Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-121)
DR DANA
ALLIN, PROFESSOR
MICHAEL COX,
DR JONATHAN
EYAL, DR
ROBIN NIBLETT
AND DR
MARK WEBBER
9 OCTOBER 2007
Q120 Willie Rennie: I take it you
would not agree on binding defence expenditure?
Dr Webber: There are no formal
targets. The two per cent GDP limit is an informal one. There
is no binding limit and attempts to use guidelines within NATO
generally have failed throughout the Cold War and the post-Cold
War period and they only generate resentment. With an alliance
of 26 Member States with hugely divergent economies, histories
and military capabilities, you cannot impose matters of that sort
and you must allow allies within NATO, if they share membership
with the EU, to contribute to defence and security in more creative
ways than assuming that what matters is that headline spend in
a defence budget as narrowly understood.
Dr Eyal: Just a codicil on this,
if I may. Of course one can bandy a great amount of the spending
and claim that it is part of security, but I am mainly talking
here about the hardware which does have an impact on NATO. NATO
as it currently is can continue functioning, as Robin has suggested,
but it is increasingly going to be hampered by these distinctions.
I can supply the Committee with a very simple graph which I do
not have with me now about not merely the disparities in current
spending but the disparities in defence research to which Robin
referred. It is a riddle within a riddle. If you look at European
defence research expenditure, which of course is dwarfed by the
Americans, within that research budget about 80 per cent is dominated
by spending by Britain and France. The rest is almost no activity
at all. The result of it is not simply that we have less equipment
but very often that our equipment becomes incompatible and not
interoperable with that of the Americans. Even if we talk about
coalitions of the willing, it becomes very difficult with a few
exceptions to talk about countries which could be strapped on
to even an American led operation, because very often they simply
are incapable of digesting or deploying the kind of technology
which the Americans have. It is not merely volume; it is also
how it is spent.
Dr Allin: In one sense the disparities
are so great that one wonders what European countries can practically
get with marginal increases in defence spending. It is not going
to impress the Americans enough to solve this resentment but on
the other hand—this is a point that goes outside of NATO—but
it is not as though the European contribution to various joint
endeavours or purposes is a token one. A few years ago, before
we got sucked into Iraq, one could talk about the United States
being able to do almost anything it wanted to on its own and European
contributions were sort of symbolic. That is clearly not the case.
What would the United States have done if the European forces
were not able and ready to go into Lebanon the summer before last?
That was a very serious crisis. The United States was not in a
position to do that. What would we do? As much as there are valid,
legitimate complaints about Europe's performance and caveats in
certain European countries in Afghanistan, what would the United
States do without them? The idea that the United States can get
disgusted and walk away from this is not exactly the case.
Q121 Willie Rennie: What do you think
the chances are of binding targets?
Professor Cox: I think that question
has already been answered. I do not think there is any chance
at all.
Dr Eyal: Just as high as the stability
pact in the euro. If countries committed themselves to the stability
pact in the euro, it is about as high as that, probably less.
Professor Cox: For those of us
who go back long enough, there were huge debates in the 1970s
about burden sharing. As far as I can remember, they did not go
anywhere. This is not a new discussion and NATO still managed
to survive the end of the Cold War. It still managed to survive
and endure the 1990s. To go back to your original question, I
still think it will endure this. Without sounding conspiratorial,
I just wonder if there is not a little bit of a verbal game being
played here on this issue because ultimately, if the United States
is the one putting most money into this Alliance and most lives
on the line into this Alliance when it comes to it, does that
not also give it legitimate leadership of this Alliance? I just
wonder if there is not also a little bit of verbal posturing on
this issue.
Chairman: I think we have covered a huge
amount of ground. To our witnesses, I will say thank you very
much indeed. It was absolutely fascinating. I know you had a great
deal more that you would have said but one consolation is that
we had a great many more questions we could have asked as well,
so thank you very much indeed.
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