Memorandum from Dr David Galbreath
"DUAL ENLARGEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
NATO AND THE ESDP"
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Since the end of the Cold War, there
has been a continual question of who should be the keeper of peace
and defender of states in Europe. In 1990, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most prominent security and
defence alliance. Other initiatives had failed (European Defence
Community), remained marginal (Western European Union), or were
simply not in a position to replace NATO (Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, now OSCE). Yet, in 1998, even the UK
government began to put more emphasis on the EU vis-á-vis
NATO in terms of security and defence. Similarly, European defence
ministers at the 1999 Cologne European Council initiated the incorporation
of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the office
of the High Commissioner of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). However, following the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements,
NATO still remains the dominant insurer of regional peace and
stability. In other words, despite considerable changes in European
security, NATO remains the dominant security organization for
the United Kingdom (UK) and Europe.
2. This paper examines how EU and NATO enlargements
have shaped the relationship between NATO and the ESDP. The discussion
engages several questions. First, what role did security and defence
play in the accession process? How did the relationship between
the EU and NATO change in this time? Second, what is the contemporary
relationship between NATO and the countries of "New Europe"?
Attention will be focused on those countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, as opposed to Malta or Cyprus since the latter states
are not members of NATO. Finally, is there a solution to accommodating
both NATO and the EU? Can there be a system of burden-sharing
that makes for effective and efficient peace-making, peace-keeping
and peace-building? Throughout, the discussion involves the impact
on and implications for the UK.
B. SECURITY AND
DEFENCE IN
EU AND NATO ACCESSION
3. The argument for EU and NATO enlargement
was constantly tied to regional security, stability and peace.
From both organizations' perspectives, enlargement could lock-in
democratizing regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, ending the
legacy of the post-war settlement in Europe. The basic assumption
is that of the "Democratic Peace": democracies do not
fight one another. At the same time, member-state governments
who resisted the enlargements of the EU and NATO thought that
bringing in potentially unstable states would bring instability
to the union and alliance. In 1995, NATO produced the "NATO
enlargement study". The study had four conclusions. Firstly,
enlargement was an end within itself. In other words, the alliance
had a political and moral responsibility to include these states.
Secondly, enlargement was seen as part of a wider process of restructuring
within NATO. The alliance had been predicated on defending against
a Soviet land invasion. With the Soviets and the threat of a land
invasion gone, NATO required restructuring to cope with the post-Cold
War challenges of security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Thirdly,
enlargement would reinforce common security amongst "us",
by connecting states to the institutional structures of defence
and security provided by NATO. Finally, the study determined that
the Russian Federation's views would be taken into consideration
over enlargement. In the end, Russia's views seemed to be ignored,
especially in the case of extending membership to the three former
Soviet states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at the Prague North
Atlantic Council in 2002.
4. EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and NATO
enlargement in 1999 and 2004, overlapped significantly. The EU
enlarged to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus in 2004 and Romania
and Bulgaria in 2007. Similarly, NATO enlarged to Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic in 1999 and Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria in 2004. Thus, this
overlap lies within Central and Eastern Europe. In part, gaining
access to one organization, helped gain access to another. Similarly,
the member-states of both organizations that were most reluctant
to accept enlargement also overlap. The UK, Denmark, Germany and
the Netherlands, were keen to see enlargement in both the union
and the alliance. Likewise, France, Portugal, Spain and Italy
were reluctant to see dual enlargement to these countries. There
were also some special cases such as Sweden and Finland providing
military assistance to the Baltic States despite not being members
of NATO. Rather, Sweden and Finland work within the framework
of the "Partnership for Peace" programme (1994).
5. With the strong overlap between enlargements,
it is unsurprising that EU and NATO cooperation became more formalised
in the accession phase. At the Berlin Ministerial Council in 1996,
the member-states of NATO and the Western European Union (later
to be incorporated into the second EU pillar (CFSP)) agreed to
the establishment of the European Security and Defence Initiative
(ESDI) within NATO. The purpose of the ESDI was to establish a
European peace-keeping force bound to the "Petersburg Tasks".
These are humanitarian and rescue tasks as well as peacekeeping
and combat-force in crisis management, including peacemaking.
As discussed earlier, the ESDI was eventually brought under the
wing of the High Commissioner of the CFSP. Closer partnership
between NATO and the EU has allowed for an easier position for
Central and East European states, as it has for the UK.
C. NATO AND "NEW
EUROPE"
6. Central and East European member-states
have been strong supporters of NATO as the primary security organization
in Europe. Much of the support for NATO comes from two sources:
a historical fear of Russia, the successor state to the Soviet
Union, and a Cold War vision of the US as a saviour. Both of these
perceptions have elements of truth and fiction. Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania have the most difficult historical relationship
with Russia. The Baltic States were occupied from 1941, first
by Soviets, then by Germans, then by Soviets again. As Soviet
Republics, they were heavily repressed through political and class
murders, forced mass migration were few survived, and agricultural
collectivization which starved to death many. Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic, and Slovakia have their own difficult history
with Russia, while not within the Soviet Union themselves, experienced
the oppression that came with being in the Soviet sphere of influence.
For these states and others, the post-war settlement did not come
until after 1990.
7. The relationship between these states
and the US became strong after the end of the Cold War. Partly
through strategic partnership, partly through globalization and
Americanization, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe came
to look upon the US as the key ally, in much the same way the
UK has done since the Second World War. Evident when speaking
to political officials at the EU in Brussels or the OSCE in Vienna,
the author has heard a great deal of distrust from the Central
and East European States towards many West European states. If
one looks across the security strategies of the Central and East
European states, one will find that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria
have all said in post-enlargement security strategies that NATO
is the core of the European security infrastructure and wish to
maintain NATO's position in the region. The Baltic States have
argued against any development of the ESDP that would be "detrimental
to NATO". Hungary has argued for a long-term preservation
of NATO's "central role" in the region. Poland has argued
that the relationship with the US and NATO is the "most important
guarantee" of security. The Czech strategy sets out NATO
as the "pillar of collective defence". Slovakia has
consistently argued a "NATO first" policy. Romania argues
that NATO holds the "essential role" in European security.
Bulgaria insists that the ESDP is "not an alternative NATO".
Overall, there is overwhelming support among these ten EU and
NATO member-states for the continuation of NATO as the key collective
security and defence organization in Europe.
D. ESDP AND NATO
8. The EU and NATO relationship has become
increasingly close as memberships have overlapped, the lack of
support for duplication between the two organizations persists,
and events in Afghanistan have developed. As the previous section
illustrates, existing reluctance to see the US withdraw from Europe
and greater EU involvement in security and defence made the traditional
position of the UK, one also of "NATO first", more tenable.
NATO has remained much more a regional security organization than
has the EU. The alliance has limited its involvement to the former
Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the EU currently
has a global presence including ESDP missions in the Palestinian
Territories, Iraq, the Congo, Sudan and Georgia in addition to
the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.
9. There has been a much greater emphasis
put on complementarity between the EU and NATO. While all of the
Central and East European member-states have pressed for the continual
strength of NATO, all have also supported the EU's development
of complimentary security and defence policies. Complementarity
should be what is expected from two organizations that overlap
strongly in terms of membership. EU and NATO enlargement has brought
both organizations to the step of post-Cold War conflicts. We
see that in terms of EU and NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia,
particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, both
organizations have a role to play in peace-making, peace-keeping
and peace-building. The UK plays a bridging part in this collaboration
between the EU and NATO. As a prominent actor in NATO, the UK
can maintain a successful ground and air campaign, in combination
with likely counterparts like the US, Dutch, Danish and Norwegians.
In other words, NATO is an effective peace-maker as can be seen
with SFOR and KFOR operations. Tied to the Petersburg Tasks, the
EU can play a greater role in follow-up operations that support
peace-keep and peace-building. Together with other organizations
like the United Nations and the OSCE, extensive burden-sharing
makes for a strong European security infrastructure.
E. CONCLUSION
10. Dual enlargement has brought greater
support in Europe for the continued presence of NATO as the primary
security organization as well as the Trans-Atlantic relationship.
Eight of the ten new Central and East European member-states have
taken active part in the coalition in Iraq (Slovenia and Hungary
participated in NATO training missions with Iceland and Turkey),
while all ten have taken part in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Both Iraq and Afghanistan highlight
that many of the threats to Europe's security will come from outside
the region. The focus on "out of area" operations was
reaffirmed at the Prague North Atlantic Council in 2002. Through
NATO's niche capabilities framework, Central and East European
states have much to offer NATO operations, as can be seen in Afghanistan
and the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, these states have much
to offer EU operations as can be seen in their active participation
in eleven current operations around the world. Europe's ability
to preserve regional peace and stability as well as Europe's obligations
to maintain security in other parts of the world require that
complementary security and defence organizations remain a characteristic
of the European security infrastructure.
Lecturer, Department of Politics and International
Relations,
University of Aberdeen
29 November 2007
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