modern security problems.
CAPABILITY
10. European nations in particular must
develop the capabilities they need to make qualitative and quantitative
contributions to NATO and the EU. Military capability should preferably
be usable by NATO, the EU or ad hoc coalitions, so that European
nations can take on an appropriate share of the global security
burden. The key priority remains the development of the capability
needed to mount, sustain, conduct and recover expeditionary operations.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU Battlegroups have been key
drivers for improving capabilities. Equally, NATO armaments bodies
and the European Defence Agency (EDA) offer Member states and
Allies the means to harmonise their requirements and research
and technology priorities, to facilitate industrial cooperation
and to open up the European equipment market, thereby helping
generate valuable efficiencies and ultimately capability improvements
for the UK and our partners.
(What more needs to be done by nations to ensure
that the Alliance can achieve its aim of being capable of deploying
joint forces which are interoperable, sustainable, and deployable
to distant theatres?)
(How can the Force Planning Process be streamlined?)
11. NATO's CPG provides a framework for
continuing transformation and sets out, the priorities for all
Alliance capability development and planning to meet the security
challenges we face over the next 10 to 15 years. It makes clear
that NATO's priority should be on the development of expeditionary
capabilities for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions, obviating
the need for separate or competing investment in static territorial
defence infrastructure. If fully implemented across the Alliance
it should improve the overall deployability of NATO forces and
their ability to be used for a full range of missions.
12. The experience of conducting operations
at distance, notably in Afghanistan, is a further and equally
significant driver for change in the Alliance, including in highlighting
key capability requirements. Transformation comes at a cost, and
resources need to be rigorously focussed on the priorities set
out in the CPG. Nations also need to be clear how NATO's priorities
translate into their own defence programmes.
13. NATO's military capability and preparedness
comes from the sum of each Ally's capability and preparedness,
but NATO can support Allies in improving the capability and preparedness
of their forces by streamlining the NATO Force Planning Process
and encompassing all NATO planning activities
14. NATO's current force planning process
identifies over a four year cycle the capabilities that would
be required for NATO to meet the range of operations and missions
that Minsters have agreed it should be capable of. On the basis
of information supplied by nations through the Defence Planning
Questionnaire, Force Goals are addressed to nations suggesting
what capabilities they should develop. But the process is lengthy,
complex, time consuming and in some areas unable to keep pace
with changes in requirement. It does not encompass all the necessary
planning activities in NATO, and is not geared to the vision and
planning horizons of the CPG. Reform of the process will inevitably
be complex. We consider that a key requirement is to address defence
planning across the board, not just force planning, which is but
one of several NATO planning disciplines (others include resource
planning, logistics, communications and armaments.) These disciplines
should be streamlined to avoid duplication, improve coherence
and support prioritisation of capability development across the
Alliance. The roles and responsibilities of the various NATO bodies,
such as the two Strategic Commands, the International Staff and
International Military Staff, and the committees responsible for
the various planning disciplines should be better defined and
streamlined.
15. A reform of Alliance defence planning
should also consider the following elements:
— Differentiation in planning
horizons.
There would be merit in tailoring the defence
planning process to deliver improved force generation. Focus in
the early years could be on current operations, force generation
for the NRF and follow-on forces. The Force Goals addressed to
nations could be focused out to two years for operations and four
to six years for the NRF. Beyond these timescales the focus should
be on longer term capability and technological development. The
planning process must be able to respond to changing priorities
within the four year cycle.
— Coherence of NATO planning processes
with national planning processes.
NATO should consider whether it really needs
a "one size fits all" planning process or whether there
is scope to make the process more flexible, for example allowing
NATO the opportunity to offer advice when there are opportunities
to shape national thinking, like at the time of defence reviews.
— Coherence with EU planning processes.
19 nations formally declare forces both to NATO
and the EU. Although the scope of operations may be different,
both organisations use planning processes and both are moving
towards capability planning. Nations need to be able to offer
capabilities to both organisations in a similar format, and one
which would allow each organisation to make use of this information
for its own purposes.
16. The NATO Response Force (NRF), which
was declared fully operational at Riga, has been at the vanguard
of the process of the Alliance developing flexible, rapidly deployable
and sustainable forces called for in the CPG. But even its development
has not been without its problems, with Allies struggling with
the demands to provide the required capabilities. We are working
with NATO in reviewing the current basis for forming the NRF,
with the aim of making it more sustainable and useable.
(To what extent has the Prague Capabilities Commitment
(PCC) been fulfilled and what measures are in place to address
the remaining capability gaps?)
17. Before the Riga Summit in November 2006
NATO reassessed the PCC initiative. It concluded that it was a
valuable initiative which had promoted progress in capability
development across the Alliance. There remained, however, a number
of areas in which progress had been slow, due in the main to financial
or technical difficulties, but which remained important. It was
agreed that the future focus of the PCC initiative should be on
high priority capability development areas as determined by the
Comprehensive Political Guidance; and that nations with outstanding
commitments should continue to report on these. Those areas considered
to require continued high-level monitoring were CBRN Defence,
Information Superiority, Combat Effectiveness, and Deployability
and Sustainability, containing a total of 76 individual commitments
(from an original total of 465).
18. The Spring 2007 Assessment of National
Commitments Requiring Further High-Level Attention shows that
implementation remains patchy. Most commitments are on track to
be implemented as planned, although concerns remain over funding,
technical feasibility and a lack of multinational co-operation.
At present, two of the remaining commitments are due to be implemented
this year, a further eight in 2008, and the remaining 66 beyond
2009.
19. In general, the main capabilities sought
through the PCC initiative are also being pursued through specific
initiatives in the Alliance, such as in the area of strategic
airlift, or through the force planning process. High-level attention
to these capability needs also continues independently of individual
national PCC commitments. Given this, NATO is likely to reconsider
before the 2008 Summit the continued high-level monitoring of
the PCC initiative
(How can the capabilities of ESDP be improved
and what role do EU Battlegroups play in enhancing EU capabilities?)
20. The capabilities available to ESDP are
to a large extent the same capabilities that are being developed
for NATO. The Headline Goal 2010 process provides specific guidance
on the types of capability that should be available under ESDP.
That process highlights the importance of EU Member States focussing
their investment not on replacing legacy fixed infrastructure
and assets but instead procuring modern deployable assets.
21. EU Battlegroups play an important role
as an example of a modern force able to quickly respond to crisis-management
operations. They have also acted as a catalyst for transforming
some Member States' armed forces from static to expeditionary.
In preparing to assume a place in the Battlegroup roster a Member
State, or more commonly a group of Member States, have to address
a number of enabling capability issues. Each Battlegroup has to
be interoperable, deployable and sustainable; this is tested through
pre-deployment training to ensure that all of the contributing
forces can work together, communicate amongst themselves and to
headquarters and are able to deploy into theatre at short notice.
For smaller Member States participating in a multinational Battlegroup,
operating alongside other nations builds confidence in operating
in a multinational force.
(Is the European Defence Agency delivering the
comprehensive and systematic support and guidance needed to help
EU Member States improve European defence capabilities, meet the
capability needs of the ESDP, and achieve the targets of the Headline
Goal 2010 initiative?)
22. The EDA is providing support and guidance
to Member States in improving their defence capabilities, The
Headline Goal 2010 process will identify any shortfalls in the
EU's ability to meet its operational levels of ambition, but the
EDA will have little scope to assist member states in correcting
these shortfalls, since most states' plans are relatively fixed
in the short term.
23. The EDA is therefore now looking to
the longer term (2025-30) where there are more opportunities to
influence and guide Member States' plans and programmes. This
initiative, called the Capability Development Plan (CDP) builds
on the work done by the EDA last year in producing a Long Term
Vision for future ESDP military capability needs. The CDP aims
to use the work produced by the Headline Goal 2010 as a baseline
that can be projected into the future, using the trends identified
in the Long Term Vision, to assess which capability shortfalls
or capability shortfall trends will still be relevant or be of
increasing relevance to ESDP operations in 2030. By combining
this information with lessons learnt from operations and with
Member States' national plans and programmes for future capabilities
the EDA will be able to make an informed judgement of the most
important capability gaps. The Agency will be then be able to
focus their efforts in assisting Member States in addressing these
shortfalls in their long term planning, and assist them in aligning
requirements to potentially produce joint projects.
(To what extent should European procurement co-operation
be enhanced?)
24. European states cannot afford to determine
our equipment requirements solely on separate national bases,
develop them through separate national R&D efforts, and realise
them through separate national procurements. This approach is
not economically sustainable for any nation outside of USA—and
in a world of multinational operations it is operationally unacceptable,
too. The United Kingdom sees benefit therefore in achieving consolidation
on both sides of the market in Europe: aligning and combining
our various needs in shared equipment requirements; and meeting
them from an increasingly integrated European Defence Technological
and Industrial Base.
25. The history of European equipment collaborations
is mixed—some have been successful but many have not been,
often because they have been less focussed on producing cost-effective
equipment and more focussed towards national defence industrial
ends. Such a course is ultimately self-defeating; European defence
industries will survive only if they can provide top quality goods
at competitive prices. When new capabilities are required, it
must be consistently borne in mind that the best collaborations
start "upstream"—the shared requirements must
be achieved at the point where thought is being given to what
the new capability will be for, and how it will be used. Attempts
to harmonise the technical requirements of independently-conceived
platforms are rarely successful.
26. Improving the possibility of collaborative
programmes being formed and their subsequent success in delivering
solutions cost-effectively is the subject of several work-strands.
The EDA is using its Capability Development Plan to provide a
new springboard for this effort in order to maximise cooperation
from the very outset. EDA also has work-strands looking specifically
at best practice for cooperative programmes; improving cooperation
on defence standards; and at cooperation on specific capability
areas. OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armaments Co-operation) was
created with the aim of improving the efficiency and lowering
the cost of managing co-operative defence equipment programmes
involving European nations. This is making good progress—OCCAR
is in the process of establishing a working relationship with
the EDA given the expectation that it will be given the role of
managing many of the programmes that evolve from the EDA's capability
development work.
(What capabilities, other than purely military
capabilities, should the EU develop?)
27. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was
established to address the challenges of civilian crisis management
and sets out the EU's ambitions for civilian ESDP. It is a similar
process to the military Headline Goal 2010 process. The EU has
made significant progress in identifying capability shortfalls
in all the priority areas: police, rule of law, civilian administration,
civil protection, monitoring and support to the EU Special Representatives.
A Civilian Capabilities Improvements Plan was adopted in December
2005 which sets out a roadmap for taking the process forward.
During 2006 the EU focussed on mission support and establishing
rapidly deployable Civilian Response Teams (CRT). CRTs are now
deployable with approximately 100 experts having received training.
Their expertise covers: civilian police, rule of law, civilian
administration, civil protection, monitoring, political affairs
and mission support. Some key shortfalls have also been identified,
notably of judges and prosecutors, prison personnel, police officers
and border police officers. The forthcoming ESDP police and rule
of law missions to Kosovo and Afghanistan will need such capabilities.
There will be a revised Headline Goal process taken forward under
the forthcoming Portuguese presidency. Improvements to the planning
and control of civilian missions are also being put in place through
the establishment of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity.
Although a civilian capacity, it will also draw on the expertise
of the EU Military Staff.
PARTNERSHIPS
28. The reality of the current international
security situation is that solutions will come through institutions
working together and with other nations. NATO and the EU need
therefore to improve their ability to work cooperatively together
and their ability individually or collectively to work with other
nations or institutions like the UN, the African Union and non-governmental
organisations that may be engaged in a crisis area. This will
require that these institutions each develop the internal structures
and processes and external interfaces that will allow them to
work cooperatively with others. This is the only way either organisation
can deliver a truly Comprehensive Approach on the ground and will
also enhance their ability to draw on wider international support.
29. The concept of partnership also includes
NATO and the EU engaging effectively with other countries where
appropriate. We strongly support NATO's open door policy on enlargement.
Enlargement is a catalyst for reform and stability in aspirant
members and brings benefits to the Alliance: decisions to further
enlarge NATO need to be based on aspirants' reform performance,
their ability to contribute to Alliance security, and an understanding
that they do not result in importing unresolved conflicts to the
Alliance.
30. It is also vital to engage with nations
that do not aspire to join NATO or the EU but which contribute
troops and/or civilian capabilities that deploy alongside or as
part of EU or NATO operations, and share our aims of promoting
security. NATO will continue to develop its networks of partnerships
to this end, including with these "contact countries"
such as Australia. The decisions taken at Riga will enable both
NATO and its partners to get more out of their relationship; with
more flexible formats; improved arrangements for dialogue with
troop contributing nations; and the opening-up of NATO's current
partnership tools to all partners.
(How can NATO and the EU work better together?)
31. It is essential to foster strong and
effective links between NATO and the EU, respecting the different
political identity of each organisation while avoiding unnecessary
duplication of capabilities between the two and thereby also minimising
the chance that doctrine and procedures will diverge.
32. There are standing arrangements agreed
for consultation and co-operation between the EU and NATO including
the "Berlin Plus" arrangements whereby the EU has guaranteed
access to NATO planning capabilities (aimed at avoiding unnecessary
duplication) and can use NATO's command and control arrangements
for running operations. EU military operations thus fall into
two categories, "Berlin Plus" operations using NATO
command and control arrangements, like EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia,
and "autonomous" operations using command and control
provided by one or more Member States, like EUFOR DR Congo, or
in future through the newly-established EU Operations Centre.
And military liaison teams have been established to facilitate
coordination between the two organisations.
33. But tensions remain in the relationship
between the two organisations. While they often co-operate together
quite effectively in-theatre (as in Bosnia and in support of the
African Union in Sudan/Darfur) the political difficulties can
make the institutional process in Brussels more difficult, particularly
in respect of information exchange and dialogue outside specific
operational areas. Planning is under way for EU policing and rule
of law missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, to run in parallel
with NATO missions in both countries. These are likely to require
specific arrangements between NATO and the EU. We have aimed to
encourage greater flexibility on information exchange at the political
level and greater interaction between staffs.
34. But there are a number of ways in which
NATO and the EU can work better together. Greater use of the new
EU/NATO liaison cells would improve levels of cooperation and
information exchange. We have seen with Darfur that staff-to-staff
contacts can deliver effective cooperation, and expect the liaison
cells will help achieve this. We expect compelling requirements
to emerge for greater levels of information exchange over missions
in Kosovo and Afghanistan. This should create precedents for EU/NATO
cooperation and information exchange for future missions. Additionally,
there have been informal meetings involving representatives of
all NATO and EU member states. We hope to build on these informal
meetings, to further improve the way in which the EU and NATO
work together.
35. Greater information exchange, cooperation
and transparency are also important for capability development.
Since the military capability requirements of NATO and the EU
are largely the same, this common approach is vital. Improving
military capabilities in Europe is beneficial to both NATO and
the EU, and work conducted in NATO and the EU (including the European
Defence Agency) should seek to achieve common goals as far as
possible. We continue to engage actively to encourage progress,
including through a NATO-EU capabilities group that brings together
nations and staff from both organisations.
REFORM
36. NATO and the EU need constantly to modernise
their structures and processes to ensure that they are able to
respond to the increasingly complex and interconnected security
challenges of the modern world. In NATO we want to see better
management of common resources, more effective working within
NATO headquarters, including greater integration between military
and civilian staffs and a command structure that is more affordable
and better meets the current demands on the alliance. In the EU
we want more effective internal working across and within the
pillars to ensure a more coherent effect from the EU's external
actions.
(How is NATO's transformation agenda progressing?)
37. NATO's true strength is, and will remain,
in expressing and delivering transatlantic consensus for action,
and in providing a crucial framework for interoperability amongst
Allies. Success on operations remains the primary measure of its
value and credibility. NATO has achieved a significant amount
in Afghanistan and Kosovo, but both theatres have posed significant
challenges. In parallel to its military transformation and the
political process of adopting more comprehensive and effective
methods of working with others, NATO needs to accelerate internal
reform. The Alliance's structure and decision-making machinery
needs to focus more sharply on its key operational, capability
development and partnership objectives. It needs to be leaner,
more responsive and accountable. This is a complex challenge for
a consensus-based organisation.
(Does NATO need a new strategic concept?)
38. NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept describes
the evolving security environment in terms that remain largely
valid. The CPG builds on this to provide a framework for NATO's
continuing transformation and sets out, for the next 10 to 15
years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning
disciplines and intelligence. Combined with NATO's developing
work on a Comprehensive Approach, this provides the strategic
framework against which NATO can plan to operate, and a good vision
for change. These elements should eventually be brought together
in a new strategic concept.
RESOURCES
39. NATO and the EU need to have the necessary
resources at the right time and managed to the highest standards
to make the most of finite budgets. Institutional investment must
be reprioritised in line with current and emerging requirements,
rather than continuing to spend money maintaining out-of-date
and less relevant capabilities. Nations need to shoulder their
fair share of the burden. Arrangements for the common funding
of military operations in NATO and the EU should be developed
carefully both to maintain an incentive on nations to develop
the necessary national capabilities and to avoid favouring one
organisation over another. The UK will continue to lobby Allies,
bilaterally and within the EU and NATO, to invest appropriately
in their national defence.
(How can NATO nations address funding shortfalls
and disparities?)
(How can the Alliance find the resources to match
its global interests?)
40. While US defence spending has increased
massively over the last five years, European defence budgets remain
low in historic terms. The 25 NATO members who participate in
the NATO force planning system (ie excluding France) have agreed
two key benchmarks: that nations should aim to spend 2% of GDP
on defence and invest 20% of their defence budget in equipment.
In 2006 only six of those 25 allies met the first of these benchmarks,
and only seven met the second. European defence spending in 2006
stands on average at about 2.0% of GDP, compared with US spending
of about 3.8%. Turkey (3%) and Greece (3%) are the only two other
NATO countries at the 3 % level, while France and the UK are the
highest defence spenders in real terms in the EU. The shortfalls
in capabilities and disparities in funding levels between nations
would be reduced if all NATO nations met the existing NATO benchmarks.
The EDA is developing indicators and benchmarks to underpin discussion
of defence investment among European countries.
41. NATO has created a new command, Allied
Command Transformation, to encourage military innovation among
NATO members that should lead to a broad reconfiguration of forces.
NATO is using the four-year old military transformation agenda
to advise member governments on future procurement needs. But
its budget is modest—only some only $20 million from NATO
common funding compared with some $150 million a year that the
US spends on defence transformation.
42. Alliance members will have to generate
new efficiencies to underwrite transformation costs. Common funding,
shared purchasing, mission specialization, more open and transparent
defence markets, and planning procurement coordination are some
of the ways in which NATO members might be able to take on these
costs without inflating national budgets.
(How can the arrangements for the funding of the
NATO Response Force be improved and made more equitable?)
43. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a "rotating"
force provided by a sub-set of NATO nations at any one time. Costs
fall to the nations that provide the force elements until such
time as the NRF deploys. When NRF HQ elements are deployed as
the senior NATO HQ in a theatre the usual range of eligibility
for common funding of HQ Command and Control functions and theatre-wide
enablers is applicable. Costs of deploying and sustaining the
force elements below the HQ level continue to fall to the nations
involved.
44. Any rapid deployment at short notice
of the NRF incurs for the nations involved substantial costs.
Some nations have indicated that the unpredictable financial consequence
of short notice deployments acts as a disincentive to making force
contributions to the NRF. As a consequence it has been argued
that the problem would be alleviated if NATO agreed at least some
common-funded reimbursement of strategic lift costs. We are not
persuaded by this argument. It is not clear that common funding
is the answer to improving the generation of forces for NATO operations
or forces. For example, SHAPE was unable to detect any early signs
of improved force generation as a result of the decision in 2005
to increase the range of eligibility for common costs in support
of Non-Article five operations (such as Afghanistan and Kosovo).
45. Nevertheless, we have agreed to a NATO
proposal to partial reimbursement of strategic lift costs for
an interim period whilst nations improve their lift capabilities
or gain assured access to lift capabilities. Any financial support
for deployment costs of national force elements will be strictly
limited to short-notice deployments of the NRF. As a rule not
all elements of an NRF would require costly movement by air. The
mode of movement would depend on the character and location of
the crisis and would need to be subject to military advice at
the time. Financial support would be provided only to meet minimum
military requirements and for the most cost-effective means of
deployment (usually about 15% deployed by air and 85% by sea).
46. The intended financial support would
be available for a two-year period and expected to start from
the North Atlantic Council's agreement in the coming months. The
interim arrangement would be subject to evaluation to assess the
effects of the financial support arrangements on force generation
and capacity building.
47. All participating nations would be eligible
for reimbursement; based on a rate below the actual costs; with
support available to those nations that have identified their
airlift needs and have put in motion credible ways to meet them,
such as ownership, or shared ownership, of appropriate aircraft,
or assured access when required. The likely cost to the UK has
yet to be established but we do not anticipate having to pay our
12.1% share of common reimbursement costs (even when UK forces
are not participating) before early 2008.
13 June 2007
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