House of Commons - Defence - Written Evidence

Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence

Memorandum from British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Few periods in the life of an institution are as critical as the one the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is facing now. The 26-member alliance is simultaneously engaged in the most difficult military mission it has ever undertaken (in Afghanistan) while also undergoing pressure to transform itself in an uncertain world. It is clear that the 21st century security environment requires the Alliance to transform, but the organisational discussions at Riga were too narrowly focused on force modernisation, interoperability and membership.

This submission argues that changes to the strategy in Afghanistan and a new Strategic Concept are both urgently needed if NATO is retain its credibility and legitimacy, within the eyes of the wider world and citizens in member states.

AFGHANISTAN

The situation on the ground in Afghanistan appears to have worsened since the Riga Summit. The most violent parts of Afghanistan have been in the east and south, where Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces continue to hold sway. NATO's aggressive counter-insurgency operations have led to an increase in civilian casualties and the failure to collect or make information on the issue public suggests a refusal to acknowledge the negative impacts this war is having on Afghanistan. National caveats on troop deployments, the rise in drug production and failures in effective police training remain problematic, and there are question marks over whether the PRTs are achieving the right combination of security and reconstruction. Development of a NATO reconstruction corps may be a partial solution re the latter. A monumental effort is necessary on the part of the international community to better coordinate military and civilian instruments (especially crisis management, reconstruction and development), reduce civilian casualties and demonstrate the political will to sustain a long-term commitment to the country.

THE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE (CPG): A STOPGAP FOR A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN 2009

The CPG endorsed by Heads of State in Riga is a brief document that "provides a framework and political direction for NATOs continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10-15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence." It reconfirms the 1999 Strategic Concept, which "described the evolving security environment in terms that remain valid", but then goes on to say that "this environment continues to change". And the two "principal threats" to NATO identified in the CPG are terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The CPG has nothing to say about how the Alliance might enhance arms control, non-proliferation or disarmament measures to significantly reduce such threats. The CPG is little more than a stopgap for a new Strategic Concept to be debated and agreed by 2009.

MISSILE DEFENCES: AN EXPENSIVE DISTRACTION FROM REAL SECURITY NEEDS

Also at Riga, NATO leaders agreed to establish a theatre missile defence system that is intended to provide NATO forces with protection from ballistic missiles with "an initial operational capability by 2010". NATO has agreed to assess by February 2008 the political and military implications of the planned missile defence systems in Europe, including the possibility of "bolting" NATO and US missile defence systems together. We lament the lack of any public debate in Britain (or any other Member State) about the desirability, or workability of missile defence, let alone about the strategic assumptions that underpin it. The British Parliament has a duty to question whether such assumptions are compatible with British national interests and our collective interests within NATO. Going ahead with the BMD proposal in Central Europe regardless of Russian opinion would be a huge mistake. More substantive US, Russian and NATO dialogue, within the NATO-Russia Council on BMD and other mutual security concerns is necessary to avoid further divisions in Europe. BASIC recommends that:

(a) any proposed bilateral or multilateral missile defence agreements involving the UK should be made available for prior parliamentary scrutiny (ie before being signed); and

(b) the numerous UK and NATO ballistic missile threat assessments and industrial studies should be declassified and placed in the public domain.

AFTER RIGA: FOCUSING ON THREE NEW GOALS

The problems in Afghanistan, the insufficiency of the CPG, and the Alliance's rush to participate in an expanded missile defence program that is under-tested and overly-expensive, reveals that much still needs to be done in terms of the often cited "NATO transformation". In addition to carrying out a much-needed debate on how to stabilise Afghanistan, given the enormous changes that have taken place since the 1999 Strategic Concept was agreed, NATO should initiate a review process with the aim of agreeing a new Strategic Concept in 2009. Three goals should be fundamental to such a review:

1. affirming collective defence, disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions as the primary purpose of NATO;

2. eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance (including, as interim goals, withdrawal of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage); and

3. improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement.

Goal 1: BASIC recommends that NATO should focus on:

(a) collective defence of the transatlantic area with selective humanitarian/ disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter- and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions "out of area" where appropriately mandated and in accordance with international law. For the present, NATO does not need to become a global membership organisation, but as in Afghanistan (where 15% of the troops are provided by non-NATO countries), the Alliance could facilitate and oversee "coalitions of the willing" in support of these missions;

(b) reshaping the NRF for peacekeeping and disaster response capabilities, and developing limited counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence capabilities, with clear rules of deployment; and

(c) Strengthening its cooperative threat reduction, weapons collection and destruction, and counter-proliferation capabilities, with a special emphasis on maritime interdiction under the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Goal 2: In the fullest recent statement of Government policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the then Foreign Secretary, Margaret Becket, made it clear that the UK endorsed the appeal from Shultz/Kissinger/Perry /Nunn et al for a new initiative towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. In particular, it believed that in combination with non-proliferation, the nuclear weapons states must take their nuclear disarmament responsibilities seriously, in order both to strengthen the arms control regime and to directly reduce risks. As part of this policy the Government is sponsoring a research project on the practicality of ultimately attaining a nuclear weapons free world. In pursuit of such policies the Government should consider the following proposals:

(a) in the process of negotiating a new strategic concept, NATO should reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in strategic planning, with a view to moving progressively towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine;

(b) NATO open negotiations with Russia to create an international treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons; and

(c) two interim goals should be: withdrawal of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage.

Goal 3: The lack of attention paid to the costs and the technical merit of the missile defence program is symbolic of a democratic deficit at the heart of the Alliance. Another example of failed transparency and accountability is the eight-year delay in NATO telling the Serbian government where thousands of cluster bombs were dropped during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. Throughout NATO's history, MPs in their national parliaments when asking questions about NATO decisions have invariably been told that such decisions are confidential. When the same questions were put to the Secretary General, he invariably replied that NATO was but an alliance of sovereign states. This Catch 22 situation may have served a purpose during the Cold War, but is no longer appropriate today. Adequate mechanisms for parliamentary accountability within NATO are urgently required. BASIC recommends that NATO's secrecy rules should be reviewed as part of the larger review of the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

THE BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL (BASIC)

BASIC is an independent research and advocacy organisation that analyses government policies and promotes public awareness of defence, disarmament, military strategy and nuclear policies in order to foster informed debate. BASIC has offices in London and in Washington and its governing Council includes former US ambassadors, academics and politicians. Further information is available on our website: http://www.basicint.org

INTRODUCTION—THE ROAD TO RIGA

1.1 Few periods in the life of an institution are as critical as the one the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is facing now. The 26-member alliance is simultaneously engaged in the most difficult military mission it has ever undertaken (in Afghanistan) while also undergoing pressure to transform itself in an uncertain world. Will NATO become a full-time crisis management force with a new reconstruction role, a rapid reaction anti-terrorism force, return to its traditional role as a defensive alliance serving as a deterrent against external attacks, or a combination of all of these roles?

1.2 The November 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, the first to be held on the territory of the former Soviet Union, was meant to provide some answers. But while the two-day meeting of the 26 Heads of State was earmarked to discuss the transformation of the Alliance, the crisis in Afghanistan and how to enhance alliance capabilities and partnerships for future global missions, the outcomes were modest at best.

1.3 A Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) document, previously agreed by Defence Ministers in June 2006, was approved and published, together with a Summit Declaration which unsurprisingly re-affirmed Afghanistan as NATO's "top priority". A contract for a theatre missile defence system for NATO was also signed at the Riga Summit: an international consortium has been selected to build the "Integration Test Bed" which puts NATO on track to have "an initial operational capability by 2010".

1.4 How times have changed. "Safeguarding the freedom and security of all" NATO's members was the primary purpose of NATO during the Cold War, as set out in the 1949 Washington Treaty. This primary role was later reaffirmed in the 1999 Strategic Concept, although since the end of the Cold War, NATO's raison-d'etre has been a source of much debate and controversy. When the West faced the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union, NATO's purpose was to counter the power of, and deter an attack from, the Warsaw Pact. NATO's mandate back then was collective defence, expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which stipulates that NATO should treat an attack on one of its members as an attack on all of its members.

1.5 After its birth in 1949 with 12 countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States), NATO admitted Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO's very existence came into question, despite agreeing a new Strategic Concept that same year. NATO was no longer needed to defend Western Europe from an unlikely invasion by an economically weak and politically wounded Russia. Amid debates over NATO's purpose, institutional survival also took hold. Member states had invested too much time and money and were accustomed to the operating procedures of the alliance. Since the latter part of the 1990s, however, NATO leaders have genuinely sought to make the alliance more relevant to the post-Cold War security environment through four key interlocking processes:

— Agreement of a new Strategic Concept in 1999.

— Crisis management missions in the Balkans.

— Building security through partnerships, eg Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO-Russian Council.

— NATO enlargement.

1.6 As part of the latter process, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were admitted into NATO in 1999, followed by seven more nations in 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

1.7 The Alliance's eastward enlargement slowed down in Riga. With potentially more enticing members available globally (as discussed below), the accession process of four more aspiring members—Croatia, Macedonia, Albania and Georgia—was put on the back-burner. All were hoping to get a clear structure and possible timetable for their membership, although only Croatia is now likely to gain membership by 2008. However, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program—the first step in preparing a country for eventual NATO membership. The offer to Serbia was a particular surprise given that Belgrade had not yet handed over two indicted war criminals (Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic) whose arrests had long been demanded by NATO member states.

1.8 NATO is also beginning to court bigger fish. Despite one member state, the United States, being responsible for about half of global military expenditure in 2007 and NATO collectively accounting for around two-thirds of the global total, concerns are being expressed that the Alliance faces "perilous overstretch". This is partly as a result of existing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also because the alliance is increasingly being asked to play a role in conflicts in parts of Africa and other potential trouble spots around the world. Some observers (see, for example, Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO", Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006) are therefore arguing that since the challenges NATO faces are global, its membership should be expanded from its currently exclusive transatlantic character to include any democratic state that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfilment of the alliance's new responsibilities. Those being touted as sharing NATO's values and many common interests include Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa and South Korea.

1.9 The argument that NATO should now be open to any state that qualifies for membership, and should not be restricted to only North American and European countries, deserves further discussion. However, the globalisation of NATO should play second fiddle to securing European-US agreement on future priorities. It is clear that the new, 21st century security environment requires the Alliance to transform, but the organisational discussions at Riga were too narrowly focused on force modernisation, interoperability and membership.

1.10 This submission argues that changes to the strategy in Afghanistan and a new Strategic Concept are both urgently needed if NATO is retain its credibility and legitimacy, within the eyes of the wider world and citizens in member states. It begins by reviewing the three key outcomes at Riga: renewed resolve in Afghanistan, a new Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) document and a theatre missile defence system for NATO Europe. It then argues that NATO should initiate a review process with the aim of agreeing a new Strategic Concept in 2008 or 2009. Three goals should be fundamental to such a review:

1) affirming collective defence, disaster relief and reconstruction, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions as the primary purpose of NATO;

2) eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance (including, as interim goals, withdrawal of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage); and

3) improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement.

AFGHANISTAN

2.1 Afghanistan dominated the agenda at Riga. NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has been held up as the ultimate test of the Alliance in its post-Cold War incarnation. But while there were displays of public unity on the issue in Riga, little is expected to change on the ground, where the difficulties cannot be so easily papered over. Indeed, the situation on the ground appears to have worsened since Riga.

2.2 In early October 2006, NATO extended its ISAF operations to include the east of Afghanistan with about 40,000 troops now under its command. This total included 10,000 US troops that were previously part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), leaving about 8,000 US troops to continue fighting under OEF-A. The most violent parts of Afghanistan have been in the east and south, where Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces continue to hold sway. British, Canadian, Dutch and US forces in the south have been exposed to some of the most intense fighting—since Korea, according to Lt Gen. Richards, the British commander of ISAF (The Independent, September 2006).

2.3 NATO continues to run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are supposed to support the Afghan government by providing security and sometimes training and humanitarian assistance. The 25th and latest PRT was inaugurated in the eastern province of Nuristan in November last year. Overall, however, question marks remain over whether the PRTs are achieving the right combination of security and reconstruction. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer summed up his understanding of the challenge in Afghanistan in an article in advance of the Riga Summit: "There is no military solution; the answer is development, nation-building, building of roads, schools" (International Herald Tribune, November 2006). This suggests that a NATO reconstruction corps may be a partial solution, as discussed further in section 5 below.

2.4 In the lead up to the Riga Summit, NATO's Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Quebec, released a Press Communiqué, declaring "NATO's Afghanistan Mission is in Trouble." The title was intended to add a sense of urgency before Riga. Also at the summit, the Parliamentary Assembly (PA) called for a "Political Initiative on Afghanistan" that would balance security, military, and reconstruction efforts, strictly apply international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, improve coordination on international institutions, devise common policies toward leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and increase effectiveness of NATO's joint operations, including meeting troop requirements. And yet, by September 2007, a NATO PA delegation from the Defence and Security Committee returned from Afghanistan and reported that contributing ISAF countries lacked a well-defined strategic mission in the country.

2.5 NATO's aggressive counter-insurgency operations in the south of the country, and especially the use of air-power, have led to an increase in non-combatant (ie civilian) casualties. As of the end of September 2007, more than 650 civilians have died as a result of insurgent violence or US or NATO attacks, according to an Associated Press tally. (3 October 2007) In August, US officials reported that insurgent attacks were at their highest level since the 2001 invasion (Associated Press 28 August 2007). Almost 200 international troops and more than 3,500 "militants" have been killed since the beginning of 2007, which is higher than the rate at the same time last year (Associated Press 3 October 2007).

2.6 Reliable information on civilian casualties in Afghanistan is extremely difficult. Neither the UK, Afghan, Iraqi or US governments track and report regularly and reliably on civilian casualties. The UN, non governmental organizations and some media outlets have provided data, though none are comprehensive in their reports and some point to the fact that the information available is likely an undercount and subject to numerous flaws and inconsistencies. A July 2007 report by the Center for Defence Information in Washington, In-attention to Detail: Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan, confirms that ISAF is also tracking civilian deaths, apparently through its medical facilities, but does not release estimates to the public. We agree with the report's conclusion that "the failure of those supporting the Karzai government—particularly the US government and NATO—to collect or make information on the issue public suggests a refusal to acknowledge the negative impacts this war is having on Afghanistan, and perhaps, the grave direction it's headed". Allegations by Amnesty International that people detained in Afghanistan continue to face torture and other ill-treatment also need to investigated (Detainees transferred to torture: ISAF complicity? Amnesty International, 13 November 2007).

2.7 Restrictions on troop deployments is another problem. Limited improvements were agreed at the Riga Summit: Poland and Romania lifted their "national caveats" on the location of their troop deployments; France agreed for its troops to operate outside of Kabul; a small US-Polish theatre reserve was established; and Germany and Italy said that their troops could be moved from northern Afghanistan "in extremis". But almost a year later, the extra troops and helicopters requested were not as forthcoming as anticipated and American, British and Canadian troops continue to carry the brunt of the combat operations in the southern provinces. The Alliance had specifically requested German trainers for the south. In September 2007, however, Germany reiterated that it has no plans to release its 3,500-man force in Afghanistan from a "caveat" that limits German troops to the northern part of the country (Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2007). Other NATO countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, also maintain caveats on the deployment of their forces to the south.

2.8 Nor were failings in US police training (with only half the official total of 70,000 police officers "trained and equipped to carry out their police functions" according to a joint report by the Pentagon and the State Department in December 2006) and drug interdiction missions addressed. The European Union has taken over leadership of the police training mission, but with frustration over the lack of coordination between the EU and NATO (International Herald Tribune 23 August 2007). US officials have said that 3,200 more police trainers are needed.

2.9 The rise in drug production, now accounting for around $3 billion or half the Afghan economy, is fast becoming the greatest problem for NATO, especially since it funds the Taliban and other regional warlords. The United Nations reported in September 2007 that the country had just experienced a record season of opium production. But NATO continues to take a secondary support role in drug eradication or interdiction, with the ill-equipped Afghan government remaining in the lead role.

2.10 Domestic support in ISAF-contributing countries has been dwindling. Canada, which has been one of the major players in a combat role in Afghanistan with over 2,000 troops, is considering downgrading its combat role to a training-type mission. The Dutch are also due to consider whether to discontinue their combat mission. If ISAF loses the participation of those two countries in a combat role, only the United Kingdom and the United States will have forces deployed in Afghanistan without any major restrictions on combat.

2.11 The problems in Afghanistan appear to be beyond what NATO can resolve alone—at least as currently mandated. NATO is not a development organisation (although the potential to give it a partial or limited reconstruction capability is discussed in section 5 below), so responsibility currently lies elsewhere for progress on creating more jobs, roads, schools and teachers as part of the so-called "comprehensive approach". A monumental effort is necessary on the part of the international community to better coordinate military and civilian instruments (especially crisis management, reconstruction and development), reduce civilian casualties and demonstrate the political will to sustain a long-term commitment to the country. Without these changes, at best, it is likely that Afghanistan will not move beyond a condition of perpetual conflict and desolation that has characterized the country for over two decades, and at worst, NATO and the international community of states engaged in the country face the prospect of defeat.

2.12 NATO's Afghanistan mission raises a host of issues that should make alliance leaders think beyond this specific conflict. They need to consider the types of missions the Alliance is likely to undertake in the future. As discussed below, the lessons drawn from Afghanistan along with what has been learned from other recent missions suggest that NATO should affirm and focus on collective defence, disaster relief and reconstruction, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions as the primary purposes of the Alliance.

THE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE (CPG): A STOPGAP FOR A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN 2009

3.1 The CPG endorsed by Heads of State in Riga is a brief document that "provides a framework and political direction for NATOs continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10-15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence." It broadly assesses the future international security environment and lays out a range of missions that NATO should be expected to fulfil in the coming decades. In so doing, it reconfirms the 1999 Strategic Concept, which "described the evolving security environment in terms that remain valid", but then goes on to say that "this environment continues to change". And the two "principal threats" to NATO identified in the CPG are terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The latter was briefly mentioned in the 1999 Strategic Concept, and the former was buried within a long list of potential threats that lay beyond a traditional military invasion of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

3.2 In terms of the implications of the new strategic environment for the Alliance, the CPG says that the Alliance will "continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership." And that it will "require the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges".

3.3 The CPG cites the spread of weapons of mass destruction as a major threat to NATO but has nothing to say about how the Alliance might enhance arms control, non-proliferation or disarmament measures to significantly reduce such threats. Instead, the guidance mirrors thinking in several recent US national security strategy documents in setting out a need to defend NATO deployed forces against WMD with missile defences, and to be able to "conduct operations taking account of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction".

3.4 On the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the CPG simply says that "there will continue to be a requirement for a mix of conventional and nuclear forces in accordance with extant guidance". As discussed further below, the failure to discuss NATO's nuclear weapons and nuclear policies is a huge dereliction of duty and something that is unsustainable in the longer term. In the discussion of a new Strategic Concept, NATO has the opportunity to set an agenda of leadership on non-proliferation and arms control efforts that would greatly enhance global security.

3.5 Thus, while the CPG claims to provide guidance for the next 10-15 years, in reality it is little more than a stopgap. Even the NATO Secretary General has said that he expects a new Strategic Concept to be debated and agreed by 2009. In particular, NATO's nuclear policy should be revised and this will be discussed at greater length below.

MISSILE DEFENCES: AN EXPENSIVE DISTRACTION FROM REAL SECURITY NEEDS

4.1 At the Riga Summit, NATO leaders agreed to establish a theatre missile defence system that is intended to provide NATO forces with protection from ballistic missiles with "an initial operational capability by 2010". NATO has agreed to assess by February 2008 the political and military implications of the planned missile defence systems in Europe. The assessment will include an update on missile threat developments, taking into account the discussions about a US "third site" in Europe. "The NATO roadmap on missile defence is now clear," said NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "It is clear, practical and agreed by all."

4.2 Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's 14 June statement also said that the alliance will study the possibility of "bolting" NATO and US missile defence systems together to ensure that all 26 allies are protected effectively from future threats. "In essence, the alliance will pursue a three-track approach," de Hoop Scheffer said in the statement. The three tracks include:

— continuing the ongoing NATO project to develop by 2010 a theatre missile defence for protecting deployed troops—the so called Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Program;

— assessing the full implications of the US system; and

— continuing existing cooperation with Russia on theatre missile defence, as well as consultation on related issues.

4.3 The Secretary-General's sense of consensus is not shared by BASIC. There has been no public debate in Britain (or any other Member State) about the desirability, or workability of missile defence, let alone about the strategic assumptions that underpin it. The British Parliament has a duty to question whether such assumptions are compatible with British national interests and our collective interests within NATO. Menzies Campbell (and more recently the Foreign Affairs Committee) made a similar point in relation to the latest UK bilateral agreement with the United States on this issue (which will allow the US administration to install additional equipment at Menwith Hill, in Yorkshire -see Yorkshire Post, 20 September 2007), but the transfer of British sovereignty behind closed doors applies equally to NATO's missile defence plans, and NATO decision-making in general (as discussed in section 5 below).

4.4 Russia has reacted angrily to the US European BMD plans and has hit back in three specific areas: the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; and missile targeting and development. But we share the conclusion of the Foreign Affairs Committee (Second Report, November 2007) that Russian opposition "largely reflects Moscow's sensitivity about the presence of NATO infrastructure in its former satellite states". Going ahead with the BMD proposal in Central Europe regardless of Russian opinion would be a huge mistake. More substantive US, Russian and NATO dialogue, within the NATO-Russia Council on BMD and other mutual security concerns is necessary to avoid further divisions in Europe.

4.5 The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in March 2007 that Ground-based Missile Defence, the system proposed for Europe, had not completed sufficient flight testing to provide a high level of confidence that it can reliably intercept Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The US Defense Department's director of operational test and evaluation has even said, "to be confident in my assessment of the effectiveness [of the ballistic missile defence system] I need validated models and simulations . . . They don't exist today because [the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)] doesn't have enough flight test data to anchor them" (Charles McQuery, Statement at the Hearing on Ballistic Missile Programs, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, US House Armed Services Committee, 27 March 2007).

4.6 Moreover, initial concerns by other European governments have been glossed over by the United States. For instance, the aggressive promotion of the US missile defence proposal in Poland and the Czech Republic was described by a former Polish defence minister Radek Sikorski as "crass". (Washington Post, 21 March 2007). And according to two US scientists (George Lewis and Theodore Postol) who are experts on missile defences:

The Russians are deeply upset and suspicious of what appears to be a lack of candour, understanding and realism with regard to US plans for missile defences. US political leaders relentlessly deny basic technical facts that show the current US missile defence might well affect Russia. The result of this standoff is clear and predictable: a world with expanded nuclear forces on high alert aimed at compensating for defences, and defences that will be so fragile to simple or inadvertent countermeasures that they will, at very best, have little or no chance of working in combat, (European Missile Defence: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns, Arms Control Today, October 2007).

4.7 While supplying sufficient helicopters and body armour to troops on the ground in Afghanistan has been beyond NATO leaders, they did find time at Riga to wrap up the contract for ALTBMD. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was the successful bidder for the contract worth 75 million Euros over a period of six years. Based in McLean, Virginia, in the United States, SAIC is comprised of the following companies: Raytheon (US), EADS Astrium (Europe), Thales (FR) Thales Raytheon System Company (FR/US); IABG (GE), TNO (NL), Qinetiq (UK), DATAMAT (IT); Diehl (GE).

4.8 At a press conference at NATO HQ in Brussels in May 2006, Marshall Billingslea, NATO assistant secretary general for defence investment, presented the results of a four-year study of the missile threat to Europe and how to defend against it. Although the report is classified, Mr. Billingslea said it found missile defence for Europe technically and financially feasible. Now, he said, it is up to NATO nations to decide what to do.

4.9 And how was that decision made? Behind closed doors in Riga with no prior independent scrutiny of the feasibility study or debate in the elected chambers of the 26 Member States. And who wrote this 10,000-page feasibility study funded by NATO (ie by European and US taxpayers)? SAIC—the same international consortium of industries that defined the threat and identified the most appropriate response, also "won" the contract to build the system.

4.10 The proposed ALTBMD system is meant to integrate with the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, which has so far cost $107 billion dollars since the mid-1980s (US GAO estimate) with very little working infrastructure to show for it. Common sense would, of course, suggest that if the US interceptor system could not reliably and consistently hit incoming warheads, it would not be deployed. Yet, as history has shown, big military programs are rarely cancelled once governments and the contractors are on board. Deployment of the GMD European capability is scheduled to be completed by 2013 at a cost of $4.04 billion (for the period from 2007 through 2013 and including operating and support costs).

4.11 Rather than indicating a transformation in thinking, it borders on the irresponsible for NATO to be squandering such large sums of money on this expensive "Maginot line in the sky" when there are higher priority defence and domestic programs that remain under-funded. Ballistic missile defences have a low relevance to contemporary security risks but conversely may well provoke long-term missile escalation with Russia and China, among others. BASIC recommends that:

(a) any proposed bilateral or multilateral missile defence agreements involving the UK should be made available for prior parliamentary scrutiny (ie before being signed); and

(b) the numerous UK and NATO ballistic missile threat assessments and industrial studies should be declassified and placed in the public domain.

AFTER RIGA: FOCUSING ON THREE NEW GOALS

5.1 The problems in Afghanistan, the insufficiency of the CPG, and the Alliance's rush to participate in an expanded missile defence program that is under-tested and overly-expensive, reveals that much still needs to be done in terms of the often cited "NATO transformation". In addition to carrying out a much-needed debate on how to stabilise Afghanistan, given the enormous changes that have taken place since the 1999 Strategic Concept was agreed, NATO should initiate a review process with the aim of agreeing a new Strategic Concept in 2009. Three goals should be fundamental to such a review:

1. Affirming collective defence, disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions as the primary purpose of NATO.

2. Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance (including, as interim goals, withdrawal of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage).

3. Improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement.

5.2 BASIC will be expanding on some of these themes as part of a review of NATO's Strategic Concept that we plan to undertake in 2008. What follows here is an initial analysis by the authors based on our experience of following NATO policy over a decade or more.

Goal 1: Affirming collective defence, disaster relief and reconstruction, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions as the primary purpose of NATO

5.3 In June this year, NATO carried out its first war games in Africa. Over a two-week period, more than 7,000 troops from Europe and North America backed by significant air, land and sea hardware pounded pretend terrorist bases, grappled with rioters and separated factions in a mock war over oil on the West African archipelago and former Portuguese colony of Cape Verde. Exercise "Steadfast Jaguar" was a crucial test for the new NATO Response Force (NRF), a 25,000-strong force able to be deployed within five to 30 days for missions ranging from "low intensity" humanitarian relief to frontline combat missions.

5.4 The exercise on Cape Verde confirmed the enthusiasm among some, but not all, member states for a NATO role in Africa and beyond. France, for example, was reluctant to support NATO's assistance to African peacekeepers in Sudan's Darfur region, preferring a role for the European Union. In a compromise, both organisations ran operations to airlift, train and provide logistics support to the peacekeepers, with France channelling its assistance through the EU.

5.5 But is NATO's increasingly global military reach really necessary? And if it is, in what circumstances should it be deployed? How might the US policy of pre-emptive intervention influence decisions to use the NRF? These questions must be openly debated within the Alliance if NATO is to develop a coherent strategic purpose with capabilities and goals that are sound, achievable and supported by domestic populations in the 26 Member States.

Collective defence

5.6 Rather than committing itself even further afield—in both geography and mission—NATO should return to its core strength of collective defence of NATO populations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This will mean foregoing, at least in the short to medium term, developing the idea of a "global NATO". Existing and new partnerships can still be developed outside of the core transatlantic membership track, but collective defence of the Alliance should remain its key focus. While the shape and nature of that collective defence will need to reflect the new security environment, it needs to be predicated on a fundamental redefinition of what constitutes security. Security should involve protection against all threats to human life, whether they emanate from terrorism, "rogue states", the spread of nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, energy or infrastructure insecurity, outbreaks of disease or instability arising from deep-rooted poverty and hunger.

5.7 This means that many of the most dangerous threats that the Alliance faces are not amenable to collective defence—or even extended notions of collective defence that have seen greater use in recent years with expeditionary forces in support of "peace enforcement" missions. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions.

5.8 Military force should also be the last of the tools used in the fight against terrorism. The tools of choice are better intelligence-gathering, efforts to limit the flow of funds and materials to terrorist groups and determined law-enforcement efforts aimed at improving on an already significant record of trying and convicting terrorist suspects in regular courts. The possible use of NATO air power or special forces to target specific terrorist training camps remains an option that should be used sparingly and in accordance with international law. The development of specialised NATO counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism forces, with clearly defined doctrines and rules of deployment and engagement, should be a priority. The comprehensive Action Plan on Terrorism agreed between Russia and NATO is a useful starting point, but a better transatlantic dialogue on these matters is essential. In Afghanistan, for example, some member states appear to looking at the problems through a counter-insurgency lens, while others see it as a capacity or nation-building issue.

5.9 Another key consideration, therefore, in a new strategic review of NATO's collective defence requirements is to fix the mismatch in resources that devotes far too much funding to traditional military missions at the expense of the more diverse set of tools needed to address current and future threats to security—as discussed in more detail below.

Disaster relief and reconstruction

5.10 Clearly, NATO's humanitarian support or disaster relief role is non-controversial: NATO helicopters have been used to deliver supplies to disaster zones and evacuate the injured; NATO command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities have been used to sustain humanitarian missions. While civilian agencies should ultimately take the lead in coordination of these activities, NATO can offer capabilities that other organizations simply are unable to offer. Moreover, these are critical security tasks that NATO has shown it can undertake with great professionalism and success. For example, the NRF was successfully mobilised in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's devastation of the US Gulf Coast and the massive earthquake in Pakistan in 2005.

5.11 However, questions remain as to how quickly the NRF can be mobilised in response to disasters in non-NATO (or Partner) countries and the extent to which it can be converted to an organisation with a larger civilian reserve component, with appropriate skills. If these problems can be resolved, NATO should consider turning the NRF into a premier disaster response force. The NRF would have a mission more focused on dealing with emergencies of either human or natural origin (or more likely a combination of both). Many more of these disasters are expected in the coming years as a consequence of environmental degradation and climate change, so the mission would strengthen NATO's purpose. NATO already has a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU). These should be expanded and more adequately resourced, with the NRF adapted to become the emergency response tool for the EADRU. Assigning the NRF this mission would have the added benefit of avoiding more controversial pre-emptive and offensive military missions.

5.12 Should this proposed new role in reconstruction be expanded even further, with NATO coordinating broader development assistance? For example, could NATO look to mirror the OSCE's comprehensive approach, which encompasses the politico-military, environmental and economic, as well as human, aspects of security? This idea deserves further consideration although it risks a further institutional and operational blurring of roles with both the EU and OSCE, especially since the latter agreed at its recent Madrid Summit to increase support to Afghanistan, and with the major civilian development agencies (governmental and non-governmental).

Conflict prevention

5.13 NATO could also take on a more decisive role in enhancing the effectiveness of international efforts to stabilise countries facing, and emerging from, violent conflict. Currently, there is no common vocabulary on conflict prevention and peacebuilding within the Alliance and different Member States' concepts and preoccupations create a divided institutional culture. Conflict prevention is commonly viewed as what happens before conflict turns violent (ie upstream) and peacebuilding is conceived as on the "far side" of violent conflict. But it is often unclear whether a violent conflict is genuinely over or whether it may re-erupt, as happens within five years in approximately 40% of cases. This overlap between post-war and inter-war periods means that peacebuilding is itself conflict prevention.

5.14 Seriously addressing conflict prevention and peacebuilding within NATO demands new and fresh thinking. The question is how to identify the conditions required to create stability and to identify what can be supported. What can NATO do to help create this stability? Stability entails more than dominating the security space. Experience in Afghanistan has led to an acknowledgement that the military is less part of the solution than was envisaged. In which case, how can NATO contribute to good governance, beyond security sector reform measures? For example, how might NATO be involved in longer term training work or in developing security "centres of excellence" in countries emerging from conflict?

5.15 Democratic, responsive and resilient states do not get built primarily by strengthening the capacity of government departments but in the relationship between state institutions and a strong civil society. NATO cannot make peace—as witnessed in Afghanistan and Kosovo—the people involved make peace between themselves. So what can be done from the outside to enable peace? Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this submission, but should be at the heart of an internal review of NATO's conflict prevention role.

5.16 NATO needs to avoid creating new mechanisms and committees—focusing instead on pushing for better implementation. Developing more effective impact assessment and evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives is crucial. This will be a gradual process but will mean a step change and realignment of resources. It envisages a shift towards early warning, early intervention and long range forecasting of potential problems. A more comprehensive strategic concept, should place conflict prevention (and new security challenges like climate change) at the front and centre.

Counter-proliferation and non-proliferation

5.17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as the widespread proliferation of conventional weapons, will remain a real threat to the transatlantic area and beyond. NATO has conducted exercises to deal with the CBRN threat and has overseen the destruction of thousands of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons in the Balkans. Given NATO's skills and concrete results, and the ongoing threats that these weapons are likely to pose, the Alliance should continually seek more opportunities for weapons collection, destruction and other coordination activities.

5.18 But the primary counter-proliferation and non-proliferation goal of Alliance policy in the current era should be preventing the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. The most urgent short-term goal of NATO policy should be to secure or eliminate nuclear bombs and bomb-making materials in Russia—where there are materials sufficient to build tens of thousands of nuclear weapons—and worldwide, where smaller quantities of bombs and bomb- making material might be seized by a terrorist group. To this end, NATO should revive its political role in negotiating drawdown in its own and Russia's nuclear stockpiles—see the further discussion about nuclear arms control below.

5.19 NATO's role in the Proliferation Security Initiative should also be reviewed to see whether a more focused and concerted response to maritime interdiction is possible. For example, how might NATO contribute to local, sub-regional and regional PSI operations in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman? And could NATO play a leading role in adapting the PSI to become the key policing mechanism for a new initiative towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons? This latter vision has been given greater weight by the January Wall Street Journal articles of, collectively, Shultz, Kissinger, Perry and Nunn, and then Mikhail Gorbachev. A NATO-led PSI might be able to provide effective policing of the zero option, both in terms of the crucial drawdown to minimum deterrent postures within the nuclear weapon states and in preventing breakout in a nuclear weapon-free world.

Peacekeeping

5.20 While the EU is looking to increase its peace operations capabilities, there will be plenty of work to go around. NATO still has the political clout to draw countries like the United States into peacekeeping and conflict prevention roles. Although riddled with problems and continuing challenges, NATO has held fast to its peacekeeping roles in Afghanistan (discussed above) and Kosovo. 16,000 troops remain in Kosovo and with negotiations over a settlement with Serbia further prolonged, they are likely to remain there for some time. In Darfur, NATO has retained a limited role by assisting with airlifts.

5.21 On the issue of future humanitarian intervention, NATO should develop objective standards based on the severity of the situation—an approach that would have dictated NATO involvement to stop the genocide in Rwanda, for example. These standards should set out the criteria under which NATO should be ready to apply non-consensual military intervention: the "Responsibility to Protect" pledge, endorsed at the 2005 World Summit and in April 2006 by the UN Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, demands nothing less.

5.22 In summary, BASIC recommends that NATO should focus on:

(a) collective defence of the transatlantic area with selective humanitarian/ disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter- and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions "out of area" where appropriately mandated and in accordance with international law. For the present, NATO does not need to become a global membership organisation, but as in Afghanistan (where 15 per cent of the troops are provided by non-NATO countries), the Alliance could facilitate and oversee "coalitions of the willing" in support of these missions;

(b) Reshaping the NRF for peacekeeping and disaster response capabilities, and developing limited counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence capabilities, with clear rules of deployment; and

Goal 2: Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from NATO and the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance

5.23 In June 2007, a meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group released a communiqué confirming:

that the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. We recalled that NATO's nuclear forces are maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability. In keeping with this goal, we continue to place great value on the nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO, which provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. We noted with appreciation the continuing contribution made by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces to deterrence and the overall security of the Allies, reaffirmed the value of this capability and welcomed the recent UK White Paper in which the UK restated its commitment to provide this contribution.

5.24 NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US "sub-strategic" or "tactical" nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these sub-strategic weapons are seen as symbolic of the transatlantic link between the United States and its European allies. Some may also regard them as a hedge against future uncertainties, although NATO retains overwhelming conventional supremacy. Expenditures by actual or potential adversaries like Al Qaeda, the Iraq insurgency, Iran or North Korea barely register compared with the combined NATO military budget. Iran, for example, spends less than 1% of what NATO spends for military purposes.

5.25 The NATO nuclear arsenal is thought to consist of between 350 and 480 US tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of six Member States: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The lower number was suggested by expert Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists in July 2007 and is based on circumstantial evidence that some nuclear weapons stored in Germany may have been removed. NATO does not publish details on the number of nuclear weapons remaining in Europe, despite the Member States' commitment to transparency in the 2000 NPT Final Document.

5.26 This combined NATO nuclear tactical arsenal is larger than China's nuclear stockpile. Up to 180 of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons are flagged for delivery by European pilots in wartime (although they remain under US control in peacetime). This raises questions as to whether basing these weapons in "non-nuclear" countries violates the NPT, which commits those countries " . . . not to receive the transfer . . . of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly . . .". Of course, preparation for their use (flight training etc) occurs during peacetime, so the argument that these weapons are only transferred in the event of war, when the NPT is technically no longer in effect, is disingenuous at best.

5.27 Tactical nuclear weapons are generally smaller and more easily transported than strategic nuclear weapons, making them a prime target for theft or diversion by terrorists. While this is unlikely to happen within NATO, the risk is of a much larger order of magnitude in Russia. But the continued presence of US nuclear weapons has, in part, also resulted in Russia declining to discuss its much larger tactical nuclear weapon holdings (thought to number several thousand, but there are no baseline figures for estimates) and dismantlement. Indeed, Russian Lieutenant-Colonel Leonid Ivashov recently argued that if tactical nuclear weapons were to be deployed in Belarus (in retaliation for US deployment of missile defences in Central Europe), it would not make that country a nuclear weapon state—"just as US weapons never made West Germany" (now Germany) a nuclear power (Vremya Novostei, 7 September 2007). Russian leaders have also expressed their concern that NATO tactical nuclear weapons are a strategic threat because the weapons could be used against Russian command and strategic nuclear centres.

5.28 The absence of any arms reduction treaties covering tactical nuclear warheads in the arsenals of both Russia and the United States is a bewildering dereliction of duty on the part of the political leadership of both countries and of NATO. The United States and NATO should seek to negotiate a treaty with Russia on the verifiable elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons and on warhead accounting.

5.29 Former US Senator Sam Nunn, one of the leaders behind the US Cooperative Threat Reduction Act that has helped to remove nuclear and other weapons materials from the former Soviet Union, told the Washington Post in August 2007 that joint action is needed between Russia and the United States to deal with tactical or short-range nuclear weapons left over from the Cold War. Even former NATO General James Jones told associates privately that he would prefer to have all US tactical nuclear weapons removed from Europe (New York Times, 9 February 2005). In 2003, NATO reduced the operational readiness level of its nuclear aircraft to several months. This suggests that the weapons could be stored in the United States and transported back to European bases in the event of a crisis.

5.30 The continued adherence to outmoded justifications for NATO nuclear doctrine prevents serious debate about how to address the proliferation threat that tactical nuclear weapons pose. A new NATO Strategic Concept should have as its primary goal a tactical nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in Europe, as a prelude to a full European NWFZ and an international treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. By including the specific goal of nuclear disarmament in Alliance strategic planning, would show the rest of the world that NATO is serious about the NPT and reduce the political capital associated with nuclear weapons. After all, if NATO, with its collective command of over 60% of global conventional military capacity, feels unacceptably vulnerable without a nuclear backup, what are countries like Iran, India and Pakistan likely to conclude?

5.31 In the fullest recent statement of Government policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the then Foreign Secretary, Margaret Becket, speaking in Washington, made it clear that the UK endorsed the appeal from Shultz/Kissinger/Perry /Nunn [see 5.19]. In particular, it believed that in combination with non-proliferation, the nuclear weapons states must take their nuclear disarmament responsibilities seriously, in order both to strengthen the arms control regime and to directly reduce risks. As part of this policy the Government is sponsoring an International Institute of Strategic Studies research project on the practicality of ultimately attaining a nuclear weapons free world. In pursuit of such policies the Government should consider the following proposals:

(b) NATO open negotiations with Russia to create an international treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons; and

(c) Two interim goals should be: withdrawal of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage.

Goal 3: Improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement

5.32 The lack of attention paid to the costs and the technical merit of the missile defence program discussed in section 4 is symbolic of a democratic deficit at the heart of the Alliance. Another example of failed transparency and accountability is the eight-year delay in NATO telling the Serbian government where thousands of cluster bombs were dropped during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. Only after pressure from foreign governments and human rights groups did NATO agree to hand over full coordinates for the hundreds of bombing sorties. With a failure rate of at least 5%, up to 20,000 unexploded sub-munitions may be strewn across Serbia and Kosovo, and at least six Serbs—including three children—have been killed by exploding cluster munitions since 1999, and twice this number wounded. Baroness Royall of Blaisdon described this delay as "rather shameful".

5.33 Throughout NATO's history, MPs in their national parliaments when asking questions about NATO decisions have invariably been told that such decisions are confidential. When the same questions were put to the Secretary General, he invariably replied that NATO was but an alliance of governments of 12 (1949)—26 (2007) sovereign states, each of which are responsible to their own parliaments. This Catch 22 situation may have served a purpose during the Cold War, but is no longer appropriate today. Adequate mechanisms for parliamentary accountability within NATO are urgently required.

5.34 NATO's system of collective decision-making might be properly accountable if members of parliament were kept fully informed of NATO decisions, and if they had financial control. Neither is currently the case. Similarly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has no formal influence or oversight over the decision-making in the Alliance. Defence decisions should certainly not be the exclusive preserve of the executive branch of government or powerful inter-governmental bureaucracies, such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the senior NATO body responsible for collaboration between Member States on equipment and research projects.

5.35 Refusal to disclose information (usually under the catch-all of "national security interests") has been exploited on numerous occasions in NATO Member States to hide inefficiencies, disguise mistakes, and to advance military procurement projects to a stage where they are beyond the point of cancellation, before parliamentary debate can take. Restricted decision-making also prevents consideration of alternatives and encourages "business as usual".

5.36 Neither the current Strategic Concept nor the CPG include sufficient references to the importance of transparency or accountability in decision-making. Yet paragraph 15 of the CPG stipulates that "increased investment in key capabilities will require nations to consider reprioritisation, and the more effective use of resources, including through pooling and other forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. NATO's defence planning should support these activities". As part of a new Strategic Concept, NATO should include a stronger commitment to transparency and accountability; to better inform the people it is supposed to protect and to arm their elected representatives with the knowledge they need to make effective decisions about "prioritisation" of defence resources at both the national and NATO levels.

5.37 Around 1998, NATO began a major overhaul on is policy on the handling of shared information, but it wasn't until 2002 that the Alliance first disclosed its clearance rules and only in 2005 that BASIC was able to obtain a copy of NATO's public disclosure guidelines drawn up in 1995. These may have changed over the ensuing years, but it is difficult to say, since we have no right to see the document that contains the current clearance standards.

5.38 Citizens (and parliamentarians) in NATO Member States are bound by secrecy rules that were drafted in a very different era—when the public had different expectations about participation in defence and foreign policy, when few of its Member States had adopted a national right-to-information law, and when the threat posed to the Western alliance was more profound and immediate. All of these circumstances have changed, but the regime that governs the handling of shared information remains unchanged in important respects. Legislators and citizens are effectively being denied the right to participate in the formulation of policies that have a profound effect on their liberties and security. BASIC recommends that NATO's secrecy rules should be reviewed as part of the larger review of the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

5.39 Another principle that NATO should follow is "value for money". This may be self-evident, but an Alliance that has interests everywhere and tries to do everything will find itself going in the opposite direction of economies of scale; trying to do more and more with an ever dwindling pool of resources. A major thrust of a new Strategic Concept must therefore address the stark misallocation of resources, which is closely tied to the persistence of cold war strategies and weapons systems that have little relevance to today's security environment.

5.40 Realizing value for money may become easier once the above recommendations of transparency and accountability are pursued, along with a sharper focus on military priorities. Value for money will also mean more sharing, especially with partners outside the Alliance. As in the case of missile defence, the United States, with the help of the NATO-Russia Council, should more seriously consider offers for sharing radar information and pool resources in instances where there are mutual security concerns.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Anti-communism was the foundation of the Cold War and the rationale for NATO and Britain's commitment to the Alliance. In the post-Cold War environment NATO has expanded its ambit and developed a body of standards, structures, knowledge and protocols for complex multinational military coalitions that is unrivalled in history. But the Alliance continues to operate within a strategic concept that is stuck in the last century, and has so far failed to articulate a truly convincing rationale and coherent strategy for this century.

6.2 Close cooperation with the United States and one of the consistently largest defence budgets in Europe has reinforced the feeling (in Whitehall at least) that Britain is number two in the Alliance. Britain should use this status to set out a new blueprint for NATO. Support for major shifts in NATO policy, along the lines set out in this submission, could be expected from other Member States, including Belgium, Holland, Germany, Greece and the Central European and Scandinavian countries. The German Chancellor, Dr. Angela Merkel, for example, is one of a growing number of political leaders that is calling for a review of NATO's Strategic Concept in 2008 or 2009 (ten years after it was elaborated at the Washington Summit in 1999). Even in the United States, public opinion has already been affected by the failures in Iraq, and there is growing momentum for greater use of "soft power" (see, for example, recent speeches by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and presidential candidate Barack Obama).

6.3 BASIC has been working on a range of NATO-related transformation issues in recent years, including: the NATO Response Force; operations in Afghanistan; Ballistic Missile Defense; nuclear policy; the Prague Capabilities Commitments and capability improvement; the Alliance's political development, and especially transparency and accountability issues; and the Global Partnership and future priorities. Based on this experience we have identified the following priorities for NATO's reform agenda in the years ahead.

6.4 In Afghanistan a monumental effort is necessary on the part of the international community to better coordinate military and civilian instruments (especially crisis management, reconstruction and development), reduce civilian casualties and demonstrate the political will to sustain a long-term commitment to the country [Para 2.11].

6.5 The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) agreed at the Riga Summit is little more than a stopgap for a new Strategic Concept that should be debated and agreed by 2009 [Para 3.5].

6.6 Given the enormous changes that have taken place since the 1999 Strategic Concept was agreed, NATO should initiate a review process with the aim of agreeing a new Strategic Concept in 2009. Three goals should be fundamental to such a review:

1. affirming collective defence, disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions as the primary purpose of NATO;

3. improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement. [Para 5.1]

6.7 (Goal 1) in summary, BASIC recommends that NATO should focus on:

(b) reshaping the NRF for peacekeeping and disaster response capabilities, and developing limited counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence capabilities, with clear rules of deployment; and

(c) strengthening its cooperative threat reduction, weapons collection and destruction, and counter-proliferation capabilities, with a special emphasis on maritime interdiction under the Proliferation Security Initiative. [Para 5.22]

6.8 (Goal 2) in pursuit of a new initiative towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons the Government should consider the following proposals:

(b) NATO open negotiations with Russia to create an international treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons; and

(c) two interim goals should be: withdrawal of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage. [Para 5.31]

6.9 (Goal 3): BASIC recommends that NATO's secrecy rules should be reviewed as part of the larger review of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. [Para 5.38]

6.10 Finally, going ahead with the US BMD proposal in Central Europe regardless of Russian opinion would be a huge mistake. More substantive US, Russian and NATO dialogue, within the NATO-Russia Council on BMD and other mutual security concerns is necessary to avoid further divisions in Europe. BASIC recommends that:

(a) any proposed bilateral or multilateral missile defence agreements involving the UK should be made available for prior parliamentary scrutiny (ie before being signed); and

(b) the numerous UK and NATO ballistic missile threat assessments and industrial studies should be declassified and placed in the public domain. [Para 4.11]

3 December 2007